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From the very necessity of the case, the general theory upon which the war was conducted, on the part of the
South, was one of defense.
The great superiority of the
North in men and material made it indispensable for the
South to husband its resources as much as possible, inasmuch as the hope of ultimate success which the latter entertained, rested rather upon the dissatisfaction and pecuniary distress which a prolonged war would entail upon the former-making the people weary of the struggle-than upon any expectation of conquering a peace by actually subduing so powerful an adversary.
Nevertheless, in the judgment of
General Lee, it was a part of a true defensive policy to take the aggressive when good opportunity offered; and by delivering an effective blow to the enemy, not only to inflict upon him serious loss, but, at the same time, to thwart his designs of invasion, derange the plan of campaign contemplated by him, and thus prolong the conflict.
The Federal army, under
General Hooker, had re-occupied the heights opposite
Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked except at a disadvantage.
Instead of quietly awaiting the pleasure of the
Federal commander, in designing and putting into execution some new plan of campaign,
General Lee determined to maneuvre to draw him from his impregnable position, and, if possible, to remove the scene of hostilities beyond the
Potomac.
His design was to free the
State of Virginia, for a time, at least, from the presence of the enemy, to transfer the theatre of war to Northern soil, and, by selecting a favorable time and place in which to receive the attack which his
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adversary would be compelled to make on him, to take the reasonable chances of defeating him in a pitched battle; knowing full well that to obtain such an advantage there, would place him in position to attain far more decisive results than could be hoped for from a like advantage gained in
Virginia.
But even if unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in
Maryland or
Pennsylvania, it was thought that the movement would at least so far disturb the
Federal plan for the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season for active operations.
In pursuance of this design, early in the month of June,
General Lee moved his army northward by way of
Culpepper, and thence to and down the
Valley of Virginia to
Winchester.
The army had been reorganized into three army corps, designated the First, Second, and Third Corps, and commanded respectively by
Lieutenant Generals Longstreet,
Ewell, and
A. P. Hill.
The Second Corps was in advance, and crossed the branches of the
Shenandoah, near
Front Royal, on the 12th of June.
Brushing aside the force of the enemy under
General Milroy, that occupied the lower valley-most of which was captured, and the remnant of which sought refuge in the fortifications at
Harper's Ferry-
General Ewell crossed the
Potomac river with his three divisions in the latter part of June; and, in pursuance of the orders of
General Lee, traversed
Maryland and advanced into
Pennsylvania.
General A. P. Hill, whose corps was the last to leave the line of the
Rappahannock, followed, with his three divisions, in
Ewell's rear.
General Longstreet covered these movements with his corps; then moved by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps into the
Valley, and likewise crossed the
Potomac river, leaving to
General Stuart the task of holding the gaps of the
Blue Ridge Mountains with his corps of cavalry.
The Federal commander had meanwhile moved his army so as to cover
Washington City; and, as soon as. he was thoroughly informed, by
Ewell's rapid advance, of the real intention of his adversary, he, too, crossed into
Maryland.
On the 27th of June,
General Lee was near
Chambersburg with the First and Third Corps, the Second being still in advance, but within supporting distance.
With the exception of the cavalry, the army was well in hand.
The absence of that indispensable arm of the service was most seriously felt by
General Lee.
He had directed
General Stuart to use his discretion as to where and when to cross the river — that is, he was to cross east of the mountains, or retire through the mountain passes into the
Valley and cross in the immediate rear of the infantry, as the movements of the
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enemy and his own judgment should determine; but he was expected to maintain communication with the main column, and especially directed to keep the commanding general informed of the movements of the
Federal army.
The army continued to advance.
On the 1st of July,
General Lee reached
Cashtown, and stopped to confer with
General A. P. Hill, whose corps was concentrating at that point, and who reported that the advance of
Heth's Division had encountered the cavalry of the enemy near
Gettysburg.
Instructions had been sent to
General Heth to ascertain what force was at
Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without forcing an engagement.
