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Further from the North.

We continue our extracts from Northern papers of the 17th inst.:

Captured Confederate letters — Beauregard's plans for the Western Campaign.

The following letters were captured some time ago by Gen. Buell while in process of transmission for file to Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Confederate army:

General Beauregard to Adjutant General Cooper.

Mobile, Ala., Sept. 5, 1862.
General: Under the supposition that on the restoration of my health I would be returned to the command of Department No. 2, I had prepared, whilst at Bladin, Alabama, a plan of operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, based on my knowledge of that part of the theatre of war; but hearing that my just expectations are to be disappointed. I have the honor to communicate it to the War Department, in the hope that it may be of service to our arms and to our cause. It was submitted by me to Gen. Bragg on the 2d inst.

By looking at the map it will be seen that the forces operating in that section of country will be separated at first by one river, (the Tennessee,) and afterwards by two, (the Tennessee and Cumberland.) hence they will be unable to support each other, being unprovided with pontoon trains; but their operations must be more or less dependent on or connected with each other. I will first refer to those in East Tennessee, and then to those west of it.

In the first case, our objective point must be, first Louisville, and then Cincinnati. How best to reach them from Chattanooga, with Buell at Huntsville and Stevenson, is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two bases of operations — the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers — and that if we advance towards our objective points without getting rid of him we would expose our lines of communication with Chattanooga. We must then give him battle first, or compel him to retire before us.

Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say he is now doing) we will be advancing towards Louisville; but should he venture on Florence or Savannah to unite his forces with Resecrans or Grant, we will have to concentrate enough of our forces from Middle and East Tennessee to follow him rapidly and defeat him in a great battle, when we would be able to resume our march as before indicated. We must, however, as soon as practicable, construct strong works to command the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for otherwise our communication would be cut off by the enemy as soon as these two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gunboats and transports.

The best positions for said works are about forty miles below Forts Donelson and Henry, not far from Eddysville, where those two rivers come within one and a half miles of each other. I am informed there is at that point a commanding elevation, where a strong field work could be constructed for a garrison of about twenty five hundred or three throusand men, when could hold out (with ample provisions and ammunition) against a large armay. Under the guns of this work and along the bank of each river a series of batteries armed with the heaviest guns (eight, nine, ten-inch and rifled guns) could be constructed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers.

When Louisville shall have fallen into our possession I would construct a work there for the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy the latter as soon as possible, so completely that future travelers would hardly know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankee vandalism in attempting to obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston and Savannah. A detachment of our army could, I think, take Louisville, while the main body would be marching to Cincinnati; but if we could get boats enough it would be shorter to go up the Ohio in them. To keep the command of Cincinnati would construct a strong work, heavily armed, at Covington.

Now for the operation in Western Tennessee.--The object there should be to drive the enemy from there, and resume the command of the Mississippi river for these purposes.

I would concentrate rapidly at Grand Junction Price's army, and all that could be spared from Vicksburg of Van Dorn's. From there I would make a forced march to Fort Pillow, which I would take with probably only a very small loss. It is evident the forces at Memphis and Yazoo river would then have their line of communication by the river with the North cut off, and they would have either to surrender or cross without resources into Arkansas, where Gen. Holmes would take good care of them. From Fort Pillow I would compel the forces at Corinth and Jackson, Tenn., to fall back precipitately to Humboldt and Columbus, or their lines of communication would be cut off also. We would then pursue them vigorously beyond the Mississippi at Columbus, or the Ohio at Paducah.

We would thus compel the enemy to evacuate the State of Mississippi and Western Tennessee, with probably the loss on our part of a few hundred men. General Price could then be detached into Missouri to support his friends, where his presence alone would be worth an army to the Confederacy.

The armament and ammunition of the works referred to to be collected as soon as possible at Meridian and Chattanooga.

Such are the operations which I would carry into effect, with such modifications as circumstances might require, if the President had judged proper to order me back to the command of that army which I had, with Gen. Bragg's assistance, collected together and organized, and which I had only left to recover my shattered health while my presence could be spared from it, and until he informed me that it was ready to take the offensive.

Hoping for its entire success, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, General, C. S. A.

General Beauregard to General Braxton Bragg.

Collum Springs, Bladin, Ala., July 28, 1862.
My Dear General:
Your letter of the 22d inst., was only received last night. I give you with pleasure the following views on your proposed operations from Tupelo, for I wish you the amplest success, both on your and the country's account.

You had evidently but one of four things to do: First, to attack Halleck at Corinth; second, to attack Buell at or about Chattanooga; third, to attack Grant at or about Memphis; fourth, to remain idle at Tupelo.

From what you state the first is evidently inadmissible and the last cannot be entertained for one moment, for action — action — action is what we require.

Now, with regard to the other two propositions, it is evident that unless you reinforce General E. K., Smith at Chattanooga he will be overpowered by Buell, and then our communication with the East and our supplies at Atlanta, Augusta, &c., will be cut off; also, that a partial reinforcement would so weaken you at Tupelo as to paralyze you for any other movements from there; hence you have adopted the wisest course in sending to Smith all your available forces, except just enough to guard your depots, &c., to the rear of your present position at Tupelo.

The third proposition would have afforded you some success, but not as brilliant and important in its results as the second one, if the newspapers will permit you to carry it successfully into effect, for Halleck and Buell occupying the base of a long isosceles triangle, of which Mobile is the apex, could get to Chattanooga before you if they should become aware of your movements, and then you would have to contend again with superior forces, as usual to us. The moment you get to Chattanooga you ought to take the offensive, keeping in mind the following grand principles of the art of war:

First, always bring the masses of your army in contact with the fractions of the enemy; second, operate as much as possible on his communications without exposing your own; third, operate always on interior or shorter lines. I have no doubt that, with anything like equal numbers, you will always meet with success.

