[
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On the 9th,
Imboden reported that a large force had been concentrated at
Harper's Ferry, consisting of the 6th, 19th, and
Crook's corps, under a new commander, and that it was moving to our right.
The new commander proved to be
Major General Sheridan, from
Grant's army.
On the 10th, we moved from
Bunker Hill to the east of
Winchester, to cover the roads from
Charlestown and
Berryville to that place; and
Ramseur's division was moved to
Winchester, to cover that place against a force reported to be advancing from the west; but, this report proving untrue, it was subsequently moved to the junction of the
Millwood and Front Royal roads.
On the morning of the 11th, it was discovered that the enemy was moving to our right on the east of the
Opequon, and my troops, which had been formed in line of battle covering
Winchester, were moved to the right, towards
Newtown, keeping between the enemy and the
Valley Pike.
Ramseur had a brisk skirmish with a body of the enemy's cavalry on the
Millwood road, and drove it back.
Imboden's and
Vaughan's brigades had a severe fight with another body of cavalry at the double toll-gate, at the intersection of the
Front Royal road with the road from
White Post to
Newtown; and it was discovered that there had been a considerable accession to that arm from
Grant's army.
Just before night,
Gordon had very heavy skirmishing near
Newtown, with a large force of cavalry, which advanced on the road from the double toll-gate, and drove it off. We encamped near
Newtown; and on the morning of the 12th, moved to
Hupp's Hill, between
Strasburg and
Cedar Creek.
Finding that the enemy was advancing in much heavier force than I had yet encountered, I determined to take position at
Fisher's Hill, above
Strasburg,
[
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and await his attack there.
Imboden with his brigade was sent to the
Luray Valley, to watch that route; and, in the afternoon, we moved to
Fisher's Hill.
I had received information, a few days before, from
General Lee, that
General Anderson had moved with
Kershaw's division of infantry and
Fitz. Lee's division of cavalry to Culpeper Court-House; and I sent a dispatch to
Anderson informing him of the state of things, and requesting him to move to
Front Royal, so as to guard the
Luray Valley.
Sheridan's advance appeared on the banks of
Cedar Creek, on the 12th, and there was some skirmishing with it. My troops were posted at
Fisher's Hill, with the right resting on the
North Fork of the
Shenandoah, and the left extending towards
Little North Mountain; and we awaited the advance of the enemy.
General Anderson moved to
Front Royal, in compliance with my request, and took position to prevent an advance of the enemy on that route.
Shortly after I took position at
Fisher's Hill,
Major General Lomax reported to me to relieve
Ransom in command of the cavalry, and MeCausland and
Johnson joined us with the remnants of their brigades.
Sheridan demonstrated at
Hupp's Hill, within our view, for several days, and some severe skirmishing ensued.
Upon taking position at
Fisher's Hill, I had established a signal station on the end of Three Top Mountain, a branch of
Massanutten Mountain, near
Strasburg, which overlooked both camps and enabled me to communicate readily with
General Anderson in the
Luray Valley.
A small force from
Sheridan's army ascended the mountain and drove off our signal-men and possession was taken of the station by the enemy, who was in turn driven away; when several small but severe fights ensued over the station, possession of it being finally gained and held by a force of 100 men under
Captain Keller of
Gordon's division.
On the morning of the 17th, it was discovered that the enemy was falling back, and I immediately moved
[
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forward in pursuit, requesting
General Anderson, by signal, to cross the river at
Front Royal and move towards
Winchester.
Just before night, the enemy's cavalry and a body of infantry, reported to be a division, was encountered between
Kernstown and
Winchester, and driven through the latter place, after a sharp engagement, in which
Wharton's division moved to the left and attacked the enemy's infantry, and drove it from a strong position on
Bower's Hill, south of
Winchester, while
Ramseur engaged it in the front and
Gordon advanced against the cavalry on the right.
