The movement to capture
Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and the fire-arms manufactured and stored there was organized at the
Exchange Hotel in
Richmond on the night of April 16th, 1861.
Ex-Governor Henry A. Wise was at the head of this purely impromptu affair.
The Virginia Secession Convention, then sitting, was by a large majority “Union” in its sentiment till
Sumter was fired on and captured, and
Mr. Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand men to enforce the laws in certain Southern States.
Virginia was then, as it were, forced to “take sides,” and she did not hesitate.
I had been one of the candidates for a seat in that convention from
Augusta county, but had been overwhelmingly defeated by the “Union” candidates, because I favored secession as the only “peace measure”
Virginia could then adopt, our aim being to put the
State in an independent position to negotiate between the
United States and the seceded
Gulf and Cotton States for a new Union, to be formed on a compromise of the slavery question by a convention to be held for that purpose.
Late on April 15th I received a telegram from “
Nat”
Tyler, the editor of the “Richmond Enquirer,” summoning me to
Richmond, where I arrived the next day. Before reaching the
Exchange Hotel I met
ex-Governor Wise on the street.
He asked me to find as many officers of the armed and equipped volunteers of the inland towns and counties as I could, and request them to be at the hotel by 7 in the evening to confer about a military movement which he deemed important.
Not many such officers were in town, but I found
Captains Turner Ashby and
Richard Ashby of
Fauquier county,
Oliver R. Funsten of
Clarke county, all commanders of volunteer companies of cavalry; also
Captain John A. Harman of Staunton-my home-and
Alfred M. Barbour, the latter ex-civil superintendent of the Government works at
Harper's Ferry.
1 These persons, with myself, promptly joined
ex-Governor Wise, and a plan
[
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for the capture of
Harper's Ferry was at once discussed and settled upon.
The movement, it was agreed, should commence the next day, the 17th, as soon as the convention voted to secede,--provided we could get railway transportation and the concurrence of
Governor Letcher.
Colonel Edmund Fontaine, president of the Virginia Central railroad, and
John S. Barbour, president of the
Orange and
Alexandria and Manassas Gap railroads, were sent for, and joined us at the hotel near midnight. They agreed to put the
necessary trains in readiness next day to obey any request of
Governor Letcher for the movement of troops.
A committee, of which I was chairman, waited on
Governor Letcher after midnight, and, arousing him from his bed, laid the scheme before him. He stated that he would take no step till officially informed that the ordinance of secession was passed by the convention.
He was then asked if contingent upon the event he would next day order the movement by telegraph.
He consented.
We then informed him what companies would be under arms ready to move at a moment's notice.
All the persons I have named above are now dead, except
John S. Barbour, “
Nat”
Tyler, and myself.
On returning to the hotel and reporting
Governor Letcher's promise, it was decided to telegraph the captains of companies along the railroads mentioned to be ready next day for orders from the governor.
In that way I ordered the Staunton Artillery, which I commanded, to assemble at their armory by 4 P. M. on the 17th, to receive orders from the governor to aid in the capture of the
Portsmouth Navy Yard.
This destination had been indicated in all our dispatches, to deceive the
Government at
Washington in case there should be a “leak” in the telegraph offices.
Early in the evening a message had been received by
ex-Governor Wise from his son-in-law
Doctor Garnett of
Washington, to the effect that a Massachusetts regiment, one thousand strong, had been ordered to
Harper's Ferry.
Without this reinforcement we knew the guard there consisted of only forty-five men, who could be captured or driven away, perhaps without firing a shot, if we could reach the place secretly.
The
Ashbys,
Funsten,
Harman, and I remained up the entire night.
The superintendent and commandant of the
Virginia Armory at
Richmond,
Captain Charles Dimmock, a Northern man by birth and a West Point graduate, was in full sympathy with us, and that night filled our requisitions for ammunition and moved it to the railway station before sunrise.
