The relief of Knoxville-headquarters moved to Nashville-visiting Knoxville-cipher dispatches --Withholding orders
now being secure to the National
troops beyond any doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville
, about the situation of which the President
, in particular, was very anxious.
Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside
at the very earliest moment after securing Chattanooga
We had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. General Thomas
was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River
to the mouth of the Holston
, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.
, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge
was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps.
With the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet
was driven away, after which event East Tennessee
would furnish abundance of food for Burnside
's army and his own also.
While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold
, I directed Thomas
, verbally, not to start Granger
until he received further orders from me; advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the situation.
I was not right sure but that Bragg
's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached Dalton
In that case Bragg
might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland
, move thence towards Knoxville
, and, uniting with Longstreet
, make a sudden dash upon Burnside
When I arrived at Ringgold
, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest.
The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether,
seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne
's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.
moved from Rossville
toward Ringgold Palmer
's division took the road to Graysville
, and Sherman
moved by the way of Chickamauga Station
toward the same point.
As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold
I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga
to advise Thomas
of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger
Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of Burnside
I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold
through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.
is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East Chickamauga Creek
and Taylor's Ridge
, and about twenty miles south-east from Chattanooga
I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker
had left behind at Chattanooga Creek
got up. His men were attacking Cleburne
's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point.
Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile.
This attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily.
captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field.
I directed General Hooker
to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction.
At this point Sherman
came up, having reached Graysville
with his troops, where he found Palmer
had preceded him. Palmer
had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route.
I went back in the evening to Graysville
, remained there over night and did not return to Chattanooga
until the following night, the 29th.
I then found that Thomas
had not yet started Granger
, thus having lost a full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of Knoxville
were aware that on the 23d of the month Burnside
had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet
, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt
To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility.
He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.
Finding that Granger
had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman
of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of Knoxville
I also gave him the problem that we had to solve — that Burnside
had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time.
, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville
, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton
to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp.
I was very loath to send Sherman
, because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis
and hard fighting at Chattanooga
But I had become satisfied that Burnside
would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger
had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River
, near Chattanooga
, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days cooked rations in their haversacks.
Expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets.
The weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less.
The two days rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food.
They did, however, succeed in capturing some flour.
They also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville
I was so very anxious that Burnside
should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. I therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson
, to get into Knoxville
if he could, report to Burnside
the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible.
Mr. Charles A. Dana
was at Chattanooga
during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed command.
volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson
, and did accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the relief of Knoxville
into writing, and directed that
in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of General Longstreet
They made the trip safely; General Longstreet
did learn of Sherman
's coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside
was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary.
had stretched a boom across the Holston River
to catch scows and flats as they floated down.
On these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of East Tennessee
, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union
They also drove cattle into Knoxville
by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived Burnside
had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.
Our total loss (not including Burnside
's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured 6,142 prisoners — about 50 per cent more than the enemy reported for their total loss-40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms.
The enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned.
I had at Chattanooga
, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg
had about half this number [not including Longstreet
], but his position was supposed to be impregnable.
It was his own fault that he did not have more men present.
He had sent Longstreet
away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.
He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport
, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. Knoxville
was of no earthly use to him while Chattanooga
was in our hands.
If he should capture Chattanooga
with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle.
I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.
Then, too, after Sherman
had arrived, and when Bragg
knew that he was on the north side of the Tennessee River
, he sent Buckner
's division to reinforce Longstreet
He also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville
ordered it back.
It had got so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga
in time to be of service there.
It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg
having become confused as to what was going on on our side.
had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River
at Brown's Ferry, in full view of Bragg
's troops from Lookout Mountain
, a few days before the attack.
They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge
until they met their assault.
knew it was Sherman
's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee River
to the relief of Knoxville
and that Longstreet
was therefore in danger.
But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet
, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had captured Chattanooga
, East Tennessee
would have fallen without a struggle.
It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga
It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it.
The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party.
The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundred if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report.
There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg
on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could.
Then, too, Chattanooga
, following in the same half year with Gettysburg
in the East
in the West
, there was much the same feeling in the South
at this time that there had been in the North
If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the South
that was allowed in the North
would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union
General William F. Smith
's services in these battles had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion.
I was aware that he had previously been named by the President
for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination.
I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy.
My recommendation was heeded and the appointment made.
Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville
I, of course, informed the
authorities at Washington
— the President
and Secretary of War
-of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there.
The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville
had been relieved1
without further bloodshed.
The safety of Burnside
's army and the loyal people of East Tennessee
had been the subject of much anxiety to the President
for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander2
with a few thousand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap
, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to “remember Burnside
,” “do something for Burnside
,” and other appeals of like tenor.
He saw no escape for East Tennessee
until after our victory at Chattanooga
Even then he was afraid that Burnside
might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet
had been driven from the field.
only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet
would leave the State
The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off East Tennessee
now relieved Burnside
made disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River
in accordance with instructions.
I left Thomas
in command at Chattanooga
, and, about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee
was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington
While remaining at Chattanooga
I was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington
Nothing occurred at Nashville
worthy of mention during the
so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring.
I expected to retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta
I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile
from the Gulf
I expected after Atlanta
fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee
's army from the West
by way of the road running through Augusta
and thence south-west.
I was preparing to hold Atlanta
with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile
if that city was in our possession: if not, to Savannah
; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.
But the spring campaign against Mobile
was not made.
The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap
until their animals had nearly all starved.
I now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville
in the latter part of December by rail for Chattanooga
I took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch
with the Tennessee
From that point the railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville
and out east to Strawberry Plains.
I went by rail therefore to Knoxville
, where I remained for several days.
General John G. Foster
was then commanding the Department of the Ohio.
It was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville
and on my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky
, the first point where I could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville
The road over Cumberland Gap
, and back of it, was strewn with debris
of broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to Chattanooga
over Waldron's Ridge.
The road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons,
and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington
over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable.
I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee
, and, almost universally, intensely loyal.
They would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived.
The people naturally expected to see the commanding general
the oldest person in the party.
I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior.
The crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house.
It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general.
Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride.
I was back in Nashville
by the 13th of January, 1864.
When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.
Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton
had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers.
The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War Department through General Stager
all the dispatches which they received or forwarded.
I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville
, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there.
As I have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted.
Accordingly I ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B. Comstock
, of the Corps
of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could.
The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain
as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War Department were not to give it to anybody — the commanding general
or any one else.
I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that if he did he would be punished.
I told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished.
Finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded.
When I returned from Knoxville
I found quite a commotion.
The operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved.
I informed the Secretary of War
, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager
, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders.
It was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect.
This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the Secretary of War
and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat.
Owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general
's office until he had approved it. This was done by directing the adjutant-general
to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general
's office until he had examined them and given his approval.
He never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them.
I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary
apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-Chief
of the Army.
But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before.
After the relief of Knoxville Sherman
had proposed to Burnside
that he should go with him to drive Longstreet
out of Tennessee
; but Burnside
assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger
, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet
without availing himself of this offer.
As before stated Sherman
's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee
, near Chattanooga
, with two days rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time.
The weather was now
cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service.
, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River