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[1317b]
[1]
for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. But one
factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular
principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if
this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be
sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute
justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so
that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich,
because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is
sovereign. This then is one mark of
liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one
is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of
liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a
slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim
not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be
governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes
to equalitarian liberty.1
And these principles having been
laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following
institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all;
government of each by all,
[20]
and of all
by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do
not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a
very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same
person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all
offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all
citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most
and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official
accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be
sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few;
or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters （and a council is the most
democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of
pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of
its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty of
pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this one2）; also
payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts,
magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and
sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are bound3 to have common mess tables. Also inasmuch as
oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications
are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in
respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life,
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944.
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