[
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The campaign of Shiloh.1
On the 22d of January, 1862,
Colonel Roger A. Pryor, a member of the Military Committee of the lower branch of the Confederate Congress, visited my headquarters at
Centreville, Virginia, and in his own name, as also for the representatives in Congress of the Mississippi Valley States, urged me to consent to be transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the Confederate forces at
Columbus, Kentucky, within the Department of Kentucky and
Tennessee, under the superior command of
General Albert Sidney Johnston,--a transfer which he said
Mr. Davis would not direct unless it was agreeable to me, but which was generally desired at
Richmond because of the recent crushing disaster at
Mill Springs, in eastern Kentucky: the defeat and death of
Zollicoffer.
Against the monitions of some of my friends at
Richmond, and after much hesitation and disinclination to sever my relations with such an army as that of the
Potomac, but upon the assurance that
General Johnston's command embraced an aggregate of at least seventy thousand men of all arms, which, though widely scattered, might, by virtue of the possession of the “interior lines,” be concentrated and operated offensively, I gave
Colonel Pryor authority to inform
Mr. Davis of my readiness to be thus transferred.
Upon the return of
Colonel Pryor to
Richmond, I was, on the 26th of January, ordered to proceed at once “to report to
General A. S. Johnston at
Bowling Green,
Kentucky,” and thence
[
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as promptly as possible to assume my new command at
Columbus, “which,” said my orders, “is threatened by a powerful force, and the defense of which is of vital importance.”
Dispatching
Colonel Thomas Jordan, my chief of staff, to
Richmond, with a view to secure from the War Department certain aids to the proper organization of the troops I was to command, I left
Centreville on the 2d of February and reached
Bowling Green about the 5th.
General Johnston, whom I had never seen before, welcomed me to his department with a cordiality and earnestness that made a deep impression on me at the time.
As he informed me,
General Buell's army, fully 75,000 strong, was on the line of
Bacon Creek, on the Louisville and Nashville railroad, about 40 miles from
Bowling Green.
General Grant had about 20,000 men in hand at or about
Cairo, ready to move either upon
Fort Henry or
Fort Donelson.
General Pope, having a force of not less than 30,000 men in
Missouri, was menacing
General Polk's positions, including New Madrid, while
General Halleck, exercising command over the whole of this force of 125,000 men of all arms, had his headquarters at
St. Louis.
On the other hand,
General Johnston (as he stated, to my surprise) had an “aggregate effective” of not over 45,000 men of all arms, thus distributed: at
Bowling Green, his headquarters, not over 14,000; at
Forts Henry and
Donelson, 5500; in the quarter of
Clarksville, Tennessee, 8000; besides 17,000 under
General Polk, chiefly at
Columbus, and for the most part imperfectly organized, badly armed and equipped.
As may be seen from any map of the region, the chief part of this force occupied a defensive line facing northwardly, the two salient extremities of which were
Bowling Green, some 70 miles by railway in advance of
Nashville, and
Columbus, about 110 miles west of
Bowling Green.
This line was penetrated, almost centrally, by the
Cumberland and
Tennessee rivers, respectively, at points in
Tennessee just south of the
Kentucky line, twelve miles apart, at which
Fort Henry had been established on the east bank of the
Tennessee, and
Fort Donelson on the west bank of the
Cumberland, thus constituting the reentering angle of the line.
These vital works
General Johnston described as defective in more than one respect and unready, but said that he had sent his chief engineer to improve their effectiveness as far as possible.
So unpromising was the situation and so different from what had been represented before I left
Virginia, that my first impulse was to return at once; but this idea was abandoned at the earnest request of
General Johnston.
However, after an inspection of the works at and around
Bowling Green, I found that while strong against any direct attack, they could be readily turned on their right, and I so stated to
General Johnston.
His reply was, that in the event of a serious flank movement he must evacuate the position, having no relieving army to support it. In the face of this self-evident military proposition, I recommended the immediate evacuation of a position so salient as
Bowling Green, that must fall from its own weight if turned-leaving there only a cavalry force in observation, and concentrating at once all our available strength at
Henry and
Donelson, information having just reached us of the aggressive presence of General
[
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Grant on the
Tennessee River.
That recommendation was not adopted, for the alleged reason that, in the event of a failure to defeat
General Grant as proposed, our forces thus assembled might be caught and crushed between the armies of
Grant and
Buell, and that it would also expose to capture the large stock of military supplies collected so far in advance as
Bowling Green and
Clarksville, as well as at
Nashville.
In this decision sight was certainly lost of the facts that having no pontoon-train,
General Buell could not possibly throw his army across the
Cumberland, between
Donelson and
Nashville, so as to prevent the
Confederates from falling safely back behind
Duck River, or retreating upon
Nashville behind the
Cumberland, as we would hold the interior or shorter lines.
Fort Henry having fallen after an ineffective but gallant defense of twenty-four hours, immediately thereafter the railroad bridge across the
Tennessee, about twelve miles southward of the surrendered fortress, was destroyed.
The direct line of communication between our forces eastward of that stream and those at
Columbus having thus been broken, on the 7th of February I again urged as imperative the swift concentration of all our then available forces upon
Donelson.
General Johnston, however, asserting that
Fort Donelson was not “tenable,” would only support the position by directing the force at
Clarksville to cross to the south side of the
Tennessee River, and ordered immediate “preparations” to be made for the “removal” of the army at
Bowling Green, “to
Nashville, in rear of the
Cumberland River.”
2 He also prescribed that, “from
Nashville, should any further retrograde movement become necessary,” it should be “made to
Stevenson and thence according to circumstances.”
He further declared that as “the possession of the
Tennessee River by the enemy, resulting from the fall of
Fort Henry, separated the army at
Bowling Green from the one at
Columbus,” henceforth the forces thus sundered must “act independently of each other until they can again be brought together.”?
Fort Henry fell on the 6th of February, but
General Grant, failing to press the signal advantage thus gained, did not advance against
Fort Donelson until the 12th, and then with but 15,000 men, having dispatched, at the same time, 6 regiments under
General Lew Wallace by water.
The investment of the position was not completed, however, until early on the 13th of February, the
Confederate commander having had a whole week for preparation.
On the 6th of February the
Confederate garrison at
Fort Donelson embraced about 600 artillerists and 3 regiments of infantry, or at most 2350 officers and men; to this force
Heiman's brigade and other troops, some 2500 men, were added that night, having been detached that morning from
Fort Henry.
Between the morning of the 7th of February and the investment of the position by the
Federal army of 15,000 men, on the morning of the 13th, it was further increased from the troops on the east and north side of the
Cumberland, under
Brigadier-General Floyd, to whom the command of the defense was now intrusted, so as to be, in numbers, about equal to that of the enemy on the land side, until the latter was reinforced by
General Wallace's
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division, nearly 10,000 strong, later in the afternoon of the 14th.
