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The navy in the Peninsular campaign.
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On the gun-deck of the Confederate iron-clad, “Merrimac.”
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At the opening of the
Peninsular campaign, April 1st, 1862, the North Atlantic Squadron, with its headquarters at
Hampton Roads, was commanded by
Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough.
The command included not only the operations in the
Chesapeake and its tributary waters, but an entirely distinct series of operations in the sounds of
North Carolina, and a third distinct and also very important service,--that of the
Wilmington blockade.
This concentration of command at a distance from the various fields of action was not without injurious results.
The attention of the
flag-officer could not be successfully directed at the same instant of time to such varied and complicated movements as were simultaneously in progress in the
York River, the
James River,
Hampton Roads,
Albemarle Sound, and the entrance to
Wilmington.
Of the various plans for a direct movement upon
Richmond considered by the civil and military authorities in the winter of 1861-62, that by way of
Urbana on the
Rappahannock River was finally adopted, but the withdrawal of
General Johnston from
Centreville led to a change of plan at the last moment; and on the 13th of March it was decided to advance from
Fort Monroe as a base.
The detailed plan of
General McClellan comprehended an attack by the navy upon the batteries at
Yorktown and
Gloucester, on opposite sides of the
York River.
It was upon the navy that he chiefly relied to reduce these obstacles to his progress and to clear the way to his proposed base, the
White House on the
Pamunkey River.
This fact was made known to the War Department, but apparently the Navy Department was not fully apprised of it. The question was asked of the Navy Department whether the
Merrimac, at that time lying in the
Elizabeth River, could be held in check,
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and
Assistant Secretary Fox replied that the
Monitor would be sufficient for that purpose.
Captain Fox said:
“It was determined that the army should go by way of Fort Monroe.
The Navy Department never was consulted at all, to my knowledge, in regard to anything connected with the matter.
No statement was ever made to us why they were going there beyond this.”1
General McClellan arrived at
Old Point on the 2d of April, and immediately communicated with
Flag-Officer Goldsborough.
The advance of the army was to begin at once.
Notwithstanding that he had previously considered it an essential part of his plan that
Yorktown should be reduced by the navy,
McClellan does not appear even at this time to have strenuously urged it, for
Goldsborough afterward stated to the
Committee on the Conduct of the
War that he performed every service in connection with army operations which was requested of him by
General McClellan.
It may be that the naval attack on
Yorktown and
Gloucester was not pressed because
McClellan learned in this interview that it was impracticable.
On this point
Fox said:
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In the Turret of the “monitor.”
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Wooden vessels could not have attacked the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester with any degree of success.
The forts at Yorktown were situated too high, were beyond the reach of naval guns, and I understand that General McClellan never expected any attack to be made on them by the navy.
At
McClellan's request
Goldsborough sent 7 gun-boats under
Commander William Smith into the
York River, the
Marblehead on the 4th of April, followed the next day by the
Wachusett,
Penobscot, and
Currituck, and later by the
Sebago,
Corwin, and
Chocura.
The
Maratanza afterward took the place of the
Penobscot. The rest of the fleet, including the
Monitor, remained to watch the
Merrimac.
On the 1st of May, during an attack made on the left flank of the army, the fleet shelled the enemy's artillery, posted on a hill to the left, and forced it to retire.
On the 5th, the day following the evacuation of
Yorktown, the fleet moved up to a position off the town, and a reconnoissance made by the
Chocura and
Corwin showed that the river was open as far as
West Point.
On the 6th,
Commander Smith moved the gun-boats up to that place, escorting the transports carrying
General Franklin's division.
On the 7th, before the landing of the troops was completed, a sharp attack was made by the enemy and repulsed, the gun-boats rendering efficient assistance.
On the 17th, the
Sebago and
Currituck passed up the
Pamunkey, which resulted in the destruction of the enemy's store-vessels.
When the
Wachusett was withdrawn to the
James, five boats remained to protect
McClellan's base, under the command of
Lieutenant Alexander Murray.
During the siege of
Yorktown the presence of the
Merrimac had, of course,
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paralyzed the efforts of the navy in the waters adjoining
Hampton Roads.
It was necessary that she should be neutralized at all hazards, or her appearance either in the
York or
James River would become a serious obstacle to the success of the campaign.
