Chapter IV
Use of the Moods.
[*] 230.
This chapter treats of all constructions which require any
other form of the finite verb than the simple indicative in absolute
assertions and direct questions
(2). The infinitive and participle are included
here so far as either of them is used in indirect discourse, in protasis
or apodosis, and in other constructions (as with
πρίν and
ὥστε) in which the finite moods also are
used.
[*] 231.
These constructions are discussed under the following
heads:—
I. The potential optative and indicative.
II. The imperative and subjunctive in commands, exhortations,
and prohibitions.—Subjunctive and indicative with
μή and
μὴ οὐ in cautious assertions.—
Ὅπως and
ὅπως μή with the independent
future indicative or subjunctive.
III. The subjunctive (like the future indicative) in
independent sentences.—The interrogative subjunctive.
IV.
Οὐ μή with
the subjunctive or future indicative.
V. Final and object clauses after
ἵνα, ὡς, ὅπως, ὄφρα, and
μή.
VI. Conditional sentences.
VII. Relative and temporal sentences, including consecutive
sentences with
ὥστε, etc.
VIII. Indirect discourse.
IX. Causal sentences.
X. Expressions of a wish.
Section I: The Potential Optative and Indicative.
[*] 232.
We find fully established in the Homeric language a use of
the optative and the past tenses of the indicative with
ἄν or
κέ, which expresses the action of the verb
as dependent on circumstances or conditions; as
ἔλθοι ἄν,
he
might (
could or
would)
go;
ἦλθεν ἄν,
he might (
could
or
would)
have
gone. Such an optative or indicative is called
potential.
I. Potential Optative.
[*] 233.
It has already been seen
(13) that Homer sometimes uses the optative in a
weak future sense, without
κέ or
ἄν, to
express a concession or permission. Such neutral forms seem to form a
connecting link between the simple optative in wishes and the optative
with
ἄν, partaking to a
certain extent of the nature of both. (For a full discussion of these
forms and their relations, see Appendix I.) Such expressions seem to
show that the early language used forms like
ἔλθοιμι and
ἴδοιμι in two senses,
I may go and
I may see, or
may I go and
may I
see, corresponding to
ἔλθω and
ἴδω in
their two Homeric senses
I shall go and
I shall see
(284), or
let me go and
let me see
(257).
[*] 234.
The neutral optatives like
Il. iv. 18 are rare even in
Homer, the language having already distinguished the two meanings in
sense, and marked them in most cases by external signs. The optative
expressing what may happen in the future took the particle
κέ or
ἄν, and was negatived by
οὐ, denoting the relations
which we express by our potential mood with
may,
can, might, could, would, and
should. Thus
ἕλοιμί κε
ἤ κεν ἁλοίην,
I may slay or I may
be slain,
Il. xxii. 253;
ἀνὴρ δέ κεν οὔ τι Διὸς νόον
εἰρύσσαιτο,
a man cannot contend
against the will of Zeus,
Il. viii. 143.1 On the other hand, the simple optative (without
κέ or
ἄν) was more and more
restricted to the expression of a wish or exhortation, and was negatived
by
μή; as
μὴ γένοιτο,
may it not happen,
“
πίθοιό μοι,”
“listen to me”
(Hom. Od. iv.
193)
, as opposed to
οὐκ ἂν
γένοιτο,
it could not
happen. The potential forms
ἔλθοιμι ἄν and
ἴδοιμι ἄν differ from the more absolute future
indicative and the old subjunctive forms
ἔλθω and
ἴδω,
I shall
go and
I shall see, by expressing a
future act as dependent on some future circumstances or conditions,
which may be more or less distinctly implied. The freedom of the earlier
language extended the use of the potential optative to present and
sometimes even to past time.
See 438 and 440.
[*] 235.
In most cases the limiting condition involved in the
potential optative is not present to the mind in any definite form, and
can be expressed in English only by such words as
perchance, possibly, or
probably, or by the auxiliaries
could,
would, should, might, etc. with the vague conditions which
these imply (like
if he should try, if he pleased,
if he could, if what is natural should happen, etc.)
Sometimes a more general condition is implied, like
in any possible case; as
οὐκ ἂν δεχοίμην τοῦτο,
I would
not accept this (
on any terms);
here the expression becomes nearly absolute, and may often be translated
by our future, as
οὐκ ἂν
μεθείμην τοῦ θρόνου,
I will not
give up the throne (
AR. Ran. 830), or (in positive
sentences) by
must, as
πάντες θαυμάζοιεν ἂν τοῦτο,
all must admire this.