He also granted one hundred stand of arms for the
Martinsburg Light Infantry, a
[
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new company just formed.
All these I receipted for and saw placed on the train.
Just before we moved out of the depot,
Alfred Barbour made an unguarded remark in the car, which was overheard by a Northern traveler, who immediately wrote a message to
President Lincoln and paid a negro a dollar to take it to the telegraph office.
This act was discovered by one of our party, who induced a friend to follow the negro and take the dispatch from him. This perhaps prevented troops being sent to head us off.
My telegram to the Staunton Artillery produced wild excitement, and spread rapidly through the county, and brought thousands of people to
Staunton during the day.
Augusta had been a strong
Union county, and a doubt was raised by some whether I was acting under the orders of
Governor Letcher.
[
114]
To satisfy them, my brother,
George W. Imboden, sent a message to me at
Gordonsville, inquiring under whose authority I had acted.
On the arrival of the train at
Gordonsville,
Captain Harman received the message and replied to it in my name, that I was acting by order of the governor.
Harman had been of the committee, the night before, that waited on
Governor Letcher, and he assumed that by that hour-noon — the convention must have voted the
State out of the
Union, and that the governor had kept his promise to send orders by wire.
Before we reached
Staunton,
Harman handed me the dispatch and told me what he had done.
I was annoyed by his action till the train drew up at
Staunton, where thousands of people were assembled, and my artillery company and the West Augusta Guards (the finest infantry company in the valley) were in line.
Major-General Kenton Harper, a native of
Pennsylvania, “a born soldier,” and
Brigadier-General William H. Harman, both holding commissions in the
Virginia militia,--and both of whom had won their spurs in the regiment the
State had sent to the
Mexican war,--met me as I alighted, with a telegram from
Governor Letcher ordering them into service, and referring them to me for information as to our destination and troops.
Until I imparted to them confidentially what had occurred the night before, they thought, as did all the people assembled, that we were bound for the
Portsmouth Navy Yard.
For prudential reasons, we said nothing to dispel this illusion.
The governor in his dispatch informed
General Harper that he was to take chief command, and that full written instructions would reach him en route. He waited till after dark, and then set out for
Winchester behind a good team.
Brigadier-General Harman was ordered to take command of the trains and of all troops that might report en route. (See map, page 113.)
About sunset we took train; our departure was an exciting and affecting scene.
At
Charlottesville, in
the night, the Monticello Guards,
Captain W. B. Mallory, and the Albemarle Rifles, under
Captain R. T. W. Duke, came aboard.
At
Culpeper a rifle company joined us, and just as the sun rose on the 18th we reached
Manassas.
The
Ashbys and
Funsten had gone on the day before to collect their
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cavalry companies, and also the famous “Black horse cavalry,” a superb body of men and horses, under
Captains John Scott and
Welby Carter of
Fauquier.
By marching across the
Blue Ridge, they were to rendezvous near
Harper's Ferry.
Ashby had sent men on the night of the 17th to cut the wires between
Manassas Junction and
Alexandria, and to keep them cut for several days.
Our advent at the
Junction astounded the quiet people of the village.
General Harman at once “impressed” the
Manassas Gap train to take the lead, and switched two or three other trains to that line in order to proceed to
Strasburg.
I was put in command of the foremost train.
We had not gone five miles when I discovered that the engineer could not be trusted.
He let his fire go down, and came to a dead standstill on a slight ascending grade.
A cocked pistol induced him to fire up and go ahead.
From there to
Strasburg I rode in the engine-cab, and we made full forty miles an hour with the aid of good dry wood and a navy revolver.
At
Strasburg we left the cars, and before 10 o'clock the infantry companies took up the line of march for
Winchester.
I now had to procure horses for my guns.
The farmers were in their corn-fields, and some of them agreed to hire us horses as far as
Winchester, eighteen miles, while others refused.
The situation being urgent, We took the horses by force, under threats of being indicted by the next grand jury of the county.
