§ ii. The Framework of the Dialogue.
(A) The Method of Narration and the Preface.
The Platonic dialogues, viewed from the point of view of literary form, may be
divided into two chief classes. To the first class belong those in which the story
of the discussion is told
directly by one of the protagonists; to the
second class belong those in which the story is told
indirectly or at second-hand,—a mode of narration which involves the
further characteristic that dialogues of this class are necessarily prefaced (and
concluded) by some explanatory paragraphs. This second class, moreover, falls into
two subdivisions, according as the narrator is or is not represented as being
himself present at the discussion. It is to the latter of these
subdivisions, in which the narrator is
not an eye-witness but
reports the matter only at secondhand, that the
Symposium (together
with the
Theaetetus and
Parmenides) belongs.
It is noteworthy also that, with the exception of the
Phaedo and
Parmenides, ours is the only dialogue in which the narrating
witness is not Socrates himself. The reason for this is obvious: eulogy of Socrates
being one of the main purposes of the dialogue, it would be unfitting to put the
story into his mouth, and make him the trumpeter of his own praises. Instead of
doing so, Plato selects as the sources of the narrative persons of such a character
as to produce the effect of verisimilitude. The way in which Aristodemus, the
primary source, and Apollodorus, the secondary source, are described is evidently
intended to produce the impression that in them we have reliable witnesses.
Apollodorus
1, “the fanatic,” is put before us not
only as a worshipper of Socrates, imbued with a passionate interest in philosophical
discourses such as are here to be related, but also as an intimate disciple who had
“companied with” Socrates for the space of nearly three years
past and during that time had made it his peculiar task to study the every act and
word of the Master (172 E). Moreover, the story of the special occasion in question
he had diligently conned (
οὐκ ἀμελέτητος,
172 A,
173 C).
Aristodemus
2, the primary source and actual
narrator, is spoken of by Apollodorus as “an old disciple” and
one of the most intimate with the Master in earlier years, and in his own narrative
he represents himself as following Socrates with dog-like fidelity, and showing the
closest familiarity with his ways and habits—a man so single-hearted, so
engrossed in matters of fact, as to be constitutionally incapable of tampering with
the truth. As the “minute biographer,” Aristodemus is the
prototype of all later Boswells.
Further, the impression of veracity made by the character of the
narrators is enhanced by the express statement that in regard to some points at
least (
ἔνια 173 B) the account of Aristodemus was
confirmed by Socrates. The points in question are probably (as Hug observes) those
which specially concern the picture drawn of Socrates himself. At any rate, it is in
regard to these that we have the detailed testimony of Alcibiades, emphasized by
repeated asseverations (214 E,
215 A, etc.), and
endorsed by the silence of Socrates.
In addition to the evidence it contains for the dates of the narration and of the
banquet
3, and the vivid picture in miniature
which it presents of a certain group of Socratics in whom an ardent admiration for
the Master was blended with a limited capacity for understanding the deeper side of
his practice and doctrine—as if to go barefoot and to rail at filthy lucre
were the sum and substance of Socraticism,—there are two further points in
the Preface which deserve attention.
Apollodorus, although asked only for the
λόγοι
spoken at the banquet (172 B,
173 E), proceeds to
give a full account of the accompanying incidents as well (
ἐξ
ἀρχῆς...διηγήσασθαι 174 A). This may be taken to indicate that for
estimating the effect of the dialogue as a whole we are meant to pay regard not only
to the series of encomia but also to the framework of incident and conversation in
which they are set.
Glaucon, in asking Apollodorus for the desired information concerning the
“erotic discourses,” states (172 B) that he has already heard an
account of them from “another man” (
ἄλλος τις), which account was unsatisfactory (
οὐδὲν σαφές), and that the authority quoted by this unnamed
informant was “Phoenix, son of Philippos.” To this Apollodorus
adds the fact (173 B) that this Phoenix was indebted to the same source as himself,
namely Aristodemus. What precisely these statements signify it is not easy to
determine, since the identity of Phoenix, as well as that of the anonymous informant
(
ἄλλος τις), is unknown to us. But it seems
reasonable to infer that there was already in existence, when Plato wrote, at least
one other account of a banquet at which Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon figured,
and that it is Plato's intention to discredit it. That such is the intention is
shown not only by the phrase
οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφὲς
λέγειν, but also by the statement that the evidence of
ἄλλος τις was one degree further off from the primary
source (Aristodemus) than is that of Apollodorus. Further, the assumption of some
such controversial intention throws light on the emphasis laid on
the veracity of the narrative—to which attention has been drawn
above—and gives it a more definite motive. It is as if the author means us
to read into his preface something to this effect: “Socrates has been
misrepresented: it is my task to clear his reputation by putting the facts in their
true light.”