On the 18th we took possession to cover
Winchester, and
General Anderson came up with
Kershaw's division of infantry,
Cutshaw's battalion of artillery and two brigades of cavalry under
Fitz. Lee.
General Anderson ranked me, but he declined to take command, and offered to co-operate in any movement I might suggest.
We had now discovered that
Torbert's and
Wilson's divisions of cavalry from
Grant's army had joined
Sheridan's force, and that the latter was very large.
On the 19th, my main force moved to
Bunker Hill and
Lomax's cavalry made reconnaissances to
Martinsburg and
Shepherdstown, while
Anderson's whole force remained near
Winchester.
On the 20th, our cavalry had some skirmishing with the enemy's, on the
Opequon, and on the 21st, by concert, there was a general movement towards
Harper's Ferry-my command moving through
Smithfield towards
Charlestown, and
Anderson's on the direct road by
Summit Point.
A body of the enemy's cavalry was driven from the
Opequon, and was pursued by part of our cavalry towards
Summit Point.
I encountered
Sheridan's main force near
Cameron's depot, about three miles from
Charlestown, in a position which he commenced fortifying at once.
Rodes' and
Ramseur's divisions were advanced to the front, and very heavy skirmishing ensued and was continued until night, but I waited for
General Anderson to arrive before making a general
[
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attack.
He encountered
Wilson's division of cavalry at
Summit Point, and, after driving it off, went into camp at that place.
At light next morning, it was discovered that the enemy had retired during the night, and his rear guard of cavalry was driven through
Charlestown towards
Halltown, where
Sheridan had taken a strong position under the protection of the heavy guns on
Maryland Heights.
I demonstrated on the enemy's front on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th, and there was some skirmishing.
General Anderson then consented to take my position in front of
Charlestown and amuse the enemy with
Kershaw's division of infantry, supported by
McCausland's brigade of cavalry on the left and a regiment of
Fitz. Lee's cavalry on the right, while I moved with my infantry and artillery to
Shepherdstown and
Fitz. Lee with the rest of the cavalry to
Williamsport, as if to cross into
Maryland, in order to keep up the fear of an invasion of
Maryland and
Pennsylvania.
On the 25th
Fitz. Lee started by way of
Leetown and
Martinsburg to
Williamsport, and I moved through
Leetown and crossed the railroad at
Kearneysville to
Shepherdstown.
After
Fitz. Lee had passed on, I encountered a very large force of the enemy's cavalry between
Leetown and
Kearneysville, which was moving out with several days' forage and rations for a raid in our rear.
After a sharp engagement with small arms and artillery, this force was driven back through
Shepherdstown, where we came near surrounding and capturing a considerable portion of it, but it succeeded in making its escape across the
Potomac.
Gordon's division, which was moved around to intercept the enemy, became heavily engaged, and cut off the retreat of part of his force by one road, but it made its way down the river to the ford by another and thus escaped.
In this affair, a valuable officer,
Colonel Monaghan, of the 6th Louisiana Regiment, was killed.
Fitz. Lee reached
Williamsport, and had some
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skirmishing across the river at that place, and then moved to
Shepherdstown.
On the 26th I moved to
Leetown, on the 27th moved back to
Bunker Hill; while
Anderson, who had confronted
Sheridan, during the two days of my absence, with but a division of infantry, and a brigade and a regiment of cavalry, moved to
Stephenson's depot.
On the 28th our cavalry, which had been left holding a line from
Charlestown to
Shepherdstown, was compelled to retire across the
Opequon, after having had a brisk engagement with the enemy's cavalry at
Smithfield.
On the 29th, the enemy's cavalry crossed the
Opequon near
Smithfield, driving in our cavalry pickets, when I advanced to the front with a part of my infantry, and drove the enemy across the stream again, and after a very sharp artillery duel, a portion of my command was crossed over and pursued the enemy through
Smithfield towards
Charlestown.