By noon we had a sufficient number of teams.
We followed the infantry down the
Valley Turnpike, reaching
Winchester just at nightfall.
The people generally received us very coldly.
The war spirit that bore them up through four years of trial and privation had not yet been aroused.
General Harper was at
Winchester, and had sent forward his infantry by rail to
Charlestown, eight miles from
Harper's Ferry.
In a short time a train returned for my battery.
The farmers got their horses and went home rejoicing, and we set out for our destination.
The infantry moved out of
Charlestown about midnight.
We kept to our train as far as
Halltown, only four miles from the ferry.
There we set down our guns to be run forward by hand to Bolivar Heights, west of the town, from which we could shell the place if necessary.
[
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 |
|
John Brown.
The well-known raid of John Brown upon Harper's Ferry, Virginia, for the purpose of freeing slaves by force of arms, occurred on the evening of Sunday, the 17th of October, 1859.
His party, including himself and five negroes (three of whom were fugitive slaves), consisted of 22 men, three of whom remained at the rendezvous on the Maryland side of the Potomac.
The others crossed by the bridge and seized the United States armory and arsenal, and during the next eighteen hours were busy in arousing slaves, cutting telegraph wires, providing defenses against attack, and imprisoning citizens.
They were at last besieged in the engine-house by a large number of citizens and militia, to whom were added, on the morning of Tuesday, a force of United States marines, sent from Washington under Colonel Robert E. Lee and Lieutenants Green and J. E. B. Stuart.
The marines battered down the door of the engine-house and captured the insurgents, after a brave resistance.
In the conflict John Brown was wounded; his sons Watson and Oliver were mortally wounded, and eight others of the party were killed.
Five, including another son, Owen Brown, escaped.
Seven were captured, and, after trial and conviction, were hanged at Charlestown, Virginia,--John Brown on the 2d of December, 1859; John E. Cook, Edwin Coppoc, John A. Copeland (a mulatto), and Shields Green (a negro) on the 16th of December; and Aaron D. Stevens and Albert Hazlett on the 16th of the following March. Three citizens and a number of negroes were killed by the insurgents, and others were wounded.
Editors. |
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A little before dawn of the next day, April 18th, a brilliant light arose from near the point of confluence of the
Shenandoah and
Potomac rivers.
General Harper, who up to that moment had expected a conflict with the
Massachusetts regiment supposed to be at
Harper's Ferry, was making his dispositions for an attack at daybreak, when this light convinced him that the enemy had fired the arsenal and fled.
He marched in and took possession, but too late to extinguish the flames.
Nearly twenty thousand rifles and pistols were destroyed.
The workshops had not been fired.
The people of the town told us the catastrophe, for such it was to us, was owing to declarations made the day before by the
ex-superintendent,
Alfred Barbour.
He reached
Harper's Ferry,
via Washington, on the 17th about noon, and, collecting the mechanics in groups, informed them that the place would be captured within twenty-four hours by
Virginia troops.
He urged them to protect the property, and join the
Southern cause, promising, if war ensued, that the place would be held by the
South, and that they would be continued at work on high wages.
His influence with the men was great, and most of them decided to accept his advice.
But
Lieutenant Roger Jones, who commanded the little guard of forty-five men, hearing what was going on, at once took measures to destroy the place if necessary.
Trains of gunpowder
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were laid through the buildings to be fired.
In the shops the men of Southern sympathies managed to wet the powder in many places during the night, rendering it harmless.
Jones's troops, however, held the arsenal buildings and stores, and when their commander was advised of
Harper's rapid approach the gunpowder was fired, and he crossed into
Maryland with his handful of men. So we secured only the machinery and the gun and pistol barrels and locks, which, however, were sent to
Richmond and
Columbia, South Carolina, and were worked over into excellent arms.
[See note, page 125.] Within a week about thirteen hundred Virginia volunteers had assembled there.
