[
420]
Chapter 17: military character.
It is difficult to accurately compare
Lee's military genius even with that of the more modern great captains of war, except in strategical science, for he believed with them that “in planning all dangers should be seen, in execution none, unless very formidable.”
The great improvements in firearms have changed the tactics of the battlefield.
Troops are no longer brought to a halt in the polite phrase of the
French, “Halt your banners, in the name of God, the king, and St. Denis,” but by bugle notes.
Armies are no longer unable to contest because the strings of crossbows are slackened by rain; short lances have been replaced by bayonets on revolving breech-loading rifles; arbalest, phalanx, and other former military terms are no longer heard, and wonderful transformation has taken place since the day on which the blind
King of Bohemia was led on the field of Cr69y that he might deal one blow of his sword in battle.
Marvelous metamorphoses have taken place even since 1815.
Imagine the
Federal and Confederate armies in a campaign in
Belgium in 1861-1865, and that the
Federal commander had accepted battle on the field of
Waterloo and taken up the line of defense adopted by
Wellington.
He would not have compressed sixtyseven thousand six hundred and sixty-one
1 men in battle lines within a space of two miles on the
Wavre road, on a slope void of intrenchments.
The chateau of Hougoumont and its inclosures might have been strongly occupied to add increased strength to the right of the line of battle; but it is improbable that La Haye
Sainte,
[
421]
three hundred yards in front of the center on the
Charleroi turnpike, and the little villages of Papelotte, La Haie, and Smohain, from a quarter to a half mile in front of the left, would have been occupied except by skirmishers.
The flanks of a Federal army equal in numbers to the
English would have been twice as far apart, and the whole line well protected by earthworks.
Lee would not have attacked as
Napoleon did if the
Union troops had been placed precisely as
Wellington arranged his, nor would his seventy-one thousand nine hundred and forty-seven troops (number of the
French) been tactically formed like the
Emperor's.
The
battle of Gettysburg was fought forty-eight years after that of
Waterloo.
A comparison of the two strikingly shows the changes in the art of war in a halfcentury only.
There was a similarity of purpose on the part of
Lee on the third day's encounter at
Gettysburg and the
French emperor at
Waterloo.
The sun rises in
Belgium in June at 3.48 A. M., in
Pennsylvania in July at 4.30 A. M.
Napoleon, at 11.30 A. M., ordered
Reille, on his left, to attack Hougoumont on the
English right with his left division as a diversion, while his main intention was to attack the
British center and left center by his first corps, under D'Erlon, and brought up seventy-eight cannon to fire an hour and a half, at less than a third of a mile from the crest which the
English occupied; but D'Erlon was not ordered forward until halfpast one.
Ewell, on
Lee's left, was ordered to make a demonstration on the
Federal right; cannon fired for hours, and then
Pickett's assaulting column attempted to pierce the center and left center of the
Union lines.
Count Reille managed to get nearly the whole of his corps engaged, but effected nothing.
Ewell got his troops early in action, but with no results.
The fighting of both had terminated before the main operations began.
Napoleon's object was to seize
Mont St. Jean, in rear of
Wellington's center, so as to possess himself of the principal avenue of retreat open to the Britishthe road to
Brussels.
Lee's object was to get possession of the
Baltimore pike and road to
Westminster,
Meade's chief route of retreat to his base of supplies.
D'Erlon was unsuccessful; so was
Pickett.
Before the
[
422]
former moved out, the Prussians of Blicher were seen on the heights of St. Lambert; and the Sixth French Corps, instead of supporting the operations of the First Corps, as had been intended, was taken away and employed in resisting their progress.
The troops ordered to support
General Pickett lay on their arms waiting orders from a corps commander charged with the assault, which were never given.
The formation of
Count d'erlon's corps for the charge in 1815, and that of
Pickett in 1863, is an apt illustration of tactical mutability.
D'Erlon's attack was made in four columns in echelon, the left in advance; the first or left column was composed of two brigades, each brigade of four battalions, one behind the other; each battalion was in three ranks, and the distance between the battalions five paces; the next column had nine battalions, and the other two eight each-twentynine battalions in all. Sixteen thousand men in twentynine battalions would give approximately six hundred men to the battalion; and when in three ranks a front of two hundred men for each one of the four charging columns.
If the front of each column had been on the same line, instead of in echelon, eight hundred men would have been in the front rank.
It was intended that this force should break through by impact, for only the few men in front could fire.
Pickett, with nearly as many troops,
2 had nine brigades in two ranks, in two long lines-six brigades in the first and three in the second.
The front line had some ten thousand men, which in two ranks would give a front of five thousand men instead of eight hundred!
The dense masses of D'Erlon's corps would have been butchered by the concentrated, converging, rapid fire of modern breech-loading guns, big and small, before their banners could have been shaken to the breeze.
We say, therefore, it is not easy to compare
Lee with the great soldiers of former ages, except as a strategist.
In strategy it is certain
Lee stands in the front rank of the great warriors of the world.
He was a greater soldier than
Sir Henry Havelock, and equally as devout
[
423]
a Christian.
“There was not a heart in
England,” it was said, when
Havelock died, thirteen years before
Lee, at about the same age, “that did not feel it to be a subject for private as well as public mourning” ; and so the
South felt toward
Lee. It is stated that it was impossible to gauge the full measure of
Moltke's potentialities as a strategist and organizer, but perhaps
Lee with the same opportunities would have been equally as skillful and far-seeing.
The success of the former and failure of the latter does not prevent comparison.
Kossuth failed in
Hungary, but the close of his long life has been strewn with flowers.
Scotland may never become an independent country, but
Scotchmen everywhere cherish with pride the fame of
Wallace and
Bruce.
If given an opportunity, said
General Scott, who commanded the army of the United States in 1861,
Lee “will prove himself the greatest captain of history.”
He had the swift intuition to discern the purpose of his opponent, and the power of rapid combination to oppose to it prompt resistance.
The very essence of modern war was comprised in the four years campaign, demanding a greater tax upon the mental and physical qualifications of a leader than the fifteen years of
Hannibal in the remote past.
Military misconceptions have been charged to him; but
Marshal Turenne has said, “Show me the man who never made mistakes, and I will show you one who has never made war.”
The impartial historian, in reviewing
Lee's campaigns and the difficult conditions with which he was always confronted, must at least declare that no commander could have accomplished more.
In his favor was, however, that ponderous force known as the spirit of the army, which counterbalanced his enemy's excess of men and guns.
Important battles are sometimes lost in spite of the best-conceived plans of the general commanding.
The battle of
Ligny, with the fate of a great campaign trembling on the result, was not made a decisive victory because
Ney, at Quatre-Bras, showed a distrust of his emperor's judgment, was unwilling to take the most obvious step, and finally disobeyed orders; and like behavior of a corps commander at
Gettysburg defeated the well-devised designs of
Lee.
[
424]
It has been wisely said that man is under no circumstance so nearly independent as he is when the next step is for life or death; and an infinite number of such independent forces influences the course of a battle — a course which can never be foreseen, and can never coincide with that which it would take under the impulsion of a single force.
There are always inevitable conditions under which a commander in chief carries on his operations.
The world places
Lee by the side of its greatest captains, because surrounded on all sides by conflicting anxieties, interests, and the gravity of issues involved, he only surrendered his battle-stained, bullet-riddled banners after demonstrating that all had been done that mortal could accomplish.
The profession of the soldier has been honored by his renown, the cause of education by his virtues, religion by his piety.
The greatest gift the hero leaves his race
Is to have been a hero.
