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The battle of Antietam.
by Jacob D. Cox, Major-General, U. S. V.
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North of the Dunker Church--a Union charge through the corn-field. |
It was not till some time past noon of the 15th of September that, the way being clear for the Ninth Corps at
South Mountain, we marched through
Fox's gap to the
Boonsboro' and Sharpsburg turnpike, and along this road till we came up in rear of
Sumner's command.
Hooker's corps, which was part of the right wing (
Burnside's), had been in the advance, and had moved off from the turnpike to the right near
Keedysville.
I was with the Kanawha Division, assuming that my temporary command of the corps ended with the battle on the mountain.
When we approached the line of hills bordering the
Antietam, we received orders to turn off the road to the left, and halted our battalions closed in mass.
It was now about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
McClellan, as it seemed, had just reached the field, and was surrounded by a group of his principal officers, most of whom I had never seen before.
I rode up with
General Burnside, dismounted, and was very cordially greeted by
General McClellan.
He and
Burnside were evidently on terms of most intimate friendship and familiarity.
He introduced me to the officers I had not known before, referring pleasantly to my service with him in
Ohio and
West Virginia, putting me upon an easy footing with them in a very agreeable and genial way.
We walked up the slope of the ridge before us, and looking westward from its crest the whole field of the coming battle was before us. Immediately in front the
Antietam wound through the hollow, the hills rising gently on both sides.
In the background on our left was the village of
Sharpsburg, with fields
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inclosed by stone fences in front of it. At its right was a bit of wood (since known as the West Wood), with the little Dunker Church standing out white and sharp against it. Farther to the right and left the scene was closed in by wooded ridges with open farm lands between, the whole making as pleasing and prosperous a landscape as can easily be imagined.
We made a large group as we stood upon the hill, and it was not long before we attracted the enemy's attention.
A puff of white smoke from a knoll on the right; of the
Sharpsburg road was followed by the screaming of a shell over our heads.
McClellan directed that all but one or two should retire behind the ridge, while he continued the reconnoissance, walking slowly to the right.
I noted with satisfaction the cool and business-like air with which he made his examination under fire.
The Confederate artillery was answered by a battery, and a lively cannonade ensued on both sides, though without any noticeable effect.
The enemy's position was revealed, and he was evidently in force on both sides of the turnpike in front of
Sharpsburg, covered by the undulations of the rolling ground which hid his infantry from our sight.
The examination of the enemy's position and the discussion of it continued till near the close of the day. Orders were then given for the Ninth Corps to move to the left, keeping off the road, which was occupied by other troops.
We moved through fields and farm lands, an hour's march in the dusk of the evening, going into bivouac about a mile south of the
Sharpsburg bridge, and in rear of the hills bordering the
Antietam.
On Tuesday, September 16th, we confidently expected a battle, and I kept with my division.
In the afternoon I saw
General Burnside, and learned from him that
McClellan had determined to let
Hooker make a movement on our extreme right to turn
Lee's position.
Burnside's manner in speaking of this implied that he thought it was done at
Hooker's solicitation and through his desire, openly evinced, to be independent in command.
I urged
Burnside to assume the immediate command of the corps and allow me to lead only my own division.
He objected that as he had been announced as commander of the right wing of the army composed of two corps (his own and
Hooker's), he was unwilling to waive his precedence or to assume that
Hooker was detached for anything more than a temporary purpose.
I pointed out that
Reno's staff had been granted leave of absence to
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Doubleday's division of Hooker's Corps crossing the Upper fords of the Antietam.
From a sketch made at the time. |
take the body of their chief to
Washington, and that my division staff was too small for corps duty; but he met this by saying that he would use his staff for this purpose and help me in every way he could, till the crisis of the campaign should be over.
The 16th passed without serious fighting, though there was desultory cannonading and picket firing.
It was hard to restrain our men from showing themselves on the crest of the long ridge in front of us, and whenever they did so they drew the fire from some of the enemy's batteries, to which ours would respond.
In the afternoon
McClellan reconnoitered the line of the
Antietam near us,
Burnside being with him. As the result of this we were ordered to change our positions at nightfall, staff-officers being sent to guide each division to its new camp.
Rodman's division went half a mile to the left, where a country road led to a ford in a great bend in the
Antietam curving deeply into the enemy's side of the stream.
1 Sturgis's division was placed on the sides of the road leading to the stone bridge, since known as Burnside's Bridge (below the
Sharpsburg bridge).
Willcox's was put in reserve in rear of
Sturgis.
My own division was divided,
Scammon's brigade going with
Rodman, and
Crook's going with
Sturgis.
Crook was ordered to take the advance in crossing the bridge, in case we should be ordered to attack.
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This selection was made by
Burnside himself, as a compliment to the division for the vigor of its assault at
South Mountain.
While we were moving, we heard
Hooker's guns far off on the right and front, and the cannonade continued an hour or more after it became dark.
The morning of Wednesday, the 17th, broke fresh and fair.
The men were astir at dawn, getting breakfast and preparing for a day of battle.
The artillery opened on both sides as soon as it was fairly light, and the positions which had been assigned us in the dusk of the evening were found to be exposed in some places to the direct fire of the
Confederate guns,
Rodman's division suffering more than the others.
Fairchild's brigade alone reported thirty-six casualties before they could find cover.
It was not till 7 o'clock that orders came to advance toward the creek as far as could be done without exposing the men to unnecessary loss.
Rodman was directed to acquaint himself with the situation of the ford in front of him, and
Sturgis to seek the best means of approach to the stone bridge.
All were then to remain in readiness to obey further orders.
When these arrangements had been made, I rode to the position
Burnside had selected for himself, which was upon a high knoll north-east of the
Burnside Bridge, near a hay-stack which was a prominent landmark.
Near by was
Benjamin's battery of 20-pounder Parrotts, and a little farther still to tile right, on the same ridge,
General Sturgis had sent in
Durell's battery.
These were exchanging shots with the enemy's guns opposite, and had the advantage in range and-weight of metal.
Whatever the reason,
McClellan had adopted a plan of battle which practically reduced
Sumner and
Burnside to the command of one corps each, while
Hooker had been sent far off on the right front, followed later by
Mansfield, but without organizing the right wing as a unit so that one commander could give his whole attention to handling it with vigor.
In his preliminary report, made before he was relieved from command,
McClellan says:
The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left — at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more, by assailing the enemy's right — and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have in hand.
McClellan's report covering his whole career in the war, dated August 4th, 1863 (and published February, 1864, after warm controversies had arisen and he had become a political character), modifies the above statement in some important particulars.
It says:
My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of
