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Chapter 20:
Great Britain Makes war on the Netherlands.
1780-1781.
the successor of Lord Weymouth was Lord Stor-
mont, the late British ambassador at
Paris.
He had an unbounded confidence in the spirit and resources of his country; but this confidence took the worst forms of haughty blindness to moral distinctions in dealing with foreign powers.
To the complaints of the
Dutch respecting the outrage on their flag, he answered by interpreting treaties directly contrary to their plain meaning, and then by saying: ‘We are determined to persist in the line of conduct we have taken, be the consequences what they may.’
1
The British ministry sent the case of the
Dutch merchant vessels that had been carried into
Portsmouth to the court of admiralty; and
Sir James Mariott, the judge, thus laid down the law: ‘It imports little whether the blockade be made across the narrows at
Dover, or off the harbor at
Brest or
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L'Orient.
If you are taken, you are blocked.
Great
Britain, by her insular position, blocks naturally all the ports of
Spain and
France.
She has a right to avail herself of this position as a gift of
Providence.’
2 Influenced by the preponderating members of the republic, the stadholder addressed a representation to the empress of
Russia for concert in the defence of neutral flags.
Before it had been received at
Petersburg, Prince Galitzin, the
Russian envoy at
the Hague, on the third of April invited the states-gen-
eral to a union for the protection of neutral trade and navigation.
‘The same invitation,’ said the envoy, ‘has been made to the courts of
Copenhagen,
Stockholm, and
Lisbon, in order that by the joint endeavors of all neutral maritime powers a natural system, founded on justice, may be established as a rule for future ages.’
The states-general desired to join in the defensive association, but the stadholder, under English influence, contrived to make delay.
England acted promptly.
On the seventeenth, an
order of the sing in council suspended all treaties between the two countries, and threw back the Netherlands upon their rights under the law of nations.
In consequence of this order in council,
Dutch ships were taken into English ports and condemned by the admiralty, on the principle that French harbors being naturally blockaded by those of
England Dutch ships had no right to sail near them.
Of the belligerents the honor of making the first answer to the
Russian declaration was conceded to
Spain; and
Florida Blanca on the eighteenth of April
adopted the measure so heartily that in the autobiographic
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report which he made of his administration
to his king he relates: ‘The honor of this successful project has been ascribed to
Russia, which in fact lent to it support; but it had its origin in the cabinet of your Majesty.’
A week later,
France, like
Spain, acceded to the declaration of
Russia.
‘The war in which the king is engaged has no other object than the liberty of the seas.
The king believed he had prepared an epoch glorious for his reign, in fixing by his example the rights of neutrals.
His hopes have not been deceived.’
On the fifth of October, the
United States of
America in congress, by a resolution which
Robert R. Livingston had drafted, proclaimed the principles of the empress of
Russia, and afterwards included them in their treaties with the Netherlands, with
Sweden, and with
Prussia.
By the other belligerent of that day, the armed neutrality was considered fatal to its sovereignty over the ocean.
The king was ready to having the question to an issue.
His ministry were of the opinion, that to tolerate the armed neutrality was to confess that British supremacy on the high seas was broken.
A half-official rumor was set afloat that
England would declare war on the Netherlands if they should accept the invitation of
Russia; and the cabinet established two points, from neither of which they would depart,——the one to attack any
Netherlands convoy; the other to prevent the association of the Netherlands with
Russia at all hazards.
3
Even Lord Shelburne, the chief of the opposition in
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the upper house, condemned the
Russian manifesto
as an attempt by a ‘nation scarcely known to have existence as a maritime power thirty years ago, to dictate laws of navigation to
Great Britain.’
And Lord Camden condemned the declaration of the empress as a dangerous and arbitrary edict, subversive of the first principle of the law of nations.
Yet the answer of the
British government to the declaration of the empress of
Russia avoided expressing any opinion on the rules which she had laid down.
‘An ambiguous and trimming answer was given:’ such is the severe judgment of
Harris.
‘We seemed equally afraid to accept or dismiss the new-fangled doctrines of
Russia.
I was instructed secretly to oppose, but avowedly to acquiesce in them.’
The neutral powers on the continent, one after the other, joined in accepting the code of Catharine.
Bernstorff, though very reluctant to do anything not acceptable to the English court, with which he was then conducting a private negotiation on contraband, on the eighth of July announced the adhesion of
Denmark to the
Russian principles, and on the next day confirmed the declaration by a treaty with
Russia.
On the twenty-first of July, Gustavus set forth to the
belligerents that the principles of
Russia were his own, and
Sweden acceded to the treaty between
Denmark and
Russia, and
Denmark to that between
Russia and
Sweden.