The optative thus used with no conscious feeling of any
definite condition, but still implying that
the statement is conditioned and not absolute, is the simplest and most
primitive potential optative. It is equivalent to the Latin potential
subjunctive, as
credas,
dicas,
cernas,
putes, etc.,
you
may believe, say, perceive, think, etc. The Homeric language
has six forms, all expressing futurity with different degrees of
absoluteness and distinctness; as
ὄψομαι, ὄψομαί κε, ἴδωμαι, ἴδωμαί κε, ἰδοίμην,
ἰδοίμην κε (or
ἄν), containing every step from
I shall
see to
I should see. Of these
only the first and the last (with a tradition of the second) survived
the Homeric period, and the others (especially the fifth) were already
disappearing during that period
(240), being found unnecessary as the language
became settled, and as the optative with
κέ or
ἄν became more fixed as a future potential form.
[*] 236.
In the following examples of the potential optative no
definite form of condition is present to the mind:—
“
Ἐμοὶ δὲ τότ᾽ ἂν πολὺ
κέρδιον εἴη,”
“but it would at that time (be likely to)
profit me far more.”
Il. xxii.
108.
“
Φεύγωμεν: ἔτι γάρ κεν
ἀλύξαιμεν κακὸν ἦμαρ,”
“let us flee; for perchance we may still
escape the evil day.”
Od. x.
269.
“
Πλησίον ἀλλήλων: καί κεν
διοϊστεύσειας,”
“the rocks are close together: you might
perhaps shoot an arrow across the space.”
Od. xii.
102.
So
Od.
xxiii. 125.
“
Οὐκοῦν πόροις ἂν τήνδε
δωρεὰν ἐμοί;”
“would you then grant me this favour?”
AESCH. Prom.
616.
So
“
πᾶν γὰρ ἂν .πύθοιό μου,”
“for you can learn anything (you please) from
me.”
Ib. 617.
“
Τί τόνδ᾽ ἂν εἴποις
ἄλλο;”
“what else could you say of this man?”
SOPH. Ant.
646.
So
Ant.
552 and
652.
Πολλὰς ἂν
εὕροις μηχανάς,
“you can find many devices.”
And. 85.
Ἕψομαί τοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν
λειφθείην,
“I will follow you and in no case will I be left
behind.”
HDT. iv. 97.
Οἱ μὲν (sc.
λέγοντες)
ὡς οὐδενὶ ἂν τρόπῳ ἔλθοιεν οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι.
THUC. vi. 35.
Ἔνθα πολλὴν μὲν σωφροσύνην
καταμάθοι ἄν τις.
XEN. An. i. 9, 3. So
Mem. i. 3,
Mem. 5,
Mem. iii. 5,
Mem. 1 and 7.
Δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν
ἐμβαίης,
you cannot step twice into the
same river (saying of Heraclitus).
PLAT. Crat. 402A.
Οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς
οὐδ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο,
“there is none and there could be none.”
Ib. Phil.
16B; so
64 B.
Ἀκούοις ἄν,
“you can hear.”
Rep. 487E.
Δειξάτω ὡς οἱ Θετταλοὶ νῦν
οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθεροι γένοιντο ἄσμενοι,
“let him show that they would not now gladly
become free.”
DEM. ii. 8.
Ἡδέως δ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγ᾽ ἐροίμην
Λεπτίνην,
“but I would gladly ask Leptines.”
Id. xx. 129.
Εἰ ἠγνόησε ταῦτα, γένοιτο γὰρ
ἂν καὶ τοῦτο,
if he did not know
this,—
and it might easily so
happen.
Ib. 143.
Οὔτ᾽ ἂν οὗτος ἔχοι λέγειν
οὔθ᾽ ὑμεῖς πεισθείητε.
Id. Ib. xxii. 17.
Ποῖ οὖν τραποίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἔτι;
“ in what other direction could we possibly turn?”
PLAT. Euthyd.
290A.
Οὐκ ἂν μεθείμην τοῦ θρόνου,
“I will not give up the throne.”
AR. Ran.
830.So
οὐκ ἂν
δεχοίμην,
AESCH. Eum. 228.
Τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀγάσαιτο τῶν
ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων τῆς ἀρετῆς;
who would not admire the valour of these
men? (i.e.
every one must admire their
valour).
DEM. xviii. 204.
Βουλοίμην ἄν,
I should like, is used like
velim. For
ἐβουλόμην ἄν,
vellem,
see 246.
[*] 237.
The potential optative in the second person may have the
force of a mild command or exhortation. E.g.
So probably
Il. ii. 250:
τῷ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ᾽ ἔχων
ἀγορεύοις,
therefore you must not
take kings upon your tongue and talk (or
do not take, etc.)
[*] 238.
Occasionally the potential optative expresses what may
hereafter prove to be true or to have been true. E.g.
Ποῦ δῆτ᾽ ἂν εἶεν οἱ ξένοι;
where may the strangers be? (i.e.
where is it likely to turn out that they are?）
SOPH. El. 1450.