As these companies were, in fact, a part of the
State militia, they were legally under command of the three brigadiers and one
major-general of militia, who had authority over this, that, or the other organization.
These generals surrounded themselves with a numerous staff, material for which was abundant in the rank and file of the volunteers; for instance, in my battery there were at least a dozen college graduates of and below the grade of corporal.
Every fair afternoon the official display in
Harper's Ferry of “fuss and feathers” would have done no discredit to the
Champs Elysees.
One afternoon, six or eight days after our occupation,
General Harper sent for me, as the senior artillery officer (we then had three batteries, but all without horses), to say he had been told that a number of trains on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad would try to pass us in the night, transporting troops from the
West to
Washington, and that he had decided to prevent
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them at the risk of bringing on a battle.
He ordered the posting of guns so as to command the road for half a mile or more, all to be accurately trained on the track by the light of day, and ready to be discharged at any moment.
Infantry companies were stationed to fire into the trains, if the artillery failed to stop them.
Pickets were posted out two or three miles, with orders to fire signal-guns as soon as the first troop-laden train should pass.
About 1 o'clock at night we heard the rumbling of an approaching train.
The long roll was beat; the men assembled at their assigned positions and in silence awaited the sound of the signal-guns.
A nervous cavalryman was the vedette.
As the train passed him (it was the regular mail) he thought he saw soldiers in it, and fired.
Pop!
pop! pop!
came down the road from successive sentries.
Primers were inserted and
lanyards held taut, to be pulled when the engine should turn a certain point four hundred yards distant from the battery.
By great good luck
Colonel William S. H. Baylor, commanding the 5th Virginia regiment, was with some of his men stationed a little beyond the point, and, seeing no troops aboard the train, signaled it to stop.
It did so, not one hundred yards beyond where the artillery would have opened on it. When the first excitement was over, he demanded of the conductor what troops, if any, were on board, and was told there was “one old fellow in uniform asleep on the mail-bags in the first car.”
Entering that car with a file of soldiers, he secured the third prisoner of war taken in
Virginia.
It proved to be
Brigadier-General W. S. Harney, of the United States army, on his way from the
West to
Washington, to resign his commission and go to
Europe rather than engage in a fratricidal war. He surrendered with a pleasant remark, and was taken to
General Harper's headquarters, where he spent the night.
On his assurance that he knew of no troops coming from the
West,
Harper ordered us all to quarters.
Next morning
General Harney was paroled to report in
Richmond, and was escorted to a train about to leave for
Winchester.
He was a fine-looking old soldier, and as he walked down the street to the depot he saw all our forces except the cavalry.
He was accompanied socially by two or three of our generals and a swarm of staff-officers.
He cast his glance over the few hundred men in sight, and turning to
General Harper, I heard him inquire, with a merry twinkle in his eye, Where is your army
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encamped, general?
“
Harper's face crimsoned as he replied, Excuse me from giving information.”
Harney smiled, and said politely, “Pardon me for asking an improper question, but I had forgotten I was a prisoner.”
He went on to
Richmond, was treated with marked courtesy, and in a day or two proceeded to
Washington.
In a few days our forces began to increase by the arrival of fresh volunteer companies.
Being only a captain, I was kept very busy in trying to get my battery into the best condition.
We had no caissons and but insufficient harness.
For the latter I sent to Baltimore, purchasing on my private credit.
In the same way I ordered from
Richmond red flannel shirts and other clothing for all my men, our uniforms being too fine for camp life.
The governor subsequently ordered these bills to be paid by the
State treasurer.
We found at the armory a large number of very strong horse-carts.
In my battery were thirty or more excellent young mechanics.
By using the wheels and axles of the carts they soon constructed good caissons, which served us till after the
first battle of Bull Run.
We had no telegraph line to
Richmond except
via Washington, and the time of communication by mail was two days.