By that time the evacuation of
Bowling Green, determined upon, as I have said, on the 7th,--and commenced on the 11th of February,--had been completed, the
Confederate rear-guard having marched out of the town at 3:30 P. M. on the 14th.
Satisfied, as affairs stood, that
Nashville and the
Valley of the Cumberland could only be defended successfully at
Donelson and by the crushing defeat of
General Grant in that quarter, an end to which all other considerations were evidently of minor military importance, I had insisted, as I may repeat, upon that as the one evident exigent operation.
That the resolution to give up
Bowling Green and to begin such a movement as early as the 11th of February ought to have removed every possible objection on the part of
General Johnston to going at once in person with fully ten thousand of his
Bowling Green army, I am very sure must be the ultimate professional lesson taught by the history of that most disastrous Confederate campaign!
Nothing were easier in the exigency than the transfer from
Bowling Green to
Donelson by the night of the 13th of February of ten thousand men, after
General Johnston had decided that the immediate abandonment of
Kentucky was an
imperative necessity.
3 Thus, on the morning of the 14th,
General Grant's army of 15,000 men could and should have been confronted with nearly if not quite 25,000 men, who, promptly handled, must have so effectually beaten their adversary, taken at such disadvantage, before the advent of
Lew Wallace that afternoon, as to have enhanced the victory for the
Confederates by the immediate defeat of
Wallace also.
What happened from the policy adopted by the
Confederate general in chief may be briefly stated:
Fort Donelson was surrendered at 2 A. M. on the 16th of February, and with it 11,600 men. In the expressive words of
General Johnston's telegram, which reached me at
Corinth, “We lost all.”
And as in the business of war, as in all other material human affairs, “the omission to do that which is necessary seals a commission to a blank of dangers,” so was it now. The failure to employ opportunely all possible available resources against
General Grant, and the consequent loss of
Donelson, with its invaluable garrison, carried immediately in its train the irrevocable loss of
Nashville also, with the early abandonment of
Middle Tennessee.
Another irrevocable consequence was the evacuation of
Columbus, with incalculable moral detriments.
And had the stroke consummated at
Donelson been vigorously pressed to its proper military corollary,--
Buell being left to look after the remains of
Johnston's army,--
General Grant's victorious army of 25,000 men, with the resources of transportation at its disposal, might have been thrown within ten days, at latest, after the fall of
Donelson, upon the rear of
General Polk's forces at
Columbus and their easy capture thus have been assured.
Going no farther in the direction of
Columbus than
Jackson, in
West Tennessee, fifty-seven miles north of
Corinth, I there established my headquarters, and called thither
Colonel Jordan, my chief of staff, who had gone to
Columbus direct from
Virginia (with
Captain D. B. Harris, my chief
[
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engineer) to inspect the command.
His report upon rejoining me about the 17th of February, and that of
Captain Harris, regarding the exaggerated extension of the lines, coupled with a faulty location, imperfect command of the river, and defective organization of the troops, confirmed my opinion that the place could not be evacuated too soon.
General Polk, whom I also called to
Jackson, I found possessed with a belief in the defensive capacity of the position and averse to its abandonment.
However, upon my exposition of its saliency, and the ease with which its communications, both by railway and water, might be broken, he changed his views.
As, meanwhile
General Johnston had telegraphed that I must do with respect to
Columbus as my “judgment dictates” ; and also, that “the separation of our armies is now complete” ; and further, as upon my report of the situation at
Columbus the
Confederate War Department had consented, on the 19th of February
General Polk was directed to prepare to evacuate the position without delay.
It was only to be held long enough to remove its invaluable ordnance to the batteries erected or under construction at
Island Number10 and Madrid Bend, to New Madrid and to
Fort Pillow, upon which the ultimate defense of the
Mississippi River must depend thereafter.
The preparation of these works for the vital service hoped from them was now intrusted to
Captain D. B. Harris, who subsequently left so brilliant a record as a consummate engineer at
Charleston and
Savannah,
Drewry's Bluff and
Petersburg.
On the 25th of February commenced the evacuation of a position the attempt to hold which must have resulted in the loss by capture of the corps of at least 13,000 men thus isolated, or, on the other hand, if left intact or unassailed by the enemy, must have been rendered wholly unavailable in the formation of a Confederate army for the recovery of what had been lately lost,--a corps without which no such army could have been possibly assembled at
Corinth as early as the 1st of April, 1862.
Because of a severe bronchial affection contracted by exposure before leaving
Bowling Green, I had not assumed formal command of the military district assigned to me, though virtually directing all the movements within it, and arduously endeavoring to become acquainted with the chief points within its limits,--a course specially requested of me by
General Johnston through his adjutant-general, in the event that I should not feel “well enough to assume command.”
Meanwhile, threatened by
Buell's presence with a large army in front of
Nashville,
General Johnston, following the line of retreat (marked out as early as February 7th) to
Stevenson, in north-eastern Alabama, had moved as far in that direction as
Murfreesboro‘, where he assembled about 17,000 men by the 23d of February, who were there subdivided into 3 divisions each of 2 brigades, with a “reserve” under
Brigadier-General Breckinridge, and several cavalry regiments unattached.
As the system of the “passive defensive” hitherto pursued had only led us to disaster,--the natural fruits, in fact, of the system,--encouraged by the latitude that was given me in
General Johnston's telegram of February 18th,
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I resolved to exert myself to the utmost, despite all that was so unpromising, to secure the means for an aggressive campaign against the enemy, of whose early movement up the
Tennessee there were already such indications that there should be no doubt as to its objective.
But as
General Johnston's projected line of retrograde upon
Stevenson must with each day's march widen the distance between that army and the corps of
General Polk, while
General Grant, naturally flushed with his recent signal successes, would be left free at any moment to move up the
Tennessee to
Hamburg or, indeed, to
Eastport, and thus, by seizing the Memphis and Charleston railroad, effectually separate and virtually neutralize the two Confederate armies,--my sole force left available for the protection of that important railway, exclusive of
General Polk's forces at
Columbus and elsewhere, would be but 2500 men under
Chalmers, in the quarter of
Iuka, with 3000 men recently arrived at
Corinth from New Orleans, under
Ruggles.
With a view to avoiding such a catastrophe as the enforced permanent separation of our two armies, I urged
General Johnston, about the 22d of February, to abandon his line of march toward
Stevenson, and to hasten to unite his army with such troops as I might be able to assemble, meanwhile, at the best point to cover the railroad center at
Corinth together with
Memphis, while holding
Island Number10 and
Fort Pillow.
This plan, of course, required more troops than our united armies would supply.
Therefore, on the 22d of February, I dispatched staff-officers with a circular addressed to the governors of
Alabama,
Louisiana,
Mississippi, and
Tennessee respecting the supreme urgency and import of the situation, in all its phases, and invoking their utmost exertions to send me, each of them, from 5000 to 10,000 men as well armed and equipped as possible, enrolled for 90 days, within which period, by timely, vigorous action, I trusted we might recover our losses, and assure the defense of the
Mississippi River.
4 At the same time I appealed to
General Bragg for such troops as he could possibly spare temporarily in such an exigency, from
Mobile and
Pensacola; and to
General Lovell for the like aid from New Orleans.
To
General Van Dorn, represented to have an army twenty thousand strong in
Arkansas, I likewise sent, on the 21st of February, a most pressing invitation to come in haste to our aid with as many men as possible, by way of New Madrid.
To him I wrote (
O. R., VII., 900): “The fate of
Missouri necessarily depends on the successful defense of
Columbus and of
Island Number10; hence we must, if possible, combine our operations not only to defend those positions, but also to take the offensive as soon as practicable to recover some lost ground.”
General Johnston acceded to my views and request, though he did not put his troops in motion until the 28th of February, and although he regarded the projected attempt to unite his army with mine a “hazardous experiment.”
5
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The evacuation of
Columbus was successfully completed on the 2d of March, apparently without any suspicion on the part of our adversary in that quarter that such an operation had been going on, or without the least show of that vigilance and vigor that were to be apprehended from him after the series of most serious disasters for the
Confederate arms which had characterized the month of February, 1862.
About seven thousand men were now placed at New Madrid, and in the quarter of
Island Number10, under the command of
General McCown, while the rest of
General Polk's force was withdrawn along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad as far south as
Humboldt, and there held in observation, with a small detachment of infantry left at
Union City, and some five hundred cavalry thrown well out toward
Hickman, on the
Mississippi below
Columbus, and extending across to the
Tennessee River in the quarter of
Paris, to watch and report all material movements upon either river.
Reliable information reached me that while
General Pope was on his march on the
Missouri side of the
Mississippi, to strike at New Madrid, such was the urgency of the danger impending by way of the
Tennessee River that it threatened the fatal hindrance of the conjunction of our forces, as already arranged about the 23d of February, in response to my dispatch through my aide-de-camp,
Captain Ferguson.
Growing profoundly apprehensive, on the 2d of March I dispatched
Captain Otey, an assistant adjutant-general on my staff, with a note to
General Johnston which contained these words: “I send herewith inclosed a slip showing intended movements of the enemy, no doubt against the troops in
Western Tennessee.
I think you ought to hurry up your troops to
Corinth by railroad, as soon as practicable, for [t]here
6 or thereabouts will be fought the great battle of this controversy.”
I thus fixed upon
Corinth as the
Confederate base, because the recent movements of our enemy up the
Tennessee could only be intelligently construed as having the Memphis and Charleston railroad primarily, and such a railway center as
Corinth later, as their immediate objectives.
7
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On the 5th of March I formally assumed command of the district, retaining my headquarters for the time at
Jackson as the most central point of observation and the junction of two railroads.
General Bragg's forces began to arrive at
Corinth on the 6th, when they, with the other troops reaching there from other quarters, were organized as fast as possible into brigades and divisions.
As a material part of the history of the campaign, I might here dwell upon the perplexing, inexplicable lack of cordial cooperation, in many ways, in the essential work of organizing the Confederate army being assembled at
Corinth, as efficiently and speedily as possible for the work ahead, that was manifested by the War Department at
Richmond, but it must suffice to say that a drawback was encountered from
that quarter which served to delay us, while helping to make the operation which we finally took in hand fall greatly short of its momentous aim.
Five Federal divisions (reinforced a few days later) had reached
Savannah, twelve miles below
Pittsburg Landing, on the east bank of the
Tennessee, by the 13th of February.
This force, aggregating some 43,000 men of all arms, was under the direct command of
General C. F. Smith, and embraced the greater part of the army that had triumphed at
Donelson.
One division, without landing at
Savannah, was dispatched, under
General W. T. Sherman, to endeavor to land, and to reach and cut some trestle-work near
Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad.
Effecting a landing, short, however, of
Eastport, the intervening country was found so inundated as to be seemingly impracticable.
So, this expedition, hardly characterized by a really vigorous effort to reach the railroad, was abortive — a result aided somewhat by the opportune presence on the ground of
Brigadier-General Chalmers with a Confederate force of 2500 infantry.
On his way upon this expedition,
General Sherman had wisely sent back from
Pittsburg Landing a request that a Federal division should be dispatched at once to that point, to prevent the Confederate forces from occupying it and obstructing his return; consequently
Hurlbut's division was sent thither, and it was found on its transports at that point by
Sherman on his return that far down the river on the 16th of March.
Sherman, landing there his own division, made an apparently objectless short march into the interior and back on the 17th of March.
Making his report the same day to
General Grant, who had just reached
Savannah,
General Sherman stated that he was “strongly impressed with the position” of
Pittsburg
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 |
|
Slaves laboring at night on the confederate earthworks at Corinth. |
Landing, “for its land advantages and its strategic character.
The ground itself admits of easy defense by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for one hundred thousand men.”
Unquestionably, it was upon this report that
Pittsburg, rather than
Hamburg, was made the
Federal base; for
Hurlbut's and
Sherman's divisions were immediately ordered ashore to encamp upon a prescribed line, while, on the same day
General Grant directed all the other troops at
Savannah except one division to be immediately sent to the same point;
Wallace's division being left, however, at Crump's Landing.
About the position thus taken by the
Federal army, there can hardly be two professional opinions.
It gave their adversary an opportunity for an almost fatal counter-stroke such as has rarely been afforded to the weaker of two belligerents in all the sinews and resources of war. A narrow cul de sac, formed by
Snake Creek and
Lick Creek, with the broad bank-full river forming its bottom, tactically as well as strategically it was a false position for an invading army, and I may add that, having been occupied, the exigent precaution, under the circumstances, of making a place d'armes of it was wholly overlooked, though it was barely twenty-three miles distant from
Corinth, where, according to the
Federal general's reports of the period, a supposed Confederate army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men were concentrated.
Previously, or as early as the 3d of March,
Pope, with about 19,000 “present for duty,” had appeared before
New Madrid, in Missouri, the essentially weak or most vulnerable point of our
upper Mississippi defenses.
8 Delaying
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his attack, however, until the 12th,--until siege-guns could be brought up,--the works there were easily made so untenable that
General McCown abandoned them and transferred his forces, at night, across the river to support the heavy batteries at Madrid Bend and
Island Number10.
About the time
Pittsburg Landing was made
General Grant's base, I had collected within easy marches of
Corinth about 23,000 men of all arms of the service, independent of the forces of
General Polk,--giving, with his troops and including those at
Forts Pillow and Madrid Bend, an aggregate of at most 44,000 men, of excellent personality but badly armed-particularly the cavalry, some of whom had no arms at all. The new forces, with the exception of those from
Mobile,
Pensacola, and New Orleans, were raw and undisciplined.
Made aware by the great number of transports
9 that were now plying up and down the
Tennessee of the magnitude of the invasion that clearly threatened the seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, the delay on the part of the
Bowling Green forces filled both
General Bragg and myself with great solicitude.
Meanwhile, on the 15th of March,
General Johnston addressed me by telegraph: “Have you had the south bank of the
Hatchee examined near
Bolivar?
I recommend it to your attention.
It has, besides the other advantages, that of being further from the enemy's line,”--that is,
Pittsburg Landing.
As the essential point for us, however, was to strike a blow at
General Grant so soon as
General Johnston's troops were united with mine, but before
Buell's junction with the exposed army at
Pittsburg, I could see no possible advantage in the least increase of distance from our real objective so soon as the advent of
General Johnston's troops should give us the power to undertake the offensive.
Exposing these features of the situation, I again urged
General Johnston to hurry his forces forward.
On the 22d of March he reached
Corinth with his staff, and I went down from
Jackson to meet him. Proceeding at once to explain to him what resources had been collected and all that was known of the position and numbers of our adversary at
Pittsburg, as also my views of the imperative necessity for an immediate movement against that adversary lest
Buell's forces should become a fatal factor in the campaign, to my surprise
General Johnston, with much emotion, informed me that it was his purpose to turn over to me the command of the entire force being assembled at
Corinth, and thereafter confine himself to the duties of department commander, with his headquarters either at
Memphis or
Holly Springs, in Mississippi.
This course, as he explained, he felt called upon to take in order to restore confidence to the people and even the army, so greatly impaired by reason of recent disasters.
Thoroughly understanding and appreciating his motives (and about these and his words there could be no possible misinterpretation), I declined as altogether unnecessary the unselfish tender of the command, but agreed, after some further exchange of views touching the military situation, to draw up a plan for the organization of our forces, and, as second in command, to supervise the task of organization.
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579]
By the 27th of March the last of
General Hardee's corps reached the vicinity of
Corinth,--about 8000 men,--while
Crittenden's division of 5000 men was halted at
Burnsville and
Iuka, eastward of
Corinth.
The order of organization, signed by
General Johnston, was published on the 29th of March.
Based on my notes, it had been drawn up by
Colonel Jordan, and subdivided the armies of
Kentucky and
Mississippi, now united, into three army corps, with reserves of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, the corps under
Major-Generals Polk,
Bragg, and
Hardee respectively, and the reserve (two brigades) under
Major-General G. B. Crittenden.
On the 30th of March,
Colonel Mackall having been promoted and assigned to the command of the river defenses at Madrid Bend,
Colonel Jordan was formally announced as the
adjutant-general of the “Army of the Mississippi,” and on the following day
Brigadier-General Breckinridge was substituted for
General Crittenden in the command of the reserve.
So much longer time than I had anticipated had been taken in effecting the junction of the “Central army” with mine, agreed upon as far back as the 23d of February, that we were scarcely as ready for assuming the offensive as I had hoped to be, at latest by the 1st of April.
However, on the night of the 2d of April, after 10 o'clock, a dispatch from
Brigadier-General Cheatham, in command at
Bethel Station, twenty odd miles north of
Corinth, reached me through
General Polk, to the effect that he was being menaced by
General Lew Wallace's division.
Assuming that the enemy had divided his forces for an operation against the Mobile and Ohio railroad at
Bethel, I thus indorsed the dispatch: “Now is the moment to advance and strike the enemy at
Pittsburg Landing.”
Colonel Jordan was then asked to carry it at once to
General Johnston, who, after reading both dispatch and indorsement, accompanied by
Colonel Jordan, went to
General Bragg's quarters near by. That officer, already in bed, immediately agreed with my recommendation.
General Johnston presented objections in effect that our forces were not as yet ready for the movement, and that we could not move up our reserve in time.
Colonel Jordan, however, was able to reassure him on these points by expressing my conviction that we were as ready now as we could hope to be for some time to come, whereas the union of
Buell's forces with
Grant, which might be anticipated at an early day, would make any offensive operation on our side out of the question.
Thereupon,
General Johnston instructed
Colonel Jordan to issue the orders for the movement.
This was done in
General Bragg's bed-chamber, in a “circular” to the three corps commanders directing them “to hold their commands in hand, ready to advance upon the enemy in the morning by 6 A. M., with 3 days cooked rations in haversacks, 100 rounds of ammunition for small arms, and 200 rounds for field-pieces.
Carry 2 days cooked subsistence in wagons and 2 tents to the company.”
These orders reached the hands of
Generals Polk and
Hardee by 1:30 A. M., and
General Breckinridge was notified to the same effect by telegraph that night.
As it had been agreed between
General Johnston and myself, the day after his arrival at
Corinth, that all orders relating to our operations in that
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quarter, as, also, touching reorganization, should be left in my hands, during the night of the 2d of April I had made notes regulating the order of march from
Corinth to
Pittsburg, and the manner of bringing on the battle, which I handed to
Colonel Jordan soon after daylight the next morning.
Those notes served as the basis of Special Orders, No. 8 of that date, issued in the name of
General Johnston.
However, before these orders were finally
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written, all the details were explained to and discussed by me with
General Johnston, who came early to my headquarters; next, before 10 A. M., I explained to and instructed
Generals Polk,
Bragg, and
Hardee, also, at my headquarters, in the presence of
General Johnston and of one another, precisely what each of them had to do with their respective corps that day, and they were severally directed to put their corps in motion by the described roads in the direction of the enemy, by 12 meridian, without further order.
Though the distance to be traversed was barely twenty-three miles, it was no easy matter to move an army of thirty odd thousand essentially raw troops, with their artillery, through so densely wooded a country as that intervening between
Corinth and our objective.
Of the two narrow country roads that existed, the shorter was assigned to
Bragg's corps, because it was the one immediately contiguous to it; while to
Hardee's corps was given the initiation of the movement, with the longest line of march as well as the front line in the approaching onset, because it was made up of troops most hardened by long marches, and the best trained in field service.
Polk's corps followed
Hardee's necessarily, because there was no other way for it,
10
[
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and next to
Hardee's troops those under
Polk had been most seasoned by marching.
