Death of Hasdrubal
MY reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book,
rather than a preface, is not because I do not recognise the
usefulness of a preface in arresting attention and rousing
interest, and also giving facilities for finding any passage that is
wanted, but because I find prefaces viewed, though from many
inadequate reasons, with contempt and neglect. I therefore
had recourse to a table of contents throughout my history,
except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads,
as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at
the same time as less subject to the objection of being out
of place, for it is closely connected with the subject-matter.
In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a
mere table of contents less suitable. . . .
After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage
over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes, B.C.
208. In the spring of B.C. 207 he crossed the Alps and descended
into Italy, crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia. Thence he
sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he would
march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria. The
letter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia,
and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his
colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. See
above, 10, 39; Livy, 27, 39-49.
Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal's journey into
Italy. . . .
1
Never at any other time had
Rome been in a greater state
of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . .
2
None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. But
Battle of the Metaurus. B. C. 207. Coss, C. Claudius Nero, M. Livius Salinator II. |
circumstances no longer admitted of delay. He
saw the enemy drawn out in battle array and
advancing; and he was obliged to get the
Iberians and the Gauls who were serving with
him into line. He therefore stationed his ten
elephants on the front, increased the depth of
his lines, and so had his whole army covering a somewhat
small ground. He took up a position himself in the centre of
the line, immediately behind the elephants, and commenced
an advance upon the Roman left, with a full resolution that in
this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius advanced to
meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to
close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry, Meanwhile Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing,
found himself unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the
rough ground in front of him, relying on which Hasdrubal
had directed his advance upon the Roman left: and being
embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow, he promptly
decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics to
pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and
marched them on the rear of the field of battle; and, after
passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the
Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to
this point the victory had been doubtful; for both sides fought
with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over
with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians
holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover
the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike; for
finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a crossfire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and
Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell
upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for
the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at
once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut
down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed with
the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and
were afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their
Indian drivers.
Hasdrubal's Conduct in His Last Battle
Hasdrubal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout
Hasdrubal falls in the battle. |
his whole life, like a brave man, and died
fighting: and he deserves not to be passed over
without remark. I have already stated that
Hannibal was his brother, and on his departure to
Italy
entrusted the command in
Iberia to him. I have also described
his many contests with the Romans, and the many embarrassing
difficulties with which he had to struggle, caused by the generals
sent from
Carthage to
Iberia; and how in all these matters he
had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a noble spirit
worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his last
contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to
deserve respectful attention and imitation. Most generals and
kings, when entering upon decisive battles, place before their
eyes the glory and advantages to be obtained from victory, and
frequently consider and contrive what use they will make of
every success; but they do not go on to review the chances
of failure, nor contemplate the plan to be adopted, or the
action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Yet the former is
obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is that most
of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought
nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have
added dishonour to defeat: have disgraced their previous
achievements, and rendered themselves, during the remainder
of their lives, objects of reproach and contempt. It is easy to
see that many leaders make this fatal mistake, and that the
difference between one man and another in these points is
most signal; for history is full of such instances. Hasdrubal,
on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of being
able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements,
regarded his personal safety in battle as of the highest consequence; but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the
future, and reduced him to the last extremities, though
neglecting nothing either in his preparations or on the field
that might secure him the victory, nevertheless considered
how, in case of total overthrow, he might face his fate and
suffer nothing unworthy of his past career.
These remarks are meant for those engaged in active
operations, that they may neither dash the hopes of those who
rely upon them by a heedless seeking of danger, nor by an
unworthy clinging to life add disgrace and shame to the
catastrophies which befall them.
The Romans Celebrate a Victory
Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the
enemy's camp; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay
stupefied with drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting
victims. Then they collected the rest of the booty, from
which more than three hundred talents were paid into the
treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts together, not less
than ten thousand were killed, and about two thousand
Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken
prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the
report reached
Rome, people at first could not believe it, from
the intensity of their wish that it might be true; but when still
more men arrived, not only stating the fact, but giving full
details, then indeed the city was filled with overpowering joy;
every temple-court was decked, and every shrine full of
sacrificial cakes and victims: and, in a word, they were raised
to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one
felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief
terror, could not after that stay even in
Italy. . . .
A Plea For Union In Greece
A speech of the legate from Rhodes3 before an assembly of
Aetolians at Heraclea in the autumn of B.C. 207 (see Livy, 28,
7), at the end of the summer campaign.
"Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you
that neither King Ptolemy nor the community of
Rhodes,
Byzantium,
Chios, or
Mitylene, regard a composition with you
as unimportant. For this is not the first or the second time
that we have introduced the subject of peace to your assembly;
but ever since you entered upon the war we have beset you
with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on this
subject; because we saw that its immediate result would be
the destruction of yourselves and of
Macedonia, and because
we foresaw in the future danger to our own countries and to that
of all other Greeks. For as, when a man has once set a fire
alight, the result is no longer dependent upon his choice, but
it spreads in whatever direction chance may direct, guided for
the most part by the wind and the combustible nature of the
material, and frequently attacks the first author of the conflagration himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by a
nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it; and
soon rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way,
continually gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater
heat by the folly of the people in its neighbourhood, as though
by the wind. Wherefore, men of
Aetolia, considering that we,
as representatives of the whole body of the islanders and of the
Greek inhabitants of
Asia, are here to beseech you to put an
end to war and to choose peace, because the matter affects
us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to us and
yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war
which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet
glorious from the motive which prompted it, and the reputation likely to accrue from it, you might be pardoned perhaps
for a fixed determination to continue it; but if it is a war
of the most signal infamy, which can bring you nothing
but discredit and obloquy,—does not such an undertaking
claim considerable hesitation on your part? We will speak
our opinion frankly; and you, if you are wise, will give us a
quiet hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable
truth now and thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth
things now, and soon afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to
ruin the rest of the Greeks with you.
Dangers of the Treaty With Rome
"Put then before your eyes your own folly. You
profess to be at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks,
that they may escape from servitude to him; but your war is
really for the enslavement and ruin of
Greece. That is the
tale told by your treaty with
Rome, which formerly existed
only in written words, but is now seen in full operation.
Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace to
you: but now your execution of it has made that disgrace
palpable to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely
lends his name and serves as a pretext for the war: he is not
exposed to any attack: it is against his allies,—the majority of
the Peloponnesian states,
Boeotia,
Euboea,
Phocis,
Locris,
Thessaly,
Epirus,—that you have made this treaty, bargaining
that their bodies and their goods shall belong to
the Romans, their cities and their territory to
the Aetolians.
And though personally, if you took a city, you
would not stoop to violate the freeborn, or to burn the buildings, because you look upon such conduct
as cruel and barbarous; yet you have made a treaty by which you have handed
over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to the
most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was
hitherto kept a secret. But now the fate of the people of
Oreus, and of the miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to
every one,—Fortune having, as though of set purpose, suddenly
brought your infatuation before the scenes.
"So much for the origin of the war and its events up to
now. But as to its result,—supposing everything to go to
your wish,—what do you expect that to be? Will it not be
the beginning of great miseries to all
Greece?
Philip In Aetolia Again
"For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the
Romans get rid of the war in
Italy,—and this is all but done,
now that Hannibal has been confined to a narrow district in
Bruttii,—they will direct their whole power upon
Greece:
professedly, indeed, in aid of the Boeotians against Philip, but
really with the view of reducing it entirely under their own
power. And if they design to treat it well when they have
conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and if
badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy,
and the power over those which they allow to survive: while
you will be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when
no god will be any longer willing, nor any man be able to
help you. Now, perhaps, you ought to have foreseen all this
from the first, for that would have been your best course.
But since the future often escapes human foresight, now, at
any rate, that you have seen by actual experience what has
happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the
future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes
sincere friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion
about the future with absolute frankness; and you we
urge and entreat not to stand in the way of the freedom and
safety of yourselves or of the rest of
Greece."
This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable
impression, he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who,
without making a long speech, merely said that they were
commissioned to do one of two things,—if the Aetolians chose
peace, to accept it readily: if not, to call the gods and the
ambassadors from
Greece to witness that the Aetolians, and
not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what happened
thereafter, and so to depart. . . .
Philip Vandalizes Thermus
Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so
narrowly missed getting Attalus into his
hands. . . .
On his way to the lake Trichonis Philip arrived
at Thermus, where there was a temple of Apollo;
and there he once more defaced all the sacred
buildings which he had spared on his former
occupation of the town. In both instances it was an ill-advised indulgence of temper: for it is a mark
of utter unreasonableness to commit an act of impiety against heaven
in order to gratify one's wrath against man. . . .
Faults of the Achaean Officers
There are three methods followed by those who wish to
Defects of the Achaean officers. |
arrive at an intelligent knowledge of tactics.
The first is by the study of history, the second
by the use of scientific treatises composed by
specialists, the third by actual experience on the field. But
of all three of these methods the Achaean commanders were
equally ignorant. . . .
A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry,
engendered by the ostentation and bad taste of the others.
They were very particular about their attendants and their
dress; and there was a show of splendour in this, kept up by
the majority beyond their means. But to their arms they paid
no attention whatever. . . .
Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to
imitate the real achievements of those who obtain success, but,
while trying to reproduce their unimportant peculiarities,
succeed only in displaying their own frivolity. . . .
