The Atlanta (Georgia) Campaign: May 1 - September 8, 1864., Part I: General Report.
Maj. George B. Davis, Mr. Leslie J. Perry, Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley, Ed.

General: In obedience to your orders I sent General Kilpatrick out this morning upon the Tunnel Hill road. I likewise sent Colonel Van Derveer with his brigade to support him. Before starting I posted General Turchin in front of the gap, with a portion of the Third Brigade, and directing him to take charge of matters here, accompanied the column myself. General Kilpatrick drove the outposts of the enemy without great opposition from their ordinary positions to Tunnel Hill, and he himself immediately reached the crest this side of the village, at Smith's house, which is almost within musket range of the town. From this point he sent back word that the enemy had deployed himself in large force beyond the village and on Tunnel Hill ridge, and asked for the assistance of the infantry, as he might otherwise find it difficult to withdraw his skirmishers, some of whom were dismounted men. I immediately went forward with four regiments, having found it necessary to post three out of the brigade to guard important avenues of approach upon our rear and flanks. Arriving at Smith's house I saw the lines of rebel troops stretching along the ridge for a long distance, and a line in the low ground at its base. Some of these men were on foot, but I suppose them to have been dismounted cavalry. A battery was likewise reported by the signal officer as visible on the ridge. I was informed by the family of my guide, Terrell, that no change had taken place in the rebel force about Tunnel Hill, and that none was known to have taken place at Dalton; on the contrary, that the enemy had been strengthening his works at Buzzard Roost by damming up the creek and otherwise, and apparently intended to stand there. I was satisfied from what I saw that no material portion of any of the enemy's force had been withdrawn, and not feeling authorized to attack so strong a position with four regiments of infantry, I determined to withdraw. The cavalry being at the time collected in masses in the open field, within range of artillery, I hastened to send it to the rear and back to camp, posting a line of infantry in its place. This done, I soon after withdrew with but little molestation. A small party followed my rear guard and exchanged shots with it, but without effect, and the reconnaissance was successfully terminated. I had in all about 10men wounded; 2, I am told, mortally. The loss of the enemy is not known, but we learned that after the previous reconnaissance 15 wounded rebels were taken to Terrell's house. I was also told that the railroad is still running to Tunnel Hill.

I must commend to the major-general commanding the fine soldierly qualities displayed by both General Kilpatrick and Colonel Van Derveer in my two reconnaissances.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

Captain: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part performed by this division in the campaign which began with the movement of the army from Chattanooga, Tenn., in May last, and terminated with the capture of Atlanta, Ga., on the 1st instant:

On the 22d of February this division marched from Chattanooga, together with the other two divisions of the corps, to Tunnel Hill and Buzzard Roost Gap, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance of the enemy's position in front of Dalton, and having ascertained by feeling him closely for two days that his army was still there in force, strongly posted and fortified, we withdrew upon the night of the 26th to Ringgold, where this division took post, the remainder of the troops being removed to other points. From February until May the division continued to occupy that place as the extreme advance post of the army. Our pickets and those of the enemy were always in close proximity, and affairs of minor importance between them were of constant occurrence. On two occasions, reconnoitering parties of large force were sent as far as Tunnel Hill, both of which were highly successful, and chiefly useful in inspiring our cavalry with greater confidence in their superiority over that of the enemy. In each of these expeditions Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, whose division of cavalry was placed under my charge, commanded the cavalry, and Col. F. Van Derveer, of the Thirtyfifth Ohio, an infantry brigade. Both of these officers displayed on these occasions the high soldierly qualities for which they are known, energy and boldness, guided by the coolest judgment. During the interval from the 1st to the 6th of May the divisions and corps of the Army of the Cumberland were concentrated about Ringgold, the Army of the Ohio taking a position on our left, and the Army of the Tennessee a line of march passing to our right. My division was at that time constituted as follows:

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[734]

Narrative.

May 7, leaving Colonel Este's brigade (the Third) in garrison at Ringgold, the remainder of the division marched on the morning of the 7th to Tunnel Hill. The other two divisions of the corps being in advance, had already brushed away with their advanced guards the pickets of the enemy at that place, and had gone into position when we arrived. This division went into line on the right a little to the south of the village, where it remained during the night. On the morning of the 8th the division moved south three miles upon the Villanow road, so as to form a connection with the corps of Major-General Hooker and at the same time to cover the right flank of Brigadier-General Johnson, who was swinging forward onto the south end of Tunnel Hill ridge. In the afternoon we crossed that ridge and moved up in support of Brigadier-Generals Johnson and Davis, then in front of Buzzard Roost Gap. May 9, 10, and 11, during these days we remained in our position in reserve, no active operations being carried on in our front. May 12, my division, in advance of the corps, marched at daybreak toward the right, to the support of Major-General McPherson, who had passed his army through Snake Creek Gap and had taken position in Sugar Valley, threatening Resaca. Being detained by the Twentieth Corps in advance of me, I did not get into position until after dark. The other divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were behind me, and they were followed by the Twenty-third Corps. May 13, moved forward at noon along with the remainder of the army, and about dark got into position on the left of Brigadier-General Johnson's division, upon a series of steep and difficult hills, covered with a dense wood and undergrowth. Major-General Schofield was somewhere on my left and rear, but not connecting. Brigadier-General Johnson's skirmishers became engaged with those of the enemy, but mine did not come in contact with them.

Resaca.

May 14, having received orders during the night from the majorgeneral commanding the corps to swing forward my entire line along [735] with that of Brigadier-General Johnson, his right being taken as the pivot, and to push on until the enemy was encountered, I put my troops in motion at daybreak. Colonel Van Derveer was on my right, formed in two lines, and Brigadier-General Turchin on the left, formed in the same manner. My right had moved some threefourths of a mile, and the direction of our line was about due north and south, facing east, when I received another order from the same source, informing me that Major-General Schofield, whose corps was then in line half, a mile to my rear, with his right overlapping nearly the whole of my left brigade, was about to advance and charge the enemy's works, and directing me to move forward with him and assault at the same time. I had not previously known that the enemy had works in our vicinity, nor was I then informed as to their position, their character, or the manner in which the attack was to be made. There was, of course, no time for a reconnaissance by me without neglecting to advance along with Major-General Schofield, as ordered. I had barely time to give the proper instructions to Brigadier-General Turchin on my left, and was communicating the same to the right brigade, when the troops of Brigadier-General Judah, on General Schofield's right, came up with my left. His front line passed through my rear line before mine began to advance, and, thus interlaced, both went forward together. It was subsequently ascertained that the rebel line of works ran along the western slope of a ridge, which extended from near Resaca northward, on the west side of the railroad. A narrow valley, intersected along its length by a boggy creek, separated this from another ridge which lay parallel with and in front of our line. This our troops had to pass. It was covered for a space of nearly half a mile in width by so dense a growth of wood that an individual alone could make his way through it only with difficulty. It was utterly impossible in this thicket for a regiment, much less for a brigade commander, to see and control the two extremities of his command. Yet our lines of battle worked through it and reached the crest overlooking the valley in as much order as could have been expected. From this position the rebel works could be distinctly seen, and could our men have been allowed to halt here, to reform and to readjust their lines, while an examination of the position should be made, better results might have ensued. It would appear that Major-General Schofield's left, in open ground, did not encounter the same difficulties as his right, and, pressing forward, the impulsion was communicated along the line to his right, and carried my left brigade along with it. It was the affair of a moment, and before I could learn (at 300 yards' distance upon the right) of the condition of affairs, it was too late to stop the movement. Descending about 100 feet the almost vertical slope of the ridge, our men emerged into the open valley, and into direct view, at short range, of the rebel works, and immediately received a fire of artillery and musketry. The tried veterans of this division, who had never failed to accomplish anything that was possible, did not falter, but pushed forward until they had reached the creek. Few got beyond this. Many stuck under the miry banks of the stream, and the few isolated groups that got beyond, not being in sufficient force to sustain themselves, were soon driven back. It was at once apparent that this effort had failed and was at an end, and most of the men were withdrawn to the summit of the ridge to be reformed. A few, unable on account of the sharp fire from the rebel works to leave the banks [736] of the creek, remained there until dark, doing valuable duty as sharpshooters. The movement of the First Brigade, along with Major-General Schofield's troops, had been so sudden, and the distance to go being less, the Second Brigade did not reach the crest of the hill until after the failure of Major-General Schofield's right and my left had become known, and I did not have it advance farther. Our whole line, from the right of the Twentieth Corps to the left of the Twenty-third, continued to occupy this ridge during the afternoon, and, having placed numerous batteries in position, shelled the rebel works with fine effect. The loss which my command sustained in the operations of this day was as follows: Casualties May 14, 1864-killed, 2 officers and 14 enlisted men; wounded, 7 officers and 112 enlisted men; total, 9 officers and 126 enlisted men.

