Battle of Black River Bridge-crossing the Big Black-investment of Vicksburg-assaulting the works
We were now assured of our position between
Johnston and
Pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces.
Pemberton might have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to
Johnston.
But this would have given us
Vicksburg.
It would have been his proper move, however, and the one
Johnston would have made had he been in
Pemberton's place.
In fact it would have been in conformity with
Johnston's orders to
Pemberton.
Sherman left
Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached
Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting.
His rear guard did not get in until two A. M. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight.
He paroled his prisoners at
Jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants.
At
Bolton he was informed of our victory.
He was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to
Bridgeport on the
Big Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy.
Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible.
This movement brought
Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and
Sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army.
I informed him that I would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.
[
274]
The advance division,
Carr's (
McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at half-past 3 A. M. on the 17th, followed closely by
Osterhaus,
McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps.
As I expected, the enemy was found in position on the Big Black.
The point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour.
Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation.
A bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages.
When the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island.
The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch.
At this time there was a foot or two of water in it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them.
The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river.
At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men.
Carr's division was deployed on our right,
Lawler's brigade forming his extreme right and reaching through these woods to the river above.
Osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of
Carr and covered the enemy's entire front.
McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance.
While the troops were standing as here described an officer from
Banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from
General Halleck, dated the 11th of May.
It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to
Banks to be forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to
Grand Gulf and to co-operate from there with
Banks against
Port Hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege
Vicksburg.
I told the officer that the order came too late, and that
Halleck would not give it now if he knew our position.
The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when I heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw
Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy.
I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; I think not even to this day.
The assault was successful.
But little resistance was made.
The enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our
[
275]
hands.
Many tried to escape by swimming the river.
Some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt.
Eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned.
But for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around
Vicksburg.
As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built.
It was but little after nine o'clock A. M. when the capture took place.
As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges.
One was taken charge of by
Lieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by
General McPherson himself and one by
General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer.
My recollection is that
Hains built a raft bridge;
McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that
Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps.
A bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway.
Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose.
By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.
Sherman reached
Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found
Blair with the pontoon train already there.
A few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered.
Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning.
On the 18th I moved along the
Vicksburg road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined
Sherman.
My first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the
Yazoo River above
Vicksburg.
Sherman's line of march led him to the very point on
Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy the December before when he was repulsed.
Sherman was equally anxious with myself.
Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers.
There were some detached works along the crest of the hill.
These were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way to
Vicksburg.
At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time.
In a few minutes
Sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before on the ground where his
[
276]
command had lain so helpless for offensive action.
He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success.
This, however, he said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it at once.
Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign.
I do not claim to quote
Sherman's language; but the substance only.
My reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on.
McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the
Jackson and
Vicksburg road which
Sherman was on, but to his rear.
He arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp.
McClernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from
Baldwin's [Baldwin] ferry to
Vicksburg.
This brought him south of
McPherson.
I now had my three corps up to the works built for the defence of
Vicksburg, on three roads-one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city.
By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow.
Sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the
Yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend.
McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the
Jackson road.
McClernand took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards
Warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line.
On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position.
The enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he would not make much effort to hold
Vicksburg.
Accordingly, at two o'clock I ordered an assault.
It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy.
The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from
Yazoo River or
Chickasaw Bayou.
Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days rations issued by the commissary.
They had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread.
I remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, “Hard tack.”
In a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, “Hard tack!
Hard tack!”
I told the men nearest to me that we had
[
277]
been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed.
The cry was instantly changed to cheers.
By the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them.
The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.
I now determined on a second assault.
Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced.
There was danger of his coming to the assistance of
Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city.
The immediate capture of
Vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive
Johnston from the
State.
But the first consideration of all was — the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try.
The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position.
All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute.
The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter.
General McClernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements.
I occupied a position from which I believed I could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the success he reported.
But his request for reinforcements being repeated I could not ignore it, and sent him
Quinby's division of the 17th corps.
Sherman and
McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of
McClernand.
This last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever.
As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon
Vicksburg.