Philopoemen in the Peloponnese, B. C. 207
"Brightness in the armour," he said," contributes much
Speech of Philopoemen urging reform. |
to inspire dismay in the enemy; and care
bestowed on having it made to fit properly is
of great service in actual use. This will best
be secured if you give to your arms the attention which you
now bestow on your dress, and transfer to your dress the
neglect which you now show of your arms. By thus acting,
you will at once save your money, and be undoubtedly able to
maintain the interests of your country. Therefore the man
who is going to take part in manœuvres or a campaign ought,
when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and
well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are; and
when he takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they
are cleaner and more costly than his cloak and shirt: for
when men take greater care of what is for show, than of what
is for use, there can be no doubt of what will happen to them
on the field. I beg you to consider that elaboration in dress
is a woman's weakness, and a woman of no very high character
either; but costliness and splendour in armour are the characteristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves
and their country with glory."
The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and
so much struck with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately
after leaving the council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn
at the over-dressed dandies, and forced some of them to quit
the market-place; and what is more, in future manœuvres and
campaigns they kept a stricter watch on each other in these
points.
Philopoemen and Machanidas
So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of
Philopoemen's own example. |
credit is often sufficient not only to turn men
from the worst courses, but even to incite
them to the noblest. But when such a
speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his
words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which
nothing can exceed. And this was above all others the case
with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in
all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple;
in his manners to others without ceremony or pretence; and
throughout his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely
sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were
sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers;
for as he could point to his own life as an example, they
wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened on
several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the
consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words
to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully
argued speeches.
So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league
separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by
the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm
could happen to them with him at their head. Immediately
afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities,
which he performed with great energy and speed. He then
summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into
companies and drilling them; and at last, after
eight months of this preparation and training, he
mustered his forces at
Mantinea, prepared to
fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the
freedom of all the Peloponnesians.
War against Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta. B. C. 208-207. |
Arrangement of Forces at Mantinea
Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and
looked upon the determination of the Achaeans
as extremely favourable to his plans. As soon
as he heard of their being in force at
Mantinea,
he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at
Tegea, and the very
next morning at daybreak advanced upon
Mantinea. He led
the right wing of the phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched
in two parallel columns on each side of his front; and behind
them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for
the catapults.
Meanwhile Philopoemen too had arranged his
army in three divisions, and was leading them out of
Mantinea,
the Illyrians and the men with body armour by the gate leading to the temple of Poseidon, and with them
all the rest of the foreign contingent and lightarmed troops; by the next gate, toward the west,
the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He sent
his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises
to a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the
above-mentioned temple: he stationed the men with body
armour next, resting on this hill to the south; next them the
Illyrians; next them, in the same straight line, the phalanx,
drawn up in companies, with an interval between each, along
the ditch which runs towards the temple of Poseidon, right
through the middle of the plain of
Mantinea, until it touches
the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the
territory of the Elisphasii. Next to them, on the right wing,
he stationed the Achaean cavalry, under the command of
Aristaenetus of
Dyme; while on the left wing he led the whole
of the foreign contingent, drawn up in lines one behind the
other.
As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen
went down the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an
exhortation which, though short, clearly pointed out to them
the nature of the battle in which they were engaged. But
most of what he said was rendered inaudible by the answering
shouts of the troops. The affection and confidence of the
men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal that they
seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as
they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing.
However he tried, when he could get the opportunity, to
make this much clear to them, that the battle on the one
side was to establish a shameful and ignominious servitude,
on the other to vindicate an ever-memorable and glorious
liberty.
Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the
The attack of Machanidas. |
enemy's right wing in column; but when he got
within moderate distance he deployed into line
by the right, and by this extension movement
made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the
left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of
the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that
the enemy's plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults
into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confusion: he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the
engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines
4 close
to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground
was flat and suitable for cavalry.
The battle begun by light-cavalry charges. |
Whereupon
Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by
sending his Tarentines forward also.
Efficiency of Mercenaries
At first the struggle was confined to these two forces,
Defeat of the Achaean right wing. |
and was maintained with spirit. But the light-armed
troops coming gradually to the support of such of them as
were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes
in close order, sometimes in pairs: and for a long time so entirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies,
who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined,
could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained
for a long while exactly their original ground.
But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant
began to get the better of the struggle, from
their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long
practice. And this is the natural and usual result. The
citizens of a democracy no doubt bring more enthusiasm to
their battles than the subjects of a tyrant; but in the same
proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally superior
and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the
former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a
condition of servitude; but in the case of mercenaries, those
of the tyrant are encouraged by the certain prospect of reward,
those of a democracy know that they must lose by victory:
for as soon as a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no
longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties; while a
tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion as its field
of ambition is extended: for as the persons injured by it are
more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous
also; and the security of despots rests entirely on the
loyalty and power of mercenaries.
Machanidas Changes his Plan
Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army
of Machanidas fought with such fury and violence, that even
the Illyrians and men with body armour, who formed the
reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were
unable to withstand their assault; but were all driven from
their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of
Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant.
And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what
some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most part
decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For
though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up a
first success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the
first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence
of mind, keep a good look-out for any error of judgment on
the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes.