During the day the Third Brigade, with the exception of the Eighteenth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, which remained to garrison Ringgold, came up and was placed in reserve behind the other brigades. On the morning of the 15th my division was withdrawn from the line and sent to the extreme right of the corps to aid in filling a gap caused by Major-General Hooker being taken out to operate on the left of Major-General Schofield. I there connected on my right with the left of the Fifteenth Corps of the Army of the Tennessee. The position was an important one, and my men worked industriously during the day and following night in advancing and strengthening our works, so as to give more perfect command of those of the enemy in our front. Our skirmishers were during this time hotly engaged with those of the rebels. May 16, during the night the skirmishers in front of my Third Brigade discovered signs of a movement of the enemy, and pressing forward shortly before daybreak, entered his lines and found them evacuated. Together with a party from the. First Division of the corps, which advanced about the same time, they pushed on into Resaca and were the first to enter that place, and the first to discover the entire withdrawal of the rebel forces to the south side of the river, Lieutenant-Colonel Wharton, of the Tenth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, in charge of skirmishers from my Third Brigade, being the first officer who entered Resaca. The division was marched into the town and remained there until night to await the construction of bridges on which to cross the Oostenaula in pursuit. At Resaca the Eleventh Regiment Ohio Volunteers was detached from the First Brigade and left in garrison at that place, thus reducing the command by 278 men. It was soon after mustered out of the service. May 17, my wagons having been crossed over during the night, the division passed the river at 3 a. m., and, following closely upon the heels of the Fourth Corps, encamped at night two miles north of Adairsville. The advance guard of Major-General Howard had closed up with the enemy and was skirmishing — throughout the afternoon with his rear. May 18, the march was continued as upon the day previous, the enemy resisting strongly to cover the withdrawal of his trains. Passing through Adairsville, my division encamped for the night four miles north of Kingston. May 19, marching through Kingston, I was there informed by Major-General Palmer that the enemy was exhibiting himself in a threatening attitude in our front, and I was ordered to post the division on a range of hills south of the town. This order was duly executed, but later, during the afternoon, other orders were received directing me to move out to the east of the town and go into line on the right of the [737] Fourth Corps. When I got to the position designated, that corps was already four miles out from the town. My line when formed connected with the right of Brigadier-General Wood, my right resting on the railroad. During the afternoon, previous to my arrival, I was informed that the enemy had displayed quite a formidable line of battle, but before my division reached the ground it had been retired from view. May 20, on this morning the rebel force was found to have again fallen back, having succeeded in passing his trains over the Etowah River at or near the railroad bridge, which was afterward destroyed. Throughout this and the two following days our troops remained in position, fitting themselves with supplies, so as to be able to quit the railroad and move upon the enemy's flank. On the 22d, the Ninth Ohio Regiment, of the Second Brigade, whose term of service had expired, went North for the purpose of being mustered out. At the same time the Twenty-fourth Regiment Illinois Volunteers from the First Brigade, and the Tenth Regiment Indiana Volunteers from the Third Brigade, were detached and left in garrison at Kingston. The Twenty-fourth Illinois never afterward rejoined the command, as its term of service soon expired. May 23, my division again marched, and, crossing the Etowah at Island Ford, encamped on Euharlee Creek. From this time until the end of the month we remained in rear guarding or escorting trains, generally not far from Burnt Hickory.

June 1, leaving the First Brigade in charge of the trains at Burnt Hickory, I marched to the front with the other two and joined the main army, then going into position on the line running northerly from Dallas toward Acworth, east of Pumpkin Vine Creek. June 2, having relieved a portion of the First Division, Fourteenth Corps. and extended the line to the left, I at once advanced my front to a more commanding position and intrenched. We were then in close proximity to the strongly constructed works of the enemy, my right connecting with the First Division, Fourteenth Corps, and Major-General Schofield operating at a little distance on my left. During the 3d and 4th my men worked constantly, both night and day, advancing our lines by pushing our skirmishers to the front, and then intrenching the troops upon the ground which they had gained. I thus, with trifling loss, drove the rebel skirmishers into their main works and put up batteries within short range of them. June 5, at daybreak, it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn under the cover of night, abandoning a line of elaborately constructed fieldworks of great strength. We received no orders to pursue, but remained all day in our position. June 6, we again marched to the front upon the Burnt Hickory and Big Shanty road, and-at night I got into line on the left of the Twentieth Corps near Durham's house. Continuing at this point until the morning of the 10th, the First Brigade, relieved from duty with the trains, came up and joined the division. It had lost while away two regiments, the Eleventh Ohio and Twenty-fourth Illinois, by expiration of service. The Tenth Indiana, of the Third Brigade, came up to us about the same time. June 10, this division marched at 6 a. m. in front of the corps, the Army of the Tennessee on our left, moving along the railroad. We took such roads as we could parallel to it, and, after crossing Procter's Creek at the old mill, our advance guard of the Third Brigade soon struck the rebel skirmishers. These were readily driven back, and my line formed upon an eminence in front of Pine Mountain, in full [738] view of the rebel works upon it and within range of their batteries. Our artillery was at once put in position and kept up an effective cannonade during the afternoon while the Fourth Corps was coming into position on our right. The object in view at this point was to obtain control of the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road. Pine Mountain lying on this road commanded it. June 11, early in the day, the rebel skirmishers were driven back nearer to the base of the mountain, and my lines were advanced, but in the afternoon our whole corps was moved about a mile to the left so as to make room for the Fourth Corps to deploy. In my new position I was on the right of our corps, connecting with the Fourth Corps, our First Division on my left. My line faced toward the south and was located about a mile north of the Marietta and Big Shanty road, fronting the northeast end of Pine Mountain. June 12 and 13, no movement took place upon our portion of the line. June 14, our whole line advanced, and my left reached the Big [Shanty] road, where it intrenched. Directly in front on the south side of the road the strongly built lines of the enemy, stretching from the base of Pine Mountain to the east, were discovered at a few hundred yards' distance. My right, nearer to the mountain, was more strongly resisted, and, although skirmishing hotly throughout the day with heavy loss, did not until dark succeed in dislodging the rebels from their rifle-pits or in gaining the road. June 15, the enemy having discovered that our lines were rapidly enveloping his advanced position of Pine Mountain, abandoned it in the night, and on the morning of the 15th we took possession of that portion of his works. He had only, however, fallen back a short distance to a line of works already constructed, but it enabled the Fourth Corps and the two right divisions of our corps to swing forward a considerable distance. My own division moved about one and a half miles to the vicinity of Smith's house, when it again came upon the pickets in front of the rebel works, and was ordered to intrench and put up batteries. I was connected with the troops of Major-General Howard on my right and with our First Division on my left. June 16 and 17, gradually driving the enemy from the woods and other strong positions held by his advanced parties, I steadily pushed forward my lines and at length established my artillery in positions highly advantageous and commanding.