The three powers agreed to support each other against all and every attack by reprisals and other means.
Each power was to fit out a fleet, and the several commanders were ordered to protect every mercantile ship of the three nations
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against injury.
When in autumn it came to
light that
Bernstorff in a separate treaty with
Great Britain had compromised the rule on contraband, the minister was for the time dismissed from office.
4 It may here be added that on the seventh of May, 1781,
Frederic of
Prussia, acceded to the armed neutrality, and obtained its protection for the commerce of his people.
Five months later, Joseph the Second overcame his ill-humored demurs, and, by yielding by treaty to the empress, gained advantages for the commerce of
Belgium.
The accession of
Portugal took place in July, 1782; that of
Naples in February
of the following year; that of the
Ottoman Porte in September, 1782, by its treaty with
Spain, confirmed in June, 1783, by its treaty with
Russia.
Every considerable power on the continent of
Europe, from Archangel to
Constantinople, accepted the rules of navigation which the empress of
Russia had promulgated; yet
Great Britain, which had met
them without a protest or a denial, was unrelentingly resolved to prevent the accession of the Netherlands to the association through their stadholder or by war.
Even if the
British had reason for suspending all treaties with the Netherlands, the republic remained an independent state, and had all the rights of an unprivileged neutral; yet
Stormont showed it no more respect than might have been done to a vassal.
‘The best way,’ wrote he to
Yorke, ‘to bring the
Dutch around to their senses is to wound them in their most feeling part, their carrying trade.
The
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success of our cruisers has hitherto fallen much short
of expectation.’
So on the thirtieth of May, in a time of uninterrupted peace,
Yorke was instructed to collect the best intelligence on the voyages of the
Dutch merchants, that the British cruisers might know where to go for the richest prizes.
5
The condition of the Netherlands was truly difficult to be borne; their honor was trifled with; their
commerce pillaged; they were weak and without promise of help from any side; their stadholder did not support them.
The arrival of each English mail was waited for to learn by what new measures the
British cabinet would abuse their power, and how many more
Dutch ships had been seized.
The republic had no part to choose but submission to
Great Britain or an association with
Russia.
The draft of the convention which the empress had directed to be offered to
Sweden,
Denmark, and the Netherlands, arrived in June.
The grand pensionary and the country wished to accede to the confederacy of the
North.
But the stadholder, who in May, acting in the interests of
England, refused to take a step till the conduct of all the other neutral powers should be thoroughly understood, in June would not listen to
any treaty with
Russia unless the possessions of the republic in both
Indies should be guaranteed.
‘A better idea,’ wrote
Yorke, ‘could not be started to overset the whole.’
6
Yet
Stormont, who on this subject guided the cabinet of
England, wrote to the
British ambassador at
the Hague: ‘If the states-general proceed, they
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throw the die and leave us no alternative;’
7 and he
made the same unequivocal declaration to Welderen, the
Dutch representative at
London.
A war by
England against the Netherlands might prove fatal to the
House of Orange. ‘I am as much attached to that family as a man can be,’ wrote
Stormont; but he would not let any sentiments of veneration and attachment bias his opinion or retard extreme measures.
8
The commissioners for the Netherlands found in
Panin a statesman who regarded the independence of
America as a result very advantageous for all nations and especially for
Russia, and who did not doubt that
England would be forced to recognise it.
9 He could not grant the wished — for guarantee of the
Dutch possessions in
America, at the
Cape of Good Hope, and in
India; but in the course of September he drafted the
convention which he held to be the only possible one between
Russia and the republic.
10 The draft did not include a general guarantee; but, if the republic should be attacked on account of the convention, the other powers were to take her part.
A separate article declared the object of the armed neutrality to be the restoration of peace.
At the same time couriers were despatched to the courts of
Stockholm and
Copenhagen; so that against the return of a favorable answer from
the Hague all things might be prepared for receiving the
Dutch republic into the league of neutral powers.
Every step of this negotiation was watched by
England, with the determination, if it should succeed,
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to declare war against the Netherlands, even though
it might prove fatal to the
House of Orange.
Yet the ministry, who were all the time seeking an alliance with
Russia, disliked the appearance of going to war with the republic solely for her intention of
joining the armed neutrality.
In October,
Henry Laurens, whom the
United States had accredited to the Netherlands for the purpose of raising a loan, was taken on his passage to
Europe, and among his papers was found the unauthorized project for a treaty, concerted as we have seen between
Neufville and
William Lee. To Lord Stormont the ‘transaction appeared to be the act of individuals,’
11 and the
Earl of
Hillsborough owned ‘that the states-general had had no knowledge of the treaty, which had never been signed except by private persons.’