If this, then, be a right reading of the hints thus given, what is the distorted
account which Plato thus discredits, and who its author? Unfortunately this must
remain a matter of conjecture. The most obvious suggestion to make is that the
author in question is Xenophon, and the account alluded to his
Symposium. But Xenophon's
Symposium is most probably a
later work than Plato's; and it is a further objection that the persons represented
by Xenophon as present at the banquet are not—with the exception of
Socrates—the persons mentioned by Glaucon.
We are obliged, therefore, to look further afield for the author whose identity is
thus shrouded. The best suggestion I can offer is that Polycrates the rhetor is the
writer intended. In favour of this we may adduce the fact that Polycrates is
ὁ κατήγορος whose calumnies Xenophon aims at
refuting in his
Memorabilia4. It is by no means
improbable
à priori that Polycrates in his attacks
on Socrates described, amongst other incidents, a banqueting-scene in which Socrates
and Alcibiades were pictured in an odious light. And if we take the
Banquet of Xenophon to be a genuine work, the very fact that Xenophon
thought it necessary to supplement his
Memorabilia by such a work
might be construed as showing that the author of the slanders he is at such pains to
refute had already libelled Socrates in connexion with a similar scene. But unless,
by some happy chance, further light should be shed upon the history of
Polycrates' literary activity, it is hardly possible to get beyond the region of
conjectural speculation, or to hope for a definitive solution of this obscure
literary problem.
(B) The Prologue of Aristodemus.
In the Prologue, with which Aristodemus's narrative opens, special attention may be
drawn to the following points:—
a It is significant that the first person to appear on the scene is Socrates. We
are led at once to admire his good humour and ready wit as shown in the playful tone
of his conversation (1) with Aristodemus (174 A, B), in which he makes jesting
quotations from Homer and indulges in a pun on the name of Agathon (cp. the pun he
makes on Gorgias,
198 C); and (2) with Agathon (175
C—E). These amiable traits in the character of Socrates are further
illustrated in other parts of the dialogue.
b Socrates on the way becomes lost in thought and fails to put in an appearance
till the banquet is already far advanced (174 D,
175
C). Aristodemus explains to Agathon (175 B) that this is no exceptional
occurrence (
ἔθος τι τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει). That this
incident is intended to be specially emphasized as typical of Socrates' habits
becomes clear when we notice how Alcibiades in his speech (220 C) describes a
similar incident as taking place in one of the campaigns in which he served. The
corroboration thus effected is one of many examples of the literary care and
ingenuity with which Plato in this dialogue interweaves incident with speech.
Another example occurs a little further on (176 C) where Eryximachus, discussing the
question “to drink or not to drink,” describes Socrates as
ἱκανὸς ἀμφότερα: this statement, too, we find
amplified and confirmed by Alcibiades (220 A). Both these matters illustrate that
entire subordination of flesh to spirit in which Socrates was unique.
c Agathon (175 C ff.) expresses a desire to share in the “witty
invention” which Socrates had discovered on his way: Socrates with his
usual mock-modesty disclaims for himself the possession of
σοφία, except of a poor kind, but congratulates Agathon on the fine
and abundant
σοφία he has just been displaying so
conspicuously: and the conversational banter concludes with Agathon's
remark—“Presently, with the Wine-god as umpire, you and I will
fight out our wisdommatch.” Here, at this early stage, we have struck for
us one of the key-notes of the dialogue. For one main motive of the dialogue as a
whole is to exhibit the
σοφία of Socrates, his
intellectual as well as moral supremacy. And we find, in the sequel,
that this is done largely by pitting him against Agathon, over the wine-bowl. In
this we have the reason for the juxtaposition of the two speeches, matched, as it
were, one against the other. His speech is, in itself, one sufficient proof of the
superiority of Socrates over his rival. But there are also other proofs: there is
the masterly criticism and confutation to which Socrates subjects the belauded poet;
there is the express statement, confirmed by expressive action, of Alcibiades, in
which is asserted the superiority of Socrates not merely to Agathon but to all
others who make claim to
σοφία (213 E,
215 C ff.); and finally the Wine-god himself bestows on
Socrates the palm when, in the concluding scene, we see him alone pursuing
discussion with unflagging zeal and with a clearness of head undimmed by long and
deep potations while his rival drowses and succumbs to sleep. Thus the
διαδικασία περὶ τῆς σοφίας runs through the book, and
always, from beginning to end,
νικᾷ ὁ Σωκράτης.
To this we may add one minor point. Agathon, in this preliminary play of wit,
applies to Socrates the epithet
ὑβριστής,
“a mocker.” And this, too, is a trait upon which Alcibiades, in
the sequel, lays much stress.
ὕβρις is one of the
most striking characteristics of the SatyrSocrates (216 E,
219 C).
d Another example of the literary interweaving—or the method of
“responsions,” as we might term it,—which is so marked
a feature of the dialogue, is to be found in the statement of Socrates concerning
the character of his own knowledge. His speciality in the way of science is, he
announces, “erotics,” and this is his only speciality (177 D).
