[435a]
to
the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by
side1 and
rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks2 we may cause
the spark of justice to flash forth,3 and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own
minds.” “Well,” he said, “that seems
a sound method4 and that is what we must
do.” “Then,” said I, “if you call a
thing by the same5 name whether it is big
or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or
like?” “Like,” he said. “Then a just
man too
1 Cf. Sophist 230 Bτιθέασι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλας, Isocrates Areopagiticus 79, Nic. 17.
2 Cf. L and S. and Morgan, “De Ignis Eliciendi Modis,”Harvard Studies, vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius (Ruelle, p. 54, line 18)καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ εξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται φῶς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων προστριβομένων.
3 Cf. Gorgias 484 B, Epistle vii. 344 B.
4 Plato often observes that a certain procedure is methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be.
5 ὅ γε ταὐτόν: there are several reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato's ethical theory and an essential feature in the structure of the Republic. Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake (cf.. Introduction p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time important principles of logic afterwards codified in the treatises of Aristotle.γε marks the inference from the very meaning of ταὐτόν. Cf. on 379 B, 389 B, and Politicus 278 E; cf. also Parmenides 139 E. The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 D-E), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text.
Purchase a copy of this text (not necessarily the same edition) from Amazon.com
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.