Political Intrigue — Buena Vista — movement against Vera Cruz-siege and capture of Vera Cruz
war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. General Scott
was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by President Polk
, or [William L.] Marcy
, his Secretary of War
was a Whig and the administration was democratic.
was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories.
It would not do therefore to give him command of the “army of conquest.”
The plans submitted by Scott
for a campaign in Mexico
disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected.
This was on the 27th of May, 1846 [May 21]. Four days later General Scott
was notified that he need not go to Mexico
General [Edmund P.] Gaines
was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field.
Colonel Zachary Taylor
--a brigadier-general by brevet — was therefore left in command.
He, too, was a Whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of Monterey
, his third battle and third complete victory, the Whig
papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the Presidency.
Something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity.
He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent.
It was finally decided to send General Scott
in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture Vera Cruz
and march upon the capital of the country.
It was no doubt supposed that Scott
's ambition would lead him to slaughter Taylor
or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize.
The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve.
It was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained.
Yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition [Taylor] had himself become a prominent candidate for the Presidency.
It was necessary to destroy his chances promptly.
The problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity.
The fact is, the administration of Mr. Polk
made every preparation to disgrace Scott
, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself.
had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande
from the first.
Now that he was in command of all the forces in Mexico
, he withdrew from Taylor
most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army.
did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande
, and authorized Taylor
to fall back to that line if he chose.
protested against the depletion of his army, and his
subsequent movement upon Buena Vista
would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande
had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture Vera Cruz
and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior.
He was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the President
, but his sincere good wishes.
The promises were all broken.
Only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and Scott
had scarcely started for Mexico
before the President
undertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H. Benton
] as lieutenant-general.
This being refused by Congress, the President
asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing Benton
to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but Congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott
remained in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile.
reached Brazos Santiago
or Point Isabel
, at the mouth of the Rio Grande
, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to Camargo
, where he had written General Taylor
to meet him. Taylor
, however, had gone to, or towards Tampico
], for the purpose of establishing a post there.
He had started on this march before he was aware of General Scott
being in the country.
Under these circumstances Scott
had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from Taylor
, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate.
's victory at Buena Vista
, February 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847 [Santa Anna
had fled by the 24th], with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs
a foregone conclusion.
He was nominated and elected in 1848.
I believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the United States
When General Scott
assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in the division of General David Twiggs
, in Taylor
's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of General William Worth
, in which I served to the close of the
war. The troops withdrawn from Taylor
to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz
, were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande
preparatory to embarkation for their destination.
I found General Worth
a different man from any I had before served directly under.
He was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth
moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison.
The length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short.
on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. Some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much.
belonged to this latter class.
He enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him.
The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Rio Grande
for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations.
The transports were all sailing vesssels.
The passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the Rio Grande
to the time of debarkation south of Vera Cruz
The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. The transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all.
The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of Anton Lizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz
, as they arrived, and
there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition, and supplies of all kinds from the North
With the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat — the first vessel of the kind I had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army.
At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were side-wheelers.
This little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention.
I recollect that Lieutenant Sidney Smith
, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, “Why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances.”
Finally on the 7th [6th] of March, 1847, the little army of [between] ten or twelve thousand men, given Scott
to invade a country with a population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea.
The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios, some three miles south of Vera Cruz
The vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; General Scott
had provided these before leaving the North
The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious.
The men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days.
were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort.
During the debarkation one shot took off the head of Major Albertis
No other, I believe, reached anywhere near the same distance.
On the 9th of March the troops were landed and the investment of Vera Cruz
, from the Gulf of Mexico
south of the city to the Gulf
again on the north, was soon and easily effected.
The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore.
, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walled city.
The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north.
There were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles.
In front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the Gulf
, stands San Juan de Ulloa
[Ulia], an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great
strength for that period.
Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength.
After the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. These batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected.
If a sortie had been made at any time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line.
No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away.
The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of March, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city.
Upon this General Morales
, who was Governor
of both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa
, commenced a correspondence with General Scott
looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison.
On the 29th Vera Cruz
and San Juan de Ulloa
were occupied by Scott
About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force.8 The casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded.