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Retrospect of the campaign-sherman's movements-proposed movement upon Mobile-a painful accident-ordered to report at Cairo
The capture of
Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the
North.
New hopes for the final success of the cause of the
Union were inspired.
The victory gained at
Gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes.
Now the
Mississippi river was entirely in the possession of the
National troops; for the
fall of Vicksburg gave us
Port Hudson at once.
The army of northern Virginia was driven out of
Pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861.
The Army of the Tennessee united with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the
Confederate States completely.
The first dispatch I received from the government after the
fall of Vicksburg was in these words:
I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy.
Such has been the case elsewhere.
If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders.
Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of
Major [N. G.]
Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners.
As
Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon, about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition.
The small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours.
Up to this time our troops at the
West had been limited to the old United
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States flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in the war-almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at-and a few new and improved arms.
These were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement.
The enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber.
After the surrender I authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter.
A large number of arms turned in to the Ordnance Department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the
Union army in the capture of
Vicksburg.
In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention.
Neither have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve.
Suffice it to say, the close of the
siege of Vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. A military education was acquired which no other school could have given.
Men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one,
Ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least.
Logan and
Crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies.
General F. P. Blair joined me at
Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade.
He commanded a division in the campaign.
I had known
Blair in
Missouri, where I had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress.
I knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader.
I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination.
It affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character.
There was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity.
He was one man as a soldier, another as a politician.
The navy under
Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign.
Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged.
It could not
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have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance.
The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service.
There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the
flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.
The campaign of
Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances.
The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible.
A forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary.
Accordingly I resolved to get below
Vicksburg, unite with
Banks against
Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that base and
Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against
Vicksburg.
Upon reaching
Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter from
Banks informing me that he could not be at
Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The time was worth more than the reinforcements; I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.
With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success.
Jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected.
A rapid movement west was made; the garrison of
Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.
It looks now as though
Providence had directed the course of the campaign while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.
Upon the surrender of the garrison of
Vicksburg there were three things that required immediate attention.
The first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the
State.
The second was to send reinforcements to
Banks near
Port Hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the
Mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes.
The third was to inform the authorities at
Washington and the
North of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart.
Soon after negotiations were opened with
General Pemberton for the surrender of the city, I notified
Sherman, whose troops extended from Haines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the
Vicksburg and
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Jackson road over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the
State as soon as
Vicksburg surrendered.
Steele and
Ord were directed to be in readiness to join
Sherman in his move against
General Johnston, and
Sherman was advised of this also.
Sherman moved promptly, crossing the Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at
Bolton, twenty miles west of
Jackson.
Johnston heard of the surrender of
Vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on
Jackson.
On the 8th of July
Sherman was within ten miles of
Jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town.
The siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night.
The weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad.
Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but
Sherman sent one division,
Steele's, to
Brandon, fourteen miles east of
Jackson.
The National loss in the second capture of
Jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing.
The Confederate loss was probably less, except in captured.
More than this number fell into our hands as prisoners.
Medicines and food were left for the
Confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind.
A large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in
Jackson.
Medicine and food were also sent to
Raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country.
I wrote to
Sherman: “Impress upon the men the importance of going through the
State in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling.
They should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people.”
Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from
Bruinsburg to
Jackson and back to
Vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army.
Very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued.
Sherman was ordered back to
Vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before — from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff.
Having cleaned up about
Vicksburg and captured or routed all regular Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all
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directions, I felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed.
I suggested to the
General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against
Mobile, starting from
Lake Pontchartrain.
Halleck preferred another course.
The possession of the trans-
Mississippi by the
Union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the
Mississippi.
I am well aware that the
President was very anxious to have a foothold in
Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the
Confederate States.
This, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in
western Louisiana and
eastern Texas, by sending a garrison at once to
Brownsville on the
Rio Grande.
Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against
Mobile, so that I was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as I had been a year before in
west Tennessee.
It would have been an easy thing to capture
Mobile at the time I proposed to go there.
Having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against
General Bragg's army.
This would necessarily have compelled
Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear.
If he had not done this the troops from
Mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and
Lee's were yet receiving their supplies.
I was so much impressed with this idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the 1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near
Mobile.
I also asked for a leave of absence to visit New Orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against
Mobile should be approved.
Both requests were refused.
So far as my experience with
General Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one.
But I did not regard this as a favor.
It was simply in line of duty, though out of my department.
The
General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of
Corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least good.
By orders, I sent to
Banks a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to
Kentucky and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of
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5,000 men to
Schofield in
Missouri where
Price was raiding the
State.
I also detached a brigade under
Ransom to
Natchez, to garrison that place permanently.
This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when
Ransom arrived there.
The enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from
Texas to feed the
Eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through
Texas from the
Rio Grande and which were on the way to
Lee's and other armies in the
East.
The troops that were left with me around
Vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads.
The guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops.
The country back of
Vicksburg was filled with deserters from
Pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from
Johnston's also.
The men determined not to fight again while the war lasted.
Those who lived beyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes.
Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for their support till the war was over.
Besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of
Mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided.
It is not probable that
Pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition.
On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps,
General Ord commanding, to
Banks.
Besides this I received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the
Mississippi.
Having received this order I went to New Orleans to confer with
Banks about the proposed movement.
All these movements came to naught.
During this visit I reviewed
Banks' army a short distance above
Carrollton.
The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. I was rendered insensible, and when I regained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit.
The pain was almost beyond endurance.
I lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. I had a steamer stop at the nearest point
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possible, and was carried to it on a litter.
I was then taken to
Vicksburg, where I remained unable to move for some time afterwards.
While I was absent
General Sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could.
No orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of
Sherman.
On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans,
Halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to
Memphis and thence to
Tuscumbia, to co-operate with
Rosecrans for the relief of
Chattanooga.
On the 15th [17th] he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to
Rosecrans.
This was received on the 27th.
I was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once ordered
Sherman to send one division to
Memphis as fast as transports could be provided.
The division of
McPherson's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join
Steele in
Arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to
Hurlbut at
Memphis.
Hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there.
Halleck suggested that some good man, like
Sherman or
McPherson, should be sent to
Memphis to take charge of the troops going east.
On this I sent
Sherman, as being, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one.
He was directed to take with him another division of his corps.
This left one back, but having one of
McPherson's divisions he had still the equivalent.
Before the receipt by me of these orders the
battle of Chickamauga had been fought and
Rosecrans forced back into
Chattanooga.
The administration as well as the
General-in-chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there.
Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the War Department, was sent to
Rosecrans' headquarters.
I do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in
Chattanooga when I arrived there at a later period.
It seems that
Halleck suggested that I should go to
Nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west.
I received the following dispatch dated October 3d: “It is the wish of the
Secretary of War that as soon as
General Grant is able he will come to
Cairo and report by telegraph.”
I was still very lame, but started without delay.
Arriving at
Columbus on the 16th I reported by telegraph: “Your dispatch from
Cairo of the 3d directing me to report from
Cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th.
Left
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the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for
Cairo.”