General Harper found it so difficult to obtain needed munitions and supplies, that about the last of April he decided to send me to the governor, who was my intimate friend, with a requisition for all we needed, and verbal instructions to make to him a full statement of our necessitous and defenseless condition, in case
General Robert Patterson,who was reported with a Federal force at
Chambersburg, should move against us. When I arrived in
Richmond,
General Robert E. Lee had been placed in command of all the
Virginia forces by the governor, and by an ordinance every militia officer in the
State above the rank of captain had been decapitated, and the governor and his military council had been authorized to fill vacancies thus created.
This was a disastrous blow to “the pomp and circumstance of glorious war” at
Harper's Ferry.
Militia generals and the brilliant “staff” were stricken down, and their functions devolved, according to
Governor Letcher's order of April 27th, upon
Thomas J. Jackson, colonel commandant, and James W.
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Massie, major and assistant adjutant-general, who arrived during the first week of May, This was “
Stonewall”
Jackson's first appearance on the theater of the war. I spent one day and night in
Richmond, and then returned to camp, arriving about 2 P. M. What a revolution three or four days had wrought!
I could scarcely realize the change.
The militia generals were all gone, and the staff had vanished.
The
commanding colonel and his adjutant had arrived, and were occupying a small room in the little wayside hotel near the railroad bridge.
Knowing them both, I immediately sought an interview, and delivered a letter and some papers I had brought from
General Lee.
Jackson and his adjutant were at a little pine table figuring upon the rolls of the troops present.
They were dressed in well-worn, dingy uniforms of professors in the Virginia Military Institute, where both had recently occupied chairs.
Colonel Jackson had issued and sent to the camps a short, simple order assuming the command, but had had no intercourse with the troops.
The deposed officers had nearly all left for home or for
Richmond in a high state of indignation.
After an interview of perhaps a half hour I proceeded to my camp on the hill, and found the men of the 5th Virginia regiment, from my own county, in assembly, and greatly excited.
They were deeply attached to their field-officers, and regarded the ordinance of the convention as an outrage on freemen and volunteers, and were discussing the propriety of passing denunciatory resolutions.
On seeing me they called
for a speech.
As I did not belong to the regiment, I declined to say anything, but ordered the men of the Staunton Artillery to fall into line.
Then I briefly told them that we were required to muster into service either for twelve months or during the war, at our option, and urged them to go in for the full period of the war, as such action would be most creditable to them, and a good example to others.
They unanimously shouted, “For the war!
For the war!”
Before they were dismissed the ceremony of mustering in was completed, and I proudly took the roll down to
Colonel Jackson with the remark, “There, colonel, is the roll of your first company mustered in for the war.”
He looked it over, and, rising, shook my hand, saying, “Thank you, captain-thank you; arid please thank your men for me.”
He had heard that there was dissatisfaction in the camps, and asked me to act as mustering officer for two other artillery companies present.
Before sunset the rolls were returned.
This prompt action of the batteries was emulated the next day by the other troops, and all were mustered in. Within a week
Governor Letcher wisely appointed
Major-General Harper colonel of the 5th Virginia,
Brigadier-General
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Harman lieutenant-colonel, and
Colonel Baylor major, and I venture to say no regiment in either army was better officered, as the fame it won in the “
Stonewall” brigade will prove.
The presence of a master mind was visible in the changed condition of the camp.
Perfect order reigned everywhere.
Instruction in the details of military duties occupied
Jackson's whole time.
He urged the officers to call upon him for information about even the minutest details of duty, often remarking that it was no discredit to a civilian to be ignorant of military matters.
He was a rigid disciplinarian, and yet as gentle and kind as a woman.
He was the easiest man in our army to get along with pleasantly so long as one did his duty, but as inexorable as fate in exacting the performance of it; yet he would overlook serious faults if he saw they were the result of ignorance, and would instruct the offender in a kindly way. He was as courteous to the humblest private who sought an interview for any purpose as to the highest officer in his command.