At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to
have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day; while
those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves
by presence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory.
Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders.
The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven
Machanidas pursues the fugitives,
and thus allows the Achaean hoplites to get between him and his quarters. |
from their ground, and their leftwing having been
thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned
his original plan of winning the day by outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and
charging their front with others, and did neither;
but, quite losing his head, rushed forward heedlessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as
though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who
had once given way up to the town gates.
Defeat of the Lacedaemonians
Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could
to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and
urging them to stand; but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the
battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx,
waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left
the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and
then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the
phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without
breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground
abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers
from returning, and got on higher ground than the enemy's
right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage,
and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a
general advance; and he ordered Polybius of
Megalopolis5 to
collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mercenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the
flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep
a look-out against the return of the pursuers.
Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the
victory gained by the light-armed contingent,
without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae
to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the
course of their advance they reached the edge of the dyke,
being unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat
when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because
they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the slope
down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water
or underwood growing in it, they continued their advance
through it without stopping to think.
Philopoemen Seizes an Opportunity
The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had
long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the
phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The
men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge
with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had
been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and as they
ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them
They lost courage and tried to fly; but the greater number
of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans,
and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was
not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the
acuteness of the general. For Philopoemen originally took
ground behind the dyke, not to avoid fighting, as some
supposed, but from a very accurate and scientific calculation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that
Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dyke, and that then his phalanx would get
entangled, just as I have described their actually doing; or
that if he advanced with a full apprehension of the difficulty
presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind and
deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose
order and a long straggling column,
6 the victory would be his,
without a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary's.
For this has happened to many commanders, who having
drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they
were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from
the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for
other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of march, and
hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at least get
safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.
Army of Machanidas Put to Flight
However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognostication of what would happen; for the Lacedaemonians
Machanidas, returning from the pursuit, is killed while trying to recross the dyke. |
were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was
victorious and that he had gained a complete and brilliant
success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing
wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the
escape of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that,
in the course of the pursuit, he was caught
between the dyke and the town with his
mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt a
return. But when Machanidas saw that his army
was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew that
he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory:
he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and
tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy,
while they were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit.
Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other
hope of safety, kept by him at first; but when they came upon
the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the
dyke, they lost heart; and the whole company began falling
away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his
own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making
his way over the bridge; and rode along the edge of the dyke,
trying with all his might to find a place which he could cross.
Fall of Machanidas
Philopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple
Death of Machanidas and capture of Tegea. |
cloak and the trappings of his horse. He at
once left Anaxidamus, with orders to guard the
bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to
any of the mercenaries; because they were the men on whom
the despots of
Sparta always depended for supporting their
power. Then taking Polyaenus of
Cyprus and Simias, who were
attending on him at the time, he rode along the edge of the
ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant and his attendants
were; for Machanidas had still two men with him, Arexidamus
and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found
a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his
horse, and tried to force it to go on and get over. Then
Philopoemen turned suddenly round upon him and dealt him
a mortal wound with his spear, and a second with a stab from
the spike at the butt end of it, and thus killed the tyrant in a
hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were riding with him
did the same to Arexidamus; but the third man seeing their
fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped. Simias
immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen,
and with their armour carried off also the tyrant's head, and
then hurried off to overtake the pursuing party; being eager to
give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy's
commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their
opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up
to
Tegea. And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of
the men that it contributed more than anything else to their
carrying
Tegea by assault, and pitching their
camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed
masters of all the open country.
For many
years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy
from their own borders, but now they were themselves devastating
Laconia without resistance, without having lost any
great number of their own men in the battle; while they had
killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even
more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage
and arms.
The Hannibalian War Continued
What profit is it to our readers to describe wars and
battles, the storming of cities and the enslavement of their
inhabitants, if they are to know nothing of the causes which
conduce to success and failure? The results of such operations
merely touch the fancy: it is the tracing of the designs of the
actors in such scenes that is really instructive; and above all
it is the following in detail of each step that can educate the
ideas of the student.
Ability of Hannibal. See Livy, 28, 12
Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of
this great man's strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one
looks to the length of time during which he displayed those
qualities; and realises to one's self the pitched battles, the
skirmishes and sieges, the revolutions and counter-revolutions
of states, the vicissitudes of fortune, and in fact the course of
his design and its execution in its entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war with
Rome in
Italy, without once releasing his army
from service in the field, but keeping those vast numbers
under control, like a good pilot, without any sign of disaffection
towards himself or towards each other, though he had troops
in his service who, so far from being of the same tribe, were not
even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians,
Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally nothing
in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor
language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that
these differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the
obedience to one word of command and to a single will. And yet
circumstances were not by any means unvarying: for though
the breeze of fortune often set strongly in his favour, it as often
also blew in exactly the opposite direction. There is therefore
good ground for admiring Hannibal's display of ability in
campaign; and there can be no fear in saying that, if he had
reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first subdued
other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects which
would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those
whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began
and ended his career with them. . . .
