John G. Nicolay, The Outbreak of Rebellion

[18] and embarrassed his always limited capabilities. In the defeat of Breckenridge, whom he had championed, and in the sweeping success of the Republicans, he had suffered scorching rebuke and deep humiliation. His administration was condemned, his policy was overthrown; his proud party was a hopeless wreck. He had no elasticity of mind, no buoyancy of hope to recover from the shock. Withal he had a blind disbelief in the popular judgment; he refused to recognize the fact of an adverse decision at the ballot-box. After his long affiliation with Southern men in thought and action, he saw, as it were, through Southern eyes; his mind dwelt painfully on the fancied wrongs of the South. His natural impulse, therefore, was to embarrass and thwart the Republican victory by such official utterance and administration as would occur in his brief remainder of office; and this was probably also the first and natural feeling of even the loyal members of his Cabinet, who were prominent and devoted Democratic partisans.

The presidential election decided, it was necessary to begin the preparation of his annual message to Congress, which would convene in less than a month. Just about this time came the thickening reports of Southern insurrection and the ostentatious resignations of the Charleston Federal officials. The first expressions from loyal members of the Cabinet were that rebellion must be put down. But this remedy grated harshly on Buchanan's partisan prejudices. He had aided these Southern malcontents to intrigue for slavery, to complain of oppression, to threaten disunion. To become the public accuser of his late allies and friends, under disaster and defeat, doubtless seemed desertion and black ingratitude. The Cabinet traitors had no such scruples. They were ready enough to desert the President, but they wanted first to use him.