He despised superciliousness and self-assertion, and nothing angered him so quickly as to see an officer wound the feelings of those under him by irony or sarcasm.
When
Jackson found we were without artillery horses, he went into no red-tape correspondence with the circumlocution offices in
Richmond, but ordered his quartermaster,
Major John A. Harman, to proceed with men to the
Quaker settlements in the rich county of
Loudoun, famous for its good horses, and buy or impress as many as we needed.
Harman executed his orders with such energy and dispatch that he won
Jackson's confidence, and remained his chief quartermaster till the day of
Jackson's death.
By
Jackson's orders I took possession of the bridge across the
Potomac at
Point of Rocks, twelve miles below
Harper's Ferry, and fortified the
Virginia end of the bridge, as we expected a visit any night from
General B. F. Butler, who was at the
Relay House on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.
It was my habit to keep awake all night to be ready for emergencies, and to sleep in the day-time, making daily reports, night and morning, to
Jackson.
One Sunday afternoon, a little over a week after we occupied this post, I was aroused from my nap by one of my men, who said there were two men in blue uniforms (we had not yet adopted the gray) riding about our camp, and looking so closely at everything that he believed they were spies.
I went out to see who they were, and found
Jackson and one of his staff.
As I approached them, he put his finger on his lips and shook his head as a signal for silence.
In a low tone he said he preferred it should not be known he had come there.
He approved of all I had done, and soon galloped away.
I afterward suspected that the visit was simply to familiarize himself with the line of the canal and railroad from
Point of Rocks to
Harper's Ferry preparatory to a sharp bit of strategy which he practiced a few days later.
From the very beginning of the war the
Confederacy was greatly in need of rolling-stock for the railroads.
We were particularly short of locomotives, and were without the shops to build them.
Jackson, appreciating this, hit upon a plan to obtain a good supply from the
Baltimore and
Ohio road.
Its line was double-tracked, at least from
Point of Rocks to
Martinsburg, a distance of 25 or 30 miles. We had not interfered with the running
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of trains, except on the occasion of the arrest of
General Harney.
The coal traffic from
Cumberland was immense, as the
Washington government was accumulating supplies of coal on the seaboard.
These coal trains passed
Harper's Ferry at all hours of the day and night, and thus furnished
Jackson with a pretext for arranging a brilliant “scoop.”
When he sent me to
Point of Rocks, he ordered
Colonel Harper with the 5th Virginia Infantry to
Martinsburg.
He then complained to
President Garrett, of the
Baltimore and
Ohio, that the night trains, eastward bound, disturbed the repose of his camp, and requested a change of schedule that would pass all east-bound trains by
Harper's Ferry between 11 and 1 o'clock in the day-time.
Mr. Garrett complied, and thereafter for several days we heard the constant roar of passing trains for an hour before and an hour after noon. But since the “empties” were sent up the road at night,
Jackson again complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and, as the road had two tracks, said he must insist that the west-bound trains should pass during the same two hours as those going east.
Mr. Garrett promptly complied, and we then had, for two hours every day, the liveliest railroad in
America.
One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its best,
Jackson sent me an order to take a force of men across to the
Maryland side of the river the next day at 11 o'clock, and, letting all west-bound trains pass till 12 o'clock, to permit none to go east, and at 12 o'clock to obstruct the road so that it would require several days to repair it. He ordered the reverse to be done at
Martinsburg.
Thus he caught all the trains that were going east or west between those points, and these he ran up to
Winchester, thirty-two miles on the branch road, where they were safe, and whence they were removed by horse-power to the railway at
Strasburg.
I do not remember the number of trains captured, but the loss crippled the
Baltimore and
Ohio road seriously for some time, and the gain to our scantily stocked Virginia roads of the same gauge was invaluable.
 |
|
Pen sketch of General Jackson.