Although our troops were under arms at an early hour on the 3d of April, as prescribed in the “circular” order, it is a part of the history of the campaign that the commanders of the two leading corps not only failed to put their troops in motion at least as early as meridian on the 3d of April, but did not move until so late in the afternoon as in effect to cause our army to reach the presence of its objective twenty-four hours later than there was every reason to expect, considering the shortness of the distance to be overcome.
What led to this delay of the outset of the Second and Third corps has certainly never been explained in any official document which has yet seen the light.
Their preparations necessary for such a movement were of the slightest, or only to cook five days rations, and to load a few wagons, for the amount of ammunition to be carried was no more than they had been directed some days previously to have and keep in possession of the troops.
Moreover,
Hardee's corps (
Polk's also), “with all detached brigades,” had been under orders of “readiness for a field movement” ever since the 1st of April (
Official Records, Vol.
X., Part II., p. 381). Be this as it may,
Bragg's corps did not quit the vicinage of
Corinth until so late that afternoon that none of it reached
Monterey, twelve miles away, until the next morning at 8:30, and one division (
Withers's) was not there until late on the 4th of April.
Hardee's corps, though dilatory in quitting
Corinth, would have easily reached its destination early enough on the second day's march to have been deployed on the same ground that it occupied on the night of the 5th, twenty-four hours later, had not
General Bragg interposed his authority to check its advance.
The march on the 4th was unaccountably slow and confused, especially that of the Second Corps, in view of the numerous staff attached to the headquarters of each corps.
The roads were extremely narrow and rendered excessively bad for artillery in some places by the rains, while the Second Corps was unused to marching; but all this hardly made it out of the power of that army to reach its objective by the night of April 4th, had there been a closer personal attention given to the movement during that day by those whose duty it was to execute Special Orders, No. 8.
And the cost was an irremediable loss of twenty-four hours. Another misadventure, that might have brought us sore disaster, was a cavalry reconnoissance with two pieces of artillery pushed forward without authority on the 4th, from
Bragg's corps into
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collision with the enemy with such aggressiveness that it ought to have given the
Federal general full notice that an offensive army was close behind it, and led to immediate preparation for our onset, including intrenchments.
After the Third Corps had reached its assigned position, on the afternoon of the 5th of April, and the other corps were in supporting distance, including the reserve that had encountered a much more difficult road between
Burnsville and
Monterey than had been traversed by the other troops, naturally their commanders were called together at a point not two miles distant from
Shiloh Church,--as it turned out, not far in the rear of
Hardee's line.
Of course, it was recognized to be too late for an attack that day. Moreover, it was reported that the First Corps was already nearly out of provisions, and that the ammunition train was still so far to the rear as to be unpromising.
The loss of twenty-four hours, when every hour was precious because of the imminent danger of
Buell's conjunction, the maladroit manner in which our troops had been handled on the march, and the blunder of the noisy, offensive reconnoissance, coupled with these reports of corps commanders, served to satisfy me that the purpose for which we had left
Corinth had been essentially frustrated and should be abandoned as no longer feasible.
The military essence of our projected operation was that it should be a surprise, whereas, now, I could not believe the enemy was still ignorant of our near presence with an aggressive intention, and if now attacked would be found intrenched beyond the possibility of being beaten in assault by so raw and undisciplined an army as ours was, however intrepid.
Hence, an imperative prudence that included the necessity for preserving that army essentially intact for further operations forced me to advise against any attempt now to attack the enemy in position and to retrace our steps toward our base with the possible result of leading him to follow us away from his own and thus giving us a probable opening to the retrieval of the present lost opportunity.
General Johnston listened heedfully to what I said, but answered that he hoped not only we should find our enemy still unready for a sudden onslaught, but that there was yet time for it before
Buell could come up; therefore, he should decide to adventure the enterprise as early after dawn the next day as possible, adding his opinion that now our troops were partly in line of battle it were “better to make the venture.”
The opinions of the corps commanders, I may add, were neither asked nor given.
That my views were based on sound military principles it seems to me could be readily deduced from what followed at the
battle of Shiloh itself, were this the place for such a discussion.
So soon as
General Johnston's decision was announced, the conference ended with the understanding on all sides that the battle should be ventured at dawn on the 6th of April, according to the manner already prescribed in Special Orders, No. 8, to which end every exertion should be made to place our troops in the best shape possible for the attack.
No further conference was held that night by
General Johnston with myself, or with the reserve
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or corps commanders; nor did he issue any order at all concerning the impending battle.
At the first flush of dawn on the 6th, the Confederate army was promptly formed in the three lines directed in Special Orders, No. 8, except that untowardly the left of
Hardee's corps, which, reinforced by
Gladden's division of
Bragg's corps, constituted the advance, did not rest on
Owl Creek, as prescribed.
Nine thousand and twenty-four men were in this line, deployed for battle, and formed, as it were, a heavy skirmish line thrown forward to embrace the whole Federal front.
Five hundred yards rearward was
Bragg's corps (less
Gladden's division), 10,731 men, exclusive of cavalry, in a line, as far as the nature of the ground admitted, of regiments massed in double columns at half distance — not deployed in line of battle, as some writers have stated, coupled with criticisms based thereon.
General Polk's corps of 9036 men, exclusive of cavalry, came next, some 800 yards behind
Bragg in a column of brigades deployed in line of battle on the left of the
Pittsburg road, each brigade having its own battery, and there was cavalry protecting the left of his line.
The reserve, under
Breckinridge, of 7062 men, exclusive of cavalry, marched in the rear of
Bragg's right or between the
Pittsburg road and
Lick Creek.
The troops of the third line were to be thrown forward according to the exigencies of the battle.
The total force thus sent forward against the
Federal position numbered 40,335 rank and file, of all arms, including 4382 cavalry, more than half of whom were of no other military value except for observation or outpost service that did not involve skirmishing.
[See estimates, page 557.] On the other hand, the force to be assailed occupied “a continuous line from
Lick Creek, on the [Federal] left, to
Owl Creek, a branch of
Snake Creek, on the [Federal] right, facing nearly south, and possibly a little west,” says
General Grant.
Their first line, reaching from the bridge on
Owl Creek to the
Lick Creek ford, was held by the divisions of
Generals Sherman and
Prentiss; three of
Sherman's brigades holding the
Federal right, while the other (
Stuart's) was on the extreme left, with its left resting on
Lick Creek.
This division had from 16 to 18 guns, and also a cavalry support.
Prentiss occupied the intervening space.
These two divisions numbered at least seventeen thousand men, exclusive of cavalry.
11
About half a mile behind
Sherman and
Prentiss came
McClernand's division of 7028 effectives; nearer the river were the divisions of
C. F. Smith, (under W . .
L. Wallace) and of
Hurlbut, aggregating 16,000 men with 34 guns.
There was also a cavalry force including detachments from two “regular” regiments.
