Capture of Port Gibson-Grierson's raid-occupation of Grand Gulf-movement up the Big Black- battle of Raymond
We started next morning [May 2] for
Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road.
We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned.
The troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the
South Fork of the
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Bayou Pierre.
At this time the water was high and the current rapid.
What might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely.
Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged.
Officers and men generally joined in this work.
When it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the
North Fork that day. One brigade of
Logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge.
Two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the
North Fork to repair the bridge there.
The enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere.
Before leaving
Port Gibson we were reinforced by [
Gen. Marcellus M.]
Crocker's division,
McPherson's corps, which had crossed the
Mississippi at
Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days rations.
McPherson still had one division west of the
Mississippi River, guarding the road from
Milliken's Bend to the river below until
Sherman's command should relieve it.
On leaving
Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after
Grand Gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at
Thompson's Hill-called the
Battle of Port Gibson-found his way to where I was. He had no horse to ride at the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal.
He, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached
Grand Gulf.
Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on the
Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege.
He was in the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned.
The first time I call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles.
Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped.
My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home.
He looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign.
His age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw,
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and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years.
When the movement from
Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train.
The train still west of the
Mississippi was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from
Milliken's Bend to Hard Times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the
battle of Port Gibson.
My own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with this train.
General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at
Bruinsburg which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups.
I had no other for nearly a week.
It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition.
Provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting.
I directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition.
Quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough-harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure.
The making out of provision returns was stopped for the time.
No formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them.
It was at
Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the complete success of
Colonel [Benjamin H.]
Grierson, who was making a raid through
central Mississippi.
He had started from
La Grange April 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. On the 21st he had detached
Colonel [Edward]
Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between
Columbus and
Macon and then return to
La Grange.
Hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at
Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at
Okalona and
Tupelo, and arriving in
La Grange April 26.
Grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at
Baton Rouge May 2d.
This raid was of great importance, for
Grierson had
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attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against
Vicksburg.
During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the
North Fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning.
Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. It was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from
Grand Gulf to
Vicksburg.
Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to
Hankinson's ferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress.
McPherson, however, reached
Hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to
Vicksburg.
When the junction of the road going to
Vicksburg with the road from
Grand Gulf to
Raymond and
Jackson was reached,
Logan with his division was turned to the left towards
Grand Gulf.
I went with him a short distance from this junction.
McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the
battle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road
Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way.
McPherson was ordered to hold
Hankinson's ferry and the road back to
Willow Springs with one division;
McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou.
I did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear.
On the way from the junction to
Grand Gulf, where the road comes into the one from
Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, I learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to
Vicksburg.
I left
Logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry.
Admiral Porter had already arrived with his fleet.
The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.
When I reached
Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage since the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship.
Then I wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from
Cairo, orders to General [Jeremiah C.]
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Sullivan commanding above
Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders.
About twelve o'clock at night I was through my work and started for
Hankinson's ferry, arriving there before daylight.
While at
Grand Gulf I heard from
Banks, who was on the
Red River, and who said that he could not be at
Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15,000 men. Up to this time my intention had been to secure
Grand Gulf, as a base of supplies, detach
McClernand's corps to
Banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of
Port Hudson.
The news from
Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended.
To wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month.
The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. The enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than
Banks could have brought.
I therefore determined to move independently of
Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of
Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.
Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at
Washington were notified.
I knew well that
Halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success.
The time it would take to communicate with
Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable.
Even
Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four States of the
Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from
Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road.
He urged me to “stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life.”
To this I replied: “I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from
Grand Gulf.
I know it will be impossible without
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constructing additional roads.
What I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance.”
We started from
Bruinsburg with an average of about two days rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time.
A delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify.
McClernand's and
McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days rations in haversacks.
Beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance.
Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves.
All these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops.
But the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the
Yazoo above
Vicksburg.
While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered reconnaissances made by
McClernand and
McPherson, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and attack the city at once.
On the 6th
Sherman arrived at
Grand Gulf and crossed his command that night and the next day. Three days rations had been brought up from
Grand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued.
Orders were given for a forward movement the next day.
Sherman was directed to order up
Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from
Milliken's Bend to Hard Times with two brigades.
The quartermaster at
Young's Point was ordered to send two hundred wagons with
Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat.
On the 3d
Hurlbut, who had been left at
Memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to
Milliken's Bend to relieve
Blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send [Jacob G.]
Lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field.
The four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay.
During the night of the 6th
McPherson drew in his troops north of the Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to
Jackson,
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via
Rocky Springs,
Utica and
Raymond.
That night he and
McClernand were both at
Rocky Springs ten miles from
Hankinson's ferry.
McPherson remained there during the 8th, while
McClernand moved to Big Sandy and
Sherman marched from
Grand Gulf to
Hankinson's ferry.
The 8th [9th],
McPherson moved to a point within a few miles west of
Utica;
McClernand and
Sherman remained where they were.
On the 10th
McPherson moved to
Utica,
Sherman to Big Sandy;
McClernand was still at Big Sandy.
The 11th,
McClernand was at Five Mile Creek;
Sherman at
Auburn;
McPherson five miles advanced from
Utica.
May 12th,
McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek;
Sherman at Fourteen Mile Creek;
McPherson at
Raymond after a battle.
After
McPherson crossed the Big Black at
Hankinson's ferry
Vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side.
It is not probable, however, that
Pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement.
The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point.
It was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of
Vicksburg, and approach from that direction.
Accordingly,
McPherson's troops that had crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to
Jackson commenced.
As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills.
The troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it.
McClernand's corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the crossings.
Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by
McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss.
McPherson was to the right of
Sherman, extending to
Raymond.
The cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack.
In making this move I estimated
Pemberton's movable force at
Vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and
Jackson.
It would not be possible for
Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail.
This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I had entirely under-estimated
Pemberton's strength.
Up to this point our movements had been made without serious
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opposition.
My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. The right was at
Raymond eighteen miles from
Jackson,
McPherson commanding;
Sherman in the centre on Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across;
McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack.
McClernand's left was on the Big Black.
In all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.
McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under
General Gregg, about two miles out of
Raymond.
This was about two P. M. [May 12].
Logan was in advance with one of his brigades.
He deployed and moved up to engage the enemy.
McPherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of
Logan's division, and
Crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch.
The order was obeyed with alacrity.
Logan got his division in position for assault before
Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending
Gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at
Jackson.
In this battle
McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing--nearly or quite all from
Logan's division.
The enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.
I regarded
Logan and
Crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command.
Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered.
His weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet.
He died not long after the close of the rebellion.