Following up.
A great deal has been said in the course of this war about the failure of our
Generals to follow up their victories.
The Northern journals have been equally clamorous about similar shortcomings on the part of their own commanders.
The
European critics have pointed out the same peculiarity in American military operations.
The fact is undeniable that all the great battles of the war have been indecisive, but that fact may be accounted for without any imputation upon the skill of the
Generals on either side.
It has been said that our officers have been educated under a peace establishment, and never accustomed, before the present war, to the handling of large bodies of troops.--The old United States Army did not number twenty thousand men. The military men of
Europe have been familiarized for ages to the operations of armies as great as those which are now in operation in
America.--Moreover, their facilities of transportation approach perfection.
Long use has rendered every detail of their organization perfect and complete.
Besides, their rank and file are all mercenary soldiers, military machines whose discipline is of the most rigid character.
Every arm of their service is perfect; their cavalry are always in force sufficient to charge an enemy, and follow up an advantage, and in every battle there is a strong reserve, which never takes part in the contest until the day is decided, and is then hurled relentlessly upon the retiring foe. We, in the
Southern States, have been laboring from the beginning against disadvantages which will never be fully known till the war is ended.
We have been deficient not only in numbers, but in munitions, whilst the volunteer character of our soldiery renders it impossible to enforce that rigid discipline which prevents men from straggling after a defeat, and from scattering themselves after a victory to secure the tempting spoils of the vanquished.
But the best reason of all for the difference in "following up" between
European and American battles is, that in
Europe battles are fought upon a wide and level expanse of country, where the cavalry, whose business it is to cut to pieces the retreating foe, have full scope for their annihilating work, whereas the thing here is a physical impossibility.
The rugged and mountainous character of the regions in which most of our battles are fought, presents to a retreating army a series of defensible positions, which can be taken up at pleasure, one after another, and forbids the use of cavalry except on a very limited scale.
The main reliance in following up must be cavalry, for foot soldiers have but little chance of overtaking foot soldiers, especially when the pursued have cast away the burthen of their arms and accoutrements.
Our own infantry have driven the
Yankee infantry further back than ever the infantry of
Europe drove an enemy.--But there have been few of our battle-fields in which cavalry could operate.
What chance was there for a cavalry pursuit at
Chickamauga, or
Fredericksburg, or
Chancellorsville?
Such facts as these explain the peculiarity of not "following up" in
America, without the necessity of any reflection upon the military capacity of the commanders.
