Canby's services in the New Mexican campaign.
by Latham Anderson, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V.
The account in this work by
Captain Pettis of “The Confederate Invasion of
New Mexico and
Arizona,”
1 is accurate as to most details.
It is open to criticism, however, in two particulars: it fails to recognize the political as well as the military importance of the campaign, and it does injustice to
General Canby.
The remote and unimportant territory of
New Mexico was not the real objective of this invasion.
The Confederate leaders were striking at much higher game — no less than the conquest of
California,
Sonora,
Chihuahua, New Mexico,
Arizona, and
Utah--and, above all, the possession of the gold supply of the
Pacific coast, a source of strength considered by
Mr. Lincoln to be essential to the successful prosecution of the war.
The truth of this view will be apparent when we consider what the relative positions of the two governments would have been had
Sibley succeeded in his enterprise.
The Confederacy would have controlled the
Gulf of
California alnd the two finest harbors on the
Pacific coast with a coast-line of 1200 or 1500 miles. The conquest alone of this vast domain, in all probability,would have insured the recognition of the
Confederacy by the
European powers.
Owing to the remoteness of this
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coast it would have been impossible for us to have effectually blockaded it. In fact the
Confederates could have overpowered us in the
Pacific Ocean, as all the advantages of position and materials would have been on their side.
Finally, the current of gold, that, according to
Mr. Lincoln, formed the life-blood of our financial credit, would have been diverted from
Washington to
Richmond.
What then would have been the relative quotations of “Green-backs” and “Graybacks”?
Unquestionably the
Confederate paper would have been worth at least as much as ours, and the oceans would have swarmed with
Alabamas. But it may be asked, to what extent would
Sibley's conquest of
New Mexico have contributed to this result?
If it would have rendered the conquest of
California probable, then it was one of the most momentous campaigns of the war. If the reverse were true, then it was a series of insignificant skirmishes, devoid of military or political significance.
The capture of
Forts Craig and Union with their garrisons and supplies would have rendered highly probable the successful accomplishment of the entire plan of
Sibley's campaign.
Southerners and Southern sympathizers were scattered throughout the
Western mountain regions.
They preponderated strongly in
Southern New Mexico,
Arizona, and
Southern California.
In the coast and river towns and cities of
California, the
Confederates formed a powerful faction.
Had
Sibley's conquest of
New Mexico been complete, he would have captured 6000 or 8000 stand of arms and 25 or 30 pieces of artillery.
Hardy miners and frontier desperadoes would have flocked to his standard from all parts of the
Rocky Mountains.
He could have entered
California with at least twice as many men as he brought into
New Mexico.
As a matter of course, the entire Mormon population of
Utah,
Arizona, and
California would have joined him joyfully, and would have furnished him most efficient aid. In the meantime the
California Secessionists would not have been idle.
Although
General George Wright and the Unionists would have been too enterprising to enable them to effect any complete or systematic organization, a fierce guerrilla warfare would certainly have been inaugurated all over the central and southern parts of the
State as soon as it was known that
Sibley's victorious army was approaching.
Unaided they could have accomplished nothing.
The National forces had absolute control of the situation.
The forts in San Francisco harbor, the arsenal at
Benicia, the
Mare Island navy-yard, and whatever naval force there was on the coast were all in Union hands, under the custody of a nucleus (small, it is true) of regular troops.
Moreover, the
Union volunteers, with whom the enemy would have had to contend, were unsurpassed as fighting material.
But with an invading army of 6000 or 8000 men across the
Colorado, flushed with victory and well supplied with small arms, artillery, ammunition, and transportation, the situation would have been materially changed.
The Government, in order to maintain its prestige, must have continually protected many points from attack.
It would thus have been compelled to divide and weaken its forces.
The
California desert constitutes a serious obstacle to an invading army; but, in this instance, the
Confederates and their natural allies , the Mormons, preponderated so largely in that region that they could have maintained control of all the water-holes on the desert, and thus could have prevented Union scouts from observing and reporting promptly the movements of the invading army.
Our forces probably could not have received notice of the route of the invading column in time to concentrate upon the
Tejon Pass.
Simultaneously with the arrival of the
Confederate column, diversion by guerrilla attacks at various points throughout the
State could, and, no doubt, would, have been made so as to compel a still further weakening of our forces at the main point of attack.
Owing to all these causes it would have been impossible for the
Union commander to meet
Sibley with equal forces.
For the
Union army defeat under these circumstances in
Southern California would have been defeat in an enemy's country, and it would have been very difficult for it to escape capture had it been routed.
However superb the material of which the
California volunteers were composed,
2 they were raw troops and would have been confronted by larger numbers of men, many of them already seasoned to war in a victorious campaign, who would, moreover, have been compelled to fight with desperation because they had the desert at their backs.
It is true the fortunes of war are uncertain, and none of these things might have happened; but, in view of the above facts, the probabilities seem altogether in favor of the success of the
Confederates, backed by an army which had conquered
New Mexico and
Arizona.
