Major--General J. G. Walker, in his interesting paper in “The century” [June, 1886], states that after he had occupied
Loudoun Heights on September 14th, he received a dispatch from
General Jackson, by signal, substantially as follows: “
Harper's Ferry is now completely invested.
I shall summon its commander to surrender.
Should he refuse, I will give him twenty-four hours to remove the non-combatants, and then carry the place by assault.
Do not fire unless forced to.”
[See p. 609.]
Referring to the statement made by me in an address before the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, October 23d, 1884, that on the 14th of September
General Jackson signaled the order to both
McLaws and
Walker, “Fire at such positions of the enemy as will be most effective,”
General Walker says: “I am, of course, ignorant of what
Jackson may have signaled
McLaws, but it is certain I received no such order.”
General Walker then goes on to show that
Jackson determined to give the
commanding officer of
Harper's Ferry twenty-four hours before he carried the place; that he,
General Walker, was satisfied that the delay of twenty-four hours would be fatal to
General Lee,--as it would have been; that, therefore, against orders not to fire until he was forced to, he determined to be forced; and that he secured this end by the display of two North Carolina regiments, under
Colonel M. W. Ransom, in line of battle on
Loudoun Heights, in full view of the
Federal batteries on Bolivar Heights.
As he expected, he says, “they at once opened a heavy but harmless fire upon my regiments, which afforded me the wished — for pretext.
Withdrawing the infantry to the safe side of the mountain, I directed my batteries to reply.”
Thus it would appear that
General Walker forced the attack on
Harper's Ferry, and prevented the delay of twenty-four hours which
General Jackson proposed to give; and that to this prompt attack was due the capture of
Harper's Ferry, and the salvation of that part of the Army of Northern Virginia which, with
Lee,
Longstreet, and
D. H. Hill, was waiting at
Sharpsburg the reduction of the force at the former place, and the reinforcement of
Lee by
Jackson,
McLaws, and
Walker after
Harper's Ferry had fallen.
Twenty-four hours delay would have postponed the fall of
Harper's Ferry, and the battle of the 17th would have been fought by
Longstreet and
D. H. Hill alone, who would have been destroyed by
McClellan before
Jackson could have come up.
I prepared the address before the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia after careful study of the records and reports of both sides, and all accessible accounts of the
battle of Sharpsburg, and believe every statement made by me can be substantiated by the record, or by the statements of eye-witnesses.
Unless
General Walker has a copy of the dispatch referred to by him, I respectfully submit that his recollection is in error; that no intention was ever entertained by
Jackson of giving twenty-four hours delay; and that
General Jackson himself gave the order to
Walker and
McLaws to open fire, exactly as stated by me.
The reasons for believing that General.Walker is mistaken in thinking that he ever received the order referred to by him, or one in any way intimating an intention of giving twenty-four hours
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delay, seem to me to be conclusive.
Colonel H. Kyd Douglas was aide-de-camp to
Jackson, and occupied, particularly in that campaign, peculiarly confidential relations to him. His home was near
Sharpsburg and
Shepherdstown, the scene of operations, and he probably knew as much of
General Jackson's intentions as any man living.
He tells me he never heard of any such projected delay.
The “lost order” No. 191--from
General Lee to
Jackson,
Walker, and
McLaws — specially directs
Walker and
McLaws to be in position on
Loudoun.
and
Maryland Heights respectively by Friday morning, September 12th, and
Jackson to take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad by Friday morning and “intercept such of the enemy as may attempt to escape from
Harper's Ferry.”
Jackson's advance division reached the vicinity of
Harper's Ferry during Saturday forenoon, the 13th;
Walker and
McLaws reached the designated points Saturday night, but were not in position for offensive action until September 14th.
Now, when the army was moving to the positions assigned by “Special orders no. 191,” it was a matter of common knowledge that
McClellan's advance was in contact with our rear.
Hampton had a sharp affair in the streets of
Frederick late on the 12th.
Fitz Lee, hanging on to the advance, located
McClellan and reported his presence to
Stuart, who held the mountain pass over Catoctin at
Hagan's. During the 13th
Stuart delayed the advance of the Federal infantry through
Middletown Valley by sturdily defending the practicable points on the
National road.
On the 14th, when, according to
General Walker,
Jackson, then a day late, proposed to give the commander of
Harper's Ferry twenty-four hours delay, and
General Walker, in order to prevent that delay, drew the fire of the
Federal guns on him on
Loudoun Heights,
Franklin's corps attacked Crampton's Gap about noon, and after a sharp defense drove
Munford through the mountain pass.
Now Crampton's Gap is in full sight of
Loudoun Heights, not four miles off as the crow flies, and is in rear of
McLaws's position on
Maryland Heights.
Jackson then knew that
McClellan was thundering in his rear.
Walker and
McLaws could see the battle and hear the guns at
Crampton's, and
Walker could also see the fight at
South Mountain.
It would have been contrary to every known characteristic of the chief of the “Foot cavalry” for him to have given his adversary twenty-four hours breathing-time, under any circumstances, anywhere, and utterly impossible for him to have done so under these circumstances at this time.
