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[1056a]
[1]
for if both
alternatives were possible, the question would be absurd; but even so
the question falls into an antithesis: that of "one" or
"many"—i.e., "whether both came, or
one")— if,
then, the question "whether" is always concerned with opposites, and
we can ask "whether it is greater or smaller, or equal," what is the
nature of the antithesis between "equal" and "greater or smaller"? It
is contrary neither to one only, nor to both: for (a) it is no more
contrary to the greater than to the smaller; (b) "equal" is contrary
to "unequal," and thus it will be contrary to more than one
thing;(c) if
"unequal" means the same as both "greater" and "smaller" at the same
time, "equal" must still be opposed to them both: This difficulty
supports the theory1 that "the unequal" is a duality. But the result is
that one thing is contrary to two; which is impossible.
Further, it is apparent that "equal" is intermediate between "great"
and "small," but it is not apparent that any contrariety is
intermediate, nor can it be, by definition; for it could not be
complete if it were the intermediate of something, but rather it
always has something intermediate between itself and the other
extreme.It remains, then, that it
is opposed either as negation or as privation. Now it cannot be so
opposed to one of the two, for it is no more opposed to the great than
to the small.Therefore it
is a privative negation of both. For this reason we say "whether" with
reference to both, and not to one of the two—e.g., "whether
it is greater or equal," or "whether it is equal or
smaller";
[20]
there are
always three alternatives. But it is not a necessary privation; for
not everything is equal which is not greater or smaller, but only
things which would naturally have these attributes. The
equal, then, is that which is neither great nor small, but would
naturally be either great or small; and it is opposed to both as a
privative negation, and therefore is intermediate between them. And
that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but it has no
name (for each of these terms has several meanings, and there is no
one material which is receptive of both); that which is neither white
nor black is better entitled to a name,although even this has no single name, but the
colors of which this negation is privatively predicated are to a
certain extent limited; for it must be either grey or buff or
something similar. Therefore those persons are wrong in
their criticism who imagine that all terms are used analogously, so
that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand will be intermediate
between "shoe" and "hand," because that which is neither good nor bad
is intermediate between good and bad—as though there must be
an intermediate in all cases; but this does not necessarily
follow.For the one
is a joint negation of opposites where there is an intermediate and a
natural interval;
1 Held by the Platonists. Cf. Aristot. Met. 14.1.4, 5.
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