During this time the practice of our gunners had been skillful and effective. We were again close up to the rebel fortifications, and they were of great strength, constructed with extreme care and everywhere fully garnished with artillery. They were field-works, requiring the slow operations almost of a siege to approach them. June 18, having been instructed by the corps commander that Major-General Howard, with the Fourth Corps, intended to swing forward toward the left, so as to sweep along the enemy's line, I was at the same time ordered to conform to this movement and advance with those troops. My line of march was through a very difficult wood and morass nearly a mile in width, impassable for the artillery. It was, therefore, sent around by the left while the troops worked their way through the woods. Passing this, we came into open ground immediately in front of works of the enemy. The Fourth Corps at the same time came up on my right and a sharp encounter ensued between our men and the rebels behind their breast-works, but the unceasing and rapid fire of our line kept theirs subdued, and our loss was less than could have been expected. I immediately ordered my men to creep forward as well as they could [739] and construct a cover for themselves on the crest of the open ground facing directly into the embrasures of the rebel batteries. Having no artillery with me, Capt. Hubert Dilger, of the First Ohio Artillery, belonging to the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, volunteered to bring up his guns, and, placing them upon the line where my men were intrenching, opened fire and maintained them there throughout the afternoon, displaying a splendid courage not often witnessed. The coolness and bravery displayed by my own men exceeds all praise, and by dark they had constructed a line of rifle-pits in open ground confronting the finished works of the enemy and within 500 yards of them. I had obtained a magnificent position and lost 40 men in so doing. June 19, the earliest dawn revealed to us another evacuation and falling back of the rebel army, this time to the lines of Kenesaw Mountain. My division, pursuing, came up in front of the central knob of the mountain, near Kirk's house, and, after a sharp skirmish, got into position close to the base of the mountain. June 20, the lines of the division were rectified and the works for protection strengthened and improved. During the day we lost 30 men, killed and wounded by shells and by sharpshooters firing from the side of the mountain. From this time until the evening of the 26th our position was not materially changed. Under direct fire from the rebel skirmishers no man could expose himself without being a mark for their bullets. They kept our men closely confined to their trenches, and the only variety we had was the constant succession of artillery duels between our batteries and those upon the mountain top, which might be looked for at any time of the day or night. At times these displays assumed a degree of magnificence, as particularly the cannonade from our batteries on the afternoon of the 21st. My average daily loss of men killed and wounded in their camps and behind their works was about 20 men. June 26, the division of Brigadier-General Davis having been sent to the right of the Fourth Corps to unite with a division of that corps in an assault of the enemy's works, I was ordered there likewise to support him, and, being relieved after dark by Brigadier-General Osterhaus' division, of the Army of the Tennessee, I marched at once and by midnight got into bivouac near department headquarters. June 27, at an early hour my division was formed in rear of the assaulting columns of Brigadier-General Davis to support him in case of disaster, and after his repulse went forward into the line on his right, relieving Brigadier-General Geary's division, of the Twentieth Corps, which was next to us upon that side. On the 27th, Col. F. Van Derveer, commanding my Second Brigade, who had long been suffering from disease, was compelled to go North for relief, and turned over the command of the brigade to Col. N. Gleason, of the Eighty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, who has since retained it. In losing Colonel Van Derveer, my command, and the service generally, was deprived of one of its most gallant and best officers and most accomplished gentlemen, Always prompt, judicious, and brave, he had distinguished himself on many fields, and his promotion had been strongly urged upon the Government, but unaccountably overlooked. June 28, from this time until the 3d of July the locality of the division was not changed. Our works were at this time so close to those of the enemy that no man on either side dared show his head during the day, and the only advantage which we gained was in the constant pushing forward of our trenches toward theirs, done under the cover of night. To exhibit [740] the changes which had taken place in the division up to this period and its subsequent strength, a new table of effective force is here given, taken from the reports of July 4:

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Effective force of division-officers, 299; enlisted men, 5,430; total, 5,729; horses, 125; guns, 8.