No tidings whatever had been received from, or of our cavalry under
General Stuart, since crossing the river; and
General Lee was consequently without accurate information of the movements, or position of the main Federal army.
An army without cavalry in a strange and hostile country is as a man deprived of his eyesight and beset by enemies; he may be ever so brave and strong, but he cannot intelligently administer a single effective blow.
The sound of artillery was soon heard in the direction of
Gettysburg.
General Hill hastened to the front.
General Lee followed. On arriving at the scene of battle,
General Lee ascertained that the enemy's infantry and artillery were present in considerable force.
Heth's Division was already hotly engaged, and it was soon evident that a serious engagement could not be avoided.
Orders had previously been sent to
General Ewell to recall his advanced divisions, and to concentrate about
Cashtown.
While
en route for that point, on the morning of the 1st of July,
General Ewell learned that
Hill's Corps was moving toward
Gettysburg, and, on arriving at
Middletown, he turned the head of his column in that direction.
When within a few miles of the town,
General Rodes, whose division was in advance, was made aware, by the sharp cannonading, of the presence of the enemy in force at
Gettysburg, and caused immediate preparations for battle to be made.
On reaching the scene of conflict,
General Rodes made his disposition to assail the force with which
Hill's troops were engaged, but no sooner were his lines formed than he perceived fresh troops of the enemy extending their right flank, and deploying in his immediate front.
With this force he was soon actively engaged.
The contest now became sharp and earnest.
Neither side sought or expected a general engagement; and yet, brought thus unexpectedly in the presence of each other, found a conflict unavoidable.
The
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battle continued, with varying success, until perhaps three P. M., when
General Early, of
Ewell's Corps, reached the field with his division, moved in on
Rodes' left, and attacked the enemy with his accustomed vigor and impetuosity.
This decided the contest.
The enemy's right gave way under
Early's assault.
Pender's Division, of ills Corps, had meanwhile been advanced to relieve that of
Heth; and
Rodes, observing the effect of
Early's attack, ordered his line forward.
There resulted a general and irresistible advance of our entire line; the enemy gave way at all points, and were driven in disorder through and beyond the town of
Gettysburg, leaving over five thousand prisoners in our hands.
In this action the force engaged on the
Confederate side, as already stated, consisted of the divisions of
Heth and
Pender, of
Hill's Corps, and those of
Early and
Rodes, of
Ewell's Corps.
On the side of the
Federals there was the First Corps, embracing the divisions of
Wadsworth,
Doubleday, and
Robinson; the Eleventh Corps, embracing the divisions of
Schurz,
Barlow, and
Steinwehr, and the cavalry force under
General Buford.
The infantry force on each side was about the same, and the preponderance in numbers was with the
Federals--to the extent of
General Buford's cavalry command.
General Lee witnessed the flight of the
Federals through
Gettysburg, and up the hills beyond.
He then directed me to go to
General Ewell, and to say to him that, from the position which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization, and in great confusion; that it was only necessary to press “those people” in order to secure possession of the heights; and that, if possible, he wished him to do this.
In obedience to these instructions, I proceeded immediately to
General Ewell, and delivered the order of
General Lee; and, after receiving from him some message for the
commanding general in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter, and reported that his order had been delivered.
General Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate the existence of any impediment, to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the impression on my mind that it would be executed.
In the exercise of that discretion, however, which
General Lee was accustomed to accord to his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement,
General Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit.
The troops were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the position which it was designed that
General Ewell should seize.
Major General Edward Johnson, whose division
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reached the field after the engagement, and formed on the left of
Early, in a conversation had with me, since the war, about this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our inaction at that time, assured me that there was no hindrance to his moving forward; but that, after getting his command in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged, or had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained reason, he had received orders to halt.
This was after
General Lee's message was delivered to
General Ewell.
Such was the condition of affairs when darkness veiled the scene on the evening of the first day. The prevailing idea with
General Lee was, to press forward without delay; to follow up promptly and vigorously the advantage already gained.
