Battle of Chattanooga-a gallant charge-complete Rout of the enemy-pursuit of the Confederates--General Bragg--remarks on Chattanooga
At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox
to encourage Burnside
was directed to attack at daylight.
was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville
and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge
was not to move until Hooker
had reached Missionary Ridge
As I was with him on Orchard Knob
, he would not move without further orders from me.
The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole
field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob
It remained so all day. Bragg
's headquarters were in full view, and officers-presumably staff officers-could be seen coming and going constantly.
The point of ground which Sherman
had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy.
A low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills.
The problem now was to get to the main ridge.
The enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first.
was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion.
Three brigades held the hill already gained.
Morgan L. Smith
moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge
; [John M.] Loomis
along the west base, supported by two brigades of John E. Smith
's division; and [John M.] Corse
with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured.
The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith
's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side.
The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works.
Morgan L. Smith
advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga Station
, where the main depot was located.
The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success.
The contest lasted for two hours. Corse
, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault.
now threatened both Bragg
's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right.
From the position I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg
's forces moving against Sherman
Every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union
forces was concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith
, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse
's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy.
He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith
's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments.
Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith
from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas
to send a division to
reinforce him. Baird
's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard Knob
It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eyes of the enemy to reach its position.
Bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction.
This was what I wanted.
But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville
and compelling Bragg
to mass in that direction also.
The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain
during the night, as I expected he would.
In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek
, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker
was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named.
He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek
, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces.
His reaching Bragg
's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas
's assault of the ridge.
's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer.
's and Wood
's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given.
I now directed Thomas
to order the charge at once.1
I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made.
The centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas
and I stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest.
Turning to Thomas
to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood
, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood
, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before.
He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice.
I told him to make the charge at once.
He was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan
were driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge
The Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base.
Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time.
Many rebels were captured
and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill.
Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.
The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the Union
soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.
Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest — thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th2
for this charge.
I watched their progress with intense interest.
The fire along the rebel line was terrific.
Cannon and musket balls filled the air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended.
The pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate
barriers at different points in front of both Sheridan
's and Wood
The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg
and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.
pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed.
He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge
, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains.
It was now getting dark, but Sheridan
, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position.
The enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and
beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands.
's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished.
While the advance up Mission Ridge
was going forward, General Thomas
with staff, General Gordon Granger
, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob
, from which the entire field could be observed.
The moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger
to join his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front.
left about the same time.
Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge.
, who commanded the division to the left of Sheridan
, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join Sheridan
in the pursuit.
To the left, in Baird
's front where Bragg
's troops had massed against Sherman
, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer.
I ordered Granger
to follow the enemy with Wood
's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman
, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also.
, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.
As soon as Sherman
discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, Davis
's division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Station
He ordered Howard
to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis
at four o'clock in the morning.
Morgan L. Smith
was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held.
Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.
The rest of Sherman
's command was directed to follow Howard
at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville
, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek
by the destruction of the bridge at that point.
He got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command.
Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge.
This threw them on Palmer
They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped.
Many, however, were captured.
's position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville
, extending east of the ridge.
was on his left, on the road to Graysville
During the night I telegraphed to Willcox
had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside
if he could hold out; to Halleck
I sent a announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside
Before the battle of Chattanooga
opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside
the moment the way should be clear.
was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga
loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition.
's corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River
to the mouth of the Holston
, and up that to Knoxville
, accompanied by the boat.
In addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days rations in haversacks.
In the battle of Chattanooga
, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland participated.
In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River
so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle.
, on the right, had Geary
's division of the 12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus
's division of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft
's division of the Army of the Cumberland.
had three divisions of his own army, Howard
's corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis
's division of the Army of the Cumberland.
There was no jealousy-hardly rivalry.
Indeed, I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands.
All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished.
The victory at Chattanooga
was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg
's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over
twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position.
It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis
had visited Bragg
on Missionary Ridge
a short time before my reaching Chattanooga
It was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg
, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville
, to be conducted by the latter general.
I had known both Bragg
before the war, the latter very well.
We had been three years at West Point
together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment.
Then we served together in the Mexican War
. I had known Bragg
, and met him occasionally subsequently.
I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them.
was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise.
He was also thoroughly upright.
But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious.
A man of the highest moral character and the most correct habit, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble.
As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order.
I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg
On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary.
He was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty.
As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster-himself — for something he wanted.
As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing.
As company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right.
In this condition of affairs Bragg
referred the whole matter to the commanding officer
of the post.
The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: “My God, Mr. Bragg
, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!”
was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain.
He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.
It may be that Longstreet
was not sent to Knoxville
for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis
had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of “killing two birds with one stone.”
On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the Union
army by means of his superior military genius.
I speak advisedly when I say Mr. Davis
prided himself on his military capacity.
He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate
Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy
My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga
were as fought.
was to get on Missionary Ridge
, as he did; Hooker
to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain
, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley
and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville
had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the centre.
arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker
was directed to come to Chattanooga
by the north bank of the Tennessee River
The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker
's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.
Note: From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the Wilderness
, which had been previously written) by General Grant
after his great illness in April, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885.