Capture of Port Gibson-Grierson's raid-occupation of Grand Gulf-movement up the Big Black- battle of Raymond
We started next morning [May 2] for Port Gibson
as soon as it was light enough to see the road.
We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned.
The troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the South Fork
At this time the water was high and the current rapid.
What might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely.
Colonel J. H. Wilson
, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged.
Officers and men generally joined in this work.
When it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the North Fork
that day. One brigade of Logan
's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge.
Two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork
to repair the bridge there.
The enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere.
Before leaving Port Gibson
we were reinforced by [Gen. Marcellus
's division, McPherson
's corps, which had crossed the Mississippi
and come up without stopping except to get two days rations.
still had one division west of the Mississippi River
, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend
to the river below until Sherman
's command should relieve it.
On leaving Bruinsburg
for the front I left my son Frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf
should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill
-called the Battle of Port Gibson
-found his way to where I was. He had no horse to ride at the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal.
He, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf
. Mr. C. A. Dana
, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on the Vicksburg
campaign and through a portion of the siege.
He was in the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned.
The first time I call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles.
Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped.
My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home.
He looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign.
His age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw,
and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years.
When the movement from Bruinsburg
commenced we were without a wagon train.
The train still west of the Mississippi
was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend
to Hard Times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of Port Gibson
My own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with this train.
General A. J. Smith
happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg
which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups.
I had no other for nearly a week.
It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition.
Provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting.
I directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition.
Quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough-harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure.
The making out of provision returns was stopped for the time.
No formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them.
It was at Port Gibson
I first heard through a Southern paper of the complete success of Colonel
[Benjamin H.] Grierson
, who was making a raid through central Mississippi
He had started from La Grange
April 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. On the 21st he had detached Colonel
with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus
and then return to La Grange
had a sharp fight with the enemy at Columbus
and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at Okalona
, and arriving in La Grange
continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at Baton Rouge
This raid was of great importance, for Grierson
attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg
During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork
was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning.
Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. It was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf
Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson
's ferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress.
, however, reached Hankinson
's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to Vicksburg
When the junction of the road going to Vicksburg
with the road from Grand Gulf
was reached, Logan
with his division was turned to the left towards Grand Gulf
I went with him a short distance from this junction.
had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of Port Gibson
and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road Logan
had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. McPherson
was ordered to hold Hankinson
's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs
with one division; McClernand
, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou.
I did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear.
On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf
, where the road comes into the one from Vicksburg
to the same place six or seven miles out, I learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to Vicksburg
I left Logan
to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry.
had already arrived with his fleet.
The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.
When I reached Grand Gulf
May 3d I had not been with my baggage since the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship.
Then I wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from Cairo
, orders to General [Jeremiah C.]
commanding above Vicksburg
, and gave orders to all my corps commanders.
About twelve o'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson
's ferry, arriving there before daylight.
While at Grand Gulf
I heard from Banks
, who was on the Red River
, and who said that he could not be at Port Hudson
before the 10th of May and then with only 15,000 men. Up to this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf
, as a base of supplies, detach McClernand
's corps to Banks
and co-operate with him in the reduction of Port Hudson
The news from Banks
forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended.
To wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month.
The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. The enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than Banks
could have brought.
I therefore determined to move independently of Banks
, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg
and invest or capture the city.
was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at Washington
I knew well that Halleck
's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success.
The time it would take to communicate with Washington
and get a reply would be so great that I could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable.
, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four States of the Confederacy
with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from Hankinson
's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road.
He urged me to “stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life.”
To this I replied: “I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf
I know it will be impossible without
constructing additional roads.
What I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance.”
We started from Bruinsburg
with an average of about two days rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time.
A delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify.
's and McPherson
's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days rations in haversacks.
Beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance.
Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves.
All these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops.
But the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo
While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered reconnaissances made by McClernand
, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and attack the city at once.
On the 6th Sherman
arrived at Grand Gulf
and crossed his command that night and the next day. Three days rations had been brought up from Grand Gulf
for the advanced troops and were issued.
Orders were given for a forward movement the next day. Sherman
was directed to order up Blair
, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend
to Hard Times with two brigades.
The quartermaster at Young's Point
was ordered to send two hundred wagons with Blair
, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat.
On the 3d Hurlbut
, who had been left at Memphis
, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend
to relieve Blair
's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send [Jacob G.] Lauman
's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field.
The four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay.
During the night of the 6th McPherson
drew in his troops north of the Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson
via Rocky Springs
That night he and McClernand
were both at Rocky Springs
ten miles from Hankinson
remained there during the 8th, while McClernand
moved to Big Sandy and Sherman
marched from Grand Gulf
The 8th [9th], McPherson
moved to a point within a few miles west of Utica
remained where they were.
On the 10th McPherson
moved to Utica
to Big Sandy; McClernand
was still at Big Sandy.
The 11th, McClernand
was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman
five miles advanced from Utica
May 12th, McClernand
was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman
at Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson
after a battle.
crossed the Big Black at Hankinson
's ferry Vicksburg
could have been approached and besieged by the south side.
It is not probable, however, that Pemberton
would have permitted a close besiegement.
The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point.
It was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg
, and approach from that direction.
's troops that had crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills.
The troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand
's corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the crossings.
Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand
with slight loss.
was to the right of Sherman
, extending to Raymond
The cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack.
In making this move I estimated Pemberton
's movable force at Vicksburg
at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson
It would not be possible for Pemberton
to attack me with all his troops at one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail.
This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I had entirely under-estimated Pemberton
Up to this point our movements had been made without serious
My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond
eighteen miles from Jackson
in the centre on Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand
to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack.
's left was on the Big Black.
In all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.
encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under General Gregg
, about two miles out of Raymond
This was about two P. M. [May 12]. Logan
was in advance with one of his brigades.
He deployed and moved up to engage the enemy.
ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan
's division, and Crocker
's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch.
The order was obeyed with alacrity.
got his division in position for assault before Crocker
could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending Gregg
flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at Jackson
In this battle McPherson
lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing--nearly or quite all from Logan
The enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.
I regarded Logan
as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command.
, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered.
His weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet.
He died not long after the close of the rebellion.