Having failed to reap the full fruit of the victory before night, his mind was evidently occupied with the idea of renewing the assault upon the enemy's right with the dawn of day on the second.
The divisions of
Major Generals Early and
Rodes, of
Ewell's Corps, had been actively engaged, and had sustained some loss, but were still in excellent condition, and in the full enjoyment of the prestige of success and a consequent elation of spirit, in having so gallantly swept the enemy from their front, through the town of
Gettysburg, and compelled him to seek refuge behind the heights beyond.
The division of
Major General Edward Johnson, of the same corps, was perfectly fresh, not having been engaged.
Anderson's Division, of
Hill's Corps, was also now up. With this force
General Lee thought that the enemy's position could be assailed with every prospect of success; but, after a conference with the corps and division commanders on our left, who represented that, in their judgment, it would be hazardous to attempt to storm the strong position occupied by the enemy, with troops somewhat fagged by the marching and fighting of the first day; that the ground in their immediate front furnished greater obstacles to a successful assault than existed at other points of the line, and that it could be reasonably concluded, since they had so severely handled the enemy in their front, that he would concentrate and fortify with special reference to resisting a further advance just there, he determined to make the main attack well on the enemy's left, indulging the hope that.Longstreet's Corps would be up in time to begin the movement at an early hour on the second.
He instructed
General Ewell to be prepared to co-operate by a simultaneous advance by his corps.
General Longstreet was unexpectedly detained, however, as will best appear from the following extract from his report of the
Gettysburg campaign.
In speaking of his movements on the first day of July, he says:
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Our march on this day was greatly delayed by
Johnson's Division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from
Shippensburg, and the long wagontrains that followed him.
McLaws' Division, however, reached
Marsh creek, four miles from
Gettysburg, a little after dark, and
Hood's Division got within nearly the same distance of the town about twelve o'clock at night.
Law's Brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day, and joined about noon on the 2d.
Previous to his joining I received instructions from the
commanding general to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left.
The enemy, having been driven back by the corps of
Lieutenant Generals Ewell and
A. P. Hill, the day previous, had taken a strong position extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmettsburg road.
Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General
Law's Brigade joined its division.
As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun.
Engineers, sent out by the
commanding general and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move.
Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route.
McLaws' Division got into position, opposite the enemy's left, about 4 P. M.
Hood's Division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left.
General Longstreet here explains the cause of the delay in bringing up his troops on the
first day; but, notwithstanding this, the divisions of
Hood and
McLaws (with the exception of
Law's Brigade) encamped within four miles of
Gettysburg at midnight of the 1st of July.
He then received instructions to move
with the portion of his command that was then up, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left; but fearing that his force was too weak to venture to make an attack, he delayed until
Law's Brigade joined its division, about noon on the 2d.
In this,
General Longstreet clearly admits that he assumed the responsibility of postponing the execution of the orders of the
commanding general.
Owing to the causes assigned, the troops were not in position to attack until 4 P. M. One can imagine what was going on in the
Federal lines meanwhile.
Round Top, the key to their position, which was not occupied in the morning, they now held in force, and another corps (
Sedgwick's) had reached the field.
Late as it was, the original plan was adhered to. The two divisions of
Longstreet's Corps gallantly advanced, forced the enemy back a considerable distance, and captured some trophies and prisoners.
Ewell's Divisions were ordered forward, and likewise gained additional ground and trophies.
On
Cemetery Hill the attack by
Early's leading brigades was made with vigor.
They drove the enemy back into the works on the crest, into which they forced their way, and seized several pieces of artillery; but they were compelled to relinquish what they had gained, from want of expected support on their right, and retired to their original position, bringing with them some prisoners and four stands of colors.
In explanation of
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this lack of expected support,
General Rodes, who was on
General Early's right, states in his report, that after he had conferred with
General Early on his left, and
General Lane on his right, and arranged to attack in concert, he proceeded at once to make the necessary preparations; but as he had to draw his troops out of the town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, while
General Early had to move only half that distance, without change of front, it resulted that, before he drove in the enemy's skirmishers,
General Early had attacked, and been compelled to withdraw.