Hence, in view of th e situation in
California and of the momentous consequences of its, capture by the
Confederates, the conflict in
New Mexico should be regarded as one of the decisive campaigns of the war. The soundness and brilliancy of
General Canby's management rendered it decisive in our favor.
For the invading column the result was practically annihilation, unless the reports brought into our lines were gross exaggerations.
It is to be hoped that this discussion may elicit from some of the survivors of
Sibley's column a detailed account of that retreat.
Soon after
Canby assumed command of the department, and before he had time to get it fairly in hand, he was confronted with the appalling disaster of
San Augustine Springs.
This was quickly followed by the intelligence that two expeditions were forming to attack him,--one in
Northern Texas under
Van Dorn, to enter by the
Canadian route against Fort Union; the other at
San Antonio, under
Sibley, intended to reinforce
Baylor at
El Paso.
He was therefore compelled to keep a strong force at Fort Union, another at
Fort Craig, and to hold a third at an intermediate point
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whence he could succor the division first attacked.
This prevented him from acting aggressively against
Baylor early in the campaign.
After
Sibley had passed
Fort Craig,
Canby called a meeting of his senior officers and outlined to them his plan of campaign, which was to follow the enemy closely in his march up the valley, harass him in front, flanks, and rear with the irregular troops and cavalry — burn or remove all supplies in his front, but avoid a general engagement, except where the position was strongly in our favor.
The numerous adobe villages along the line gave admirable opportunities for carrying out this plan at intervals of a few miles.
Canby had no confidence in the capacity of the New Mexico volunteers to face the
Texans in the open field, and the results fully confirmed his judgment on that point.
But the adobe villages could be quickly loop-holed and converted into admirable defenses for raw troops.
By placing the New Mexicans in these improvised fortresses, and using the regulars and
Colorado volunteers aggressively in the open parts of the line, the efficiency of his force would have been doubled.
Should the enemy refuse to attack us in any of these strong positions until he passed
Albuquerque,
Canby could then form a junction with the reinforcements at Fort Union, and
Sibley's fate would have been sealed.
The late
Major H. R. Selden, who was present at the meeting, is the w riter's authority for this outline of
Canby's intended plan of campaign.
This plan was marred at the very outset by the impetuosity of that rash old fighter,
Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Roberts, who, at
Valverde, January 21st, precipitated a decisive engagement with the enemy, where the latter had the advantage of position.
It must be said in justice to
Colonel Roberts, however, that had not two of his subordinates shown a lack of their commander's dash, the result of that day's battle would have been different.
Mr. Pettis intimates that all went well on the field until
Canby arrived.
Such was not the case.
Roberts had failed to dislodge the enemy from his strong position behind the sand hills.
Had it not been for the fatal gap in our center, the
Texan assault on
McRae's battery could not have been made, as the attacking column would have been taken in flank by our center.
That gap was caused by
Colonel Miguel Pino's 2d New Mexican Regiment remaining under the river-bank and refusing to move forward into line.
For this, of course,
Canby was not responsible.
His plan of pivoting on his left and doubling up the enemy's left flank so as to sweep him out of his natural intrenchment was an admirable one.
After the reverse at
Valverde nothing remained for
Canby but to strive for a junction with the troops at Fort Union.
In this he was thwarted for a time by the fact that
Colonel John P. Slough, against his instructions, brought on a decisive engagement with the enemy at Cañon
Glorietta on the 28th of March.
Slough's main force was driven from the field, and the defeat would have been a disastrous one had not the flanking party, under
Major Chivington, of the 1st Colorado Volunteers, and
Captain W. H. Lewis, 5th U. S. Infantry, succeeded in destroying the
Texan train.
The rumor is said to have spread among the
Texans that they were being attacked in rear by
Canby's column.
This caused a panic among part of their force, and prevented an effective pursuit of
Slough's defeated troops.
After the junction with the troops from Fort Union, and the overtaking and surprising of the enemy at
Peralta, on the 15th of January,
Canby had it in his power to capture the entire column.
But this was impracticable, because he could not have fed his prisoners.
The country was stripped of provisions of all sorts, his own troops were on short rations, and he was at
Peralta, one thousand miles from his base of supplies.
His only alternative was to force the
Texans into their disastrous retreat.
The account of the
battle of Valverde in
Greeley's
American conflict is erroneous in two important statements.
First, speaking of the fighting in the morning he says: “The day wore on with more noise than execution, until 2 P. M.” As a matter of fact our losses in the morning were heavier than in the evening, when most of the casualties were confined to
McRae's Battery.
Also
Mr. Greeley states: “Our supporting infantry, twice or thrice the
Texans in number, and including more than man for man of regulars, shamefully withstood every entreaty to charge, and the
Colorado volunteers vied with the regulars in this infamous flight.”
There were only one thousand regulars in the field altogether, and the bulk of them were on the extreme right, out of supporting distance of the battery.
In the morning fight the single company of
Colorado volunteers behaved admirably, showing as much steadiness as old regulars.