But for the negligence of the Navy Department in postponing the building of iron-clads until six months after the war had begun, and that of the War Department in omitting, during the six following months, when it had 150,000 men lying inactive around
Washington, to send 50,000 of them to capture
Norfolk, the
Merrimac would never have become a serious factor in the situation.
As, however,
General McClellan had been satisfied to leave
Norfolk to be turned by his advance on the
Peninsula, and as the Navy Department had thus far succeeded in getting afloat only one iron-clad, the efforts of the force at
Hampton Roads were necessarily concentrated on holding the enemy in check.
This was the first consideration of the
flag-officer from March 9th, when the engagement took place between the
Monitor and
Merrimac [see Vol.
I., p. 692], until May 11th, when the latter was destroyed.
During most of this time — that is, from April 5th to May 4th--the Army of the Potomac was conducting the siege of
Yorktown.
After the battle of the 9th of March,
Tattnall had taken command of the
Merrimac, and on the 4th of April she came out of the dock thoroughly repaired, and, except for her engines, in good condition.
On the morning of the 11th she steamed down
Elizabeth River and came out into the
Roads, advancing to a position between
Sewell's Point and Newport News.
Goldsborough, with the
Minnesota, the
Monitor, and other vessels of his squadron, was lying near
Fort Monroe.
The
transports and store-ships at this time in the neighborhood had been warned of the danger of lying near
Hampton, and most of them had withdrawn under the protection of the fort.
Three vessels of the quartermaster's department still remained near Newport News.
They had been run on shore.
The Confederate gun-boats
Jamestown and
Raleigh, under
Captain Barney and
Captain Alexander, were sent to tow them off. This was handsomely done, in full view of the Union vessels, which offered no opposition, notwithstanding the challenge offered by the captors in hoisting the flags of their prizes Union down.
This event, rendered all the more humiliating by the presence of a foreign ship-of-war, was suffered by
Goldsborough because, in accordance with the wishes of the Department, it was his duty to hold in check the
Merrimac; and he feared that a collision between the gun-boats might bring on a, general engagement.
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During April the squadron was gradually increased by the addition of new vessels, including the new iron-clad
Galena, and several fast steamers, the
Arago,
Vanderbilt,
Illinois, and
Ericsson, as rams.
When it was apparent that the
Confederates would shortly be compelled to abandon
Norfolk, a squadron, consisting of the
Galena, the gun-boat
Aroostook, and the double-ender
Port Royal, was sent up the
James River on the 8th of May, by direction of the
President.
On the same day a demonstration made by the fleet against the battery at
Sewell's Point led the
Merrimac to come out again from the river.
The
Monitor had orders to fall back into fair channel-way, and only engage the
Merrimac seriously in such a position as to enable the
Minnesota and the other vessels to run her down if an opportunity offered.
According to
Flag-Officer Goldsborough, “the
Merrimac came out, but was even more cautious than ever.
The
Monitor was kept well in advance, and so that the
Merrimac could have engaged her without difficulty had she been so disposed; but she declined to do it, and soon returned and anchored under
Sewell's Point.”
Commodore Tattnall said:
We passed the battery and stood directly for the enemy for the purpose of engaging him, and I thought an action certain, particularly as the Minnesota and Vanderbilt, which were anchored below Fortress Monroe, got under way and stood up to that point, apparently with the intention of joining their squadron in the Roads.
Before, however, we got within gunshot, the enemy ceased firing and retired with all speed under the protection of the guns of the fortress, followed by the Virginia, until the shells from the Rip-Raps passed over her. The Virginia was then placed at her moorings near Sewell's Point.
This was the last exploit of the
Merrimac.
On the 10th,
Norfolk was abandoned, and was immediately occupied by the
Union forces under
General Wool.
Early the next morning
Commodore Tattnall, being unable to carry out his plan of taking the
Merrimac up the
James River, destroyed her near
Craney Island.
Meantime, the
Galena and her consorts under
Commander John Rodgers had been working their way up the
James River.
On the first day two batteries were encountered.
The first, at Rock Wharf, was silenced.
The resistance of the second, at Hardin's Bluff, was more obstinate, but
Rodgers, in the
Galena, lay abreast of the enemy's guns and kept up a steady fire, disconcerting their aim while the wooden boats went by. During the next week
Rodgers continued on his course up the
James, meeting with no serious impediment until he arrived at
Drewry's Bluff, eight miles below
Richmond.
