Advance on the City of Mexico-battle of Contreras-assault at Churubusco-negotiations for peace-battle of Molino del Rey-storming of Chapultepec-San Cosme-evacuation of the City-Halls of the Montezumas
The route followed by the army from Puebla
to the City of Mexico
was over Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water.
The pass through this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was
not; and the advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla
The City of Mexico
lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and south.
Between the western base of Rio Frio
and the City of Mexico
there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left and Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico
Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the city runs.
Xochimilco is also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with Lake Chalco by a narrow channel.
There is a high rocky mound, called El Pefion, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground dividing the lakes.
This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its base and summit and rendered a direct attack impracticable.
's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points near the eastern end of Lake Chalco.
Reconnaissances were made up to within gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south side of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west.
A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of August troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam
, a town about eleven miles due south from the plaza of the capital.
Between St. Augustin Tlalpam
and the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio
and the village of Churubusco
, and south-west of them is Contreras
All these points, except St. Augustin Tlalpam
, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned.
is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to San Antonio
This made the approach to the city from the south very difficult.
The brigade to which I was attached-Garland's, of Worth
's division — was sent to confront San Antonio
, two or three miles from St. Augustin Tlalpam
, on the road to Churubusco
and the City of Mexico
The ground on which San Antonio
stands is completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water.
To the south-west is the Pedregal — the volcanic rock before spoken of-over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an enemy.
From the position occupied by Garland
's brigade, therefore, no
movement could be made against the defences of San Antonio
except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry.
, some three miles west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the city.
Under these circumstances General Scott
directed the holding of the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders.
On the 18th [17th] of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam, Garland
's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced intrenchments of San Antonio
, but where his troops were protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose than defence.
at once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about Contreras
, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that place.
The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy.
This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo
, was an engagement in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction.
In fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary field.
The very strength of each of these positions was, by the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting parties while securing their positions for final attack.
All the troops with General Scott
in the valley of Mexico
, except a part of the division of General Quitman
at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of Garland
's division) at San Antonio
, were engaged at the battle of Contreras
, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to reinforce those who were engaged.
The assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores.
The brigade commanded by General [Bennett] Riley
was from its position the most conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars.
From the point occupied by Garland
's brigade we could see the progress made at Contreras
and the movement of troops toward the
flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans
all the way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight.
We moved out at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. [Col. N. S.
's brigade of Worth
's division now moved west over the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to clear San Antonio
, turned east and got on the causeway leading to Churubusco
and the City of Mexico
When he approached Churubusco
his left, under Colonel Hoffman
, attacked a tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement.
About an hour after, Garland
was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement.
was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes waving over Contreras
The troops that had been engaged at Contreras
, and even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way of San Antonio
It was expected by the commanding general
that these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco
, before turning east to reach the San Antonio
road, but they did not succeed in this, and Churubusco
proved to be about the severest battle fought in the valley of Mexico
coming upon the battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields
, to move north and turn the right of the enemy.
did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss.
The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners, artillery, and small arms.
The balance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner.
I recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their ground were deserters from General Taylor
's army on the Rio Grande
Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott
in these various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as I look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years.
As before stated, the work of the engineer officers
who made the reconnaissances and led the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he could use on an ordinary march.
I mean, up to the points from which the attack was to commence.
After that point is reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before contemplated.
The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so
demoralized by the succession of defeats this day, that the City of Mexico
could have been entered without much further bloodshed.
In fact, Captain Philip Kearney
[Kearny]-afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion-rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers.
He had not heard the call for a halt.
General Franklin Pierce
had joined the army in Mexico
, at Puebla
, a short time before the advance upon the capital commenced.
He had consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the battle of Contreras
By an unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured.
The next day, when his brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the road from San Augustine Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce
attempted to accompany them.
He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and fainted.
This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency.
Whatever General Pierce
's qualifications may have been for the Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage.
I was not a supporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did any other of the volunteer generals.
abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr. Nicholas P. Trist
, the commissioner on the part of the United States
to negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico
, was with the army, and either he or General Scott
thought-probably both of them-that a treaty would be more possible while the Mexican
government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader.
Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time.
The army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as Tacubaya
Negotiations were at once entered into with Santa Anna
, who was then practically the Government
and the immediate commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country.
A truce was signed [August 24] which denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the armistices, but authorized General Scott
to draw supplies for his army from the city in the meantime.
Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously, between Mr. Trist
and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico
, until the 2d of September.
At that time Mr. Trist
was to be given up absolutely by Mexico
, and New Mexico
ceded to the United States
for a stipulated sum to be afterwards determined.
I do not suppose Mr. Trist
had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries.
The war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new States might be carved.
At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without giving notice of the termination of the armistice.
The terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army.
The first train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the Mexican
people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the citizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and negotiations continued.
As soon as the news reached General Scott
of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote a vigorous note to President Santa Anna
, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end [September 7].
, with Worth
's division, was now occupying Tacubaya
, a village some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico
, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile.
More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molino del Rey
. The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in length.
At the period of which I speak General Scott
supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of guns.
This, however, proved to be a mistake.
It was valuable to the Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained.