Scipio in Spain, After the Battle of the Metaurus
Hasdrubal having collected his forces from the various
towns in which they had wintered, advanced to
within a short distance of Ilipa and there encamped; forming his entrenchment at the
foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of
him well suited for a contest and battle. His
infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his
cavalry to four thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two.
On his part, Scipio sent M. Junius Silanus to
visit Colichas and take over from him the forces
that had been prepared by him.
These
amounted to three thousand infantry and five hundred horse.
The other allies he received personally in the course of his
march up the country to his destination. When he approached
Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus
Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a
position of great perplexity. For without their allies the
Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle; yet
to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate
success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome.
In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to
the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians;
but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to
the enemy, while he really fought the action
with his own legions.
and encamps close to the Carthaginian forces. |
With this purpose in his
mind he got his whole army on the march,
forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand
cavalry; and when he had come within the view of the
Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on some low hills exactly
opposite the enemy.
Futile Attack by Mago
Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment
to attack the Romans while actually engaged
in making their camp; he therefore rode up
to the entrenchment with the greater part of his
own cavalry and Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded
that he should catch Scipio off his guard. Scipio had however
all along foreseen this, and had placed some cavalry
equal in number to those of the Carthaginians under cover
of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge,
many of the enemy's horsemen at once took to flight at the
startling appearance, and began to make off; while the rest
closed with their opponents and fought with great gallantry.
But the Carthaginians were disconcerted by the agility of some
of the Roman horsemen in dismounting, and after a short
resistance they retreated with considerable loss. The retreat
was at first conducted in good order: but as the Romans
pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and fled for
safety to their own camp. This affair gave the Romans
better spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the
contrary effect on the Carthaginians. However, during the
next few days they both drew out on the intervening plain;
skirmished with their cavalry and light-armed troops; and, after
thus trying each other's mettle, were resolved to bring the matter
to the test of a general engagement.
Defeat of Hasdrubal Son of Gesco
On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a
Scipio resolves on a general engagement, and alters his disposition
so as to make the battle depend upon the Italians rather than the Spaniards. |
two-fold stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make
his demonstrations in force somewhat late in the day, with the
Libyans in his centre, and the elephants on either wing; while
his own practice had been to make his counter-movements somewhat later still, with the Roman soldiers on his centre opposite
the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings; but the day
on which he resolved upon a general engagement,
by reversing this arrangement, he greatly contributed to secure the victory for his own men, and
succeeded in putting the enemy at a considerable disadvantage. For directly it was light he
sent his aides with orders to the tribunes and
men to arm, as soon as they had got their
breakfasts, and parade outside the camp. The
order was obeyed with alacrity because the men
suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the
cavalry and light-armed forward, with orders to advance close
to the enemy's camp, and skirmish boldly up to it; while he
himself marched out with the infantry, just as the sun was
appearing above the horizon; and on reaching the middle of
the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse order to his
usual arrangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and the
Roman legionaries on the two wings.
The sudden approach of the cavalry to their camp, and the
simultaneous appearance of the rest of the army getting into
order, left the Carthaginians barely time to get under arms.
Hasdrubal was therefore obliged, without waiting for the men
to get breakfast, or making any preparations, to despatch his
cavalry and light-armed troops at once against the enemy's
cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into order on
some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains, as
was their custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet;
but when the morning was getting on, and the engagement
between the light-armed troops still continued undecided,
because such of them as were forced from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry and then formed again for
attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He
withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples,
and then distributed them equally between the two wings on
rear of his line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry.
He then advanced, at first in line direct; but when he was
about a stade
7 from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to
continue the advance in the same order, while he commanded
the maniples and squadrons on the right wing to turn outwards to the right, and those on the left wing to the left.
Scipio Outflanks the Enemy
Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from
the right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three
maniples (a combination of troops which the Romans call a
cohort), and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar
force from the left wing, turned the one to the left the other to
the right, and advanced at a great speed in column upon the
enemy, the troops in succession forming up and following in
column as they wheeled. When these troops were within a short
distance of the enemy,—the Iberians in the line direct being
still a considerable distance behind, because they were advancing at a deliberate pace,—they came into contact with the two
wings of the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in
column, according to Scipio's original plan. The movements subsequent to this, which resulted in the troops
on the rear finding themselves in the same line as the
troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy,
were exactly the converse of each other—taking the right
and left wings in general, and the cavalry and infantry in particular. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing
came into line on the right and tried to outflank the
enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the left;
but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the
right, the cavalry and velites by the left. The result of this
movement was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry
were concerned, their right became their left. Scipio cared little
for this, but was intent on something more important, namely,
the outflanking of the enemy. For while a general ought
to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he
ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances.