General Jackson did send
General Walker an order by signal: “I do not desire any of the batteries to open until all are ready on both sides of the river, except you should find it necessary, of which you must judge for yourself.
I will let you know when to open all the batteries.”
In the
War Records office may be seen the report of
Captain J. L. Bartlett,
signal officer of
Jackson's corps.
It contains the order to
Walker and
McLaws quoted by me in my address: “Fire at such positions of the enemy as will be most effective.”
This order
General Walker does not recollect to have received.
It certainly was sent by
Captain Bartlett to
Walker's signal officer, and just as certainly received by the latter.
It is hardly possible that so important an order, at such a time, should not have been forwarded by the
signal officer to
General Walker.
The following order was also sent from
Captain Bartlett's signal-station to
General Walker's officer on
Loudoun Heights:
Special Orders headquarters Valley District, No.--September 14, 1862.
1. To-day
Major-General McLaws will attack so as to sweep with his artillery the ground occupied by the enemy, take his batteries in reverse, and otherwise operate against him as circumstances may justify.
2.
Brigadier-General Walker will take in reverse the battery on the turnpike, and also sweep with his artillery the ground occupied by the enemy, and silence the battery on the island in the
Shenandoah, should he find a battery there.
3.
Major-General A. P. Hill will move along the left bank of the
Shenandoah, and thus turn the enemy's left flank and enter
Harper's Ferry.
4.
Brigadier-General Lawton will move along the turnpike for the purpose of supporting
General Hill and otherwise operating against the enemy on the left of
General Hill.
5.
Brigadier-General Jones will, with one of his brigades and a battery of artillery, make a demonstration against the enemy's right; the remaining part of his division will constitute the reserve and move along the turnpike.
By order of
Major-General Jackson:
Captain Bartlett, after reporting all messages and orders sent through his station, among which were the foregoing, says, “If any other dispatches or orders were sent at
Harper's Ferry, it was done at other posts than mine.”
Now, there was no signal officer except
Captain Bartlett attached to
Jackson's headquarters, communicating with
Loudoun Heights, and his report thus shows all the orders sent by
Jackson to
Walker.
The one quoted by
General Walker is not among them; the one quoted by me is. Therefore, inasmuch as it appears that the investing force under
Jackson was twenty-four hours behind the time fixed by
General Lee for completing the investment of
Harper's Ferry, and that
Generals Jackson and
McLaws knew that
McClellan had been in
Frederick mon the 12th, only twenty miles off; and that
McClellan was actually attacking at
Crampton's, three or four miles from
Harper's Ferry; and that
Lee,
Longstreet, and
D. H. Hill were then north of the
Potomac, and in imminent danger of being cut off from the rest of the army at
Harper's Ferry; and that
General Jackson did, in fact, send the order, cited by me, to
Walker and
McLaws to fire at such positions of the enemy as would be most effective, and did, in fact, as soon as his troops were in position, completing the investment, issue an order of battle for the assault on
Harper's Ferry: taking all these facts into consideration, we must believe that
General Walker is mistaken as to the order he thinks he received, and that
General Jackson never issued such order, nor entertained the idea of delaying the attack.
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In his article in “The century” for June, 1885, on “
Harper's Ferry and
Sharpsburg,”
General John G. Walker said, in substance, that
General Jackson, after
Harper's Ferry was invested, informed him that he intended to summon the
Federal commander to surrender, and, should he refuse, then to give him twenty-four hours to remove the noncombatants before making an assault; but that he,
General Walker, being better advised as to the movements of
General McClellan, became impatient of the delay, and by a piece of mild strategy
forced the assault, and thereby hastened the surrender of
Harper's Ferry, saved
Jackson from being “compromised,” and
Lee from being driven into the
Potomac.
[See pp. 604-611.]
With the help of such notes as I have, confirming my recollection, and the official reports corroborating them, I will briefly examine
General Walker's statement.
I think I may safely assume that
General Jackson, being in immediate communication, by signal, with
General McLaws (who was in contact with the enemy), and with
General Lee both by signal through
McLaws and by a constant line of couriers, knew at least as much about the movements of
General McClellan and the situation of the rest of our army as
General Walker, on
Loudoun Heights, could possibly know.
Jackson reached
Harper's Ferry on Saturday, September 13th, and immediately shut up his side of the pen.
McLaws and
Walker were not yet in position, their delay being doubtless unavoidable.
Let us see whether
Jackson was in danger of compromising himself by want of activity.
The next day at 7:20 A. M., in anticipation that
McLaws and
Walker would soon be ready, he sent to
McLaws a characteristic letter of instructions.
As will appear, a copy of this letter was doubtless sent to
Walker, and will help to explain one of the errors into which he has fallen.
That letter looks to quick work.
But although
Jackson was ready, there were obstacles in the way of immediate action.
General Jackson says that, separated by the
Potomac and
Shenandoah from
McLaws and
Walker, he resorted to signals, “and that before the necessary orders were thus transmitted the day was far advanced.”