Thus the force encountered must have numbered forty thousand men, infantry and artillery, supported by sixty odd guns.
The ground occupied was an undulating table-land embraced between
Owl Creek and
Lick Creek, that run nearly in the same general direction and are about four miles apart at their mouths.
This area, rising in some places about one hundred feet above the low-water level of the river, was from three to five miles
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broad.
Interlaced by a network of ravines, which, near the river, are deep, with abrupt sides, the ground rises somewhat ridge-like in the quarter of
Lick Creek, and recent rains had made all these depressions boggy and difficult for the movement of artillery across them.
A primitive forest, dense with undergrowth, spread over the whole space except a few scattered farm fields of from fifty to seventy-five acres.
Pittsburg Landing, near the mouth of
Snake Creek, was about three miles from that of
Lick Creek.
The two roads from
Corinth, while crossing
Lick Creek about a mile asunder, come together two miles from
Pittsburg.
A road from
Purdy, crossing
Owl Creek by a bridge near
Sherman's right, gave one way to reach the field from Crump's Landing, but the shortest road between the two landings was one near the river leading over a bridge across
Snake Creek.
As it has been denied in the highest quarters that the
Confederate attack on the 6th of April was of the nature of a surprise, it belongs to the history of the day's operations to give here these words of a note from
General Sherman to his chief, in the afternoon of the 5th.
The “enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday. ... I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position.”
General Grant thereupon wrote to his superior,
General Halleck: “Our outposts have been attacked in considerable force.
I immediately went up, but found all quiet. ... I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack upon us.”
Moreover, at 3 o'clock P. r., having visited the encampment of
Colonel Ammen near
Savannah,
General Grant informed that officer that water transportation would be furnished for his brigade of
Nelson's division, Army of the Ohio, on the 7th or 8th of April, or some time early in the week, and also that there would be “no fight” at
Pittsburg, but at “
Corinth, where the rebels were
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fortified.”
12 Further, even when leaving
Savannah the next morning,
General Grant scarcely at first can have believed that his army was being seriously attacked, for instead of dispatching to the field the whole of
Nelson's division by steamers, he ordered it to march thither by a wretched road, a march that occupied nearly the whole day. Aside, however, from such documentary evidence, or did none exist, the absence of all those ordinary precautions that habitually shield an army in the field must forbid the historian from regarding it as other than one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved.
About 5 A. M. the
Confederate lines were set in motion.
The first collision was in the quarter of
Gladden's brigade, on our right, and with a battalion of five companies of the 21st Missouri of
Prentiss's division dispatched well to the front by
General Prentiss, of his own motion, as early as 3 A. M. But for this incident, due solely to the intelligent, soldierly forethought of an officer not trained to the business of war, the whole Federal front would have been struck wholly unawares, for nowhere else had such prudence been shown.
Exactly at 6 A. M.
Prentiss's whole division was under fire, and the
battle of Shiloh began in earnest.
A. s soon as the outburst of musketry and artillery gave notice that
Hardee's line was engaged,
General Johnston said that he should go. to the front, leaving me in the general direction, as the exigencies of the battle might arise.
13 Then he rode forward with his personal staff and the
chief engineer of the army,
Colonel Gilmer, the only officer of the
general staff in his suite,
Colonel Jordan, remaining with me. At 7:30 A. M., by which time the battle was in full tide, as was evident from the play of artillery and the heavy, continuous rattle of small arms, I ordered
Generals Polk and
Breckinridge to hasten forward, the first to the support of our now engaged left, and the latter in a like service affecting our right.
Adjutant-General Jordan, whom I had early in the morning directed to impress personally on the corps commanders the value of fighting their artillery massed twelve guns at a point, was also now dispatched forward to overlook the field and urge on the attack continuously at as many points as possible.
When our attack reached
Sherman's division, owing to the failure of
Hardee to keep his left near
Owl Creek as was intended, only the left brigade of that division on the
Federal right was struck, leaving intact the other two to the left of our left flank, which were swiftly formed by
General Sherman on strong ground with a small watercourse in his front.
But the other stricken brigade was swept out of its encampment, scattered, and took no further part as an organization in the battle of either day.
While
Hardee's left failed to touch the enemy's right, on his own right there was left a vacant space between it and
Lick Creek, to fill which
Chalmers's brigade of
Withers's division,
Bragg's corps, was ordered up from the second line, with a battery; and a hot, urgent conflict ensued in that quarter, in which
General Johnston was present, after
Chalmers had carried at least
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one encampment.
In the same quarter of the field all of
Withers's division, including
Gladden's brigade, reinforced by
Breckinridge's whole reserve, soon became engaged, and
Prentiss's entire line, though fighting stoutly, was pressed back in confusion.
We early lost the services of the gallant
Gladden, a man of soldierly aptitudes and experience, who, after a marked influence upon the issue in his quarter of the field, fell mortally wounded.
His immediate successor,
Colonel D. W. Adams, was also soon seriously disabled.
Meantime, on our left (Federal right)
Ruggles's division of
Bragg's corps was so strenuously pressing the two brigades of
Sherman's division, that at the moment
McClernand's division came up,
Sherman was giving way with the loss of five or six guns.
McClernand could not stay the retrograde, and the
Federal right was forced back to the line of the road from
Purdy to
Hamburg.
There a foothold was gained on a thickly wooded ridge, with a ravine in front, from which two favorably posted batteries were used with deadly effect for a time upon our assailing force, now composed of
Ruggles's three brigades reinforced by several of
Polk's. Here, again, the
Federal line had to give way, with the loss of some guns.
By 7:30
Hurlbut, sending
Veatch's brigade of his division to the help of
Sherman and
McClernand, had gone, in person with his two other brigades, to the support of
Prentiss, and with him went 8 companies of cavalry and 3 batteries.
Prentiss's division was met, however, in a somewhat fragmentary condition, but was rallied in the immediate rear of a line which
Hurlbut formed along the edge of a field on favorable ground on the
Hamburg road, southward of the position last taken up by
McClernand.
Meanwhile (9:30 A. M.) I had advanced my headquarters to a point about a quarter of a mile in advance of the
Shiloh Meeting House, whence I dispatched my staff in all directions to gather reports of the progress of the battle with its exigencies and needs on our side, as, also, in quest of stragglers, whose numbers had become dangerously large under the temptations of the abundant stores of food and other articles left in the abandoned Federal camps.
14 In the work of cleaning these encampments of stragglers and dispatching them to the front, my cavalry escort was also effectively employed.
As designated by Special Orders, No. 8,
Hardee's corps having developed the enemy's position,
Bragg's troops first and then
Polk's on our left and left center,
Withers's division of
Bragg's corps and
Breckinridge's reserves on the right, had been thrown forward to fill intervening gaps and to aid the onset.