Carthaginians Driven From Spain
When these troops were at close quarters the elephants
were severely handled, being wounded and
harassed on every side by the velites and
cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes;
for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that
fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry,—
the Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre
occupied by the Libyans, and which was the best part of the
army, was never engaged at all. It could not quit its ground
to go to the support of the wings for fear of the attack of the
Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its position do any actual
fighting, because the enemy in front of it did not come to close
quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings fought
gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle
for life and death. But now the midday heat was become intense, and the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the
unusual time at which they had been forced to come on the
field had prevented them from fortifying themselves with the
proper food; while the Romans had the advantage in physical
vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was especially promoted
by the fact that the prudence of their general had secured his
best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the enemy.
Thus hard pressed Hasdrubal's centre began to retreat; at first
step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men
rushed in confusion to the skirts of the mountain; and on the
Romans pressing in pursuit with still greater violence, they
began a headlong flight into their entrenchments. Had not
Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have
been driven from their camp too; but a sudden storm
gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of
rain descended, under which the Romans with difficulty
effected a return to their own camp. . . .
Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in
The Romans in the mining district of Spain. |
trying to get the silver and gold which had been
melted and fused. . . .
Scipio on the Expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain in Consequence of the Above Victory
When every one complimented Scipio after he had
Scipio's idea of transferring the war to Africa. |
driven the Carthaginians from
Iberia, and
advised him straightway to take some rest and
ease, as having put a period to the war, he
answered that he "congratulated them on their sanguine
hopes; for himself he was now more than ever revolving in his
mind how to begin the war with
Carthage. Up to that time
the Carthaginians had waged war upon the Romans; but that
now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make war
upon them. . . ."
Scipio's Visit to Syphax, King of Masaesylians
See Livy, 28, 17, 18.
In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently
Scipio's influence over Syphax. |
endowed by nature in this respect, conducted
himself with so much kindness and tact, that
Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that
"Scipio appeared more formidable to him in such an interview
than in the field. . . ."
Scipio Suppresses A Mutiny in Spain
When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops
Scipio appeases a mutiny in the Roman camp, at Sucro. Livy, 28, 24. In the autumn of B. C. 206. |
in the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had
now had a very adequate experience of the
difficulties of administration, never felt himself more at a loss how to act or in greater
embarrassment. And naturally so. For as
in the case of the body, causes of mischief,
such as cold, heat, fatigue, or wounds, may be avoided
by precautions, or easily relieved when they occur; while those
which arise from within the body itself, such as tumours or
diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve when
they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and
military administration. Against plots from without, and the
attacks of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the
measures for relief may readily be learned by those who pay
the requisite attention; but to decide on the right method of
resisting intestine factions, revolutions, and disturbances is
difficult, and requires great tact and extreme acuteness; and,
moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable in my
opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this:
never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose,
and least of all at a time of success and when provisions are
abundant.
Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently
careful, acute, and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the
military tribunes and proposed a solution of the existing
troubles as follows. He said that "he must promise the
soldiers the settlement of their pay; and, in order to create a
belief in his promise, he must now take public steps to exact
with all speed the contributions which had been already
imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army,
with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure
was the settlement of the pay: and these same tribunes
should return to the army and urge and entreat the men
to abandon their rebellious spirit, and come to him to receive
their pay, either singly or, if they preferred it, in a body. And
when this was done he would consider, as circumstances arose,
what measures it was necessary to take."
Scipio's Plan to Punish the Rebels
With this suggestion in their minds these officers
deliberated on the means of raising money; and having
communicated their decisions to Scipio, he said that he would
now consult them on the next necessary step. They accordingly resolved that they would name a day on which all were
to appear; and that then they would pardon the general body
of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny,
who were as many as thirty-five. The day having arrived, and
the mutineers having appeared to make terms and receive their
pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes, who had
been sent on the mission to them, to meet them; and, each
of them selecting five of the ringleaders, to greet them with
politeness and invite them, if possible, to their own tent, or,
if they could not do that, to dinner or some such entertainment. But to the troops with him he sent round orders
to have provisions for a considerable period ready in three
days' time, because they were to march against the deserter
Andobales under Marcus Silanus. When they heard this
the mutineers were much emboldened, because they imagined that they would have everything in their own hands,
as the other troops would be gone by the time they joined
the general.
Suppression of the Mutiny
Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders
The mutiny suppressed and the ringleaders executed at New Carthage. |
to his army to march out the next morning at
daybreak with their baggage. But he instructed
the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they
met the mutineers, they should order their men
to put down their baggage, and keep them
under arms at the city gate; and then, placing a detachment at
each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers
should leave the city. The officers who had been sent to
meet the men fell in with them on their arrival, and took the
ringleaders with every appearance of civility to their own tents,
in accordance with the arrangement that had been made. At
the same time orders had been given to them to arrest the
thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep them in fetters:
without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except the
messenger who was to inform the general from each of them
that this had been accomplished.