General A. P. Hill says, in effect, that it was afternoon before the signals from
Maryland and
Loudoun Heights notified
Jackson that “all was ready,” and then
Jackson ordered him against the enemy.
General McLaws says the morning of the 14th was occupied cutting a road for artillery, and that by 2 P. M. he had four pieces in position on
Maryland Heights.
General Walker says that at half-past 10 he succeeded in notifying
Jackson that he was ready, and
Captain Bartlett, the
signal officer of
Jackson, reports to the same effect.
Jackson then ordered
Walker to “wait” for
McLaws.
Every one at headquarters knew how impatient
General Jackson was at the unavoidable loss of time.
He had written the McLaws letter very early in the morning, and in further preparation for prompt and decisive action he dictated to
Colonel Jackson his “special order” for the attack, and as soon as it was practicable issued it. It speaks for itself.
He also issued his joint order to
McLaws and
Walker--“Fire at such positions of the enemy as will be most effective.”
Walker opened fire about 1 P. M.--whether shortly before or shortly after this joint order does not appear, and is of little importance.
McLaws began about 2 P. M. He says
Walker and
Jackson were both at it before him.
Hill moved promptly, and did enough of work that afternoon and night, as he says, “to seal the fate of
Harper's Ferry,” with the assistance of
McLaws and
Walker.
At 3 o'clock the next morning I was sent by
General Jackson to direct the movement of
Jones's division at first dawn, and at daylight everybody was in action, and
Harper's Ferry speedily surrendered.
In energy,
Jackson at
Harper's Ferry simply paralleled himself; he could do no more.
“Let the work be done thoroughly,” he had said to
McLaws; and it was.
Was
General Jackson pushed to this activity by
General Walker, and would he otherwise have given
Colonel Miles twenty-four hours to remove non-combatants before assault, and thus have imperiled
General Lee beyond hope?
I will treat this question soberly, as becomes the gravity of
General Walker's statement and his regard for
General Jackson's reputation.
But, as the matter now presents itself, I will submit the reasons for thinking
General Walker is mistaken in regard to the dispatch he says he received from
General Jackson respecting the twenty-four hours delay.
It is known now that
Jackson never did summon the enemy to surrender, and in his report he makes no mention of such a purpose.
I find in my notes this item in regard to the 14th: “It was late in the afternoon when
McLaws was ready for action — too late to effect anything on that day. Preparations were made for an assault early the next morning.
I am not aware that
General Jackson made any demand for the surrender of the garrison.”
There is nothing in the reports of
Hill,
McLaws,
Jones, or
Walker, touching the matter of a contemplated demand for surrender, or any delay by reason thereof.
Captain Bartlett's report as signal officer — the only one known to have sent signal dispatches between
Jackson and
Walker — contains no such order as the one quoted by
General Walker.
If such a message had been sent to
Walker, it would, of course, have been sent also to
Hill and
McLaws, and they make no mention of it. It could not have gone to
McLaws except through
Bartlett, and he surely would have made a note of it.
General Walker says it was after
Jackson was informed that
McLaws was in possession of
Maryland Heights that the dispatch was sent to him. This was not earlier than 2 P. M., and before that time
Walker had opened fire, and
Jackson had issued the joint order, “Fire,” etc., and had followed it up with his specific “special order,” prepared beforehand.
In fact,
General Jackson knew the urgency of the situation better than
General Walker, and it is simply incredible that he contemplated a delay of twenty-four hours
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for any purpose.
General Walker must be mistaken.
It does not follow, however, that he has no ground for his mistake.
I have said that the substance of
Jackson's early letter to
McLaws must have been sent to
Walker.
That letter looks to an attack by
Walker on an island battery in the
Shenandoah, and during the morning a dispatch to
Jackson from
Loudoun Heights says: “
Walker can't get position to bear on island,”--showing that
Walker had in some way been instructed with regard to it. (It would seem that
Jackson's “special order” must have been prepared in the morning and before the receipt of the dispatch from
Walker, for in it he gives instructions to
Walker touching that island battery.) In the McLaws letter,
Jackson speaks of a flag of truce to get out non-combatants should the enemy not surrender; but the spirit of that letter is against any delay.
I remember the question of a demand for surrender was vaguely talked of at headquarters by the staff.
It is likely they got the idea from the McLaws letter, for I never heard the general [Jackson] say anything on the subject, and every indication was against any delay in making the assault.
I merely throw out the suggestion to account for the error of memory into which I think
General Walker has fallen.
Whatever purpose
General Jackson at first had to demand a surrender or to consider non-combatants, his ruling anxiety was for the speedy fall of
Harper's Ferry.
It maybe that a little reflection satisfied him, after writing the McLaws letter, that the citizens of the town would be in little danger from the firing of
McLaws and
Walker at the enemy on Bolivar Heights, and that he dismissed that consideration from his mind.
If this humane purpose ever took definite shape in his intentions, there was never any occasion to execute it, and it would now be of little consequence had not
General Walker attempted to give it such strange form and significance.