Plutarch, Antony
Bernadotte Perrin, Ed.

39. This calamity naturally distressed all the followers of Antony, for they had received an unexpected blow at the outset; besides, Artavasdes, the king of Armenia, despairing of the Roman cause, took his own forces and went off, although he had been the chief cause of the war. [2] And now the Parthians presented themselves to the besiegers in brilliant array, and threatened them insultingly. Antony, therefore, not wishing that the inactivity of his army should confirm and increase among them consternation and dejection, took ten legions and three praetorian cohorts of men-at-arms, together with all his cavalry, and led them out to forage, thinking that in this way the enemy would best be drawn into a pitched battle. [3] After advancing a single day's march, he saw that the Parthians were enveloping him and seeking to attack him on the march. He therefore displayed the signal for battle in his camp, and after taking down his tents, as though his purpose was not to fight but to withdraw, he marched along past the line of the Barbarians, which was crescent-shaped. But he had given orders that when the first ranks of the enemy should appear to be within reach of his legionaries, the cavalry should charge upon them. [4] To the Parthians in their parallel array, the discipline of the Romans seemed to beggar description, and they watched them marching past at equal distances from one another, without confusion, and in silence, brandishing their javelins. But when the signal was given, and the Roman horsemen wheeled about and rode down upon them with loud shouts, they did indeed receive their onset and repel them, although their foes were at once too close for them to use their arrows; when, however, the legionaries joined in the charge, with shouts and clashing of weapons, the horses of the Parthians took fright and gave way, and the Parthians fled without coming to close quarters.

[5] Antony pressed hard upon them in pursuit, and had great hopes that he had finished the whole war, or the greater part of it, in that one battle. His infantry kept up the pursuit for fifty furlongs, and his cavalry for thrice that distance; and yet when he took count of those of the enemy who had fallen or had been captured, he found only thirty prisoners and eighty dead bodies. Despondency and despair therefore fell upon all; they thought it a terrible thing that when victorious they had killed so few, and when vanquished they were to be robbed of so many men as they had lost at the waggons. [6] On the following day they packed up and started on the road to Phraata and their camp. As they marched they met, first a few of the enemy, then more of them, and finally the whole body, which, as though unconquered and fresh, challenged and attacked them from every side; but at last, with difficulty and much labour, they got safely to their camp. [7] Then the Medes made a sally against their mound and put its defenders to flight. At this Antony was enraged, and visited those who had played the coward with what is called decimation. That is, he divided the whole number of them into tens, and put to death that one from each ten upon whom the lot fell.¹ For the rest he ordered rations of barley instead of wheat.