At all points from the right to the left, the opposing forces had been stoutly engaged on ground in rear of the line of
McClernand's encampment since 9 A. M., when
W. H. L. Wallace had carried forward his division into action; a division that, trained by so thorough a soldier as
General C. F. Smith, had done most soldierly work at
Donelson, and which
Wallace now handled with marked vigor.
Its influence seemed to stiffen the
Federal
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center and left center.
Stuart, commanding one of
Sherman's brigades strongly posted on the extreme Federal left, also, had made so obstinate a stand that he was not forced from the position until three times his numbers, of
Withers's division, diverted from the main current of the attack, were brought to bear against him. For some time
General Johnston was with that division, but he shifted to
Breckinridge's division about 11 A. M., and remained closely in rear alternately of either
Bowen's or
Statham's brigade until mortally wounded near the latter, a little after 2 P. M. He took post and remained on our extreme right, and at no time does it appear from the reports of subordinates in any other part of the field that, either personally or by his staff,
General Johnston gave any orders or concerned himself with the general movements of our forces.
In fact, engrossed as he soon became with the operations of two or three brigades on the extreme right, it would have been out of his power to direct our general operations, especially as he set no machinery in motion with which to gather information of what was being done elsewhere, or generally, by the Confederate army, in order to enable him to handle it intelligently from his position on the field.
Learning about 1 P. M. that the
Federal right (
Sherman and
McClernand) seemed about to give way, I ordered
General Hardee to employ his cavalry (
Wharton's Texas Rangers) to turn their flank and cut off their retreat to the river, an operation not effected because a proper or sufficient detour to the left was not made; and the gallant
Texans under a heavy fire became involved in ground impracticable for cavalry, and had to fall back.
But
Colonel Wharton soon afterward dismounted half of his regiment and, throwing it forward on foot, drove his adversary from the position.
The falling back of
Sherman's and
McClernand's troops under stress from several brigades of
Hardee's corps with a part of
Ruggles's division of
Bragg's, aided by some of
Polk's troops, left
Wallace (W. H. L.) on the advanced Federal right, where, with
Hurlbut and
Prentiss on his left, in a strong, sheltered
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position, well backed by artillery, and held with great resolution, they repulsed a series of uncombined assaults made against them.
Here
General Bragg was directing operations in person; and it was here that, after
Hindman had suffered severely in several ineffectual efforts,
Gibson's brigade of
Bragg's own corps was employed in four unavailing assaults, when finding himself unable to carry the position,
General Bragg, as he reports, desisted from any further attempt, leaving that part of the field in charge of a staff-officer with authority to act in his name, and going farther to the right to find that
General Johnston was dead.
However, having previously learned, from his aide-de-camp,
Colonel Urquhart, that
Adjutant-General Jordan was near by, he requested that officer, through
Colonel Urquhart, to collect and employ some of our troops to turn the left of the position that obstructed his advance toward the river, as just described.
Upon that service
Colonel Jordan, in a few moments, employed
Statham's brigade, which was fortunately found near by, resting at ordered arms,
General Breckinridge, to whom the order was given, being with it at the time.
This happened, be it noted, at 2:30 P. M., or about the moment that
General Johnston was bleeding to death in the covert of a deep ravine a very short distance from
Statham's brigade, in the immediate rear of which it was that his wound had been inflicted.
15
General Breckinridge quickly became engaged with the enemy in his front, covered by a thick underbrush that edged an open field over which the
Confederate advance was made.
The conflict was sharp for a few moments, but the
Federals had to give way.
16 About this time, under my orders,
Cheatham came up with his Second Brigade on the left of
Breckinridge.
Moreover, a few moments later, or as early as 3 P. M.,
Withers, of
Bragg's corps, having found that his adversary (
Stuart's brigade) which had so long occupied him on the extreme right had disappeared toward
Pittsburg Landing, and having moved across the intervening ravines and ridges with his division to where the sound of artillery and musketry showed the main battle was now raging,--was brought opportunely into cooperation with
Cheatham's and
Breckinridge's operations directly upon
Hurlbut's left flank — a movement which
Hurlbut resisted stoutly until, justly apprehensive of being cut off, he fell back, after 4 P. M., upon
Pittsburg Landing.
17 This left
Prentiss's left flank exposed;
Wallace, whose unflinching handling of his division had done so much to keep the
Federal army from being driven to the river-side by midday, now also, to
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avoid being surrounded, gave orders for it to retire, and soon fell mortally wounded; but a part of his division remained with
Prentiss.
Sometime previously I had ordered
General Hardee to gather all the forces he could and press the enemy on our own left.
Stragglers that had been collected by
Colonels Brent and
Chisolm and others of my staff, were also sent forward extemporized into battalions, and
Colonel Marshall J. Smith with the New Orleans Crescent Regiment was added, with orders to “Drive the enemy into the
Tennessee.”
Meantime, or shortly after 3 P. M.,
Governor Harris and
Captain Wicliffe, both of
General Johnston's staff, had reached me with information of his death.
Staff-officers were immediately dispatched to acquaint the corps commanders of this deplorable casualty, with a caution, however, against otherwise promulgating the fact.
They were also urged to push the battle with renewed vigor and, if possible, to force a speedy close, to which end my staff were energetically employed in pushing up the stragglers or regiments or parts of regiments that had become casually separated from their organizations because of the nature of the battle-field.
As I have said, by five o'clock the whole Federal army except
Prentiss's division, with a part of
Wallace's, had receded to the river-bank, and the indomitable force which under
Prentiss still contested the field was being environed on its left by brigades from the divisions of
Breckinridge,
Cheatham, and
Withers in that quarter.
It remains to be said that
Prentiss was equally encompassed on the other flank by a part of
Ruggles's division, together with some of
General Polk's corps.
Thus surrounded on all sides, that officer, whose division had been the first to come into collision with us that morning, stoutly keeping the field to the last, was now forced to surrender in person, just after 5:30 P. M., with some 2200 officers and men.
We had now had more than eleven hours of continuous fighting, fighting without food except that hastily snatched up in the abandoned Federal encampments.
In the meantime
Colonel J. D. Webster, the
Federal chief of staff, had massed his reserve artillery, some sixty guns, on a ridge about three hundred yards in advance of the landing which commanded all the approaches thereto from the landward, with a deep ravine on the side facing the
Confederates.
Moreover, much of the ground in front of this position was swept by the guns of the steamers
Lexington and
Tyler, properly posted for that purpose.
Near by had gathered the remnants of
Wallace's,
Hurlbut's, and
McClernand's divisions, from which gunners had been taken to man the artillery.
