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Chapter 40: in front of Washington.
On the 10th, the march was resumed at daylight, and we bivouacked four miles from
Rockville, on the
Georgetown pike, having marched twenty miles.
Ramseur's division, which had remained behind for a short time to protect a working party engaged in destroying the railroad bridge, was detained for a time in driving off a party of cavalry which had been following from
Maryland Heights, and did not get up until one o'clock at night.
McCausland, moving in front on this day, drove a body of the enemy's cavalry before them and had quite a brisk engagement at
Rockville, where he encamped after defeating and driving off the enemy.
We moved at daylight on the 11th;
McCausland moving on the
Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceded by
Imboden's cavalry under
Colonel Smith, turned to the left at
Rockville, so as to reach the 7th Street pike which runs by
Silver Spring into
Washington.
Jackson's cavalry moved on the left flank.
The previous day had been very warm, and the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain for several weeks.
The heat during the night had been very oppressive, and but little rest had been obtained.
This day was an exceedingly hot one, and there was no air stirring.
While marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaustion.
Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the fortifications around
Washington before they could be manned.
Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the woods on the 7th Street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed them as skirmishers.
I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived in sight of
Fort Stevens on the road a short time after noon, when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned.
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Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skirmishers, and move into the works if he could.
My whole column was then moving by flank, which was the only practicable mode of marching upon the road we were on, and before
Rodes' division could be brought up, we saw a cloud of dust in the rear of the works towards
Washington, and soon a column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left and skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire was opened on us from a number of batteries.
This defeated our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became necessary to reconnoitre.
Rodes' skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was practicable to carry them by assault.
They were found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be enclosed forts of heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in front of each pierced for an immense number of guns, the whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and strengthened by palisades and abattis.
The timber had been felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground, making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by artillery.
On the right was
Rock Creek running through a deep ravine which had been rendered impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, and beyond were the works on the
Georgetown pike — which had been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of the same impregnable character.
The position was naturally strong for defence, and the examination showed, what might have been expected, that every appliance of science and unlimited means had been used to render the fortifications around
Washington as strong as possible.
This reconnaissance consumed the balance of the day.
The rapid marching which had broken down a number
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of the men who were barefooted or weakened by previous exposure, and had been left in the
Valley and directed to be collected at
Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded at
Harper's Ferry,
Maryland Heights and
Monocacy, had reduced my infantry to about 8,000 muskets.
Of those remaining, a very large number were greatly exhausted by the last two days marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and I was satisfied, when we arrived in front of the fortifications, that not more than one-third of my force could have been carried into action.
I had about forty pieces of field artillery, of which the largest were 12 pounder Napoleons, besides a few pieces of horse artillery with the cavalry.
McCausland reported the works on the
Georgetown pike too strongly manned for him to assault.
We could not move to the right or left without its being discovered from a signal station on the top of the “Soldiers' home,” which overlooked the country, and the enemy would have been enabled to move in his works to meet us. Under the circumstances, to have rushed my men blindly against the fortifications, without understanding the state of things, would have been worse than folly.
If we had any friends in
Washington, none of them came out to give us information, and this satisfied me that the place was not undefended.
I knew that troops had arrived from
Grant's army, for prisoners had been captured from
Rickett's division of the 6th corps at
Monocacy.
From
Sharpsburg I had sent a message to
Mosby, by one of his men, requesting him to cross the
Potomac below
Harper's Ferry, cut the railroad and telegraph, and endeavor to find out the condition of things in
Washington, but he had not crossed the river, and I had received no information from him. A Northern paper, which was obtained, gave the information that
Hunter, after moving up the
Ohio River in steamboats, was passing over the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and I knew that he would be at
Harper's Ferry soon, as
Imboden had done very little damage to the road west of
Martinsburg.
After dark on
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the 11th I held a consultation with
Major Generals Breckenridge,
Rodes,
Gordon and
Ramseur, in which I stated to them the danger of remaining where we were, and the necessity of doing something immediately, as the probability was that the passes of the
South Mountain and the fords of the upper Potomac would soon be closed against us. After interchanging views with them, being very reluctant to abandon the project of capturing
Washington I determined to make an assault on the enemy's works at daylight next morning, unless some information should be received before that time showing its impracticability, and so informed those officers.
During the night a dispatch was received from
Gen. Bradley Johnson from near
Baltimore informing me that he had received information, from a reliable source, that two corps had arrived from
General Grant's army, and that his whole army was probably in motion.