Quiet prevailed on the 30th, but on the 31st there were some demonstrations of cavalry by the enemy on the
Opequon, which were met by ours.
On this day
Anderson moved to
Winchester, and
Rodes, with his division, went to
Martinsburg on a reconnaissance, drove a force of the enemy's cavalry from that place, interrupted the preparations for repairing the railroad, and then returned.
There was quiet on the 1st, but on the 2nd, I broke up my camp at
Bunker Hill, and moved with three divisions of infantry and part of
McCausland's cavalry, under
Colonel Ferguson, across the country towards
Summit Point, on a reconnaissance, while the trains under the protection of
Rodes' division were moved to
Stephenson's depot.
After I had crossed the
Opequon and was moving towards
Summit Point,
Averill's cavalry attacked and drove back in some confusion first
Vaughan's and then
Johnson's cavalry, which were on the
Martinsburg road and the
Opequon, but
Rodes returned towards
Bunker Hill and drove the enemy back in turn.
This affair arrested my march and I recrossed the
Opequon and
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moved to
Stephenson's depot, where I established my camp.
On the 3rd,
Rodes moved to
Bunker Hill in support of
Lomax's cavalry, and drove the enemy's cavalry from and beyond the place.
A letter had been received from
General Lee requesting that
Kershaw's division should be returned to him, as he was very much in need of troops, and, after consultation with me,
General Anderson determined to recross the
Blue Ridge with that division and
Fitz. Lee's cavalry.
On the 3rd, he moved towards
Berryville for the purpose of crossing the mountain at Ashby's Gap, and I was to have moved towards
Charlestown next day, to occupy the enemy's attention during
Anderson's movement.
Sheridan, however, had started two divisions of cavalry through
Berryville and
White Post, on a raid to our rear, and his main force had moved towards
Berryville.
Anderson encountered
Crook's corps at the latter place, and after a sharp engagement drove it back on the main body.
Receiving information of this affair, I moved at daylight next morning, with three divisions, to
Anderson's assistance,
Gordon's division being left to cover
Winchester.
I found
Kershaw's division extended out in a strong skirmish line confronting
Sheridan's main force, which had taken position in rear of
Berryville, across the road from
Charlestown to that place, and was busily fortifying, while the cavalry force which had started on the raid was returning and passing between
Berryville and the river to
Sheridan's rear.
As may be supposed,
Anderson's position was one of great peril, if the enemy had possessed enterprise, and it presented the appearance of the most extreme audacity for him thus to confront a force so vastly superior to his own, while, too, his trains were at the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, had the latter known it. Placing one of my divisions in line on
Kershaw's left, I moved with the other two along the enemy's front towards his right, for the purpose of reconnoitring and
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attacking that flank, if a suitable opportunity offered.
After moving in this way for two miles, I reached an elevated position from which the enemy's line was visible, and within artillery range of it. I at first thought that I had reached his right flank and was about making arrangements to attack it, when, casting my eye to my left, I discovered, as far as the eye could reach, with the aid of field glasses, a line extending toward
Summit Point.
The position the enemy occupied was a strong one, and he was busily engaged fortifying it, having already made considerable progress.
It was not until I had had this view that I realized the size of the enemy's force, and as I discovered that his line was too long for me to get around his flank and the position was too strong to attack in front, I returned and informed
General Anderson of the condition of things.
After consultation with him, we thought it not advisable to attack the enemy in his entrenched lines, and we determined to move our forces back to the west side of the
Opequon, and see if he would not move out of his works.
The wagon trains were sent back early next morning (the 5th) towards
Winchester, and about an hour by sun,
Kershaw's division, whose place had been taken by one of my divisions, moved toward the same point.
About two o'clock in the afternoon my troops were withdrawn, and moved back to
Stephenson's depot.
This withdrawal was made while the skirmishers were in close proximity and firing at each other; yet there was no effort on the part of the enemy to molest us. Just as my front division (
Rodes') reached
Stephenson's depot, it met, and drove back, and pursued for some distance,
Averill's cavalry, which was forcing, towards
Winchester, that part of our cavalry which had been watching the
Martinsburg road.
It was quiet on the 6th, but on the 7th the enemy's cavalry made demonstrations on the
Martinsburg road and the
Opequon at several points and was repulsed.
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On the 8th it was quiet again, but on the 9th a detachment of the enemy's cavalry came to the
Opequon below
Brucetown, burned some mills and retreated before a division of infantry sent out to meet it.
On the 10th, my infantry moved by
Bunker Hill to
Darksville and encountered a considerable force of the enemy's cavalry, which was driven off, and then pursued by
Lomax through
Martinsburg across the
Opequon.
We then returned to
Bunker Hill and the next day to
Stephenson's depot, and there was quiet on the 12th.
On the 13th, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, reported to be supported by infantry, advanced on the road from
Summit Point, and drove in our pickets from the
Opequon, when two divisions of infantry were advanced to the front, driving the enemy across the
Opequon again.
A very sharp artillery duel across the creek then took place and some of my infantry crossed over, when the enemy retired.
On the 14th,
General Anderson again started, with
Kershaw's division and
Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to cross the
Blue Ridge by the way of
Front Royal, and was not molested.
Fitz. Lee's cavalry was left with me, and
Ramseur's division was moved to
Winchester to occupy
Kershaw's position.
There was an affair between one of
Kershaw's brigades and a division of the enemy's cavalry, while I was at
Fisher's Hill and
Anderson at
Front Royal, in which some prisoners were lost; and two affairs in which the outposts from
Kershaw's command were attacked and captured by the enemy's cavalry, one in front of
Winchester and the other in front of
Charlestown; which I have not undertaken to detail, as they occurred when
General Anderson was controlling the operations of that division, but it is proper to refer to them here as part of the operations in the
Valley.
On the 15th and 16th my troops remained in camp undisturbed.
The positions of the opposing forces were now as follows:
Ramseur's division and
Nelson's battalion of
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artillery were on the road from
Berryville to
Winchester, one mile from the latter place.
Rodes',
Gordon's and
Wharton's divisions (the last two being under
Breckenridge), and
Braxton's and
King's battalions of artillery were at
Stephenson's depot on the Winchester & Potomac Railroad, which is six miles from
Winchester.
Lomax's cavalry picketed in my front on the
Opequon, and on my left from that stream to
North Mountain, while
Fitz. Lee's cavalry watched the right, having small pickets across to the
Shenandoah.
Four principal roads, from positions, centred at
Stephenson's depot, to wit: the
Martinsburg road, the road from
Charlestown via
Smithfield, the road from the same place via
Summit Point, and the road from
Berryville via
Jordan's Springs.
Sheridan's main force was near
Berryville, at the entrenched position which has been mentioned, while
Averill was at
Martinsburg with a division of cavalry.
Berryville is ten miles from
Winchester, nearly east, and
Martinsburg twenty-two miles nearly north.
The crossing of the
Opequon on the
Berryville road is four or five miles from
Winchester.
From
Berryville there are two good roads via
White Post to the
Valley Pike at
Newtown and
Middletown, the last two roads running east of the
Opequon.
The whole country is very open, being a limestone country which is thickly settled and well cleared, and affords great facilities for the movement of troops and the operations of cavalry.
From the enemy's fortifications on
Maryland Heights, the country north and east of
Winchester, and the main roads through it are exposed to view.
The relative positions which we occupied rendered my communications to the rear very much exposed, but I could not avoid it without giving up the lower Valley.
The object of my presence there was to keep up a threatening attitude towards
Maryland and
Pennsylvania, and prevent the use of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as well as to keep as large a force as possible from
Grant's army to defend the
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Federal Capital.
