A war of artillery.
--The advantage gained by the enemy at
Port Royal is one which, to a chivalric adversary, would afford little ground of exultation.
His tremendous odds in artillery, four hundred guns to thirteen, made the result inevitable.
It was a victory which reflected no glory on the successful, and no disgrace on the vanquished.
But whilst it has been attended thus far with no practical advantage to the enemy, it ought to admonish us of the necessity of proper preparation for the war of artillery which
Gen. McClellan relies upon as the only means of meeting the
South both by land and sea. We have no fear of his artillery in a field battle, for every such action in which we have been engaged attests beyond dispute the superior capacity and aptitude of Southern artillerists.
But the naval batteries of the Federalists have been handled both at
Hatteras and
Port Royal with the proverbial accuracy and skill of that branch of the service, and should warn us to make effectual preparations for visitation at every point upon our coasts and rivers where we may expect an attack from ships.
We confess ourselves surprised at the indifferent results which have hitherto followed the engagements of land batteries and ships.
We had been led to suppose, from the experience of the last war with
England, of the great
European war half a century ago, and from the more recent conflicts of ships and batteries in the
Russian war, that land batteries, properly constructed, were more than a match for ships.
In at least seventy-five out of every hundred engagements of the last century, the conflicts between shore and naval batteries have resulted in the success of the former.
In the
Russian war, a small land battery of four guns, with furnaces for heating shot, silenced a British steam frigate.
It is demonstrable that batteries can be so constructed as to be invulnerable by ships of-war, and they can be so sheltered by bomb proofs as to render the men secure from the shells of an enemy.
We understand that the
Federals are constructing mortar batteries opposite our works on the
Potomac, and we should like to be assured that our men are sheltered from the storm which will be rained upon them by a combined shelling from the
Lincoln fleet and the batteries on the
Maryland shore.
Recent events convince us that land batteries are not impregnable, that we must make them bomb-proof, and pay more attention to our gunnery.
It is only in conflicts, where the enemy is able to choose and keep his own distance, that we have any reason to apprehend mischief.
Whenever our men can get at him, we have nothing to fear.
Hence, the only advantage of his naval successes is to make a lodgment on the coast, from which he can make flying excursions, annoying and irritating us, but making no impression beneath the surface.
Two months have elapsed since the expedition to
Hatteras, but, notwithstanding the internal water communications to vulnerable points of
North Carolina, he is still high and dry upon the sand bank, and has made no more impression upon the old
North State than a fly upon the back of an elephant.
