It is moreover against sense to say that nothing
touches another; nor is this less absurd, that bodies touch
one another, but touch by nothing. For they are necessitated to admit these things, who allow not the least parts
of a body, but assume something which is before that
which seems to touch, and never cease to proceed still
farther. What, therefore, these men principally object to
the patrons of those indivisible bodies called atoms is this,
that there is neither a touching of the whole by the whole,
nor of the parts by the parts; for that the one makes not
a touching but a mixture, and that the other is not possible, these individuals having no parts. How then do not
they themselves fall into the same inconvenience, leaving
no first or last part, whilst they say, that whole bodies
mutually touch one another by a term or extremity and not
by a part? But this term is not a body; therefore one
body shall touch one another by that which is incorporeal,
and again shall not touch, that which is incorporeal coming between them. And if it shall touch, the body shall
both do and suffer something by that which is incorporeal.
For it is the nature of bodies mutually to do and suffer,
and to touch. But if the body has a touching by that
[p. 417]
which is incorporeal, it will have also a contact, and a mixture, and a coalition. Again, in these contacts and mixtures the extremities of the bodies must either remain,
or not remain but be corrupted. Now both of these are
against sense. For neither do they themselves admit corruptions and generations of incorporeal things; nor can
there be a mixture and coalition of bodies retaining their
own extremities. For the extremity determines and constitutes the nature of the body; and mixtions, unless the
mutual laying of parts by parts are thereby understood,
wholly confound all those that are mixed. And, as these
men say, we must admit the corruption of extremities in
mixtures, and their generation again in the separation of
them. But this none can easily understand. Now by
what bodies mutually touch each other, by the same they
press, thrust, and crush each other. Now that this should
be done or suffered by things that are incorporeal, is impossible and not so much as to be imagined. But yet this
they would constrain us to conceive. For if a sphere
touch a plane by a point, it is manifest that it may be also
drawn over the plane upon a point; and if the superficies
of it is painted with vermilion, it will imprint a red line
on the plane; and if it is fiery hot, it will burn the plane.
Now for an incorporeal thing to color, or a body to be
burned by that which is incorporeal, is against sense. But
if we should imagine an earthen or glassy sphere to fall
from on high upon a plane of stone, it were against reason
to think it would not be broken, being struck against that
which is hard and solid; but it would be more absurd that
it should be broken, falling upon an extremity or point
that is incorporeal. So that the presumptions concerning
things incorporeal and corporeal are wholly disturbed, or
rather taken away, by their joining to them many impossibilities.
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