The whole affair was disjointed.
There was an utter absence of accord in the movements of the several commands, and no decisive results attended the operations of the second day. It is generally conceded that
General Longstreet, on this occasion, was fairly chargeable with tardiness, and I have always thought that his conduct, in this particular, was due to a lack of appreciation, on his part, of the circumstances which created an urgent and peculiar need for the presence of his troops at the front.
As soon as the necessity for the concentration of the army was precipitated by the unexpected encounter, on the 1st of July, with a large force of the enemy, near
Gettysburg,
General Longstreet was urged to hasten his march; and this, perhaps, should have sufficed to cause him to push his divisions on toward
Gettysburg, from which point he was distant but four miles, early on the 2d.
But I cannot say that he was notified, on the night of the 1st, of the attack proposed to be made on the morning of the 2d, and the part his corps was to take therein.
Neither do I think it just to charge that he was alone responsible for the delay in attacking that ensued
after his arrival on the field.
I well remember how
General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of the troops, until he finally became restless, and rode back to meet
General Longstreet, and urge him forward; but, then, there was considerable delay in putting the troops to work after they reached the field; and much time was spent in discussing what was to be done, which, perhaps, could not be avoided.
At any rate, it would be unreasonable to hold
General Longstreet alone accountable for this.
Indeed, great injustice has been done him in the charge that he had orders from the
commanding general to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2d of July, and that he disobeyed these orders.
This would imply that he was in position to attack, whereas
General Lee but anticipated his early arrival on the 2d, and based his calculations upon it. I have shown how he was disappointed, and I need hardly add that the delay was fatal.
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General Lee determined to renew the attack upon the enemy's position on the 3d of July.
In his report of the campaign, in speaking of the operations of the second day, he says:
The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed; and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack.
The general plan was unchanged.
Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning; and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time.
General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected.
It appears that he was delayed by apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse as they advanced.
General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with
General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack arranged to be made on the enemy's left, having reinforced
General Johnson, whose division was upon our extreme left, during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning.
In obedience to these instructions,
General Johnson became hotly engaged before
General Ewell could be informed of the halt which had been called on our right.
After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments,
General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly-fortified crest of the hill.
The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of
General Johnson, and, finally, to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about one P. M.
General Lee then had a conference with
General Longstreet, and the mode of attack, and the troops to make it, were thoroughly debated.
I was present, and understood the arrangement to be that
General Longstreet should endeavor to force the enemy's lines in his front.
That front was held by the divisions of
Hood and
McLaws.
To strengthen him for the undertaking, it was decided to reinforce him by such troops as could be drawn from the centre.
Pickett's Division, of
Longstreet's Corps, was then up, fresh and available.
Heth's Division, of
Hill's Corps, was also mentioned as available, having been, in great measure, recuperated since its active engagement of the first day; so, also, were the brigades of
Lane and
Scales, of
Pender's Division,
Hill's Corps; and as our extreme right was comparatively safe, being well posted, and not at
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all threatened, one of the divisions of
Hood and
McLaws, and the greater portion of the other, could be removed out of the lines and be made to take part in the attack.
Indeed, it was designed, originally, that the two divisions last named, reinforced by
Pickett, should make the attack; and it was only because of the apprehensions of
General Longstreet that his corps was not strong enough for the movement, that
General Hill was called on to reinforce him. Orders were sent to
General Hill to place
Heth's Division and two brigades of
Pender's at
General Longstreet's disposal, and to be prepared to give him further assistance if requested.
The assault was to have been made with a column of not less than two divisions, and the remaining divisions were to have been moved forward in support of those in advance.
This was the result of the conference alluded to, as understood by me.