Accordingly, when we find Socrates in the sequel delivering a discourse on this
subject we are evidently intended by Plato to feel that his views are to be taken
seriously as those of one who professed to be an expert in this subject if in
nothing else. And this intention is emphasized when we come to the later passage
(the “responsion”) in
198 D
where Socrates again refers to his conviction that concerning
“erotics” he knew the truth (
εἰδὼς τὴν
ἀλήθειαν). It is hardly necessary to add that
“erotics,” construed in the Socratic sense, constitutes by no
means an insignificant department of knowledge (
φαύλη τις
σοφία 175 E), as Socrates modestly implies, inasmuch as it is
practically coextensive with a theory of education and involves an insight into the
origin, nature and destiny of the human soul.
e In
177 B we have an interesting parallel between
Plato's language and that of Isocrates. In
Hel. 210 B,
“
τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοὺς βομβυλίους καὶ τοὺς
ἅλας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βουληθέντων ἐπαινεῖν κ.τ.λ.,”
Isocrates scoffs at the eulogists of “bees and salt and such-like
trumpery,” and his language is echoed in the allusion (put in the mouth of
Eryximachus quoting Phaedrus) to a
βιβλίον ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ
ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν
(177 B). This eulogist of salt is commonly supposed to be Polycrates, since encomia
on similar paltry subjects—mice,
χύτραι,
ψῆφοι—are ascribed to him
5.
Dümmler, however
6, takes the reference to be to Antisthenes
(
Protreptikos), on the strength of the statement in Pollux VI. 16.
98:
βομβύλιος δὲ τὸ στενὸν ἔκπωμα καὶ βομβοῦν ἐν τῇ
πόσει, ὡς Ἀντισθένης ἐν προτρεπτικῷ. And for
ἅλες as eulogized in the same work he quotes also
Rep. 372 B ff. (
ὄψον ἕξουσιν ἅλας). It may be added that a further allusion to
the
βομβύλιος, as
στενὸν
ἔκπωμα, may be discovered in the mention of
ἔκπωμα μέγα in
Sympos.
213 E. Since Antisthenes seems to have devoted a good deal of attention to
the subject of
μέθη7, one is inclined
to suppose that his views are alluded to in
Sympos. (176, 213-14);
and another allusion to him may be found in the mention of the
χρηστοὶ σοφισταί who eulogized Heracles (177 B), since Heracles was,
notoriously, the patron-saint of the Cynics
8. However much they might differ on other points, Plato and Isocrates were
agreed in so far as both found the Cynic leader an objectionable person.
f A significant indication is given us at the conclusion of the Prologue that the
account of the speeches which follows is not an exhaustive account, but only a
selection. And it is a selection that has been sifted twice.
For Apollodorus states (178 A) that neither did Aristodemus remember
all the views put forward by
every
speaker, nor did he (Apollodorus) remember all that Aristodemus had related. This
statement is further confirmed by the later statement (180 C) that Aristodemus
passed over the discourses of several speakers who followed next after Phaedrus. We
are to infer, therefore, that there was a good deal of speechifying at the banquet
which was not
ἀξιομνημόνευτον. But why Plato is at
pains to emphasize this point is not wholly clear. It may, of course,
be merely a literary device meant to enhance the verisimilitude of the account,
since the speeches actually related might be thought insufficient to occupy the
length of time supposed to elapse between the end of the
δεῖπνον and the hour of Alcibiades' arrival—which would
probably not be early. It is possible, however, that we should look for a deeper
reason. If so, may not the intention be to brush aside and discredit other speeches
stated by another author
9 (
ἄλλος τις,
172 B) to have been delivered on this occasion?
(C) The Interludes.
