Arrival of the peace commissioners-lincoln and the peace commissioners-an anecdote of Lincoln-the winter before Petersburg-Sheridan Destroys the Railroad — Gordon Carries the picket line-parke Recaptures the line-the battle of White Oak road
On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called Confederate States
presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg
, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point
They proved to be Alexander H. Stephens
of the Confederacy
[John A.] Campbell
, Assistant-Secretary of War
, and R. M. T. Hunter
, formerly United States Senator
and then a member of the Confederate Senate.
It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at once conducted them to the steamer Mary Martin
, a Hudson River
boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers.
I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington
and informed the Secretary of War
and the President
of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the United States
and, as they termed it, the Confederate Government.
I was instructed to retain them at City Point
, until the President
, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them.
They remained several days as guests on board the boat.
I saw them quite frequently, though I have no recollection of having
had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission.
It was something I had nothing to do with, and I therefore did not wish to express any views.on the subject.
For my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government
. There had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind.
As long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and I found them all very agreeable gentlemen.
I directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every way possible.
No guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them.
They were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters.
I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stephens
I had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. When he got down on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the South
during the rebellion.
The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had ever seen, even in Canada
The overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. He took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it.
After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a dispatch from Washington
, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads
to meet the President
and a member of the cabinet.
met them there and had an interview of short duration.
It was not a great while after they met that the President
visited me at City Point
He spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first: that the Union
as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished.
If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the Union
and be one people.
He always showed a generous and kindly
spirit toward the Southern
people, and I never heard him abuse an enemy.
Some of the cruel things said about President Lincoln
, particularly in the North
, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition-and I saw a great deal of him at City Point
, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital.
Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln
It was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at Hampton Roads
After a little conversation, he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens
's. I replied that I had. “Well,” said he, “did you see him take it off?”
I said yes. “Well,” said he, “didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?”
Long afterwards I told this story to the Confederate General J. B. Gordon
, at the time a member of the Senate.
He repeated it to Stephens
, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens
laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln
The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents.
On one occasion during this period, while I was visiting Washington City
for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton
, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. Before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section.
It was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the Confederates
It was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies-taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten.
As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River
near Port Hudson
on their way from Texas
to supply the Confederate army in the East
One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg
I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee
had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line.
He had his railroad by the way of Danville
south, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence.
I knew he could move
much more lightly and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south-and the war might be prolonged another year.
I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it was possible for the Confederates
to hold out much longer where they were.
There is no doubt that Richmond
would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army.
When it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy
at once began to crumble and fade away.
Then, too, desertions were taking place, not only among those who were with General Lee
in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole Confederacy.
I remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this, General Butler
remarked that the Confederates
would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though I am not certain as to this, “unless they should arm the slave.”
The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves.
The latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear.
, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus “robbing both the cradle and the grave,” an expression which I afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn
It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone.
Then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier.
It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. Of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs.
Then too I knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in-and as earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting-had lost hope and become despondent.
Many of them were making application to be sent North where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.
For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly believed would close the war.
There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and which detained me. One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams.
It was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country.
The other consideration was that General Sheridan
with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was operating on the north side of the James River
, having come down from the Shenandoah
It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the James River
Let us now take account of what he was doing.
On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan
He had met Early
and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command.
Early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.
On the 12th I heard from him again.
He had turned east, to come to White House
He could not go to Lynchburg
as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen.
He had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered.
I had supplies sent around to White House
for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived.
We had intended to abandon it because the James River
had now become our base of supplies.
had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by Custer
was acting as chief of cavalry.
moved very light, carrying only four days provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition.
They stopped at Charlottesville
and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg
He also sent a division along the James River Canal
to destroy locks, culverts, etc. All mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also.
had in this way consumed so much time that his making
a march to White House
was now somewhat hazardous.
He determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to Richmond
as it was possible to get, or until attacked.
He did this, destroying the canal as far as Goochland
, and the railroad to a point as near Richmond
as he could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia
Negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal.
His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage.
He had captured most of Early
's horses and picked up a good many others on the road.
When he reached Ashland
he was assailed by the enemy in force.
He resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna
, going north, and reached White House
safely on the 19th.
The time for Sherman
to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from Goldsboro
where he then was. Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass.
I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro
, on the 18th of April, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.
was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan
, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind.
However, having arrived at White House
on the 19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans.
Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee
should get away some night before I was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina
to join with Johnston
in attempting to crush out Sherman
, I had, as early as the 1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops around Petersburg
to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready to strike at once if it was undertaken.
It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis
and General Lee
had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about Richmond
, and they both agreed that these
places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible.
They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move.
, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the Danville Road
with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg
The night of the 24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon
was assigned to the execution of the plan.
The point between Fort Stedman
and Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack.
The attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines.
hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape.
The plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line.
assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. For some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the Confederate
Taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to desert.
When they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners.
In the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security.
This plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce Gordon
had to be brought from the north side of the James River
and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.
The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman
and Battery No. 10.
Then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them.
Continuing the charge, they also carried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turned toward City Point
happened to be at City Point
that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters.
, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade
's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back.
General [J. C.] Tidball
gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly.
was soon out with his division, as also was Willcox
to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into Fort Stedman
On the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by Willcox
early in the morning.
then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established.
The artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the Confederates
to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them.
They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands.
This effort of Lee
's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.
After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates
, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held.
This, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later.
The day that Gordon
was making dispositions for this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th.
, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie
's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the James River
and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.
He left Weitzel
with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred
and the north of the James River
The engineer brigade was to be left at City Point
, and Parke
's corps in the lines about Petersburg
was at his place promptly.
were then on our extreme left with the 2nd and 5th corps.
They were directed on the arrival of Ord
, and on his getting into position in their places,
to cross Hatcher's Run
and extend out west toward Five Forks
, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad.
There was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe.
This was what was known as the battle of White Oak Road