Joseph Wheeler, Lieutenant-General, C. S. A.
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In the van. |
General Bragg succeeded
General Beauregard in command of the
Confederate troops at
Tupelo, Miss., about fifty miles south of
Corinth, on June 27th, 1862.
The field returns of June 9th, a week after our army reached
Tupelo, reported it at 45,080.
1 This return included the Army of Mississippi, reinforced by the troops brought from
Arkansas by
Generals Price and
Van Dorn, together with detachments gathered from various localities.
About two thousand cavalry not included in this return also belonged to the army.
This was the maximum force
General Bragg could expect to concentrate at that point.
General Halleck, immediately confronting
Bragg with the armies of
Grant,
Pope, and
Buell, had in and about
Corinth a force of 128,315 men, of which the field return of June 1st showed 108,538 present for duty.
A division reporting 8682 for duty, under the
Federal General George W. Morgan, was at
Cumberland Gap; a division with 6411 for duty, under
General Ormsby M. Mitchel, was in
north Alabama, and three brigades were located at
Nashville,
Murfreesboro‘, and other points in
middle Tennessee.
Buell soon started
en route to
north Alabama,
General Halleck remaining at or near
Corinth with seventy thousand men for duty, a force strong enough to hold
Corinth and
west Tennessee, while
Buell could menace or even invade
Alabama or
north Georgia.
The changed condition of the opposing armies during four months should now be considered.
In January, 1862, the
Confederates had held all of
[
2]
Tennessee and most of
Kentucky, and the
Mississippi River from
Columbus to the delta.
Now, after a series of Confederate reverses, both States were virtually under the control of the armies under
General Halleck, and the
Federal flotilla sailed unmolested from
St. Louis to
Vicksburg.
The Federal right was thrown forward into
Mississippi.
Its center occupied
north Alabama, and its left was pressing the
Confederates to the southern border of
east Tennessee.
The Confederate problem was to devise some plan to turn the tide of disaster and recover at least a portion of our lost territory.
Our soldiers had expected a
battle at Corinth, in which they felt confident of as decisive a victory as was won by them on the first day of
Shiloh; and the withdrawal to
Tupelo had at last forced upon them a conviction that the numerical preponderance of the enemy was such that they could not expect to cope success-fully with the combined armies then commanded by
General Halleck.
Already the army had suffered much from sickness, and we could hardly expect any improvement while it remained idle in the locality where it had halted after its retreat from
Corinth.
An advance into
west Tennessee would not afford protection to
Alabama or
Georgia.
An advance into
middle Tennessee by crossing the river at
Florence,
Decatur, or any neighboring point, would have the disadvantage of placing the
Confederates between the armies of
Grant and
Buell under circumstances enabling these two commanders to throw their forces simultaneously upon
General Bragg, who could not, in this event, depend upon any material cooperation from the army in
east Tennessee under
General Kirby Smith.
There was another line for an aggressive movement.
A rapid march through
Alabama to
Chattanooga would save that city, protect
Georgia from invasion, and open the way into
Tennessee and
Kentucky, without the disadvantage of an intervening force between the column commanded by
Bragg and that under the orders of
General Kirby Smith.
This movement was determined upon and resulted in what is called the
Kentucky Campaign of 1862.
Major-General E. Kirby Smith had reached
Knoxville March 8th, 1862, and assumed command of the
Confederate troops in
east Tennessee.
The returns for June reported his entire force at 11,768 infantry, 1055 cavalry,;
2 and 635 artillery.
The occupation of
Cumberland Gap, June 18th, by a Federal division, and the approach of
Buell's forces toward
Chattanooga seriously threatened his department.
[
3]
General Bragg recognized the inadequacy of
General Smith's force, and on June 27th he transferred the division commanded by
Major-General John P. McCown from.
Tupelo to
Chattanooga.
3 Forrest and
John H. Morgan had already been sent into
middle Tennessee and
Kentucky, and the operations of these enterprising officers materially lessened the pressure upon
General Smith.