12 But the resolution was instantly taken to use the Laurens papers so as to ‘give the properest direction to the war.’
13 After an examination at the admiralty before the three
secretaries of state,
Laurens was escorted through the streets of
London by a large guard, and confined as a state's prisoner in the tower, where he was debarred from all intercourse, and from the use of pen and paper, so as to produce upon the public mind a strange and startling sensation.
When the courier from
Petersburg arrived at
the Hague with the treaty that
Panin had drafted,
Stormont saw there was no time to be lost.
‘If the states should relinquish the demand of a general
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guarantee,’ thus on the eleventh of October he in-
Chap. XX.} 1780. Oct. 31. |
structed
Yorke, ‘and accede to the neutral convention, such an event would leave us no alternative.’
14 On the last day of October,
Yorke announced that the states-general, at their meeting in the first week of November, would disavow the transaction between Am-
sterdam and
America, but would decide to join the northern league.
‘I am afraid,’ he said, ‘we must proceed alone, and advise an immediate declaration.’
15
On the third of November, this despatch was laid before the king.
On that very same day, the states of
Holland, after full deliberation, condemned the conduct of
Amsterdam for the acts which
Great Britain resented, and resolved to give to the
British government every reasonable satisfaction, so as to leave not the slightest ground for just complaint.
Even
Yorke, who saw everything with the eyes of an Englishman, thought their conduct rather fair.
16 Yet
Stormont would brook no delay; and the
British cabinet anticipating the peaceful intentions of the states of
Holland and the states-general, with the approval of the king, on the same day came to a determination to make war upon the republic, unless it should recede from its purpose of joining the northern confederacy.
17 In the very hours in which this decision was taken,
Yorke was writing that a war with the republic would be a war with a government without artillery, ‘in want of stores of all kinds, without fleet or army, or any one possession in a state of defence.’
18
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The memorial to the states-general was drafted by
Lord Stormont himself, and was designed to conceal the real motives of
Great Britain under a cloud of obloquy relating to
Amsterdam, and by demands impossible to be complied with.
The memorial was not to be presented if the ambassador had certain information that the majority of the provinces would refuse to join the maritime league of the
North.
‘We do not wish,’ wrote
Stormont, ‘to give a deep wound to our old and natural allies.
Our object is to cure their madness by stunning them into their senses.’
19
On the sixth,
Yorke represented to the stadholder the opportunity of the republic for repentance and amendment.
The prince, shrugging his shoulders, answered: ‘I foresee consequences which may be fatal to my house and the republic.’
Yorke replied that the stadholder might do a secondary and passive kind of service by starting difficulties and delays to hamper the conclusion of the fresh instructions to the ministers at
Petersburg.
The stadholder answered: ‘
England cannot impute a wish for war to those who are for concluding a neutral alliance with
Russia, nor blame a vote of convoy from which masts and shiptimber are excluded.’
Yorke urged that the alliance with the
North was pushed by men of warlike views.
The stadholder answered: ‘The regents in general have not that view.’
Yorke turned the conversation to the negotiation with
America.
The stadholder answered: ‘I have reason to believe
Holland will, as it ought to do, disavow and disapprove that transaction.’
‘And give satisfaction too?’
asked
Yorke.
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The prince answered: ‘I hope they will communi-
cate their disavowal to
England.’
But he did not deny that the plurality of the provinces was in favor of the connection with
Russia on the terms which that empire had proposed.
20
Just after this interview,
Yorke received from
Stormont an inquiry as to where blows could be struck at the republic with the most profit, and on the seventh of November
Yorke replied: ‘This
country is by no means prepared for war. It is the fashion still to suppose a war against
England impossible.
The executive part of the government has been averse to it all along.
As to the
Dutch settlements in the
East and
West Indies, their own avowal proves them in a deplorable state; but St. Eustatius, above all St. Eustatius, is the golden mine of the moment.’
21 This letter of
Yorke was received by
Stormont on the twelfth; and the passage relating to
St. Eustatius was secretly sent forthwith to the
British admiralty for its guidance.
Already on the tenth
Yorke had presented to
the states-
general Lord Stormont's memorial.
‘The king insists,’ so ran its words, ‘on the exemplary punishment of the
Pensionary van Berckel and his accomplices, as disturbers of the public peace, and violators of the rights of nations.
His Majesty flatters himself that the answer of your High Mightinesses will be speedy, and to the purpose in every respect.’
‘To pass over in silence so just a request will be deemed a denial, and his Majesty will think himself obliged to take such steps as become his dignity.’
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Three days after the delivery of the memorial,
Yorke caused it to be printed.
It seemed to the patriots singular for the
English to demand the punishment of
Van Berckel, when they themselves did not even bring
Laurens to trial.