Lieutenant General A. P. Hill appears to have had the same impression, for he says, in his report of the operations of his corps at this time:
I was directed to hold my line with Anderson's Division and the half of Pender's, now commanded by General Lane, and to order Heth's Division, commanded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' Brigades, of Pender's Division, to report to Lieutenant General Longstreet, as a support to his corps, in the assault on the enemy's lines.
General Longstreet proceeded at once to make the dispositions for attack, and
General Lee rode along the portion of the line held by
A. P. Hill's Corps, and finally took position about the
Confederate centre, on an elevated point, from which he could survey the field and watch the result of the movement.
After a heavy artillery fire along the entire line, and at a given signal, the movement began, but the plan agreed on was not carried out. The only troops that participated in the attack were the divisions of
Pickett (First Corps) and
Heth (Third Corps)-the latter, since the wounding of
General Heth, commanded by
General Pettigrew-and thy brigades of
Lane,
Scales, and
Wilcox.
The two divisions were formed in advance, the three brigades as their support.
The divisions of
Hood and
McLaws (First Corps) were passive spectators of the movement.
To one who observed the charge, it appeared that
Pettigrew's line was not a continuation of that of
Pickett, but that it advanced in
echelon.
It would seem that there was some confusion in forming the troops, for
Captain Louis (r. Young, of
General Pettigrew's staff, says:
On the morning of the 3d of July, General Pettigrew, commanding Heth's Division, was instructed to report to General Longstreet, who directed him to form in the rear of Pickett's Division, and support his advance upon Cemetery Hill, which would be commenced as soon as the fire from our artillery should have driven the
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enemy from his guns, and prepared the way for the attack.
And I presume that it was in consequence of this having been the first plan settled on, that the erroneous report was circulated that Heth's Division was assigned the duty of supporting that of Pickett.
But the order referred to was countermanded almost as soon as given, and General Pettigrew was instructed to advance upon the same line with Pickett, a portion of Pender's Division acting as supports.
Wilcox's Brigade was ordered to support
Pickett's right flank, and the brigades of.
Lane and
Scales acted as supports to
Heth's Division.
General Lane, in his report, says:
General Longstreet ordered me to form in rear of the right of Heth's Division, commanded by General Pettigrew.
Soon after I had executed this order, putting Lowrance on the right, I was relieved of the command of the division by Major General Trimble, who acted under the same orders that I had received.
Heth's Division was much longer than Lowrance's Brigade and my own, which constituted its only support, and there was, consequently, no second line in the rear of its left.
The assaulting column really consisted of
Pickett's Division-two brigades in front, and one in the second line as a support-with the brigade of
Wilcox in the rear of the right, to protect that flank; while
Heth's Division moved forward on
Pickett's left in
echelon, or with the alignment so imperfect and so drooping on the left as to appear in
echelon, with
Lane's and
Scales' Brigades in rear of its right, and its left without reserve or support, and entirely exposed.
Thus the column moved forward.
It is needless to say a word here of the heroic conduct of
Pickett's Division; that charge has already passed into history as “one of the world's great deeds of arms.”
While, doubtless, many brave men of other commands reached the crest of the height, this was the only organized body that entered the works of the enemy.
Much can be said in excuse for the failure of the other commands to fulfil the task assigned them.
As a general rule, the peculiarly rough and wooded character of the country in which our army was accustomed to operate, and which, in some respects, was unfavorable for the maneuvres of large armies, was of decided advantage to us; for, in moving upon the enemy, through bodies of woods, or in a broken, rolling country, not only was the enemy at a loss how to estimate our strength, but our own men were not impressed with that sense of insecurity, which must have resulted from a thorough knowledge of their own weakness.
1
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It was different here.
The charge was made down a gentle slope, and then up to the enemy's lines, a distance of over half a mile, denuded of forests, and in full sight of the enemy, and perfect range of their artillery.
These combined causes produced their natural effect upon
Pettigrew's Division, and the brigade supporting it, caused them to falter, and finally retire.
