The capture of Petersburg-meeting President Lincoln in Petersburg-the capture of Richmond --pursuing the enemy-visit to Sheridan and Meade
and I entered Petersburg
on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemies musketry which was flying thick and fast there.
As we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the Appomattox bottom
, presumably near the bridge, packed with the Confederate army.
I did not have artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee
was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit.
At all events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.
Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg
, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia.
He said that Lee
had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg
, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond
, and falling back into this prepared work.
This statement was made to General Meade
and myself when we were together.
I had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the Appomattox
for the purpose of heading off Lee
; but Meade
was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the Appomattox
there at once and move against Lee
in his new position.
I knew that Lee
was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the James
and Appomattox rivers
, and between two such armies as those of the Potomac
and the James
Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of
It would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army.
Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist.
My judgment was that Lee
would necessarily have to evacuate Richmond
, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road
Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of Lee
, and I told Meade
He suggested that if Lee
was going that way we would follow him. My reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade
) believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the Danville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appomattox River
, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. Then we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg
, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer
I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the Danville Road
early in the morning, supposing that Lee
would be gone during the night.
During the night I strengthened Sheridan
by sending him Humphreys
, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond
, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long.
was at church when he received Lee
The congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service.
The rebel government left Richmond
about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d.
At night Lee
ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House
, his object being to get away, join Johnston
if possible, and to try to crush Sherman
before I could get there.
As soon as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan
and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the Appomattox River
as speedily as possible.
He replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. I then ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade
to follow the same road in the morning.
's corps followed by the same road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road
which ran alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded.
That road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8½/ inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives.
was at City Point
at the time, and had been for some days.
I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only while I felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. But when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result.
The next morning after the capture of Petersburg
, I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln
asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await his arrival.
I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the National
army left Petersburg
there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets.
There was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry.
We had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the President
About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln
said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was: “Do you know, general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this.”
Our movements having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President
all my movements, and the objects I had in view.
He remained for some days near City Point
, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph.
knew that it had been arranged for Sherman
to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee
I told him that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern
armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital.
The Western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the Mississippi River
to the State of North Carolina
, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond
, asking admittance.
I said to him that if the Western
armies should be even upon the field, operating against Richmond
, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from.
It might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East
and those of the West
in some of their debates.
Western members might be throwing it up to the members of the East
that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the Western
armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with.
said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done.
The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years record in the suppression of the rebellion.
The army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United States
Its loss would be the loss of the cause.
Every energy, therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy
to protect and maintain their capital.
Everything else would go if it went.
's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South
in another quarter.
I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians.
Possibly I am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance.
When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln
mounted his horse and started on his return to City Point
, while I and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance.
Up to this time I had not received the report of the capture of Richmond
Soon after I left President Lincoln
I received a dispatch from General Weitzel
which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond
at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d and that he had found the city on fire in two places.
The city was in the most utter confusion.
The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. The city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave.
In fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee
had gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg
's command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee
's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town.
The city was on fire.
Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing.
The fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army.
All authorities deny that it was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy.
Be that as it may, the National
troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them.
The troops that had formed Lee
's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into Petersburg
, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River
until finally they took water and crossed over.
I left Mr. Lincoln
and started, as I have already said, to join the command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine miles out. We had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. Then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared.
This caused further delay.
, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted.
, who was far ahead, was also out of rations.
They did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them.
So the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.
's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek
, and driven them north to the Appomattox
, where, I presume, most of them were forced to cross.
On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee
had ordered rations up from Danville
for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at Farmville
This showed that Lee
had already abandoned the
idea of following the railroad down to Danville
, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of Farmville
I notified Sheridan
of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee
. He responded that he had already sent Crook
's division to get upon the road between Burkesville
, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought Crook
must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly for Jetersville
by two roads.
After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan
saying that Crook
was on the Danville Road
, I immediately ordered Meade
to make a forced march with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke
's corps across from the road they were on to the South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along.
Our troops took possession of Jetersville
and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from Lee
, ordering two hundred thousand rations from Danville
The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan
sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville
and had it forwarded from there.
In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached Danville
, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter.
At this time Merritt
, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and the Appomattox River
, and were attacking the enemy in flank.
They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property.
intrenched himself at Amelia Court House
, and also his advance north of Jetersville
, and sent his troops out to collect forage.
The country was very poor and afforded but very little.
His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army of Northern Virginia.
's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville
, and Sheridan
notified me of the situation.
I again ordered Meade
up with all dispatch, Sheridan
having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee
's entire army.
, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. Humphreys
moved at two, and Wright
at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the wagons being far in the rear.
I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side Railroad.
On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan
of the progress Meade
was making, and suggested that he might now attack Lee
. We had now no other objective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once.
On the 5th I marched again with Ord
's command until within about ten miles of Burkesville
, where I stopped to let his army pass.
I then received from Sheridan
the following dispatch: “The whole of Lee
's army is at or near Amelia Court House
, and on this side of it. General Davies
, whom I sent out to Painesville
on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons.
We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. My cavalry was at Burkesville
yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road
, last night.
is at Amelia Court House
They are out of rations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad towards Burkesville
yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point.”
It now became a life and death struggle with Lee
to get south to his provisions.
, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards Farmville
, moved Davies
's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies
found the movement had already commenced.
He attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons.
He also captured five pieces of artillery.
The Confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but Sheridan
had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow Davies
, and they came to his relief in time.
A sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.
himself reached Jetersville
about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops.
The head of Humphrey
's corps followed in about an hour afterwards.
stationed the troops as they came up, at Meade
's request, the latter still being very sick.
He extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin
's corps, and one division to the right.
The cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, Sheridan
feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape.
He wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but Meade
prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up.
At this juncture Sheridan
sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he
wished I was there myself.
The letter was dated Amelia Court House
, April 5th, and signed by Colonel
[William B.] Taylor
It was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army.
's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. I received a second message from Sheridan
on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence.
This was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform.
It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco
is folded in. This was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. It would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing tobacco
It was nearly night when this letter was received.
I gave Ord
directions to continue his march to Burkesville
and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and Farmville
I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade
The distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads.
However, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where Sheridan
We talked over the situation for some little time, Sheridan
explaining to me what he thought Lee
was trying to do, and that Meade
's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him.
We then together visited Meade
, reaching his headquarters about midnight.
I explained to Meade
that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no doubt that Lee
was moving right then.
changed his orders at once.
They were now given for an advance on Amelia Court House
, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left.