People in the towns under English influence said: ‘
Van Berckel and accomplices deserve to be “ de-Witted.”
’
22 ‘If a small mob,’ wrote
Yorke from
the Hague, ‘receive the deputies of
Amsterdam when they next come here, the affair will be soon decided.
But how promise for work with the tools I have.’
23
‘The die is thrown,’ wrote
Stormont to
Yorke on the fourteenth, as he asked him for the best informa-
tion respecting all the vulnerable parts of the republic.
24 At that time there still reigned among the
Dutch confidence in peace.
On the twenty-third,
the states of
Holland, acting on a communication from the stadholder, entirely disavowed and disapproved all and whatever had been done by or on the part of the burgomasters and regents of the town of
Amsterdam respecting negotiations with congress.
25 The disavowal of
Van Berckel was, in itself, a very severe punishment.
Before further proceeding, inquiry needed to be made as to the nature of his offence and the tribunal before which he could be brought to trial.
The states-general confirmed the disavowal made by the states of
Holland, and further declared their wish to preserve a good understanding with
England.
Every post brought to the court of London concurrent proofs that the cities, the people,
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every branch of the government, all the ministers,
desired to continue at peace.
Even the stadholder, the great partisan of
England, thought that the
Dutch government had done enough to remove from themselves every suspicion.
Yet on the first of December
Stormont demanded
the exemplary and immediate punishment of the Amsterdam offenders; and on the fifth he asked of
Yorke some ideas for a manifesto, for he was preparing ‘to send secret orders to seize the
Dutch settlements in the
West Indies.’
26 Then, on the sixteenth,
before he even knew that his second memorial had been presented, having been informed that, on the afternoon of the eleventh, the states-general had resolved to make the declaration of the armed neutrality without delay, he sent orders to
Yorke ‘as soon as may be to quit
Holland without taking leave.’
27
While
Yorke was still negotiating at
the Hague, British cruisers pounced upon the unsuspecting merchantmen of their ally of a hundred and six years, and captured two hundred ships of the republic, carrying cargoes worth fifteen millions of guilders.
Four days at least before he left
the Hague, a swift cutter was sent to
Rodney at
Barbadoes with orders, founded upon the ambassador's letter of the seventh of November, to seize St. Eustatius.
Suddenly, on the third of February, 1781, the
British West India fleet and army, after a feint on the coasts of
Martinique, appeared off the island and demanded of de Graat, the governor, its surrender
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within an hour.
‘The surprise and astonishment of
the inhabitants was scarcely to be conceived.’
Unable to offer resistance, ignorant of a rupture between
Great Britain and the republic, the governor surrendered his post and its dependencies, invoking clemency for the town.
The wealth of the island, which was a free port for all nations, astonished even those who had expected most, ‘the whole of it being one continued store of French, American,
Dutch,’ and also
English ‘property.’
In the words of
Rodney: ‘All the magazines, the storehouses, are filled, and even the beach covered with tobacco and sugar.’
The value of the merchandise, at a moderate estimate, considerably exceeded three millions of pounds sterling.
Besides this, there were taken in the bay upwards of one hundred and fifty merchant vessels, a Dutch frigate, and five smaller vessels of war, all complete and ready for service.
Thirty richly freighted
Dutch ships, which had left the island about thirty-six hours before, were overtaken by a detachment from
Rodney's fleet, and captured with the
Dutch ship of sixty guns which was their convoy.
The
Dutch flag was kept flying on the island, and decoyed no less than seventeen ships into the port after its capture.
Three large ships from
Amsterdam, laden with all kinds of naval stores, were taken and carried into
St. Christopher.
At St. Eustatius, in the order of sale, English stores were, for form's sake, excepted; but all property was seized, and the confiscation was general without discrimination between friend and foe, between neutral powers and belligerents, between
Dutch and
British.
A remonstrance from British merchants, written by the king's solicitor-general
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in
St. Christopher,
Rodney scorned to read, and
answered: ‘The island of St. Eustatius is
Dutch; everything in it is
Dutch; everything is under the protection of the
Dutch flag, and as
Dutch it shall be treated.’
Besides St. Eustatius, all the settlements of the republic in
South America were taken during the season.
The undefended
Cape of Good Hope, the half-way house on the voyage to
India; the feebly garrisoned Negapatam; and the unique harbor of
Trincomalee on Ceylon,—were all of them most desirable objects for
Great Britain.
The
Dutch republic was relatively weak; yet, if her finances were impaired, it was by debts contracted during her alliance with
England and in rendering service to that power.
England lost, for the time, its remaining influence on the continent of
Europe by this cruel and unjust war. No nation remained with which it had any connection on the score of principle; not one to which it was drawn by regard for the higher interests of humanity.