Then
Pickett's Division, continuing the charge without supports, and in the sight of the enemy, was not half so formidable or effective as it would have been had trees or hills prevented the enemy from so correctly estimating the strength of the attacking column, and our own troops from experiencing that sense of weakness which the known absence of support necessarily produced.
In spite of all this, it steadily and gallantly advanced to its allotted task.
As the three brigades under
Garnett,
Armistead, and
Kemper, approach the enemy's lines, a most terrific fire of artillery and small-arms is concentrated upon them; but they swerve not — there is no faltering; steadily moving forward, they rapidly reduce the intervening space, and close with their adversaries; leaping the breastworks, they drive back the enemy, and plant their standard on the captured guns, amid shouts of victory-dearly won and short-lived victory.
No more could be exacted, or expected, of those men of brave hearts and nerves of steel; but where are the supports to reap the benefit of their heroic efforts, and gather the fruits of a victory so nobly won?
Was that but a forlorn hope, on whose success, not only in penetrating the enemy's lines, but in maintaining its hold against their combined and united efforts to dislodge it, an entire army was to wait in quiet observation Was it designed to throw these few brigades-originally, at the most, but two divisions-upon the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile away, seven-ninths of the army, in breathless suspense, in ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved not?
I maintain that such was not the design of the
commanding general.
Had the veteran divisions of
Hood and
McLaws been moved forward, as was
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planned, in support of those of
Pickett and
Pettigrew, not only would the latter division, in all probability, have gained the enemy's works, as did that of
Pickett, but these two would have been enabled, with the aid of
Hood and
McLaws, to resist all efforts of the enemy to dislodge them.
The enemy closing in on
Pickett's Brigades, concentrating upon that small band of heroes the fire of every gun that could be brought to bear upon them, soon disintegrated and overpowered them.
Such as were not killed, disabled, and made captive, fell back to our lines.
It appears that
General Longstreet deemed it necessary to defend his right flank and rear with the divisions of
McLaws and
Hood.
These divisions, as before stated, constituted all of the
Confederate line held by
Longstreet's troops, and it is not apparent how they were necessary to defend his flank and rear.
The nearest infantry force of the enemy, to our right, occupied the hills-Round Top and Little Round Top-and the only force that could be said to have threatened our flank and rear consisted of a few brigades of cavalry, so posted as to protect the enemy's left.
It is not my purpose here to undertake to establish the wisdom of an attack on the enemy's position on the third day, which
General Longstreet contends was opposed by his judgment, and of which he says he would have stayed the execution, had he felt that he had the privilege so to do; nor do I propose to discuss the necessities of his position, which he represents to have been such as to forbid the employment of
McLaws' and
Hood's Divisions in the attack; neither do I seek any other than a just explanation of the causes of our failure at that time; but well recalling my surprise and disappointment when it was ascertained that only
Pickett's Division, and the troops from
Hill's Corps had taken part in the movement, and with positively distinct impressions as to the occurrences just related, I deem it proper to record them for confirmation or refutation as the undisputed facts of the case, and the testimony of others, may determine.
After the assault on the enemy's works, on the 3d of July, there was no serious fighting at
Gettysburg.
The 4th passed in comparative quiet.
Neither army evinced any disposition to assail the other.
Notwithstanding the brilliant achievements of
Ewell and till on the first day, and the decided advantage gained by
Longstreet on the second, the failure of the operations of the third day, involving, as they did, but two divisions of the army, deprived us of the prestige of our previous successes, and gave a shadow of right to our adversary's claim of having gained a victory.
Their exultation, however, should be tempered with moderation, when we consider
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that, after one day of absolute quiet, the
Confederates withdrew from their front without serious molestation, and with bridges swept away, and an impassable river in rear, stood in an attitude of defiance until their line of retreat could be rendered practicable, after which they safely recrossed into
Virginia.
Then, again, so serious was the loss visited upon the
Federals in the engagements of the first and second days, and so near success was the effort to storm their position on the third day, that they were themselves undecided as to whether they should stand or retreat.