The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at daybreak next morning,
seeing that the new arrivals were collected
Scipio's speech to the mutineers. |
in the market-place, the general gave the signal for the assembly of the army. The signal was as usual promptly obeyed
by all, for they were curious to see how the general would
demean himself in their presence, and what he would say to
them about the business in hand. As soon as they were come
together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their
soldiers under arms, and station them round the assembled
men. He then came forward himself. His first appearance
caused an immediate change of feeling. The
soldiers supposed that he was still unwell, and
when they suddenly saw him, contrary to all
expectations, with all the appearance of full health and strength,
they were struck with terror.
Scipio Harangues the Mutinous Troops
He began his speech by saying that he wondered what
their grievances were, or what they looked for forward that
induced them to mutiny. For that there were three motives
only on which men usually venture to rebel against their
country and their commanders,—discontent and anger with
their officers; dissatisfaction with their present position; or,
lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious. "Now, I
ask you," he continued, "which of these can you allege? It is
with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not
pay you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge; for
while I was in office your pay was never short. The fault then
may lie with
Rome that the accumulated arrears have not been
settled. Which was your proper course then in that case?
To have brought forward your complaint thus, as rebels and
enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to have come
personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged
your friends to support and help you? The latter would
have been the better plan in my opinion. In those who
serve others for pay it is sometimes pardonable to revolt
against their paymasters; but in the case of those who are
fighting for themselves, for their own wives and children, it
can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though, on
the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father,
a man were to come in arms to slay him from whom he received his own life. Or perhaps you may allege that I
imposed greater hardships and dangers on you than on the
others, and gave the rest more than their share of profits and
booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you
did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance
against me at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have
mutinied? I believe that not one of you will be able to express
or even conceive it.
Scipio's Speech Continued
"Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with
the position of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater?
When has
Rome won more victories, when have her arms
had brighter prospects than now? But perhaps some faint-heart will say that
our enemies have more numerous advantages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves.
Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and
Mandonius? But which of you is ignorant of the fact that
these men first betrayed the Carthaginians and joined us,
and now once more, in defiance of their oaths and pledges,
have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine thing
surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on
such men as these! Nor again had you any prospect of becoming masters of
Iberia by your own prowess: for you would not
have been strong enough, even in conjunction with Andobales,
to meet us in the field, to say nothing of doing so without
such aid. I should like then to ask,—what was it in which
you trusted? Surely not in the skill and valour of the leaders
whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which
were borne in front of them,—men of whom I will not deign
to say even another word. All this, my men, is absolutely
futile; nor will you be able to allege even the smallest just
complaint against me or your country. Wherefore I will
undertake your defence to
Rome and myself, by putting forward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold good.
And it is that,
a crowd is ever easily misled and easily induced
to any error. Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea,
which in its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall
violently upon it, assumes the character of the blasts which
lash it into fury: thus a multitude also is ever found to be
what its leaders and counsellors are. Acting on this consideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby offer you pardon
and amnesty for the past: but to the guilty authors of the
mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them
as their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves."
Execution of the Ringleaders
Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were
posted under arms round the assembly, clashed their swords
against their shields; and at the same instant
the ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in,
stripped and in chains. But such terror was
inspired in the men by the threatening aspect of the surrounding troops, and by the dreadful spectacle before them, that,
while the ringleaders were being scourged and beheaded, they
neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound, but remained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was
going on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged
and dragged off through the crowd dead; but the rest of the
men accepted with one consent the offer of an amnesty from
the general and officers; and then voluntarily came forward, one
by one, to take an oath to the tribunes that they would obey
the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to
Rome.
Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning
of serious danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former
good disposition. . . .
Scipio at New Carthage has heard of hostile movements on
the part of Andobales north of the Ebro, B. C. 206. See Livy, 28, 31-34.
Scipio Proposes to Fight Andobales
Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in
Scipio's address to his soldiers. |
New Carthage, and addressed them on the subject of the audacious proceedings of Andobales,
and his treachery to them; and by dwelling at
great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very
great eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded
to enumerate the battles they had already fought against the
Iberians and Carthaginians combined, the Carthaginians acting
as leaders in the campaigns. "Seeing," he added, "that
you always beat them, it does not now become you to
fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led
by Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian
of them all as a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake
the campaign by the unassisted services of my Roman soldiers:
in order to make it plain to all that it was not, as some
assert, by the aid of Iberians that we defeated the Carthaginians and drove them from
Iberia; but that it was by Roman
valour and your own gallantry that we have conquered Carthaginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore
disturb your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done
it before, approach this undertaking with courage undismayed.
For securing the victory I will with God's help make every
necessary provision." This speech filled the troops with such
zeal and confidence, that they presented all the appearance of
men whose enemies are in full view, and who are on the very
point of closing with them.