Correspondence between
Generals Bragg and
Smith resulted in an order, dated July 21st, transferring the entire Army of Mississippi to
Chattanooga.
To mislead the enemy and to prevent an advance upon
Tupelo,
Bragg had, on the 19th, sent
Colonel Joseph Wheeler with a brigade of cavalry into
west Tennessee, and
Brigadier-General Frank C. Armstrong with a like force into
north Alabama.
Wheeler's operations in
west Tennessee may be briefly summarized as a rapid march from
Holly Springs, Mississippi,
[
4]
to
Bolivar, Tennessee; an attack upon the outposts at that place; the destruction of bridges on the line of communications of the troops at
Bolivar and
Jackson; a number of slight affairs with the enemy's cavalry, and the burning of a quantity of cotton in transit to the
North.
One week was thus occupied behind the enemy's lines, the main object of the movement being to create the impression of a general advance.
On July 31st
Bragg and
Kirby Smith met at
Chattanooga, and a joint movement into
middle Tennessee was determined upon,
Price and
Van Dorn being left to confront
Grant in
northern Mississippi.
On August 5th
Bragg sent two of his brigades (
Cleburne's and
Preston Smith's) to
General Smith at
Knoxville.
General C. L. Stevenson, with nearly nine thousand men, was ordered to watch the
Federal General G. W. Morgan, who occupied
Cumberland Gap.
General Smith started on the 14th
en route to Rogers's Gap, with 4 brigades, 6000 strong.
The brigades of
Preston Smith and
B. J. Hill were commanded by
General P. R. Cleburne, and the brigades of
McCray and
McNair were under command of
General T. J. Churchill.
General Henry Heth, with a force nearly 4000 strong, was ordered to march direct to
Barboursville by way of
Big Creek Gap, and the army was preceded by 900 cavalry under
Colonel John S. Scott.
General Smith had at first contemplated cutting off the supplies of the garrison at
Cumberland Gap, but learning that they were well provisioned, and seeing the difficulty of supplying his own troops in the poor and barren region of
south-eastern Kentucky, he determined to push rapidly on to the rich blue-grass country in the central part of the
State.
This determination had been communicated to
General Bragg, and a march toward
Lexington was commenced.
On the evening of the 29th, having reached
Madison County, Kentucky,
Colonel Scott found the enemy about half way between the small village of
Kingston and the town of
Richmond.
The force displayed and resistance offered indicated that they were resolved to contest any farther advance of the
Confederates.
Although his troops were quite weary and
General Heth was far to the rear,
General Smith determined upon an immediate attack.
He was in the heart of
Kentucky, and the
Confederate commander rightly judged that boldness was the surest road to victory.
Early on the 30th,
General Cleburne, being in advance with his two brigades, found that the
Federal force had moved forward and was in line of battle about a mile north of
Kingston and probably five miles south of
Richmond.
The extreme advance-guard of the enemy, about six hundred yards in front of their main line, became engaged with
Cleburne's leading brigade, commanded by
Colonel Hill, but after a light brush retired upon the main body of the
Federal army.
Hill's brigade was soon formed in line behind the crest of a low ridge which was nearly parallel with and about five hundred yards south of the position occupied by the enemy.
Cleburne also brought up Douglas's battery, which he placed in a favorable position near the center of his line.
A fire of artillery and infantry commenced, and
Captain Martin, with a second battery, having arrived, it was also brought into action, and for two hours both infantry and artillery were engaged from their respective positions.
[
5]
General Mahlon D. Manson, who was in command of the
Federal army before
General Nelson arrived, and who commenced the battle, now pushed his left forward to turn our right.
Cleburne met this with one regiment of
Preston Smith's brigade, which had been formed behind a crest in his rear, but the persistence of the enemy in that quarter made it necessary to reenforce the right with all of the reserve brigade under
Preston Smith.
