The European Intelligence.
While we are disposed to give all the credit which it can possibly claim to the reported assertion of
Elmont Cameron, that the subject of mediation or intervention will be brought forward on the first day of the approaching session of the British Parliament, we nevertheless see grave reason to doubt in the assumption of the London
Times that
Sir G. C. Lewis, the
War Secretary, spoke the mind of the
Cabinet in the speech which we published last week.
It is true, the doctrine enunciated by him is directly opposed to the late practice of the
British Government.
That Government adopted the
American policy of recognizing the
Government de facto of every country with which it had diplomatic intercourse very early after it was introduced here.
True, it had not adopted it at the instant the most important opportunity it ever had to do so — we mean the case of the first French Republic, which it refused to recognise — presented itself.
But the terrible consequences of that neglect — a war running, with but fifteen months intermission, through twenty-three years, and a debt of a thousand million sterling — taught it wisdom, and it hastened to recognize the Republics of
South America, the
Grecian communities, and
Belgium.
Nevertheless, the London
Times has been generally understood to represent the opinions of the masses and to be in the habit of ascertaining pretty accurately, before speaking out upon any important question, what that opinion may be. The
Times has spoken of us, of late, in the most flattering terms, but has constantly sustained the ministerial policy of absolute neutrality.
Secretary Lewis himself, and every member of the
Cabinet who has been heard from, except
Mr. Gladstone, speak very much the same language.
For the
English people, there can be no doubt that their feelings are all in our favor.
But is it not possible that the views of the majority may coincide with those of the
Times, and of the members of the
Cabinet alluded to?
Is it not possible that the views of the latter may even take their from the popular sentiment?
Looking at the matter in this light, we feel it our duty to caution the public against indulging in any extravagant hopes of immediate recognition.
That the question may be brought up at the opening of the session we think probable enough.
It has even been said that Parliament has been called together earlier than usual for the purpose of presenting it. This it is true, would seem to indicate that the Ministry is disposed to consider our claim to recognition Favorably.
Nevertheless it is by no means decisive of the question.
It must be recollected that we have often been deceived in speculations upon this subject, and that there is no better reason now for expecting recognition than there was a year ago. The policy of
England upon the matter is entirely selfish, and perhaps is necessarily so. Yes to every person on this side of the
Atlantic it appears obviously mistaken.
There cannot be a plainer proposition than that the subjugation of this Confederacy, and its reunion with the
Yankee States, would prove eventually highly disastrous to
Great Britain.
The world has never beheld such armaments, such resources, and such fighting, as this contest has brought out on both sides.
The armies of the
Holy Alliance and of
Napoleon sink into insignificance beside them.
Now Yankeedom is bitterly exasperated against
Great Britain, and could she subdue us, and become the possessor of our resources in addition to her own, would take the very first opportunity to make war on her. How that war would end is, we think, not in the least doubtful, and it will not appear so to any man who looks at what has been lately done here.
In the first place,
Great Britain would lose
Canada.
Her fleets would next be swept from the ocean.
Next, all the rest of her colonial possessions — the
West Indies,
Australia,
India--would assuredly follow.
Next, again, she would inevitably lose
Ireland, and, lastly, she would find her own soll invaded by a million of men. No man will think those recurrences at all improbable who reflects that the old
United States was wont to double its population in twenty-three years, and that, if these States ever become reunited, they will in forty years--a mere second in the life time of a nation — be inhabited by 100,000,000 of just such people as new waging this unheard of war. It is, therefore, so plainly the interest of
Great Britain to keep the two sections separate, that every thinking, man on this side of the water has wondered that, from the prompting of mere selfishness--con that she acts upon none other than selfish principles — she has permitted the war to assume sues gigantic proportions, and the parties engaged in it to ascertain the secret of their terrible strength.
Let she has pursued this blind policy, in opposition to her own recorded practice heretofore.
Is it possible, then, to be sure that any inducement can prevail upon her to adopt a different line of policy to that she is now pursuing?
This the greatest of all probably involving her very existence as a nation, has . What other can succeed?
It certainly would be a very pleasant thing to be recognized by the ruling Powers of the earth.
It would, on many accounts, too, be of essential service to us. If we had the fleet of
Great Britain, or one like it, we could put an end to the war at short notice.
Not one of the marauding scoundrels now infesting our country could escape death or capture.
But still, it is our duty to impress upon the public the important truth that such assistance is by no means absolutely essential.
We both can and
will work out our own salvation, through great trials and tribulation it may be, but certainly and triumphantly.
The enemy never will, and never can, subdue us. The very and privations our soldiers endure without murmuring is a guarantee of the fact.
While, therefore, we do not say that intervention will not come, we
do say that we ought to act as though it were an impossible occurrence.