Scipio Defeats Andobales
Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next
Scipio marches to the Ebro, crosses it, and in fourteen days is in the presence of the enemy. |
day got his troops on the march, and having
reached the
Ebro in ten days and crossed it,
on the fourth day after that pitched his
camp near that of the enemy, with a valley between his own and the enemy's lines. Next
day he turned some cattle that had accompanied his army into this valley, after giving Caius Laelius
instructions to have the cavalry ready, and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians having at once
made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some of
the velites against them.
These two forces became engaged,
and reinforcements being sent to either party
from time to time, a severe infantry skirmishing
took place in the valley. The proper moment for attack being now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as
directed, charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between
them and the high ground, so that the greater number of
them were scattered about the valley and killed by the cavalry.
This event roused the barbarians to a furious desire to engage,
that they might not appear to be entirely reduced to despair
by their previous defeat; and accordingly by daybreak next
day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was
quite ready to give them battle; but when he saw that the
Iberians had come down into the valley in an imprudent
manner, and were stationing, not only their cavalry, but their
infantry also on the level ground, he waited for a time, because
he wished as many of the enemy as possible to take up a
position like that. He felt confidence in his cavalry, and still
more in his infantry; because, in such deliberate and hand-tohand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the Iberians
both in themselves and in their arms.
Scipio's Return To Rome
When he thought the right time had come he drew
Decisive victory of Scipio. |
out [the velites]
8 to oppose those of the
enemy who occupied the foot of the hills;
while against those who had descended
into the valley he led his main force from the camp in four
cohorts, and attacked the infantry. Caius Laelius at the
same time made a detour with the cavalry by the hills, which
stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the enemy's
horse on the rear; and so kept them occupied with fighting
him. The enemy's infantry therefore, being thus deprived of
the support of the cavalry, on which they had relied in
descending into the valley, were distressed and overmatched
in the battle; while their cavalry was in much the same plight:
for, being surprised on ground of insufficient extent, they fell
into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each other than
by the hands of the enemy; for their own infantry was pressing
upon their flank, and the enemy's infantry on their front, while
his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having
taken this course, the result was that nearly all those who
had descended into the valley lost their lives; while those who
had been stationed on the foot of the hills managed to escape.
These last were the light-armed troops, and formed about a
third of the whole army: with whom Andobales himself contrived to make good his escape to a certain stronghold of great
security. . . .
By further operations in this year, B. C. 206, Scipio had
compelled Mago to abandon Spain: and towards the winter the
Roman army went into winter-quarters at Tarraco.
Having thus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in
Scipio returns to Rome in the autumn of B. C. 206. |
Iberia, Scipio arrived at
Tarraco in high spirits,
bringing with him the materials of a brilliant
triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for
his country. But being anxious to arrive in
Rome before the consular elections, he arranged for the government
of
Iberia,
9 and,
having put the army into the hands of
Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked with Caius Laelius
and his other friends for
Rome. . . .
Antiochus Moves from Bactria Through Interior Asia
Antiochus in Bactria. See 10, 48, 49
Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he answered the envoy by saying that "Antiochus
The answer of Euthydemus (a Magnesian), king of Bactria, to Teleas, the envoy of Antiochus. |
was acting unjustly in trying to expel him from
his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted
subject, but had destroyed the descendant of
some who had been such, and so had obtained
the kingdom of Bactria." After adding more
arguments to the same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a
sincere mediator of peace, by urging Antiochus not to grudge
him the royal title and dignity, "for if he did not yield to
this demand, neither of them would be safe: seeing that great
hords of Nomads were close at hand, who were a danger to
both; and that if they admitted them into the country, it
would certainly be utterly barbarised." With these words
he sent Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been
looking about for some means of ending the controversy; and
when he was informed by Teleas of what Euthydemus had
said, he readily admitted these pleas for a pacification. And
after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between the two,
Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the
terms of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and
judging from his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of
his manners that he was worthy of royal power, he first promised to give him one of his own daughters, and secondly
conceded the royal title to his father. And having on the other
points caused a written treaty to be drawn up, and the terms
of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away; after
liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants
belonging to Euthydemus.
Antiochus continues his march into the interior of Asia. |
He crossed the
Caucasus10 and descended into India; renewed
his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of
the Indians; received more elephants, until he
had a hundred and fifty altogether; and having once more
provisioned his troops, set out again personally with his army:
leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty of taking home the
treasure which this king had agreed to hand over to him.
Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus,
he came through Drangene to Carmania; and, as it was now
winter, he put his men into winter quarters there.
This was
the extreme limit of the march of Antiochus into the interior:
in which he not only reduced the up-country Satraps to
obedience to his authority, but also the coast
cities, and the princes on this side Taurus; and,
in a word, consolidated his kingdom by overawing all his subjects with the exhibition of his boldness and
energy. For this campaign convinced the Europeans as well
as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power. . . .