Drawn from life, near ball's bluff.
Probably in 1861. |
While we held the
Point of Rocks bridge,
J. E. B. Stuart (afterward so famous as a cavalry leader) was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, and reported to
Colonel Jackson for assignment to duty.
Jackson ordered the consolidation of all the cavalry companies into a battalion to be commanded by
Stuart, who then appeared more like a well-grown, manly youth than the mature man he really was. This order was very offensive to
Captain Turner Ashby, at that time the idol of all the troopers in the field, as well he might be, for a more brave and chivalrous officer never rode at the head of well-mounted
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troopers.
Ashby was older than
Stuart, and he thought and we all believed, that he was entitled to first promotion.
When not absent scouting,
Ashby spent his nights with me at the bridge.
He told me of
Jackson's order, and that he would reply to it with his resignation.
I expostulated with him, although he had all my sympathies.
I urged him to call upon
Colonel Jackson that night.
It was only twelve miles by the tow-path of the canal, and on his black Arabian he could make it in less than an hour.
I believed
Jackson would respect his feelings and leave his company out of
Stuart's battalion.
I ventured to write a private letter to
Jackson, appealing in the strongest terms for the saving of
Ashby to the service.
The result of his night ride was that
Jackson not only relieved him from the obnoxious order, but agreed to divide the companies between him and
Stuart, and to ask for his immediate promotion, forming thus the nuclei of two regiments of cavalry, to be filled as rapidly as new companies came to the front.
One of these regiments was commanded at first by
Colonel Angus McDonald, with
Ashby as lieutenant-colonel, and in a few months
Ashby was promoted to its full command.
Ashby got back to
Point of Rocks about 2 in the morning, as happy a man as I ever saw, and completely
enraptured with
Jackson.
From that night on, the affection and confidence of the two men were remarkable.
A trip
Ashby had made a few days before to
Chambersburg and the encampment of
General Robert Patterson was the real reason for
Jackson's favor.
Ashby had rigged himself in a farmer's suit of homespun that he had borrowed, and, hiring a plow-horse, had personated a rustic horse-doctor.
With his saddle-bags full of some remedy for spavin or ringbone, he had gone to
Chambersburg, and had returned in the night with an immense amount of information.
The career of
Ashby was a romance from that time on till he fell, shot through the heart, two days before the
battle of Cross Keys.
May 23d, 1861,
Colonel Jackson was superseded in command at
Harper's Ferry by
Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston.
When
General Johnston arrived several thousand men had been assembled there, representing nearly all the seceded States east of the
Mississippi River.
Johnston at once began the work of organization on a larger scale than
Jackson had attempted.
He brigaded the troops, and assigned
Colonel Jackson to the command of the exclusively
Virginia brigade.
The latter was almost immediately commissioned
[
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brigadier-general, and when on the 15th of June
Johnston withdrew from
Harper's Ferry to
Winchester, he kept
Jackson at the front along the
Baltimore and
Ohio road to observe
General Patterson's preparations.
Nothing of much importance occurred for several weeks, beyond a little affair near
Martinsburg in which
Jackson captured about forty men of a reconnoitering party sent out by
Patterson.
His vigilance was ceaseless, and
General Johnston felt sure, at
Winchester, of ample warning of any aggressive movement of the enemy.
On the 2d of January, 1861,
Alfred M. Barbour (mentioned in the foregoing paper),
Superintendent of the United States Armory at
Harper's Ferry, wrote to
Captain William Maynadier of the Ordnance Bureau,
Washington, in part as follows:
I have reason to apprehend that some assault will be made upon the United States Armory at Harper's Ferry.
My reasons I do not feel at liberty to disclose.
They may or they may not be well founded.
I deem it my duty to inform you that there is no regularly organized defense for the post.
