Chate's resignation — what it means
Several months ago, before
Banks had been routed in
Louisiana, and before
Grant and
Sherman had opened the campaigns in
Virginia and
Georgia,
Chase is understood to have declared that the success of his financial plans depended upon the success of the
Yankee military operations.
The financial operations have failed disastrously — gold is already
acknowledged to have reached 2.50, and, we have no doubt, has really gone greatly beyond that point — and
Chase has thrown up in despair.
His resignation is a plain confession that he sees no hope in the only quarter from which hope could come — in the army.
It is a silent but significant rebuke of that Administration which has so long been deluding the public with shouts of victory, while it knew that its armies were meeting with nothing but disaster at every step they took.
Chase was behind the curtain, and he had a full opportunity of knowing everything that passed.
He was well aware of the slaughter with which
Grant had been repulsed in every attempt he had made upon the Confederate army.--
Stanton might deceive the public, but he could not deceive him. He saw the main army of the United States, after having lost largely over 100,000 men, brought to a dead stand in a position from which it could only escape by flight or surrender — with a determined foe, who had proved itself its superior in every battle, menacing it in front — in a locality which even the inhabitants abandon at this season of the year on account of unhealthiness, surrounded by swamps every gale from which is laden with death — perishing of thirst, or compelled to slake it with water which is poison to the
Yankee--falling sick by hundreds, and in a fair way to perish daily by thousands before the expiration of the summer and the first days of autumn.
All this he saw in
Grant's camp.
When he looked around him he saw the marauders whom he had selected to do the business which his army had failed to do, beaten and flying in all directions.
He saw the utter failure of
Hunter, the total defeat of
Sheridan, and the disgraceful rout of
Wilson.
He saw that
Grant's scheme had utterly failed.
When he looked for consolation to
Georgia he saw
Sherman baffled, discomfited, and on the eve of a great disaster.
When he cast his eyes beyond the
Mississippi he saw nothing but defeat and ruin.
He saw that
Lincoln had already called out 200,000 men to supply the place of those he had lost, and he knew that they would not do it, even in point of numbers.
Was it wonderful that he despaired of that military success which alone could secure the success of his financial operations, and threw up his office under the influence of the deep and bitter disappointment?
There are Confederates who take a delight in desponding — who will be satisfied with no success of our army, and love to magnify every petty reverse — who cannot see anything hopeful in the result of the many conflicts in which
Lee has put
hors de combat the majority of
Grant's good troops, and left him to fight his way with hundred day men, but think it ominous of approaching destruction if a railroad bridge break in or a car run off the track.
Such persons, if we did not know that they take a pleasure in being miserable themselves, and making everybody else miserable around them, we would ask. What can be more significant than this resignation, and whether it does not make them ashamed of their unmanly fears?
Who knows the truth of the situation if
Chase does not?
Who has manifested a greater degree of determination, or a greater amount of faith, in the fortunes of the country, whose financial affairs he has so long conducted?
Of what is his abandonment of his post in this hour of peril a proof, if it signify not that he has no hope of the army or of the finances?
And while there is despair on that side, why should we hear of croakers on this?
Chase was undoubtedly the ablest officer that
Lincoln ever employed.
Gen. Andrew Jackson said that man who traded on credit ought to break.
Whether he
ought or ought not, he is pretty certain to do it in the long run.
Chase attempted an impossibility, and failed.
But he put off the evil day longer than any other man could have done it, and he gave proof of great ability in doing it. He undertook to conduct a gigantic war, involving an expenditure equal to two millions
per diem entirely on credit, and he did it for three years. Such a thing never was done in the case of an aggressive war before, whatever might have happened in wars of defence.
The
Yankees were determined to have a big war, and then to pay nothing for it. In the first they were gratified.
In the last,
Chase gratified them as for as he could.
But the inevitable pay day has come at last, though long deferred. --There is no alternative but repudiation, unless they should think it better to have peace.
But repudiation is peace in point of fact.
In the meantime we look forward to the issue of a fresh batch of Yankee Treasury notes to the amount of $1,000,000,000 or so as a thing of certainty.
Before this year shall have passed the greenbacks will be worth about five cents in the dollars, and nothing more.