Had
Sheridan, by a prompt movement, thrown his whole force on the line of my communications, I would have been compelled to attempt to cut my way through, as there was no escape for me to the right or left, and my force was too weak to cross the
Potomac while he was in my rear.
I knew my danger, but I could occupy no other position that would have enabled me to accomplish the desired object.
If I had moved up the
Valley at all, I could not have stopped short of
New Market, for between that place and the country, in which I was, there was no forage for my horses; and this would have enabled the enemy to resume the use of the railroad and canal, and return all the troops from
Grant's army to him. Being compelled to occupy the position where I was, and being aware of its danger as well as apprised of the fact that very great odds were opposed to me, my only resource was to use my forces so as to display them at different points with great rapidity, and thereby keep up the impression that they were much larger than they really were.
The events of the last month had satisfied me that the commander opposed to me was without enterprise, and possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity.
If it was his policy to produce the impression that his force was too weak to fight me, he did not succeed, but if it was to convince me that he was not an energetic commander, his strategy was a complete success, and subsequent events have not changed my opinion.
My infantry force at this time consisted of the three divisions of the 2nd Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, and
Wharton's division of
Breckenridge's command.
The 2nd corps numbered a little over 8,000 muskets when it was detached in pursuit of
Hunter, and it had now been reduced to about 7,000 muskets, by long and rapid marches, and the various encampments and skirmishes in which it had participated.
Wharton's division had been reduced to about 1,700 muskets by the same causes.
Making a small allowance for details and
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those unfit for duty, I had about 8,500 muskets for duty.
When I returned from
Maryland, my cavalry consisted of the remnants of five small brigades, to wit:
Imboden's,
McCausland's,
Johnson's,
Jackson's and
Vaughan's.
Vaughan's had now been ordered to
Southwestern Virginia, most of the men having left without permission.
The surprise and rout of
McCausland's and
Johnson's brigades by
Averill at
Moorefield had resulted in the loss of a considerable number of horses and men, and such had been the loss in all the brigades, in the various fights and skirmishes in which they had been engaged, that the whole of this cavalry, now under
Lomax, numbered only about 1,700 mounted men.
Fitz. Lee had brought with him two brigades, to wit:
Wickham's and
Lomax's old brigade (now under
Colonel Payne), numbering about 1,200 mounted men. I had three battalions of artillery which had been with me near
Washington, and
Fitz. Lee had brought a few pieces of horse artillery.
When I speak of divisions and brigades of my troops, it must be understood that they were mere skeletons of those organizations.
Since my return from
Maryland, my supplies had been obtained principally from the lower Valley and the counties west of it, and the money which was obtained by contributions in
Maryland was used for that purpose.
Nearly the whole of our bread was obtained by threshing the wheat and then having it ground, by details from my command, and it sometimes happened that while my troops were fighting, the very flour which was to furnish them with bread for their next meal was being ground under the protection of their guns.
Latterly our flour had been obtained from the upper Valley, but also by details sent for that purpose.
The horses and mules, including the cavalry horses, were sustained almost entirely by grazing.
I have no means of stating with accuracy
Sheridan's force, and can only form an estimate from such data as I have been able to procure.
Citizens who had seen his
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force stated that it was the largest which they had ever seen in the
Valley on either side, and some estimated it as high as 60,000 or 70,000, but of course I made allowance for the usual exaggeration of inexperienced men. My estimate is from the following data: in
Grant's letter to
Hunter, dated at
Monocacy, August 5th, 1864, and contained in the report of the former, is the following statement: “In detailing such a force, the brigade of cavalry now
en route from
Washington via
Rockville may be taken into account.
There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least 5,000 men and horses.”
Sheridan relieved
Hunter on the 6th, and
Grant says in his report, “On the 7th of August, the Middle Department and the Departments of
West Virginia,
Washington and the
Susquehanna were constituted into the Middle Military division, and
Major General Sheridan was assigned to the temporary command of the same.
Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by
Generals Torbert and
Wilson, were sent to
Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac.