In the meantime
General Kirby Smith had reached the field with the two brigades (
McCray's and
McNair's) forming
General Churchill's division.
He promptly dispatched that officer with one brigade to turn the enemy's right.
The Federal commander, apparently disregarding this movement, still boldly advanced his own left to carry out his plan of turning the
Confederate flank.
This well-conceived manceuvre at first seemed to endanger the Confederate army, but
Colonel Preston Smith with his brigade stood firm, and after a severe struggle checked and finally drove back the advancing enemy.
General Cleburne, who up to this time had displayed both skill and gallantry, was severely wounded and left the field.
General Churchill had now gained the enemy's right, and by a bold and determined charge threw the enemy into disorder.
Two miles farther north the
Federal force made a stand, and
McCray's gallant brigade, by a rapid march, struck their right, while
Cleburne's division, now commanded by
Colonel Preston Smith, moved to the attack in front.
The celerity of
McCray's movements brought him into action before the other troops reached the field, and he suffered from the concentration of a galling and destructive fire; but the approach of
Preston Smith, with troops cheering as they advanced again, caused a rout of the
Federal army, closely followed by our victorious soldiers.
When in sight of the town of
Richmond the enemy were seen forming for a final struggle upon a commanding ridge, which had been judiciously selected by the
Federal commander,
Major-General William Nelson, both of the enemy's flanks being protected by skirts of woods.
General Smith promptly sent
McNair's brigade again to turn the
Federal flank, and with the remaining force attacked directly in front.
A warm fusillade lasted a few moments, when the
Federal army again retreated.
Early in the morning
Colonel Scott had been sent to gain the rear of the town.
His arrival at this moment increased the dismay of the enemy, and assisted materially in securing prisoners.
The reports of the division and brigade commanders show that
General Smith's entire force was about five thousand.
The enemy supposed it much greater, their estimate including
General Heth, but his division did not join
General Smith until the day after the battle.
4 Kirby Smith's loss was 78 killed, 372 wounded, and 1 missing.
Nelson in his report speaks of his own command on the
Kentucky River as 16,000 strong,
5 and the official report of casualties is given as 206 killed, 844 wounded, and 4303 captured. The Federal official reports admit that nine pieces of artillery and all their wagon trains were captured by the
Confederates.
[
6]
General Manson contends that the
Federals engaged did not exceed 6500.
6 General Horatio G. Wright, who commanded the department, in his report of Sept. 2d, says:
The force engaged in the battle in front of Richmond was utterly broken up, and after all the exertions that could be made to collect the stragglers, only some 800 or 900 could be found.
The remainder of the force were killed, captured, or scattered over the country.
[
7]
Elated with success, and reinforced by about four thousand troops just arrived under
Heth, the victorious army moved forward to
Lexington, and was designated by its commander as “The army of Kentucky.”
During the month of September the greater portion of the army remained in that vicinity.
On September 4th
Colonel Scott, with a brigade of cavalry, was ordered to push on as near as practicable to
Louisville, and to destroy the Louisville and Nashville Railroad.
Heth, with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, marched north; some of his troops, on September 6th, reached the suburbs of
Covington, but his instructions were not to make an attack upon the city.
Smith used vigorous efforts to gather and concentrate supplies, arouse the people, and raise and organize troops for the
Confederacy.
General George W. Morgan (Federal), who was left at
Cumberland Gap with 8682 men, seeing these active movements in his rear, evacuated that position on September 17th and made his way through
eastern Kentucky to the
Ohio River at Greenupsburg, arriving there October 3d.
While these events were happening,
Bragg had organized his army at
Chattanooga into two wings.
The right, commanded by
General Polk, consisted of
Cheatham's and
Withers's divisions of infantry and
Colonel Lay's brigade of cavalry.
The left wing, commanded by
General Hardee, consisted of
Buckner's and
Anderson's divisions of infantry and
Wheeler's brigade of cavalry.