July 3, the enemy having again abandoned his works and fallen back during the night, my men entered them before daybreak and were prompt in pursuit, capturing a large number of prisoners. We marched at an early hour, and, passing through Marietta, had advanced about two miles along the right side of the railroad when we came upon a new line of works in which the rebel army had taken position. It was here that the last stand to cover the passage of the trains over the Chattahoochee was made. July 4 was spent in reconnoitering this position. Our troops were pressed close up to the works and a constant skirmish was kept up along our front during the day, but no general assault made. At this point my Second Brigade was detached and sent to Marietta to constitute the garrison of that place. July 5, the enemy, not waiting for an attack, had again given up his laboriously constructed works and retreated to the river during the night. So soon as this was discovered our troops pursued, my division taking a road leading toward Vining's Station and lying a short distance south of the railroad. Prisoners were taken and stragglers picked up almost from the outset, and [741] some distance before reaching Vining's the head of my column came upon a strong rear guard of the enemy. The Tenth Indiana Volunteers, skirmishing in our front, pressed this party handsomely and vigorously, driving it beyond the road, and the conduct of Col. M. B. Taylor, commanding that regiment on this occasion, is worthy of praise. On reaching the heights overlooking the station a rebel train was discovered moving south beyond the river, and one of my batteries, hastily brought up, shelled it with much apparent effect. My line of march would at this point have led me to cross the railroad and move in the direction of Pace's Ferry, but encountering the head of Brigadier-General Wood's division, of the Fourth Corps, which came down that road and arrived soon after I did, his column, to avoid confusion, was turned to the left toward Pace's Ferry, whilst mine, turning to the right, pursued the railroad. I had marched about one and a half miles along this road, skirmishing lightly, but not strongly resisted, when I came upon the head of our First Division (Fourteenth Army Corps) column, which, taking a shorter road, was coming in on my right and reached the railroad in front of me. These troops immediately abutted upon the strong rebel works on the road, a part of the continuous line constituting the tete-de-pont of the railroad crossing. My troops were then formed, by direction of the major-general commanding the corps, so as to connect with the left of the First Division, and extending back along the line of the railroad. July 6, 7, and 8, during these days, while other portions of the army were working themselves into position, this division remained stationary, the skirmish lines alone keeping up a constant and continuous fire from their pits. July 9, having received orders to push out my skirmishers and feel the enemy for the purpose of developing his position I caused Colonel Este, whose brigade was the most advanced, to deploy a heavy line, and, supporting it by a regiment, directed him to make the advance required. I at the same time was informed that the skirmishers of the First Division on my right would advance with ours, and I directed those of the First Brigade, although more remote from the enemy's works, to keep up their connection with Este's left. Having selected the Tenth Kentucky to support his advance, Colonel Este began his movement at 8 a. m. .The more advanced pickets of the enemy were readily driven back and our men gained some hundreds of yards distance to the front. They came, however, upon a very heavy line posted in strong pits, and these supported by heavy reserves. The troops on the right had at the same time gained a portion of the rebel works, but were almost immediately driven back, and the enemy then pushed out in superior force upon my men and compelled them to retire almost to their original position. The arrival of another regiment again gave us the command of the position, and the rebels fell back to their pits; but as their presence in considerable force, both in their works and in front on their skirmish line, had been ascertained, a second advance was not ordered. In this little fight, which was brief but severe, we lost 4 men killed and 19 wounded. Colonel Este, who commanded the line in person, was severely bruised by a bullet and narrowly escaped losing his leg. He displayed the utmost bravery, as did the officers and men generally who were engaged. In the afternoon I advanced my whole line and intrenched it, and the Fourth Corps connected with me on the left. July 10, the passage of the river some miles above having been at length effected by the Twenty-third Corps, the [742] last of the rebels were withdrawn to the south bank during the previous night and the bridges were burned. Major-General Howard then moved his troops to the support of the Twenty-third Corps, and my division replaced him in his position at Pace's Ferry. I moved into this position before night. July 11, from this date until the 17th my command remained stationary, picketing the riverbank. In the interval the Twenty-third Regiment Missouri Volunteers, assigned by Major-General Thomas to my First Brigade, came up and joined the command. The Second Brigade likewise came forward from Marietta, leaving only the Second Regiment Minnesota Volunteers at that place, and rejoined the division. In the same interval also Brigadier-General Turchin was compelled to go North for the benefit of his health, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Col. M. B. Walker, Thirty-first Ohio, who has retained it until this time. July 17, pontoon bridges having been completed at Pace's Ferry, and the Fourth Corps from above having cleared the opposite shore, we crossed the river, the First and Second Divisions preceding mine. July 18, the corps advanced, passing Nancy's Creek at Kyle's Ferry, and encamped at night with our advance at Howell's Mill, on Peach Tree Creek, the Twentieth Corps being a little above us on our left. July 19, most of the day was spent in reconnoitering the creek, which was deep, and, the bridges being destroyed, the passage was difficult. In front of Howell's Mill, the point occupied by the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, the crossing was strongly disputed, and the character of the ground admitted of such easy defense that to have forced a passage must have been hazardous and attended with much loss. In the afternoon, however, the Second Division succeeded in getting over lower down, and I, being in reserve, sent my First Brigade to cross with it. I had at first been directed by Major-General Thomas to cross my division at that place, but on going there and finding it occupied by Brigadier-General Davis, the order was modified by the corps commander, and a single one of my brigades sent to support him. This brigade, having crossed, g6t into position about dark, after a brisk skirmish on the left of the Second Division. The Twentieth Corps, higher vp the stream, had likewise got over during the afternoon, and this doubtless induced the force in front of Brigadier-General Johnson to retire. As soon as it had done so I was ordered with my Second and Third Brigades to pass to the front of him and cross at the mill. I began the movement soon after dark, being obliged in the first place to build a temporary bridge, and by midnight had the two brigades well intrenched upon the heights on the south side of the creek. July 20, at daylight Brigadier-General Johnson's division crossed over and went into position on my left; it also made a connection with the Twentieth Corps on the other flank. I at the same time moved forward my Third Brigade, and forming it on the left of the First, which had crossed with the command of Brigadier-General Davis, pushed the two out and took possession of an important range of wooded hills half a mile to the front of my first location. As these troops went into position, and, indeed, throughout the day, they were subjected to a very galling fire from rebel batteries which were posted beyond the ridge and out of our reach. To enable these two brigades to make a still farther advance I posted my two batteries at a point on Brigadier-General Johnson's front, from which they would have a cross-fire upon the wooded ground over which the troops must pass. [743] The batteries had gone into position, but had not opened fire, when the great assault made that day upon the Twentieth Corps and the First Division of our corps took place, and they did good service in aiding to repel that attack. No part of the rebel assaulting columns reached my lines, but throughout the whole attack and until dark my troops were subjected to an artillery fire as constant and as terrible as any that I have ever witnessed, and the loss in the division from this cause and upon the skirmish line was considerable. Throughout the whole both my officers and my men behaved themselves with a degree of coolness and heroism highly commendable and showing them to be veteran soldiers. (July 21. about this time the batteries were relieved from duty with the division and ordered to report to corps headquarters.) July 21, after a hot skirmish of some hours, my lines were again moved forward nearly a mile, established, and intrenched at a short distance from the works of the enemy, in a position so advantageous and commanding that it must have contributed largely to compelling him to retire. July 22, during the night previous the rebel army fell back finally from our front into the works about Atlanta, and my division, marching forward until it came to the Marietta and Atlanta road, followed it until it struck the railroad two miles from the city. We there came up with the First Division, Fourteenth Corps, whose advance guard was then skirmishing close up to the line of works surrounding that place. The Twentieth Corps was immediately to the left, and the Army of the Tennessee some miles to the eastward on the Augusta railroad. I immediately received orders from Major-General Thomas to move to the south along the west side of the town until I came to the intersection of the Atlanta and Turner's Ferry road with that leading from White Hall to the latter place, and there to post my command. This point was reached without opposition, and my troops were put in position under the supervision of the department commander, who had come to that place. The Second Division on arriving formed on my right a little retired, and all of our troops intrenched themselves during the afternoon, so as to be covered while within camp from the shells and sharpshooters of the enemy. It was at this time that the great battle with the Army of the Tennessee, in which the gallant McPherson was killed, took place, and we waited anxiously, expecting orders to take part in it. July 23, from this date until the 3d of August the general location of the division was not changed. A constant and venomous skirmish was kept up between the pickets on both sides, and our lines were so close that our men in camp were at any moment that they exposed themselves liable to be picked off by the enemy's riflemen. Our batteries and those upon the rebel forts kept up an unceasing exchange of compliments, so that our daily loss in killed and wounded in camp was not inconsiderable. Numerous 20-pounder shells, and shells of sixty-four pounds' weight from the “old 32-pounder rifle,” came regularly into our camps, a weight of metal entirely out of proportion to our light field pieces. While in this position two regiments of the First Brigade, the Eighty-second Indiana and the Twenty-third Missouri, drove the enemy, after sharp skirmishing, from some wooded heights on our right and in front, which they fortified and held until turned over to the Second Division. These hills were not properly in our front, but, in the hands of the enemy, were annoying to us, and the regiments deserve honorable mention for this service. On the 27th the Army of the Tennessee passed around our [744] rear and took position on our right, and on the 28th was attacked by the rebel army in force, making one of the chief battles of the campaign. A single change in the strength of my command took place at that time — the Thirty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, being ordered to Vining's Station, on August 3, never afterward returned, being mustered out at that point.

