The battle in Arkansas.
From the Memphis Appeal, of the 29th ult., we take the following interesting particulars of the late battle in Arkansas. It will be seen that our army has nothing to blush for in the recent engagement in that States with the Yankees, notwithstanding they outnumbered us, as usual, two to one: We had an interview yesterday with an officer direct from our army in the West, and from him obtained the following interesting details of the battle at Sugar Creek, or Elkhorn. Gen. Price had remained at Springfield until the enemy were in six miles of the town, when he put his army in motion toward the Arkansas line. There was more or less skirmishing between his rear guard and the enemy's advance until he crossed into Arkansas and effected a junction with Van-Dorn and McCulloch. In all these skirmishes, our informant says the Missouri sharp shooters invariably got the best of their pursuers.--Price's object was to draw them down into Arkansas, since Van-Dorn had not joined him at Springfield. The Confederates rested a few days at Cove creek, in Washington county, Arkansas, some thirty miles below the line. At length Gen. Van-Dorn having got ready, he determined to go in search of the enemy, and to make the attack himself. The troops were ordered to cook five day's provisions, and move upon the enemy, who had stopped at Sugar creek. At Sentonville, on their way up, they encountered the Federal rear guard, and had quite a brisk skirmish, in which we lost one man and the enemy eight or ten. We also took one piece of artillery there. The Confederates marched all that day and night without food or sleep, and came up with the enemy in the Sugar creek hills at half past 10 o'clock A. M., when the action at once became general. The enemy was completely surrounded, General Price attacking them on the north and Gen. McCulloch on the west. It is now generally believed that we made a mistake in surrounding the enemy and cutting off every avenue of escape. It is thought that if we had attacked them from one side only, as it is understood Gen. Price proposed, we should have driven them out and taken everything they had ere the sun went down. As it was, we drove them for two miles from all their strong positions, and held their encampment during the night, with the greater part of their commissary stores, on which our half famished men fed. Many of our troops who were supposed to be captured by the enemy have come in, and our whole loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, will not exceed six hundred, viz: one hundred and twenty-five killed, two hundred and seventy-five wounded, and two hundred prisoners. The enemy's loss was far greater — probably five to our one. A Federal Colonel who was taken on the evening of the first day, says their loss up to that time was terrific — probably twelve hundred to fifteen hundred--and the next morning they lost many more, among whom were several officers. Such prisoners as have escaped from them, say that there was no exultation among them, so heavy had their losses been. The Confederates took two hundred and twenty-five prisoners. On the morning of the 8th, the enemy, having taken a strong position during the night, re- opened the fight. The action soon became general, and continued until about half past 9 o'clock, by which time Gen. Van-Dorn had completed his arrangements to withdraw his forces. The reasons for our withdrawal were, first, that a number of the Southern regiments, after the fall of McCulloch and McIntosh, became demoralized, and could not be relied upon. Secondly, some 200 Federal troops, (Germans,) while fleeing from the field, came upon our ammunition wagons, and the teamsters, supposing they intended an attack, put whip to their horses, and fled as rapidly as possible. This left several of our batteries without a single round. These unfortunate occurrences rendered it necessary for the Confederates to retire, and that at a time when victory had actually perched upon their banners. With the exception of a portion of the regiments thrown into confusion by the untimely fall of McCulloch and McIntosh, the retreat was conducted in the utmost good order — so good, indeed, that many did not know but that they were making a flank movement on the enemy until late in the afternoon.--Several of our batteries were in great danger, having to be brought off through the woods and over hills. The enemy did not pursue, except a few squads of cavalry who followed up some of our baggage trains. We brought off four more pieces of cannon than we went on the field with having lost only two pieces, which were disabled and spiked. Several of the enemy's batteries were taken, but they could not be brought off. They were dismounted and the wheels taken off, dry brush and leaves were piled on them, and they were burnt by our troops. Our list of killed and wounded is still imperfect. Col. Rives, of the Missouri Confederates, and Capt. Churchill Clark, of the Artillery, whose loss has not heretofore been mentioned, were killed. Many other officers were killed or wounded. Gen. Van-Dorn paid a high compliment to Price's army.--Many of their charges would have done credit to Napoleon's old guard. The troops in McCulloch's division, up to the time of his and McIntosh's fall, fought with the most determined gallantry and covered themselves with glory. We left the field on the second day, for the reasons given above; and yet the result of the battle was as good as a victory to the Confederates. They have so crippled the enemy, that they will be unable to attack us until they get reinforcements. Price and Van-Dorn, however, can march where they please, and without molestation. At last accounts they were recruiting, and getting ready for another forward movement in a direction but little suspected by the enemy. With the exception of Stanwatie's regiment our Indian allies did not take much part in the fight. This regiment took a battery, having approached it behind trees, and behaved with much courage and gallantry. Owing to the early fall of McCulloch and McIntosh some six or seven of our regiments were never brought into action. The enemy's forces were at least double ours.
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