This entire force, on August 27th, reported 27,816 officers and men for duty.
7 On the 28th the army was fairly in motion, but up to this time
General Bragg,had not positively determined upon his plan of campaign, and much depended upon the course pursued by the
Federal army.
As early as the 22d
General Buell had established his headquarters at
Decherd, on the Nashville Railroad, thirty miles north-west of
Stevenson, and had all the supplies at
Stevenson transferred to that place.
8 Two parallel mountain ranges, running north-east and south-west, separated him from
Chattanooga.
A railroad, connecting
McMinnville and
Tullahoma, ran nearly parallel to the north-west slope of these mountain ranges.
Already he had located
General Thomas at
McMinnville with
Wood's and
Ammen's divisions, while the divisions of
Schoepf,
McCook, and
Thomas L. Crittenden were near the Nashville and Stevenson Railroad within easy call of headquarters at
Decherd.
Buell seemed impressed with the belief that
Bragg's objective point was
Nashville, and that he would take the short route over the mountain by way of
Altamont, which movement, if made, would have placed
Bragg between the force under
Thomas and the rest of
Buell's army.
To prevent this Buell, on the 23d, ordered these five divisions to concentrate at
Altamont.
General Thomas reached his destination on the 25th, but, finding no enemy to confront him and learning that there was no enemy on the mountains, the nearest Confederates being at
Dunlap's in the
Sequatchie Valley, he reported
[
8]
these facts to
Buell and returned to
McMinnville.
Crittenden's division halted near
Pelham, and
Schoepf at
Hillsboro‘.
McCook pressed on and reached
Altamont on the 29th, where, on the 30th,
Wheeler attacked his out-posts, and
McCook retired down the mountain.
The same day
General Buell ordered his entire army to concentrate at
Murfreesboro‘.
By September 5th, the five divisions just mentioned had reached that place, together with all detachments from along the lines of railroad except
Rousseau's division, which, being on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, marched directly to
Nashville.
The strength of
Buell's forces during the months of July, August, and September was estimated by witnesses before the
Buell Commission, in 1863, at from 45,000 to 59,309.
His own returns for June, deducting the force at
Cumberland Gap, showed 56,706 present for duty, and his October returns, with
the same deduction, 66,595.
9 General Buell presented a paper to the Commission which does not question any of these statements regarding strength, but states that he could not have concentrated more than 31,000 men at
McMinnville to strike the Confederate forces as they debouched from the mountains; and the same paper estimated
Bragg's army at 60,000, while his returns on August 27th showed but 27,816 officers and men for duty.
10 These facts prove the large preponderance of the
Federals.
At
Murfreesboro'
Buell heard of
Nelson's defeat at
Richmond, and without halting he marched to
Nashville.
On September 7th he intrusted
General Thomas with the defense of that city with the divisions of
Palmer,
Negley, and
Schoepf, while with the infantry divisions of
McCook,
Crittenden,
Ammen,
Wood,
Rousseau, and
R. B. Mitchell, and a cavalry division under
Kennett,
General Buell determined to race with
Bragg for
Louisville.
[
9]
It was a fair race, as on that day most of
Bragg's army was south of the
Cumberland River, at
Carthage and
Greensboro‘.
Bragg was nearest to
Louisville by some twenty-five miles, but
Buell had the advantage of a bridge at
Nashville and the assistance of the railroad to aid in his march.
With seven hundred cavalry, I hastened to strike and break the railroad at points between
Bowling Green and
Nashville, and otherwise sought to retard the northern march of the
Federal army.
By the 12th it was evident to
Buell that no attack would be made on
Nashville, and he ordered
General Thomas to join him with his own division, which had been commanded by General
 |
|
Union Fort at Munfordville, captured by Bragg, September 17, 1862--the Green River bridge on the left.
From a photograph taken in 1886. |
Schoepf.
Buell reached
Bowling Green with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry on the 14th, and turned his column in the direction of
Munfordville.