August 3, the Fourteenth Army Corps, having received orders to move to the extreme right of the army, with the view of forming a column of support upon the right flank of Major-General Schofield's command, to protect, cover, and sustain him in certain offensive operations which he proposed to carry into execution, marched on this morning. My division, in rear of the other two, came up with them already encamped about two miles to the north of Utoy Creek, and passing through them and also through the lines of Brigadier-General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, the head of my column came up to the creek near an old mill. On the way I was informed that Brigadier-General Hascall's division, of the same corps, was about to cross the stream, and I was ordered to move my column so as to cover his right flank. When I arrived at his position he had already gotten over and with but little resistance, and was establishing his line on the first range of open hills to the left of the road. It was then about 5 p. m., when, meeting Major-General Sherman, I was ordered by him to put my division in line on Brigadier-General Hascall's right, but to throw back my own right so as to rest on the creek. This order was at once carried into execution, yet it was quite dark before all the troops got into position. My line taking the highest ground stretched along the road for the length of a brigade beyond Brigadier-General Hascall, and then bent to the rear. Its length was so great that I was required to put nearly all my troops in a single line, while the division just formed on my left was compactly formed and held a brigade in reserve. This disposition I thought strange, since I had been sent out simply to support another division while it performed a certain work. August 4 in the morning, my lines were rectified so as to conform better to the ground, the batteries were put in position, and the works thrown up during the night strengthened. About midday, as no movement of the troops on my left seemed to be in preparation, although I was told that an advance was contemplated, I reported in person at the headquarters of the corps two miles back of the creek, and while there I saw the First and Second Divisions of the corps just moving out and passing toward the front. I then returned to my command, and soon after received a written order from Major-General Palmer directing me to advance my right with a view to gaining the high ground on my right front, and informing me that Brigadier-General Morgan would cross the creek on my right and support the movement. It also stated that this movement was intended as a preliminary to an advance upon the enemy's works, should that be judged expedient or ordered, and for which I would be expected to furnish the assaulting column. It further directed me to push out my skirmishers and begin the movement as soon as Brigadier-General Morgan should begin crossing. A little later I received another written order, also from Major-General Palmer, stating that it was intended that I should push out with Brigadier-General Hascall as far as practicable and reconnoiter the enemy's works, and directing me to attack in column if the works could be carried. The first part of these instructions had [745] already been carried out before the order was received, for I had, the night previous, taken possession of all the high ground in that vicinity, and it only remained for me to await the other contingencies — the arrival of Brigadier-General Morgan or the advance of Brigadier-General Hascall. I had made full preparations, and was awaiting accordingly, when, about 4 p. m., Major-General Palmer came up in person and asked me if my brigade was ready for the reconnaissance. I replied that no special mention had been made of sending out a brigade on that duty, and asked if he wished me to send one. He replied that he did, and I at once detailed Colonel Gleason's brigade for that purpose. The brigade was formed in the shortest possible time in two lines, with a strong skirmishing party in front, and at once moved out. The operation was vigorously conducted and two lines of skirmish pits captured. The party kept on until the location and character of the rebel main line was fully developed and a heavy fire of artillery and musketry drawn from it. This accomplished, and no movement whatever of the troops on our left having been made, and no tidings received of Brigadier-General Morgan, I at dark directed Colonel Gleason to bring his men back to their works, leaving his skirmishers in the first pits. Colonel Gleason and his officers and men deserve the highest praise for the manner in which this affair was conducted. They brought in 25 prisoners, and the brigade sustained a loss of 26 in killed and wounded.

August 5, at 4.30 o'clock in the morning, I received, directly from Major-General Schofield, commanding the Twenty-third Army Corps, an order prescribing movements for the Fourteenth and Twenty-third Corps upon that day, embracing operations proposed for this division, and I at once. wrote a note to him stating that I knew of no authority under which he could assume to give orders to my division, which belonged to the Army of the Cumberland, but informing him that I would communicate his wishes to my commanding officer. As the order of Major-General Schofield detailed at length operations for all the troops acting on the right of the army, and being always anxious to perform my part in whatever may be calculated to promote the success of our arms, I immediately went to my troops to prepare them for the execution of the orders in case they should receive the proper sanction of my commander, or to be in readiness to co-operate, on my own responsibility, in any movement which the troops near me might undertake. The order from Major-General Schofield, alluded to above, directed me to move at 6 a. m., to push forward my whole line, conforming it to the direction of that of the enemy, and, driving in his skirmishers, to press on until I had drawn the fire of his line. The Second Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan, was directed to support my right in the movement and, if possible, to prolong my line when formed. I was also directed to move without reference to my connection with Brigadier-General Hascall, as Brigadier-General Cox would stand ready to fill any interval between us. It was 4.30 a. m. when I gave notice to Major-General Schofield that I did not recognize his authority, and both his headquarters and those of our corps were within a mile of mine, yet it was not until 6.30 a. m. that he wrote me another note, saying that my corps commander would communicate the order to me properly, and at about 7 a. m. notice was given me that the corps would act during the day under the direction of Major-General Schofield. About that same time I [746] found the head of Brigadier-General Cox's column well closed up in rear of my left, but I was informed that Brigadier-General Hascall would make no movement during the day, as his lines were already so close to those of the enemy that a farther advance was not possible. When I did finally receive authentic orders from my commanding officer for a movement I had not yet heard from Brigadier-General Morgan, who was to move on my right flank. I did not know how far below us he had crossed the creek, nor how far distant he might be, but convinced from my experience of the day before that, if anything was to be accomplished, I must act independently of connections, taking care of my own flanks, I instructed my officers accordingly. The reconnaissance of the night previous had made us thoroughly acquainted with the ground we were to pass over, as well as with the position which we wished to take up, and it took but a short time to prepare for the move. A doubly strong skirmish line was thrown out from each brigade, supported by heavy reserves, and the troops were prepared to follow. A perfect understanding was then established between the officers along the line, and at a signal given about 8 o'clock the skirmishers dashed forward. The more distant rifle-pits, which had been taken the evening before, but not held by us, had been reoccupied by a largely increased force, and much strengthened, with orders to the rebel officers in charge to hold them to the last extremity. This order, by keeping them there, enabled us to take more prisoners than we would otherwise have done. Our men were met by a very heavy fire, but pushed on so rapidly that the struggle was of short duration, and a few minutes put us in possession of all the ground up to within short musket-range of the rebel main works. With the capture of the rebel skirmish line. the forward movement of my troops was brought to an end, but their exposure to the fire of the main works did not cease. The regiments being brought up to take position and intrench themselves upon the new line were subjected throughout the day to a galling musketry fire from the rebel main works, as well as from his batteries, from which our loss was considerable. In the very handsome charge of the skirmish line Capt. Michael Stone, of the Thirty-first Ohio Volunteers, commanded the skirmishers of the First Brigade; Maj. R. C. Sabin, Eightyseventh Indiana, those of the Second Brigade, and Maj. William Irving, Thirty-eighth Ohio, those of the Third Brigade, and deserve special mention for their gallantry. Maj. William Irving was wounded in the leg, which has since been amputated, and a little later in the day the brave Lieut. Col. Myron Baker, commanding the Seventy-fourth Indiana, was shot dead whilst putting his regiment in the line. My casualties amounted in all to 5 officers and 78 enlisted men killed and wounded, whilst we captured about 140 prisoners. All engaged in this affair, both officers and men, behaved as handsomely as men could do, and are deserving of the highest praise. When I first got into position the Second Division had not yet come up, and my two right regiments were refused so as to cover that flank; but later, when those troops did arrive, all were brought up on the same line. Whilst I was making my advance, and throughout the day and until dark, no movement was made by the troops of the Twenty-third Corps on my left, although the line of rebel riflepits captured by my men extended along Brigadier-General Hascall's front, and could have been carried easily by a charge simultaneously with mine. They were the same pits which were taken two days [747] later by the troops of our First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps. August 6, about daybreak in the morning the troops of the Twenty-third Army Corps were withdrawn from my left to be transferred to the extreme right, and were replaced by the First Division of our corps, commanded by Brigadier-General King. The operations of the two corps for that day again were detailed and promulgated in a lengthy order from Major-General Schofield, issued the night previous, but as the part to be performed by my division was dependent upon the movements of Brigadier-Generals Cox and Hascall, who were expected to turn the enemy's left flank or to break through his line in the vicinity of the Sandtown road, and as those movements did not appear to be carried into execution, my men remained in their works. It was on the same day that Major-General Palmer relinquished the command of the Fourteenth Corps and turned it over to Brigadier-General Johnson. August 7, the First Division having made arrangements to push out and take the skirmish pits of the enemy, corresponding with those captured by my men on the 5th, I ordered a strong demonstration along my whole line to aid them. In some places my works were so close to those of the rebels that the men could not go out of them, but in others the skirmishers were pressed out strongly and a sharp encounter of some duration ensued. It ended in my advancing my left regiments some 200 yards, and those on the right, which had been retired, came up on line with the others. Brigadier-General Morgan moved forward at the same time and our divisions joined near the junction of the Sandtown and Lick Skillet roads. In the operations of that day I lost 66 men killed and wounded. The loss in the First Division was of course heavy, but it gained both prisoners and an advanced position. I have been thus minute and circumstantial in my narrative of events since coming in contact with the Twentythird Army Corps, inasmuch as complaint was made to the majorgeneral commanding the Department of the Cumberland that the Fourteenth Corps had failed to accomplish its portion of the work marked out, when, in point of fact, every advantage of any kind that was gained from the time we moved to the right up to the 8th of August was achieved by the Fourteenth Corps. August 8, from this date until the 26th the general position and disposition of my troops was not changed. The necessary location of our camps was such that they were constantly exposed to the enemy's fire, and there were few points at which a man could show himself without the risk of being shot. On certain portions of the line a temporary truce would be arranged with the troops that chanced to be in front, whilst at others a vicious skirmish would be kept up, and for days the men would be imprisoned in their trenches, not daring to show their heads above the parapet, and this varied by the fire of artillery or more active demonstrations begun by one or the other party. In this passive condition, with no operations on hand, our daily reports presented not unfrequently a list of 10, 20, or 30 casualties, and the long continuance of the confinement and privation were extremely trying, yet the men bore all with a degree of cheerfulness, patience, and heroism that can find its reward only in the consciousness of duty well performed and of devotion to the holy cause in which they were engaged. During our long stay in such close proximity to the enemy, deserters from their lines, chiefly from Alabama regiments, came in constantly and in large numbers. They finally became so numerous that the most strenuous means were resorted to by the rebel officers to prevent them. [748]