The building is flat-roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for infantry.
is a mound springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey
and the western part of the city.
It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous sides.
The City of Mexico
is supplied with water by two aqueducts resting on strong stone arches.
One of these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino del Rey
, and runs north close to the west base of Chapultepec
; thence along the center of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east
into the city by the Garita San Cosme
; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to the city.
The second aqueduct starts from the east base of Chapultepec
, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to the city.
This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side.
The arches supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those engaged defensively.
At points on the San Cosme
road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in each.
At the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the San Cosme
road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to Chapultepec
, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of sand-bags.
The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San Cosme
, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched.-Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads.
Such were the defences of the City of Mexico
in September, 1847, on the routes over which General Scott
Prior to the Mexican
war General Scott
had been very partial to General Worth
-indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities --but, for some reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief.
evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart.
He did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate.
It was understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan and execute the battle of Molino
without dictation or interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations.
The effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile.
The battle of Molino
was fought on the 8th of September.
The night of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for the morrow.
These orders contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the Mills
The engineers had reconnoitred the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack.
By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at
were all at the places designated.
The ground in front of the Mills
, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of Chapultepec
as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was over.
Worth's troops entered the Mills
by every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec
Had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans
and Mexicans would have gone over the defences of Chapultepec
so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss.
The defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering their own men. This was not done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the 8th.
I do not criticise the failure to capture Chapultepec
at this time.
The result that followed the first assault could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected advantage, the commanding general
must have been on the spot and given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept on without orders.
It is always [thus], however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed.
The loss on our side at Molino del Rey
was severe for the numbers engaged.
It was especially so among commissioned officers.
I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills
In passing through to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec
, I happened to notice that there were armed Mexicans still on top of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. Not seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the building, I took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by some other way. There were still quite a number of Mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the building.
They still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had surrounded
, all by himself.
I halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the
soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below.
Molino del Rey
was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and property, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya
The engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged.
During the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play upon the fortifications of Chapultepec
The bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during this day than that of the artillery.
assigned the capture of Chapultepec
to General Pillow
, but did not leave the details to his judgment.
Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed.
They were commanded by Captains
and [Silas] Casey
The assault was successful, but bloody.
In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del Rey
have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary.
When the assaults upon the garitas of San Cosme
were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the Mills
until west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from Chapultepec
In like manner, the troops designated to act against Belen
could have kept east of Chapultepec
, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of Chapultepec
Molino del Rey
would both have been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have been turned.
, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi
, who stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting against Belen
commanded the column against San Cosme
fell the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads.
I was on the road to San Cosme
, and witnessed most that took place on that route.
When opposition was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time.
We encountered no serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on intersects that running east to the city,
the point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle.
I have described the defences of this position before.
There were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that I can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached.
One of these officers was a Lieutenant [Raphael] Semmes
, of the Marine Corps.
I think Captain
, of the 4th infantry, were the others.
Our progress was stopped for the time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it.
West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the south-west angle made by the San Cosme
road and the road we were moving upon.
A stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house.
I watched my opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south wall.
Proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, I peeped around and, seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached.
I then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers.
All that were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services.
Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would fire at it. Our crossing was thus made practicable without loss.
When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the San Cosme
road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them.
When we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, I saw some United States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance.
This was the company of Captain Horace Brooks
, of the artillery, acting as infantry.
I explained to Brooks
briefly what I had discovered and what I was about to do. He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I might go on and he would follow.
As soon as we got on the road leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close pursuit — the troops we had left
under the arches joining — that a second line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried.
No reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks
's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a force.
It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss.
's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. Later in the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back of the garita San Cosme
I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. The road being in possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the church.
This took us over several ditches breast deep in water and grown up with water plants.
These ditches, however, were not over eight or ten feet in width.
The howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by the men to its destination.
When I knocked for admission a priest came to the door, who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. With the little Spanish
then at my command, I explained to him that he might save property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, I intended to go in whether he consented or not. He began to see his duty in the same light that I did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so. The gun was carried to the belfry and put together.
We were not more than two or three hundred yards from San Cosme
The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created great confusion.
Why they did not send out a small party and capture us, I do not know.
We had no infantry or other defences besides our one gun.
The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so marked that General Worth
saw it from his position.1
He was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant
[John C.] Pemberton
— later Lieutenant-General
commanding the defences of Vicksburg
— to bring me to him. He expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed along with the one already rendering so much service.
I could not tell the General
that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would
have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant.
I took the captain with me, but did not use his gun.
The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under General Worth
in the houses near San Cosme
, and in line confronting the general line of the enemy across to Belen
The troops that I was with were in the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the town.
During the night Santa Anna
, with his army-except the deserters-left the city.
He liberated all the convicts confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after Santa Anna
was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to General Scott
to ask — if not demand — an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal affairs.
declined to trammel himself with conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved themselves properly.2
had advanced along his line very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at Belen
's troops did about San Cosme
After the interview above related between General Scott
and the city council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning.
The troops under Worth were to stop at the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city.
was to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of the Palace — a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all located, the President
resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. This is the building generally designated as the “Halls of the Montezumas.”