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Assuming the command at Chattanooga-opening a line of supplies-battle of Wauhatchie-on the picket line
The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking
Thomas and
Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff.
We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the
Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, some three miles below
Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy.
Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot.
There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range.
They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence.
They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.
But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of
Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.
That night I issued orders for opening the route to
Bridgeport-
a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. They had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them.
Chattanooga is on the south bank of the
Tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west.
It is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which
Chattanooga Creek runs.
To the east of the valley is
Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the
Tennessee.
On the west of the valley is
Lookout Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet [between 2,300 and 2,400] above-tide water.
Just below the town the
Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of
Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river.
The Memphis and Charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain
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stands nearly perpendicular.
East of
Missionary Ridge flows the South Chickamauga River; west of
Lookout Mountain is
Lookout Creek; and west of that,
Raccoon Mountains [Mountain].
Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height.
On the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farm-house [Cravens], which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.
The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of
Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across
Chattanooga valley to
Lookout Mountain.
Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in
Lookout valley west, and on
Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line in
Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to
Lookout Mountain, to make the investment complete.
Besides the fortifications on Mission
[sic] Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front.
The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse.
At one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water.
The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy.
Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below.
Practically, the Army of the Cumberland was besieged.
The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies.
The Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting.
General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by
Generals [0. 0.]
Howard and [Henry W.]
Slocum, [Joseph]
Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce
Rosecrans.
It would have been folly to send them to
Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there.
They were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them.
Before my arrival,
Thomas ordered their concentration at
Bridgeport.
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General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.
On the 24th of October, after my return to
Chattanooga, the following details were made:
General Hooker, who was now at
Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the
Tennessee and march up by
Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry.
General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite
Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in
Hooker's rear after he had passed.
Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under
General Smith directly from
Chattanooga.
Eighteen hundred of them, under General [William B.]
Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point.
Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.
On the 26th,
Hooker crossed the river at
Bridgeport and commenced his eastward march.
At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th,
Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men.
Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when
Hazen should arrive.
There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at
Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.
It was over this road
Smith marched.
At five o'clock
Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By seven o'clock the whole of
Smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry.
This was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge.
By ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in
Lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army.
The two bridges over the
Tennessee River — a flying one at
Chattanooga and the new one at Brown's Ferry — with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy,
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made the connection complete.
Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into
Lookout valley at Wauhatchie.
Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry, while [John W.]
Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south.
The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.
The river was now opened to us from
Lookout valley to
Bridgeport.
Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the
Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore.
But there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from
Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry.
The latter point is only eight miles from
Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the
Raccoon Mountains on the south side of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite
Chattanooga.
There were several steamers at
Bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.
On the way to
Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to
Nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of.
Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation.
His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition.
In five days from my arrival in
Chattanooga the way was open to
Bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and
Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations.
It is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought.
The men were soon reclothed and also well fed; an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks.
Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed.
The weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once.
I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing.
Mr. Davis had visited
Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as
Bragg described it in his subsequent report.
“These dispositions,” he said, “faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of
Chattanooga for want of food and forage.
Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time.”
But the
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dispositions were not “faithfully sustained,” and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to “sustain” them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the
South was more to be benefited by its defeat than the
North.
The latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation.
The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.
With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory.
The labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated “poor white trash.”
The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor.
The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor.
Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them.
The war was expensive to the
South as well as to the
North, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.
The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies.
He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. His strength on
Lookout Mountain was not equal to
Hooker's command in the valley below.
From
Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from
Chattanooga, in order to reach
Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on
Geary at Wauhatchie by
Longstreet's corps.
When the battle commenced,
Hooker ordered
Howard up from Brown's Ferry.
He had three miles to march to reach
Geary.
On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded.
Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners.
Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce
Geary.
Before he got up,
Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force.
The night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets.
In the darkness and uproar,
Hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams.
The mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the
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enemy.
The latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn.
By four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our “cracker line” was never afterward disturbed.
In securing possession of
Lookout Valley,
Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured.
In the night engagement of the 28th-29th
Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred.
After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies.
As I have stated,
Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of
Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then northwesterly, and enters the
Tennessee River at the foot of
Lookout Mountain.
This creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream.
As I would be under short-range fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear.
I rode from our right around to our left.
When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, “Turn out the guard for the
commanding general.”
I replied, “Never mind the guard,” and they were dismissed and went back to their tents.
Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the
Confederate pickets.
The sentinel on their post called out in like manner, “Turn out the guard for the
commanding general,” and, I believe, added, “
General Grant.”
Their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I returned.
The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies.
At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps.
General Longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.
Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to
General Longstreet's corps.
I asked him a few questionsbut
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not with a view of gaining any particular information-all of which he answered, and I rode off.