I am happy to see that my two Lieutenants, Morgan and Forrest, are doing such good service in Kentucky and Tennessee. When I appointed them I thought they would leave their mark wherever they passed.

By the by, I think we ought hereafter, in our official papers, to call the ‘ "Yankees"’ ‘"Abolitionists"’ instead of ‘"Federal," ’ for they now proclaim not only the abolition of slavery, but of all our constitutional rights; and that name will have a stinging effect on our Western enemies. I intend to issue a general order on the subject whenever I assume a command.

Sincerely your friend,
G. T. Beauregard.
Gen. Braxton Bragg, commanding Department No. 2, Mobile, Ala.

The Famous Criticism of the late General
Kearny on M'Clellan.

Wilkes's (N. Y.) Spirit of the Times, of last week, publishes the following letter of Major General Philip Kearny to O. S. Halstead, Jr., of Newark N. J., which has been made the subject of much comment:

Harrison's Landing, 4th August, 1862.
Dear Pet:
I thank you for your kind, long letter. You extend to me hope. You suggest withdrawing me and my division out of this ignoble position. With Pope's army, I would breathe again.

We have no Generals McClellan is the failure I ever proclaimed him. He has been punished, just as I at once comprehended the moves of the portion. He will only get us in more jollies, more waste of blood, fighting by driblets. He has loss the confidence of all Nor has he a single officer about him capable of bettering us. Sumner is a ‘"bull in a china shop,"’ and a sure enough blunderer.--lost his corps gratuitously at Fair Oaks. He is not now in his right place, and will be much worse. --is a small brain, ossified in a ‘"4 company"’ garrison on the frontier. He was not ‘"of us"’ in Mexico, but in a rear column once saw a distant flash in a guerrilla fight. His skill is a myth — a political version of his own part at Bull Run. Porter is good in nature, but weak as water — the parent of all the disaster for his want of generalship on the Chickahominy.--and Franklin are talented engineers. They might make good Generals if they understood the value of elements in their calculations; as it is, they are dangerous failures.

When — was drunk, he had some few men drowned before Yorktown. I know of no other feat of his. Franklin's battle of West Point was a most runaway picket fight of ours. His part on the Chickahominy was unpardonable. He sent over a division, (his own) was present on that side out of fire, and never interfered to prevent them from being sacrificed by driblets and rendered a prey to their false position. I was horrified at it, as described by Gen. Taylor and all others. Is it surprising that I want to get out of this mess? Besides, they have sent me a Major-Generalship, like all these others, dating from 4th July, muddled in a batch of new and very ordinary junior officers. Do they forget that I was appointed twelfth on the original list ? That I, on the heels of Bull Run, faced the enemy with a Jersey brigade, in advance of all others — McClellan, McDowell, et id omne genus, nearly forcing me to come back of the ‘"Seminary."’ Do they forget me at Manassas ?--My Jersey brigade, that infected with panic the retiring enemy ? Has Williamsburg never come to their ears ? Oh, no ! I really feel aggravated beyond endurance. Discipline becomes degradation if not wielded with justice. Patriotism cannot, amid all her sacrifices, claim that of self-respect-- Generals, victorious in the past, are not ceded on to expose their troops unless those brave men are acknowledged. Their identity in their chief's promotion claims a date of their own high acts. Oh. no, I am nearer returning to the home I have given up, to the interests I have sacrificed, to my cherished wife, whose anxiety oppresses me, than I ever dreamt of in a war for the Union. But if the infatuated North are weak enough to let this crisis be managed by ‘"small men of small motives,"’" I am not willing to be their puppet.

My dear Pet, I am too lazy, and too little interested, to dive into the future of this ‘"little box of heresies."’ so do tell me — what do the people at the North look forward to in the future ? I fear lest the war will die out in rapid imbecility.

For McClellan, he is burnt out. Never once on a battle-field, you have nothing to hope from him as a leader of a column. How do they expect Pope to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of Ewell and Jackson ? But these are episodes. We deceive ourselves. There was a people of old — it was the warrior Spartan, with his Helot of the field. The South have realized it. There was an ambitious people of recent times, and a conscription pandered to bet invasions. At this moment the South exemplifies them both. ‘"Peace, peace,"’ but there is no peace. No, not even with a disruptured Union. Let the North cast away that delusion.

Draft we must, or the disciplined thousands of the South will redeem scrip in Philadelphia, and yet the true North must accept it, and quickly, to a man, or the moment it draggles in debate, Maryland, Tennessee, and Kentucky will cast past victories to the winds and rise with their nearly allied rebel kin. My dear Pet, I shall be delighted when Henry can come on. As to Col. Halstead, I think that his case is a type of the insane and unnecessary despotism introduced into the army, under the auspices of McClellan and his very weak aids. It is now too late; but why was not the cavalry put in my charge at the commencement ? Two nights ago the rebel batteries fired from across the river, and killed and wounded some thirty men. Last night Hooker started out on a crude expedition to Malvern Hill. He went out four miles and came back again. Still, a ‘"false fuss" ’ injures the whole army. McClellan is dangerous, from the want of digesting his plans. He positively has no talents. Adieu. Get me and my ‘"fighting division"’ with Pope.

With best regards, yours,
Kearny. To Mr. O. S. Halstead, Jr., Newark, N. J.

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