This caused me to delay the attack until I could examine the works again, and as soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front and found the parapets lined with troops.
I had, therefore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing
Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the
Capitol, and given the
Federal authorities a terrible fright.
In his report,
Grant says, in regard to the condition of things when I moved towards
Washington, “The garrisons of
Baltimore and
Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred days men, and detachments from the invalid corps.”
And, in regard to the force of
Wallace at
Monocacy, he says: “His force was not sufficient to ensure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy and thereby served to enable
General Wright to reach
Washington with two divisions of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps before him.”
Stanton says in his report: “Here (at
Washington) they (we) were met by troops from the Army of the Potomac, consisting of the
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6th corps under
General Wright, a part of the 8th corps under
General Gilmore and a part of the 19th corps, just arrived from New Orleans under
General Emory.”
Taking
Grant's statement of the troops which had arrived from his army, they were sufficient to hold the works against my troops, at least until others could arrive.
But in addition to those which had already arrived, there were the detachments from the invalid corps, called, I believe, the “Veteran reserves” (of which I was informed there were 5,000), the heavy artillery regiments, the hundred days men, and, I suppose, the part of the 8th corps mentioned by
Stanton.
To all of these may be added the local troops, or militia, and the
Government employees.
Some of the
Northern papers stated that, between Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the city: but on Saturday I was fighting at
Monocacy, 35 miles from
Washington, a force which I could not leave in my rear; and after disposing of that force and moving as rapidly as it was possible for me to move, I did not arrive in front of the fortifications until after noon on Monday, and then my troops were exhausted and it required time to bring them up into line.
I had then made a march, over the circuitous route by
Charlottesville,
Lynchburg and
Salem, down the
Valley and through the passes of the
South Mountain, which, notwithstanding the delays in dealing with
Hunter's,
Sigel's, and
Wallace's forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I believe, without a parallel in this or any other modern war-the unopposed excursion of
Sherman through
Georgia not excepted.
My small force had been thrown up to the very walls of the
Federal Capital, north of a river which could not be forded at any point within 40 miles, and with a heavy force and the
South Mountain in my rear,--the passes through which mountain could be held by a small number of troops.
A glance at the map, when it is recollected that the
Potomac is a wide river, and navigable to
Washington with the largest vessels, will cause the intelligent reader to wonder, not why I failed to take
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Washington, but why I had the audacity to approach it as I did, with the small force under my command.
It was supposed by some, who were not informed of the facts, that I delayed in the lower Valley longer than was necessary; but an examination of the foregoing narrative will show that not one moment was spent in idleness, but that every one was employed in making some arrangement, or removing some difficulty in my way, which it was necessary to make or remove; so as to enable me to advance with a prospect of success.
I could not move across the
Potomac and through the passes of the
South Mountain, with any safety, until
Sigel was driven from, or safely housed in, the fortifications at
Maryland Heights.
After abandoning the idea of capturing
Washington, I determined to remain in front of the fortifications during the 12th, and retire at night, as I was satisfied that to remain longer would cause the loss of my entire force.
Johnson had burned the bridges over the
Gunpowder, on the
Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened
Baltimore, and started for
Point Lookout, but I sent an order for him to return.
The attempt to release the prisoners, of which I was informed by
General Lee, was not made, as the enemy had received notice of it in some way.
Major Harry Gilmor, who burned the bridge over the
Gunpowder on the
Philadelphia road, captured
Major General Franklin on a train at that point, but he was permitted to escape, either by the carelessness or exhaustion of the guard placed over him, before I was informed of the capture.
On the afternoon of the 12th, a heavy reconnoitring force was sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, was driven back by
Rodes' division with but slight loss to us. About dark we commenced retiring and did so without molestation.
Passing through
Rockville and Poolsville, we crossed the
Potomac at
White's Ford, above
Leesburg in
Loudoun County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners
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captured at
Monocacy and everything else in safety.
There was some skirmishing in the rear, between our cavalry and that of the enemy which was following, and on the afternoon of the 14th, there was some artillery firing by the enemy, across the river, at our cavalry which was watching the fords.
Besides the money levied in
Hagerstown and Frederick, which was subsequently very useful in obtaining supplies, we brought off quite a large number of beef cattle, and the cavalry obtained a number of horses, some being also procured for the artillery.
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