On the 22d of August Brigadier-General Davis, having received the brevet of major-general, and been assigned to the command of the Fourteenth Corps, relieved Brigadier-General Johnson, who was transferred out of the corps. August 26, a general movement of the entire army to the right, by which we were to break off from our railroad communications and throw ourselves upon the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, having been decided upon, the Fourth and Twentieth Corps had already been withdrawn from before — the city, and on the night of the 26th the Fourteenth Corps and the Army of the Tennessee were also to withdraw and pass to the right, going in rear of the Twenty-third Corps, and of the Fourth Corps, then in position on the right of the former. The operation of withdrawing from such close proximity to the enemy was one of much delicacy. At 8 p. m. the Army of the Tennessee and the First Division of our (Fourteenth) corps drew out and began the march, leaving my division on the extreme left. I should have marched immediately after them, but for delays and detentions caused by the trains of other commands and the artillery, I did not feel authorized to quit my position until nearly 3 o'clock. The enemy was doubtless apprised by the noise of our trains and artillery that some movement was taking place, and opened upon us from his batteries, but beyond this we were not disturbed, and withdrew most successfully. August 27, arriving at the left of the Twenty-third Corps, our troops were formed upon it, facing to the north to cover the further withdrawal and arrangement of the trains, and we remained in that position until the following morning. August 28, we again marched, my division following the Second, which formed the head of the column. The advance guard of that division had some little skirmishing, which did not delay our march, and in the afternoon we went into position near Red Oak Station, on the West Point railroad. We formed line south of the road, Brigadier-General Morgan on my right, and Brigadier-General Carlin, commanding the First Division, on my left, reaching to the railroad. The Fourth Corps prolonged our line, and was north of the road. August 29, the army remained stationary, and the troops were employed in destroying the railroad, in making reconnaissances, and in cutting roads. August 30, we moved on in a southeasterly direction, and reaching the Rough and Ready and Fayette road at Couch's house, took position there for the night. The Army of the Tennessee was a few miles distant on the right; the Fourth Corps connected with the Fourteenth on the left, and the Twenty-third Corps was still farther to the left, toward Rough and Ready. August 31, having heard trains of the enemy during the night moving south along our front, our skirmishers pushed out and at daybreak discovered them, although at a considerable distance, still moving in that direction. They were on a road to the east of Flint River. As soon as this was reported to me I sent forward a battery, supported by Colonel Walker's brigade, and opened a fire of shell upon the wagons, which compelled them to turn back and quit the road. A reconnoitering party from this brigade was then pushed forward about two miles, crossing Flint River, and until it reached the Rough and Ready and Jonesborough road near Smith's, and immediately after the entire division, with Colonel Mitchell's brigade, of the Second Division, ordered to report to me, were brought up and posted at this point. As soon as our troops had secured themselves in this position, about 4 p. m., I detailed Colonel Carlton's regiment, of the First Brigade, together with large parties from each of the [749] other two brigades, and sent them forward with orders to reach the Macon railroad, if possible, and if they were able, to hold themselves upon it. The party struck that road at Morrow's, or Chapman's, Station, a point four miles from Jonesborough, seven miles from Rough and Ready, and about two and.a half miles from our position. The road was reached about 6 p. m., and a considerable party of rebel cavalry encountered there, and, as the nature of the country admitted readily of our men being cut off from the division, Colonel Carlton, after destroying three cars which he had captured, fell back some quarter of a mile to higher ground on the edge of the woods. As soon as I learned of this success and that the railroad was so remote from the rest of our troops, I sent out Colonel Gleason's brigade to occupy a ridge nearly a mile in our front, and detached three other regiments to strengthen the party on the railroad. The wholo of this detachment being then under the command of Colonel Hunter, Eighty-second Indiana Volunteers, the senior officer, he again moved it up to the road, and after putting up a defensive work, which occupied most of the night, he set his men to work to take up the track. It was not until late that I learned that the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps had also reached the railroad near Rough and Ready, and were there intrenching. My little party moved out independent of every one else, and, although opposed and constantly menaced by the rebel cavalry, struck the road some miles in advance of any other. Colonel Hunter and his officers and men deserve much credit for their enterprise and determination.

September 1, about 8 a. m. I received notice that the Fourteenth Corps would be concentrated at my position on the Jonesborough road, to move by it toward that place, whilst the Fourth Corps would move simultaneously along the railroad, I being also directed to withdraw my men from it so as to be ready for the movement. Brigadier-General Carlin's division coming in from the rear, took the advance along the road, and was followed by that of Brigadier-General Morgan. Whilst waiting for these troops to stretch out upon the road my party from the railroad came in, but it was not until 12 m. that the road was clear for me to march.

Battle of Jonesborough.