At this time, May 15th, the flotilla had been increased by the addition of
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the
Monitor and the
Naugatuck.
Fort Darling (
Commander E. Farrand, C. S. N.), at
Drewry's Bluff, was a strong position, two hundred feet above the river, and mounting a number of heavy guns.
At the foot of the bluff an obstruction had been placed in the river formed of sunken vessels secured by chains.
The light armor of the
Galena had not as yet been seriously tested, and
Rodgers had no great confidence in her ability to stand a severe fire; nevertheless, he decided to make the test.
In a private letter written shortly after, he said: “I was convinced as soon as I came on board that she would be riddled under fire, but the public thought differently, and I resolved to give the matter a fair trial.”
Accordingly, he ran the
Galena up to a point opposite the battery, where the width of the stream was not more than double the ship's length.
According to an officer in the fort, the
Galena “steamed up to within seven or eight hundred yards of the bluff, let go her starboard anchor, ran out the chains, put her head inshore, backed astern, let go her stream-anchor from the starboard quarter, hove ahead, and made ready for action before firing a gun.”
Nothing could have been more beautiful than the neatness and precision
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of movement with which
Rodgers placed the
Galena, as if at target-practice, directly under the enemy's fire.
In the words of the officer already quoted, “It was one of the most masterly pieces of seamanship of the whole war.”
In this position the
Galena remained for three hours and twenty minutes until she had expended all her ammunition.
She came out of the action badly shattered, having been struck 28 times and perforated in 18 places.
The
Monitor passed for a short time above the
Galena, but being unable to elevate her guns sufficiently to reach the bluff, she again dropped below.
The wooden vessels cooperated as far as possible, but of course could not accomplish much.
The attack made it clear that the obstructions could not be passed without first reducing the fort, and that the fort could not be reduced without the cooperation of the army.
Notwithstanding the vital importance of such a movement, seeing that
Fort Darling was the only obstacle to the direct passage up the river to
Richmond, and that a small force would have sufficed to accomplish the work, nothing was done by
General McClellan.
According to
Goldsborough's testimony, he went in person to the
White House to see
McClellan, and, showing him
Rodgers's report of the fight, offered the cooperation of the squadron, if
McClellan would make the attack with a land force.
“
General McClellan,” he adds, “replied to me that he would prefer to defer his answer until he got his army on the other side of the
Chickahominy.”
On the 17th of May,
Flag-Officer Goldsborough, in the
Susquehanna, with the
Wachusett,
Dacotah, and
Maratanza, had destroyed the two abandoned batteries of the enemy at Rock Wharf and Hardin's Bluff.
All this time, and during the campaign,
James River was open to
Fort Darling.
On the 18th of May,
Commander William Smith arrived at
City Point in the
Wachusett, and relieved
Rodgers of the command, being the
senior officer.
The force was gradually increased, and in June comprised, in addition to the vessels already mentioned, the
Mahaska,
Jacob Bell,
Southfield,
Maratanza,
Stepping Stones, and
Delaware.
Commander Gillis shortly after relieved
Smith.
Occasional attacks were made upon passing gun-boats by field-batteries of the
Confederates stationed along the river-banks.
The difficulties of the channel and the unprotected character of the vessels rendered them liable to serious injury from such attacks, and the
Jacob Bell, under
Lieutenant McCrea, narrowly escaped severe loss at Watkin's Bluff on the 21st of June.
On the 27th, a demonstration was made up the
Appomattox, but nothing was accomplished, the channel proving to be too shoal for successful operations.
On the 29th,
McClellan's retreating army opened communication with
Rodgers, who now commanded the vessels in the
James River.
Little change had taken place in the composition of the force since the 1st of June, the
Wachusett only having left the squadron, and the
Satellite having joined it. The gun-boats rendered efficient assistance to the army, especially in the
battle at Malvern Hill on the 1st of July.
By the 4th of July,
McClellan's position was comparatively secure.
On July 6th, the
James River flotilla was organized as a separate command under
Captain John Wilkes, and so remained, until disbanded, on August 31st, the withdrawal of the army rendering its presence no longer necessary.