The armorers have been formed into volunteer companies, and arms and ammunition furnished them. . . . But the armory might be taken and destroyed; the arms might be abstracted and removed or destroyed; vast amount of damage might be done to the Government property before the companies could be notified or rallied. . .. I cannot be held responsible for consequences at present, unless the Government itself sees to the protection of its property by placing reliable regularly drilled forces to sustain me. I do not look to personal consequences at all. I look to the duty of protecting the property of the Federal Government now under my charge.
The next day
Major (now General)
Henry J. Hunt was assigned to command at
Harper's Ferry, and
Lieutenant Roger Jones was ordered to report to him with a small force from Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania.
Major Hunt, in response to his request for instructions, accompanied by a statement of the weakness of his position, was directed by the
Secretary of War (
Holt) to avoid all needless irritation of the public mind.
April 2d
Major Hunt was ordered to other service, and the command devolved upon
Lieutenant Jones (now
Colonel and
Inspector-General, U. S. A.), who, in a letter to the Editors, gives the following account of the destruction of the armory:
From an early day after I reported with my detachment of sixty men from Carlisle, it became evident that a defense of the valuable Government interests at Harper's Ferry would be impracticable unless large reinforcements were sent there; and as there was every reason for believing that this would not be done, I early became convinced that there was but one course to pursue,viz., to destroy what could not be defended.
The chances for the capture or destruction of my small force — reduced on April 18th to 45 men — were overwhelming, but I counted on the unorganized and undisciplined state of the troops to be sent against me, on their surprise and bitter disappointment, as circumstances favoring our escape.
On the Sunday preceding the seizure of the armory, a wealthy miller of the village came to me and offered to be the bearer of any message I might care to send to the Secretary of War [Mr. Simon Cameron], saying he knew him intimately and that he believed Mr. Cameron would heed and give due consideration to any representation coming from him. Having full confidence in the gentleman, I intrusted him with a message to Mr. Cameron, to the effect that if he would save for the Government the arms, etc., etc., at the armory, troops must be sent there at once and by the thousand.
I further charged this gentleman to go to Washington that night, and not delay until the next morning, as he had intended — all of which he promised to do and none of which he did. But of his failure and change of purpose I was ignorant until his return to the Ferry Wednesday evening, when I learned that fear of the consequences of his mission, voluntarily assumed, had made him abandon it. Monday was passed in anxious expectation; the silence of Tuesday added to my anxiety, which culminated on the following morning, when Ex-Superintendent Barbour, fresh from the convention at Richmond, appeared upon the scene, told what had been done, and announced that within twenty-four hours the forces of the State of Virginia would be in possession of the armory.
As I was acting entirely on my own judgment and responsibility, it was apparent I must not act prematurely, before the danger was self-evident and imminent.
As the evening advanced, nearer and nearer came the troops from Halltown, and finally, shortly after 9 o'clock, when they had advanced to within less than a mile of the armory,--in time less than five minutes,--the torch was applied, and before I could withdraw my men from the village, the two arsenal buildings, containing about twenty thousand stand of rifles and rifle muskets, were ablaze.
But very few of these arms were saved, for the constantly recurring explosions of powder which had been distributed through the buildings kept the crowd aloof.
The fire in the shops was extinguished, but the arms, which were then of incalculable value, were destroyed.
The spirit, devotion, and loyalty of my men, except two deserters, were admirable; four of them were captured at their posts, but they all eventually escaped,--one by swimming the river,--and reported to me at Carlisle.
I have heard that within a few minutes after my command had crossed the Potomac to the Maryland side of the river, a train was heard starting off for Baltimore, and that it was assumed by the Virginia troops and their officers that my command had been taken off by that train, and that, consequently, pursuit was useless.
Lieutenant Jones's action was warmly approved by the
President in a congratulatory letter from
Secretary Cameron.
Governor Letcher estimated the value of the property secured to the
State by the seizure of the
Gosport Navy Yard and the
Harper's Ferry Arsenal at $25,000,000 to $30,000,000.
Editors.