On arriving near the creek, two miles north of Jonesborough, I met Major-General Thomas, and was informed that Brigadier-General Morgan had already formed beyond the creek, connecting with the left of the Army of the Tennessee, that Brigadier-General Carlin had also crossed, and was forming to the left of Brigadier-General Morgan, and I was expected to go into line on the left of Carlin. Morgan's skirmishers were then engaged with those of the enemy, but Carlin's had not yet struck them. I at once turned to the left, leaving the high road, to march toward my position, and as the head of my column passed the creek, I met one of my staff officers, whom I had sent out in advance, bringing orders from General Davis. He directed me to post my division in rear of an interval between Brigadier-Generals Morgan and Carlin, through which he was fearful that the enemy would pass, and the precise ground on which it was desired that I should form was pointed out. General Davis, coming up immediately after, confirmed the correctness of the disposition. Before, however, this order could be executed, I received another, directing this division to form on Brigadier-General Carlin and prolong [750] his line to the left. My column was at once turned in that direction, and I rode forward along the intrenchments which Brigadier-General Carlin's men had thrown up to find the point at wh'ch my right would rest. Finding this point I also found that division just put in motion, marching toward the right and front, and I followed a short distance to discover the direction which I would have to take, and the best route for getting into position. My column followed closely in rear of the First Division, and by the time that it had become stationary, and was formed, was close up in rear of the left flank. Not one moment was lost by this division, for at the very moment that the point where it was to rest became determined it was on the spot. Brigadier-General Carlin's left reached just to the railroad, and then joined the head of Major-General Stanley's column, the Fourth Corps, which had arrived. I accordingly caused my troops to be massed in rear of Brigadier-General Carlin's left. Having seen Major-General Stanley, and finding that he was willing to make way for me, and understanding it to be the intention of Major-General Thomas' order that our line should be prolonged beyond the railroad in case it should reach that far, I rode forward to examine the ground. I passed along the east side of the road some distance beyond our lines without meeting with opposition, and, having discovered an advantageous position, was about to bring my division up to it. I had given the order, and the troops were about to march, when I received contrary instructions requiring me to hold my division west of the road as a reserve to support the other two. Soon after that, at near 4 o'clock, Brigadier-General Carlin's line moved forward and, by direction of General Davis, I moved Colonel Este's brigade in line of battle behind General Carlin's left brigade, the left flank of both keeping along the railroad. My other two brigades moved in column on the road leading along the right of the railway. The deployed lines of my Third Brigade had to work their way through a thick wood, nearly a third of a mile in width, before reaching the open ground stretching in front of the wood in which were the rebel works, and having put this brigade in motion, I moved forward with the other two. On reaching a cabin beyond the woods, marked on the accompanying map,¹ I met General Davis, who informed me that he had sent Colonel Este's brigade, which came up in advance of me, to support the right brigade of Brigadier-General Carlin, which had been severely handled in an attempt to advance upon the rebel works. A staff officer arriving at the same moment with a message from Brigadier-General Carlin created the impression that there was some misunderstanding of their respective relations between that officer and Colonel Este, whereupon General Davis sent word to Colonel Este that he was to report to General Carlin and be subject to his orders. Fearful that some ill result might arise should the orders still not be understood, and notwithstanding that the brigade was thus placed under the control of another division commander, I volunteered to go myself and give personal supervision to the execution of all orders. General Davis told me as I started that he wished Colonel Este to replace the right brigade of Brigadier-General Carlin, the regular brigade, and then to advance upon the enemy along with the other troops on the right and left when they advanced. As I passed to the right I had an opportunity for a hasty glance at the ground constituting the field of fight, and the rough map which is attached to this report, [751] made from actual bearings and distances taken by myself, gives the most accurate representation of it that I have seen. It represents the rebel works and the position of my three brigades quite accurately, and that of Brigadier-General Carlin's two brigades approximately, at the moment when Colonel Este began to move forward.

Our troops were in open ground, which was bordered on the south by a very regular line of woodland, running due east and west, and extending from near the railroad to the west a distance of 620 yards or steps. The line of woods then turned and ran south, facing westward upon another field in which were the troops of Brigadier-General Morgan. The rebel works lay within the wood, and were entirely concealed from view. They approached at the nearest point to within fifteen yards of the open ground, but at others were 60, 80, or 100 yards back in the woods. From the northwest angle of the woods ran northerly a kind of ravine and thicket, apparently an old fence line, which separated the field in which the Second Division lay from that occupied by the First and Third Divisions. I found Colonel Moore's brigade, of the First Division, formed in two lines, the one near the cabin, and the other intrenched along the edge of the woods, its left on the railroad. Apparently the regular brigade had endeavored to take up a position on the same line in the edge of the woods, but the rebel works in their front approaching so much nearer to the open ground, it was, of course, impossible, without first taking the works in the woods. It was in this way, doubtless, that it lost so heavily before my men came up. I found it to the right of the other brigade of the First Division, and some 200 yards back in the open field partially covered by an undulation of the ground in front. Colonel Este's brigade, when it came up, was formed in the position represented on the map, fifty yards in rear of the regular brigade, in two lines of battle. The Tenth Kentucky and the Thirty-eighth Ohio in the first line, the Tenth Kentucky on the right, and the Seventy-fourth Indiana and the Fourteenth Ohio in the second line, the Seventy-fourth Indiana on the right. Colonel Walker's and Colonel Gleason's brigades were in reserve, and then just coming up to take position. Seeing that to relieve Major Edie's brigade required Colonel Este to pass to the front of it, and that to come into line with Colonel Moore, so as to advance at the same time with the other troops might involve a serious assault of works hidden in the woods, I directed the men to unsling and pile their knapsacks, and fix bayonets, so as to be ready for heavy work. Our uncertainty with regard to the works we might encounter was increased from having been told that the rebels had two lines, one of which had been taken by our men, some of whom remained in them, allof which turned out to be a delusion. The order to move forward was given at 4.45 p. m., when the lines moved off handsomely. Attended by a single staff officer, Captain Acheson, assistant adjutant-general, and two orderlies, I accompanied Colonel Este, so as to be ready to give him any assistance which he might require. Our men passing over the lines of the regular brigade soon reached the crest in front, and at about 100 yards from the works began to receive a murderous fire of musketry and canister. They were immediately put at the charge, and without faltering the whole line moved splendidly into the woods. On the right the success was immediate and complete. The Tenth Kentucky, followed by the Seventy-fourth Indiana, struck upon the short projecting point of rifle-pit called the first line and carried it, [752] as well as the main line. extending thence to the right. A single dash, after entering the woods, gave them the victory. The rebel troops, confident in themselves and in their ability to hold their works, were totally unprepared for a charge of this kind, and were taken completely by surprise. They delivered a single volley, and before they could reload found our men in the trenches with them, bayoneting all who did not surrender.

Three companies on the right of the Seventy-fourth Indiana,which overlapped the Tenth Kentucky, obliquing to the right, entered the woods at the east end of the battery of four guns on the angle, and driving the enemy out took possession of the guns. They belonged to a battery of the consolidated Eighth and Nineteenth Arkansas Regiments, and Lieutenant Kuder, of the Seventy-fourth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, capturing the battery flag, brought it away with him. After holding this battery for some minutes, until the troops of the next brigade on the right came up in the rear and entered it, these companies closed to the left on their own regiment, leaving the guns with the newcomers. As the only material evidence of the capture brought away was the flag, the guns themselves being left with the Second Division, Colonel Este has procured statements from several of his officers and men who were present, and forwards them with his report. On the left our men were not immediately so successful. The Thirty-eighth and Fourteenth Ohio Regiments, after entering the woods, formed a line extending from the short projecting work to the left, but the distance to the rebel main work being greater than on the right, and the approach to it more obstructed by fallen trees, they could not at once reach it. They remained in this position, subjected to a most terrible fire coming obliquely down the works from the rebel right, for some minutes after the right wing had achieved its success. Colonel Este, who was at this point of the line, finding that the troops on our left did not or could not move forward with us as we had been led to expect that they would, began to fear that his men could not hold on where they were, and sent for re-enforcements. Seeing at the same time a regiment of Brigadier-General Morgan's left brigade, the Seventeenth New York, marching up to go into place in rear of our right, where it was no longer needed, Colonel Este appealed to the commanding officer, requesting him to put in his regiment on our left where it could be most useful, and guided him to the place. The fire of the enemy at this point was most destructive, yet the gallant Colonel [Grower] carried his regiment into position with a heroic bravery challenging the highest admiration, and was himself almost the first to fall before it. The regiment seeing this, for a moment faltered, but was at once reassured, and the order to charge being given, rushed forward along with the Fourteenth and Thirtyeighth Ohio, and captured not only the works, but nearly all in them. This ended the battle, as all that followed was desultory firing or shots from distant artillery. This charge of my Third Brigade-one of the most magnificent on record, and the first during this campaign in which works upon either side have been assaulted and carried — was productive of the greatest results in opening the way for the advance of the troops on our right and left, and destroying the morale of the boldest and most confident troops in the rebel army. The losses sustained attest the severity of the struggle. Out of 1,100 officers and men who went into the action 75 were killed and 255 wounded; nearly 1 out of every 3 being hit, and all in a space [753] of thirty minutes time. Among those who fell was the gallant Colonel Choate, of the Thirty-eighth Ohio, who has since died of his wounds. Major Wilson, commanding the Fourteenth Ohio, lost his leg, and numerous others of our best officers and men on this glorious occasion sacrificed themselves upon the altar of their country. For the names of those who particularly distinguished themselves, I refer to reports of brigades and regiments. On no occasion within my own knowledge has the use of the bayonet been so general or so well authenticated. Three brothers named Noe, of the Tenth Kentucky, went over the rebel parapet together, and two of them pinned their adversaries to the ground with the bayonet, and as an officer of the Seventy-fourth Indiana was about to be bayoneted by a rebel, a soldier warded off the blow, and, after some moments of fencing, transfixed his antagonist. These, as the wounded rebels show, are but isolated instances.

The brigade captured 426 prisoners, including 55 officers from the rank of colonel down. They were from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Kentucky; the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Arkansas; the Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fourth, and Forty-sixth Alabama; the Twenty-fourth South Carolina, and the Sixty-third Virginia Regiments. It also captured the battle-flags of the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas Regiments, and the battery flag heretofore spoken of. In closing the report of this battle, and while testifying to the heroic conduct of all officers and men of the brigade, I cannot overlook the splendid gallantry of Colonel Este, commanding it. His horse was shot under him and his clothing torn with bullets, yet he retained the utmost coolness and managed his command with a high degree of judgment and skill. I hope that he will receive the reward which his service merits. I must also make honorable mention of the bravery of Capt. J. W. Acheson, the only staff officer I had with me, who was wounded while riding with me in the charge. My First and Second Brigades were not actively engaged in this battle, but held themselves close in reserve. After dark Colonel Walker relieved Colonel Este's brigade on the line, and remained in that position during the night. Colonel Gleason remained in reserve. Both of these brigades sustained slight losses. September 2, the enemy having evacuated Jonesborough during the night and fallen back on the Macon road, our army pursued. The Fourteenth Corps, however, was left behind as the rear guard of the grand army. September 3, it was announced that Atlanta had been evacuated, and our campaign was at an end. In this long, remarkable, and glorious campaign the soldiers of this army have endured fatigues, sufferings, and privations which will never be known or related.

The quiet and heroic patience with which all has been undergone, and duty performed, whilst establishing for them the highest reputation as soldiers, will still tend to cause their hardships to be forgotten. Starting without transportation and with only the supplies for an expedition of three or six weeks, these things have been required to last for four months, so that often our officers, lying in the dirt and rain for days without shelter, have been unable to preserve the ordinary cleanliness which is essential to health, and many have broken down for want of proper food. During the greater part of the time our men have lain constantly under the enemy's fire, at every moment liable to be picked off, whilst the sound, not of distant artillery and musketry, but of the closely whistling bullet and bursting shell, has seldom been out of their ears. The rest [754] which they have experienced by the simple cessation of these noises has been great. Our losses, in the slow operations of the trench, on picket, on daily and nightly skirmishes, as well as in battle, although distributed over a great length of time, yet equal in the aggregate the casualties of the greatest battles. The following report exhibits the total loss of the division in killed and wounded during the campaign from the 7th of May to the 7th of September:

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This loss of 1,225 officers and men is to be compared not with the aggregate effective force of 8,460 men with which we entered upon the campaign, but with a much smaller average in the field, as the time of many regiments soon expired, reducing our strength at the end of the campaign to an aggregate of 4,840 officers and men. The following table of effective force, made since the close of the campaign, may be profitably compared with that of the 7th of May:

Effective force of the Third Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, September 2, 1864.

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[755]

The division captured during the four months 908 men, including 61 officers. One hundred and forty-seven of these desired to be sent to the rear and classed as deserters, the rest as prisoners of war. It will be seen by this that while the division has not lost in all 20 prisoners, that it has taken from the rebel army, independent of those killed and wounded, almost as many men as it has lost in battle. Some flags have been captured but not all turned over to me. Of material trophies, however, we have obtained little except arms of no great value to our army. This long record would be incomplete should I fail to mention especially the five officers who, as brigade commanders, have been my chief assistants in the campaign-Brig. Gen. J. B. Turchin, one of the most thoroughly educated and scientific soldiers in the country, and a more devoted patriot than most of those born upon our soil, commanded the First Brigade with distinguished ability during the first half of the campaign. He was then, by a failure of health, compelled to resign, thus inflicting a great loss upon the service. Col. F. Van Derveer, Thirty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, the brave and accomplished commander of the Second Brigade at Chickamauga and at Mission Ridge, remained with the command until the end of June. He also has, by expiration of service, been returned to civil life. Col. George P. Este, who has commanded the Third Brigade during the campaign; Col. N. Gleason, who has succeeded Colonel Van Derveer in command of the Second Brigade, and Col. M. B. Walker, who has succeeded Brigadier-General Turchin, have all exhibited a high degree of capacity. Their devotion to duty, their bravery in action, and their distinguished services throughout the campaign, merit reward, and I recommend them for promotion or brevets. To the officers of my staff my own thanks and the gratitude of the command are due for the efficient manner in which their duties have been performed, and the promptness with which we have been kept supplied. Those who have remained with me in the field, sharing all the hardships, privations, and dangers of the campaign are deserving of special honorable mention. They are-Maj. J. A. Lowrie, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. J. A. Connolly, One hundred and twenty-third Illinois Volunteers, assistant inspector-general; Capt. John Moulton, Second Minnesota Volunteers, provost-marshal; Capt. E. K. Buttrick, Thirty-first Wisconsin Volunteers: Capt. John W. Acheson, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. I. C. Lawyer, Ninety-second Illinois Volunteers, aide-de-camp; Lieut. George K. Sanderson, Fifteenth U. S. Infantry, assistant commissary of musters and acting aide-de-camp, and Surg. F. Lloyd, U. S. Volunteers, medical director. I commend these officers to the favorable notice of any commanders with whom they may hereafter serve.

Respectfully submitted.

With regard to the affair of yesterday I can only say at present that the Third Brigade made as gallant a charge as ever was made. It relieved one of Carlin's brigades, which was used up, and passed to the front of it. Then it charged into the woods without any troops either right or left moving with it, and a large interval on the left. It carried two lines of works and took 2 regimental colors and 1 battery flag; likewise 4 cannon. Almost immediately after getting the works, General Morgan, on the right, came forward to the same line, and as Este had to move to the left the guns fell into the hands of General Morgan's troops. I think 600 men, at least, were captured on the front of this brigade, but in falling to the rear many were taken up by officers of regiments lying behind, and we do not have them to report. The brigade went into the fight with about 1,100 men, and lost 75 killed, and 271 wounded, about 50 supposed mortally. I lost many good officers, and all behaved magnificently. I will give further particulars as soon as possible. This brigade started the movement of the line, which had completely stopped before we came up, and it did actually carry the intrenchments of the enemy with the bayonet, using it all along the line with more freedom than I have ever seen it done. Very many were bayoneted.

Consolidated report of casualties in the Third Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, July, 1864.

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