The
first Interlude, worthy of the name, occurs between the
second and third encomia (185 C—E), and it is noticeable, first, for the
reference to the “isology” of the rhetorical sophists; secondly,
for the device by which the natural order of speakers is changed (Eryximachus taking
the place of Aristophanes); and thirdly, for the alleged cause which renders such a
change necessary, namely the hiccough (
λύγξ) of
Aristophanes. As regards the significance of this last matter considerable diversity
of opinion exists among the commentators. Of the ancients, Olympiodorus (
vit. Plat. 3) supposed that Plato here
ἐκωμῴδησε Ἀριστοφάνη when he
εἰσάγει
αὐτὸν μεταξὺ λυγγὶ περιπεσόντα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον πληρῶσαι τὸν
ὕμνον: and similarly Athenaeus (187 C) writes
τὸν
μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς λυγγὸς ὀχλούμενον...κωμῳδεῖν ἤθελε καὶ
διασύρειν: and Aristides (
or. 46, II. p. 287),
ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι λύζειν αὐτὸν ἔδει, ἵνα εἰς ἀπληστίαν
σκωφθῇ. Of the moderns, some have followed the ancients in supposing
that the incident is meant to satirize Aristophanes and his intemperate habits (so
Stallbaum, Rückert, Steinhart); while some (Stephens, Sydenham, Wolf,
Schwegler) take the object of the ridicule to be not so much the habits of the poet
as his speech with its “indelicate ingredients.” On the other
hand, Schleiermacher held the view that Eryximachus with his
“physiological and medical notion of love” is here being
satirized; while Ast—whose view is shared in the main by Hommel, van
Prinsterer and Rettig—argued that the real object of the ridicule is
Pausanias, by whose speech Aristophanes implies that he has been “fed
up” to the point of loathing. This view Rettig thinks is supported by the
phrase
Παυσανίου παυσαμένου, which he takes to
indicate Apollodorus' ridicule,—by the allusion made by Aristophanes to
Pausanias' speech in
189 C,—and by his
mention of Pausanias again in
193 B; and he
construes the hint of another possible cause (
ἢ ὑπό τινος ἄλλου,
185 C) as
“affording the key to the hidden meaning of the word
πλησμονή.” This view, however, is open to the objections
(urged by Rückert against Ast) that, first, it makes Aristophanes guilty of
excessive rudeness in feigning a hiccough to show his disgust (“aliud est
in convivio iocari, aliud in scena,”
e.g. Nub. 906
ff.,
Ach. 585 ff., the places cited by Rettig); and that, further,
there is no plain sign that the hiccough was feigned, but on the contrary the whole
incident is stated by Aristodemus as matter-of-fact. It seems safe, therefore, to
conclude that the most obvious view— that of the ancients—is
nearest to the truth. The incident shows up Aristophanes in a ludicrous light, and
at the same time it gives further occasion to Eryximachus to air his medical lore;
so that we can read in it the intention of satirizing gently both these personages.
But to construe it as aimed at Pausanias is far-fetched and improbable: he is
already disposed of in the satirical reference to sophistical
“isology”; and to discover a fresh allusion to him in the
“other cause” of the hiccough is to discover a mare's nest,
for—as the Scholiast
ad loc. informs
us—other physical causes of this symptom were as a matter of fact
recognized by the medical profession, and it is only polite on the part of
Aristodemus to leave the matter open.
The
second Interlude (189 A—C) and the
third (193 D—194 E) call for no special remark.
The
fourth Interlude (198 A—199 C), which follows
on the speech of Agathon, is linked to the third both by a remark which Socrates
addresses to Eryximachus, and also, at the close, by his appeal to Phaedrus (cp.
199 B with
194
D). Here, in even a greater degree than in the previous Interludes, Socrates
is the central figure of interest, and this position he continues to hold throughout
the rest of the dialogue. This Interlude, indeed, may be regarded as one of the
cardinal points of the structure, in which the First Act, as we may term it, passes
on into the Second; and in the Second Act we reach at length the theoretical climax,
in the doctrine of Socrates-Diotima. To this climax the present Interlude, wherein
is laid before us Socrates' confession of rhetorical faith, serves as prologue.
The
fifth Interlude (212 C—215 A) is by far the
longest and, as regards the action of the piece, the most important. For it
introduces a new actor, and he a protagonist, in the person of Alcibiades. The
contrast is striking between the prophetess in her soaring flights to the heavenly
places of the spirit and the tipsy reveller with his lewd train who takes her place
in claiming the attention of the audience. The comic relief which, in
the earlier scenes, had been supplied by Aristophanes, as
γελωτοποιός, is now supplied by Alcibiades. We should notice also how
a link with the Second Act is furnished here, at the commencement of the Third Act,
by the mention of an attempt by Aristophanes to reply to an observation made by
Socrates in the course of his speech. But apart from this, the rest of the speakers
and banqueters are left out of account except only Agathon, Socrates and
Eryximachus. The action of the last of these here is parallel to his action at the
commencement of the First Act where he had taken the lead in fixing the rules for
the conduct of the symposium. As regards Agathon and Socrates, the most important
incident in this Interlude is the decision concerning their contest in
σοφία which is pronounced by Alcibiades, when, acting the
not inappropriate part of Dionysus, he awards the crown to Socrates,—an
incident to the significance of which we have already (§ ii. B, C) drawn
attention.
Of the
Epilogue or concluding scene (222 C—end) it is
unnecessary to say much. The persons that figure most largely in it are the three
central characters, Alcibiades, Agathon and Socrates; while towards the close the
rest of the characters receive, as it were, a farewell notice. When the curtain
finally falls, it falls significantly on the solitary figure of Socrates, the
incarnation of the Eros-daemon, behind whom in his shadow stands the form of his
erastes, the “shadow”-biographer Aristodemus.
