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First of all then, I say, the reasons which hinder us
from asserting an infinite number of worlds do not hinder
us from affirming that there are more than one; for as
well in many worlds as in one there may be Providence
and Divination, while Fortune intervenes only in the smallest things; but most part of the grand and principal things
have and take their beginnings and changes by order,
which could not be in an infinite number of worlds. And
it is more conformable to reason to say that God made
more than one world; for, being perfectly good, he wants
no virtue, and least of all justice and friendship, for they
do chiefly become the nature of the Gods. Now God
hath nothing that is superfluous and useless; and therefore there must be other inferior Gods proceeding from
him, and other worlds made by him, towards whom he
must use these social virtues; for he cannot exercise those
virtues of justice and benignity on himself or any part of
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himself, but on others. So that it is not likely this world
should float and wander about, without either friend,
neighbor, or any sort of communication, in an infinite
vacuum. For we see Nature includes all single things in
genera and species, like as in vessels or in husks of seeds;
for there is nothing to be found in Nature—and nothing
can have a common notion or appellation—which is not
qualified both in common and in particular. Now the
world is not said to be such in common, but in particular,
for its quality is derived from its being an harmonious
whole made up of different parts. But yet, there being
no such thing in Nature as one man alone, one horse,
one star, one God, one Daemon, why may we not believe that there is not in Nature one only world and no
more, but several? And if any one shall object against
me that this world hath likewise but one earth and one
sea, I can answer him, he is much deceived by not understanding the evidence afforded by like parts. For we
divide the earth into similar parts of the same denomination; for all the parts of the earth are earth, and so of
the sea; but no part of the world is still the world, it
being composed of divers and different natures.
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 4.
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