In discussing several councils, or conferences, held by
General Meade with his corps commanders,
General Sickles testified, before the
Committee on the Conduct of the
War, that the reason the
Confederates were not followed up was on account of differences of opinion whether or not the
Federals should themselves retreat, as “it was by no means clear, in the judgment of the corps commanders, or of the general in command, whether they had won or not.”
It appears, from the official returns on file in the War Department, that on the 31st of May, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia numbered: infantry, fifty-nine thousand four hundred and fifty-seven; cavalry, ten thousand two hundred and ninety-two; and artillery, four thousand seven hundred and two; of all arms, seventy-four thousand four hundred and fifty-one effectives.
This was immediately before the invasion of
Pennsylvania, and may be regarded as representing the maximum of
General Lee's army in the
Gettysburg campaign.
On the 20th of July, 1863, after the return of
General Lee to
Virginia, his army numbered forty-one thousand three hundred and eighty-eight effectives, exclusive of the cavalry corps, of which no report is made in the return of the date last mentioned; allowing “eight thousand one hundred and twelve,” a fair estimate for the cavalry, the effective total of the army on the 20th of July was forty-nine thousand five hundred.
It appears, therefore, that
General Lee's loss in the
Pennsylvania campaign was nearly twenty-five thousand.
Concerning the strength of the
Federal army,
General Meade testified as follows, before the
Committee on the Conduct of the
War (second series, vol.
i., p. 337): “Including all arms of the service, my strength was a little under one hundred thousand men — about ninety-five thousand.
I think
General Lee had about ninety thousand infantry, four thousand to five thousand artillery, and about ten thousand cavalry.”
Again, he testifies: “I think the returns showed me, when I took command of the army, amounted to about one hundred and five thousand men; included in those were the eleven thousand of
General French.”
In this latter matter the
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evidence is against
General Meade.
General Hooker, on the 27th of June, 1863, telegraphed to
General Halleck, from
Poolesville: “My whole force of
enlisted men for duty will not exceed one hundred and five thousand (105,000).”
This would make his total effective force (officers and men) full one hundred and twelve thousand.
This dispatch was received by
General Halleck at nine A. M. On reaching
Sandy Hook, subsequently, on the same day,
General Hooker telegraphed as follows, concerning the garrison at
Harper's Ferry, under
General French: “
I find ten thousand men here in condition to take the field.
Here they are of no earthly account.
They cannot defend a ford of the river; and, as far as
Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn.
No enemy will ever take possession of them for them.
This is my opinion.
All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service.”
This dispatch was received by
General Halleck at 2.55 P. M. It is evident that the garrison at
Harper's Ferry was not embraced in the returns alluded to by
General Hooker in his first dispatch.
Although
General Halleck refused these troops to
General Hooker, they were immediately awarded to
General Meade, on his assuming command when
General Hooker was relieved.
With t more accurate returns of the two armies at
Gettysburg, we are left to form our conclusions as to their strength from the data given above.
I put the Army of the Potomac at one hundred and five thousand, and the Army of Northern Virginia at sixty-seven thousand of all arms-fifty-three thousand five hundred infantry, nine thousand cavalry, and four thousand five hundred artillery-and believe these figures very nearly correct.
In this estimate, I adopt the strength of the
Federal army as given by its commander on the 27th of June, but four days before the first encounter at
Gettysburg, excluding all consideration of the troops at
Harper's Ferry, although
General Meade, on assuming command, at once ordered
General French to move to
Frederick with seven thousand men, to protect his communications, and thus made available a like number of men of the Army of the Potomac, who would otherwise have been detached for this service.
On the side of the
Confederates, the entire cavalry corps is included.
That portion which
General Stuart accompanied made a complete circuit of the
Federal army, and only joined
General Lee on the evening of the second day; and the brigades under
Generals Jones and
Robertson, which had been left to guard the passes of the
Blue Ridge, did not rejoin the army until the 3d of July.