At this critical instant,
Colonel Ammen's brigade of
Nelson's division of
Buell's army was brought across the
Tennessee and placed as a support, on the ridge, in a position selected by
General Buell himself, just at the instant that the
Confederates attempted to storm this last foothold to which they had finally driven their adversary after eleven hours of unceasing battle.
This was the situation at 6 p. M., and that the
Confederate troops were not in a condition to carry such a position as that which confronted them at that late hour becomes clearly apparent from the official reports.
After the capture of
General Prentiss no serious effort was made to press the
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victory by the corps commanders.
In fact the troops had got out of the hands either of corps, divisional, or brigade commanders, and for the most part, moreover, at the front, were out of ammunition.
Several most gallant uncombined efforts (notably by
Chalmers) were made to reach and carry the
Federal battery,
but in every instance the effort failed.
Comprehending the situation as it was, at six P. M. I dispatched staff-officers with orders to cease hostilities, withdraw the troops from under fire of the
Federal gun-boats, and to sleep on their arms.
However, before the order was received many of the regiments had already been withdrawn out of action, and really the attack had practically ceased at every point.
18
My headquarters for the night were established at the
Shiloh Meeting House, in the tent that
General Sherman had occupied.
There several of the corps and division commanders called for orders, and all evinced and expressed much satisfaction with the results, while no one was heard to express or suggest that more might have been achieved had the battle been prolonged.
All seemed to believe that our troops had accomplished as much as could have been hoped for.
Of the second day's battle my sketch shall be very brief.
It began with daylight, and this time
Buell's army was the attacking force.
Our widely scattered forces, which it had been impossible to organize in the night after the late hour at which they were drawn out of action, were gathered in hand for the exigency as quickly as possible.
Generals Bragg,
Hardee, and
Breckinridge hurried to their assigned positions,--
Hardee now to the extreme right, where were
Chalmers's and
Jackson's brigades of
Bragg's corps;
General Bragg to the left, where were assembled brigades and fragments of his own troops, as also of
Clark's division,
Polk's corps, with
Trabue's brigade of Kentuckians;
Breckinridge was on the left of
Hardee.
This left a vacant space to be occupied by
General Polk, who during the night had gone with
Cheatham's division back nearly to
Hardee's position on the night of the 5th of April.
But just at the critical time, to my great pleasure,
General Polk came upon the field with that essential division.
By 7 P. M. the night before, all of
Nelson's division had been thrown across the
Tennessee, and during the night had been put in position between
General Grant's disarrayed forces and our own;
Crittenden's division, carried from
Savannah by water and disembarked at midnight, was forced through the mob of demoralized soldiers that thronged the river-side and established half a mile in advance, to the left of
Nelson.
Lew Wallace's division of
General Grant's army also had found its way after dark on the 6th across
Snake Creek from Crump's Landing to the point near the bridge where
General Sherman had rallied the remains of two of his brigades.
Rousseau reached the field by water, at daylight, while two other brigades of the same division
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 |
|
The Union gun-boats at Shiloh on the evening of the first day. From a lithograph. |
(
McCook's) were close at hand.
Thus, at the instant when the battle was opened we had to face at least 23,000 fresh troops, including 3 battalions of regulars, with at least 48 pieces of artillery.
19 On the
Confederate side there was not a man who had not taken part in the battle of the day before.
The casualties of that day had not been under 6500 officers and men, independent of stragglers; consequently not more than 20,000 infantry could be mustered that morning.
The Army of the Ohio in
General Buell's hands had been made exceptionally well-trained soldiers for that early period of the war.
The extreme Federal right was occupied by
General Lew Wallace's division, while the space intervening between it and
Rousseau's brigade was filled with from 5000 to 7000 men gathered during the night and in the early morning from
General Grant's broken organizations.
After exchanging some shots with
Forrest's cavalry,
Nelson's division was confronted with a composite force embracing
Chalmers's brigade,
Moore's Texas Regiment, with other parts of
Withers's division, also the
Crescent Regiment of New Orleans and the 26th Alabama, supported by well-posted batteries, and so stoutly was
Nelson received that his division had to recede somewhat.
Advancing again, however, about 8 o'clock, now reinforced by
Hazen's brigade, it was our turn to retire with the loss of a battery.
But rallying and taking the offensive, somewhat reinforced, the
Confederates were
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able to recover their lost ground and guns, inflicting a sharp loss on
Hazen's brigade, that narrowly escaped capture.
Ammen's brigade was also seriously pressed and must have been turned but for the opportune arrival and effective use of
Terrill's regular battery of
McCook's division.
In the meantime
Crittenden's division became involved in the battle, but was successfully kept at bay for several hours by the forces under
Hardee and
Breckinridge, until it was reinforced by two brigades of
McCook's division which had been added to the attacking force on the field, after the battle had been joined, the force of fresh troops being thus increased by at least five thousand men.
20 Our troops were being forced to recede, but slowly; it was not, however, until we were satisfied that we had now to deal with at least three of
Buell's divisions as well as with
General Lew Wallace's, that I determined to yield the field in the face of so manifestly profitless a combat.
By 1 o'clock
General Bragg's forces on our left, necessarily weakened by the withdrawal of a part of his troops to reenforce our right and center, had become so seriously pressed that he called for aid. Some remnants of
Louisiana,
Alabama, and
Tennessee regiments were gathered up and sent forward to support him as best they might, and I went with them personally.
General Bragg, now taking the offensive, pressed his adversary back.
This was about 2 P. M. My headquarters were still at
Shiloh Church.
The odds of fresh troops alone were now too great to justify the prolongation of the conflict.
So, directing
Adjutant-General Jordan to select at once a proper position in our near rear, and there establish a covering force including artillery, I dispatched my staff with directions to the several corps commanders to prepare to retreat from the field, first making a show, however, at different points of resuming the offensive.
These orders were executed, I may say, with no small skill, and the Confederate army began to retire at 2:30 P. M. without apparently the least perception on the part of the enemy that such a movement was going on. There was no flurry, no haste shown by officers or men; the spirit of all was admirable.
Stragglers dropped into line; the caissons of the batteries were loaded up with rifles; and when the last of our troops had passed to the rear of the covering force, from the elevated ground it occupied and which commanded a wide view, not a Federal regiment or even a detachment of cavalry was anywhere to be seen as early as 4 P. M.
General Breckinridge, with the rear-guard, bivouacked that night not more than two miles from
Shiloh.
He withdrew three miles farther on the 8th, and there remained for several days without being menaced.
Our loss in the two days was heavy, reaching 10,699.
[See page 539.] The field was left in the hands of our adversary, as also some captured guns, which were not taken away for want of horses, but in exchange we carried off at least 30 pieces of his artillery with 26 stands of colors and nearly 3000 prisoners of war, also a material acquisition of small arms and accouterments which our men had obtained on Sunday instead of their inferior weapons.