I interposed my cavalry on the
Munfordville road, and also on the roads leading to
Glasgow, and reported
Buell's movements to
Bragg.
General Chalmers, with
Bragg's advance, reached
Munfordville at daylight on the 14th and learned that
Colonel Scott, with a cavalry brigade, had demanded the surrender on the night previous.
11 Chalmers was misinformed regarding the strength of the garrison and the character of the defensive works.
He attacked with vigor, but was repulsed.
He reported his force at 1913 men, and his loss at 35 killed and 253 wounded. On the 14th all of
Buell's six divisions had reached
Bowling Green, and on the 16th he advanced vigorously to succor the garrison at
Munfordville, the head of his column being opposed by cavalry.
Bragg, hearing of
Chalmers's attack and of
Buell's movements, ordered his entire army, which had rested two days at
Glasgow, to start early on the 15th
en route for
Munfordville.
On the next day he reached that place, boldly displayed his army, and on the 17th at 2 P. M. the
[
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fort and garrison surrendered.
The Federals reported their loss at 15 killed, 57 wounded, and 4076 prisoners. We also captured their armament, 10 pieces of artillery, and 5000 stand of small-arms.
As might be expected, the Confederate army was much elated, and were eager to grapple with the dispirited army under
General Buell.
Bragg placed his troops in a strong position south of the river, using the fort as a part of his line of defense.
My command was thrown forward to meet and skirmish with the enemy, who, on the 19th, commenced preparations for an attack.
On the 20th
General Thomas joined the
Federal army with his division.
General Bragg, in referring to the situation of September 20th, wrote:
With my effective force present reduced by sickness, exhaustion, and the recent affair before the intrenchments at Munfordville to half that of the enemy, I could not prudently afford to attack him there in his selected position.
If
Kirby Smith's command had been ordered from
Lexington to
Munfordville even as late as the 12th, a battle with
Buell could not have been other than a decided Confederate victory.
Bragg at first had determined to fight with his four divisions, and no doubt would have done so had
Buell advanced on the 17th, or 18th, or 19th.
Early on the morning of the 18th,
General Bragg sent for me and explained his plans.
I never saw him more determined or more confident.
The entire army was in the best of spirits.
I met and talked with
Generals Hardee,
Polk,
Cheatham, and
Buckner; all were enthusiastic over our success, and our good luck in getting
Buell where he would be compelled to fight us to such a disadvantage.
It is true our back was to a river, but it was fordable at several places, and we felt that the objection to having it in our rear was fully compensated by the topographical features, which, with the aid of the fort, made our position a strong one for defense.
So anxious was
Bragg for a fight that he sent
Buckner's division to the front in the hope that an engagement could thus be provoked; but after the arrival of
General Thomas,
Bragg did not deem it advisable to risk a battle with the force then under his command, believing that another opportunity would offer after being joined by
Kirby Smith.
He therefore withdrew to
Bardstown, sending to me, who still confronted
Buell, the following order, dated September 20th, through
General Hardee:
General Bragg directs that, if possible, the enemy be prevented from crossing Green River to-morrow, and General Hardee instructs me to say that he expects you will contest the passage of that river at Munfordville to that end.
Buell heard of
Bragg's movements and pressed forward with determination.
My small brigade of cavalry contested his advance on the 20th and 21st, in efforts to comply with the instructions from
General Bragg.
On the afternoon of the 21st,
Buell's right approached the river above the town, and at the same time he pressed forward his line of battle so rapidly as almost to command the only ford by which I could cross
Green River with both artillery and cavalry.
Allen's 1st Alabama Regiment, being directly in front, was thrown into column and, charging gallantly, defeated the opposing cavalry and broke through their infantry.
Among our killed was the noble
[
11]
Lieutenant-Colonel T. B. Brown, but the charge sufficiently checked the advance to enable the command to cross the ford in good order.