The first reached him at
Harper's Ferry on the 11th of August.”
Before this cavalry was sent to the
Valley, there was already a division there commanded by
Averill, besides some detachments which belonged to the Department of West
Virginia.
A book containing the official reports of the
chief surgeon of the cavalry corps of
Sheridan's army which was subsequently captured at
Cedar Creek on the 19th of October, showed that there were present for duty in that corps, during the first week in September, 10,000 men. The extracts from
Grant's report go to confirm this statement, as, if three brigades numbered at least 5,000 men and horses, the two divisions, when the whole of them arrived with
Averill's cavalry, must have numbered over 10,000.
I think, therefore, that I can safely estimate
Sheridan's cavalry at the
battle of Winchester, on the 19th of September, at 10,000.
His infantry consisted of the 6th, 19th, and
Crook's corps, the latter being composed of the
[
418]
“Army of west
Virginia,” and one division of the 8th corps.
The report of
Secretary Stanton shows that there was in the department of which the Middle Military division was composed the following “available force present for duty May 1st, 1864,” to wit:
| Department of Washington | 42,124 |
| Department of West Virginia | 30,782 |
| Department of the Susquehanna | 2,970 |
| Middle Department | 5,627 |
making an aggregate of 81,503; but, as the
Federal Secretary of War in the same report says, “In order to repair the losses of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force designed to guard the Middle Department and the Department of Washington was called forward to the front,” we may assume that 40,000 men were used for that purpose, which would leave 41,503, minus the losses in battle before
Sheridan relieved
Hunter in the Middle Military division, exclusive of the 6th and 19th corps, and the cavalry from
Grant's army.
The infantry of the Army of the Potomac was composed of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th corps, on the 1st of May, 1864, and
Stanton says the “available force present for duty” in that army, on that day, was 120,386 men. Allowing 30,000 for the artillery and cavalry of that army, which would be a very liberal allowance, and there would be still left 90,385 infantry; and it is fair to assume that the 6th corps numbered one-third of the infantry, that is 30,000 men on the 1st of May, 1864.
If the losses of the Army of the Potomac had been such as to reduce the 6th corps to less than 10,000 men, notwithstanding the reinforcements and recruits received, the carnage in
Grant's army must have been frightful indeed.
The 19th corps was just from the Department of the Gulf and had not gone through a bloody campaign.
A. communication which was among the papers captured at
Cedar Creek, in noticing some statement of a newspaper correspondent in regard to the conduct of that
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corps at
Winchester, designated it as “a vile slander on 12,000 of the best soldiers in the
Union army.”
In view of the foregoing data without counting the troops in the Middle Department and the Departments of
Washington and the
Susquehanna, and making liberal allowances for losses in battle, and for troops detained on post and garrison duty in the Department of West Virginia, I think that I may assume that
Sheridan had at least 35,000 infantry against me. The troops of the 6th corps and of the Department of West Virginia, alone, without counting the 19th corps, numbered on the 1st of May, 1864, 60,784.
If with the 19th corps
Sheridan did not have 35,000 infantry remaining from this force, what had become of the balance?
Sheridan's artillery very greatly outnumbered mine, both in men and guns.
Having been informed that a force was at work on the railroad at
Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of September, with
Rodes' and
Gordon's divisions, and
Braxton's artillery, to
Bunker Hill, and on the morning of the 18th with
Gordon's division and a part of the artillery to
Martinsburg, preceded by a part of
Lomax's cavalry.
Averill's division of cavalry was driven from the town across the
Opequon in the direction of
Charlestown, and we then returned to
Bunker Hill.
Gordon was left at
Bunker Hill, with orders to move to
Stephenson's depot by sunrise next morning, and
Rodes' division moved to the latter place that night, to which I also returned.
At
Martinsburg, where the enemy had a telegraph office, I learned that
Grant was with
Sheridan that day, and I expected an early move.
