[1304b]
[1]
for instance the rich and the people, and there is no middle
class or only an extremely small one; for if either of the two sections becomes
much the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an encounter with its
manifestly stronger opponent. Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue
generally speaking do not cause faction, because they find themselves few
against many. Universally then in connection with all the forms of constitution
the origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of this nature.The means
used to cause revolutions of constitutions are sometimes force and sometimes
fraud. Force is employed either when the revolutionary leaders exert compulsion
immediately from the start or later on—as indeed the mode of using
fraud is also twofold: sometimes the revolutionaries after completely deceiving
the people at the first stage alter the constitution with their consent, but
then at a later stage retain their hold on it by force against the people's
will: for instance, at the time of the Four Hundred,1 they deceived the
people by saying that the Persian King would supply money for the war against
the Spartans, and after telling them this falsehood endeavored to keep a hold
upon the government; but in other cases they both persuade the people at the
start and afterwards repeat the persuasion and govern them with their
consent.Speaking generally therefore in
regard to all the forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated are
those from which revolutions have occurred.But in the light of these
general rules we must consider the usual course of events
[20]
as classified according to each different kind of
constitution. In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence
of the demagogues; for they cause the owners of property to band together,
partly by malicious prosecutions of individuals among them （for common
fear brings together even the greatest enemies）, and partly by setting
on the common people against them as a class. And one may see this taking place in this manner in many
instances. In Cos the democracy was overthrown2 when evil demagogues had arisen there,
for the notables banded themselves together; and also in Rhodes,3 for the demagogues used to provide pay for public
services, and also to hinder the payment of money owed4 to the naval captains, and these
because of the lawsuits that were brought against them were forced to make
common cause and overthrow the people. And also at Heraclea5 the people were put down
immediately after the foundation of the colony because of the people's leaders;
for the notables being unjustly treated by them used to be driven out, but later
on those who were driven out collecting together effected their return and put
down the people. And also the
democracy at Megara was put down in
a similar manner6;
the people's leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on
expelling many of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body, and
these came back and defeated the people in a battle and set up the oligarchy.
And the same thing happened also at Cyme
1 The oligarchy at Athens 411 B.C., cf. 1305a 27.
2 Date unknown.
3 See 1302b 23 n.
4 i.e. owed for repairs to the ships, and perhaps also for advances of pay to the crews.
5 Probably the Pontic Heraclea （cf. 1305b 5, 36, 1306a 37）, founded middle of the 6th century B.C., not the Trachinian.
6 See 1300a 18 ff. n.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944.
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