The following note, referring to this engagement, explains itself:
headquarters, Sixth division, army of the Ohio, September 22d, 1862. General Wheeler, Commanding Cavalry Brigade.
General: I am directed by General Buell to say, in answer to your request to admit the brother of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, killed in the affair of yesterday within our lines, he regrets he cannot, on account of the present state of the service, accede to your wishes.
General Buell has referred your note to me to give you the desired information in regard to the fate of Colonel Brown.
He was killed outright in the handsome cavalry charge executed by your troops yesterday afternoon.
His body was taken to a neighboring house and cared for. He will be interred to-day, and doubtless in the vicinity.
His watch was taken charge of by an officer of rank in our service, and I will make it a point to have it forwarded to you. I am not now informed whether there were any other valuables on the person of Colonel Brown.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, th. J. Wood, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.
The watch was subsequently sent to
Colonel Brown's daughter.
On the 22d, with a clear road to
Louisville,
Buell moved with celerity in that direction.
My cavalry contested his advance, but the country was too open to allow of effective opposition with so small a force.
On the 25th the leading Federal column reached the city, and the seven divisions were all up on the 27th.
Bragg,
Polk; and
Hardee had been kept thoroughly informed of
Buell's march and of the exposure of his flank, which presented an inviting opportunity for attack, but so worn and wearied was the condition of our army that these officers did not feel justified in attempting an aggressive movement.
On the 28th
Bragg left
Bardstown with his staff to confer with
Kirby Smith at
Lexington, and then proceeded to
Frankfort, where, on the 4th of October, a day was occupied in the installation of
the Hon. Richard Hawes as Confederate
Provisional Governor of the
Commonwealth.
While these events were happening
Buell was making active preparations for an aggressive campaign.
On the 26th
Major-General Wright, commanding the Department of the Ohio, went from
Cincinnati to
Louisville to confer with him, and on the 27th
General Halleck issued an order placing
Buell in command of the troops of both departments, then in
Louisville.
There has been much controversy as to the “strength of the opposing armies.”
After the most careful study of Federal and Confederate official statements, I have reached the following conclusions:
[
12]
To these we might with propriety add the 26,351 men which
General Wright could have drawn from his command in
West Virginia.
These stupendous armies did not include the 12,397 troops left at
Nashville, which would make the entire force subject to
Buell's and
Wright's orders 176,030.
Maximum Confederate forces.
| General E. Kirby Smith's column taken to Kentucky | 10,000 |
| Humphrey Marshall, from West Virginia | 2,160 |
| Stevenson, joining after Perryville | 7,500 |
| John H. Morgan | 1,300 |
| Bragg's largest force before crossing Tennessee River — officers and men, for duty | 27,816 |
| | |
| Bragg, Smith, and Marshall | 48,77614 |
The above was the reported strength of the
Confederate troops when the campaign began, but to make sure and to compensate for any omitted cavalry let us add 100, making the entire force 49,776.
The losses at
Richmond and
Munfordville were very slight, compared to the daily depletion caused by dropping out along the route.
Some were allowed to organize in squads and make their way back to
east Tennessee; some sought shelter among the kind and hospitable people; some struggled along with the ambulance trains, and some were left at temporarily established hospitals, one of which, containing two hundred inmates, was captured by the enemy at
Glasgow.
This character of loss always attends a rapidly moving army, and its extent can be realized when we see that
Hardee's wing left
Chattanooga 12,825 strong, was reinforced by
Cleburne's brigade early in October; yet, even with
Cleburne included,
Hardee, in stating officially the force with which he fought at
Perryville, says: “Thinned by battle and long and arduous service, my effective force did not exceed 10,000 men.”
It will be seen, there-fore, that these causes reduced the
Confederate ranks in much greater proportion than they were increased by enlistments and other accretions, and
General Bragg in his official report of the campaign asserts that we were able “at no time to put more than forty thousand men of all arms and at all places in battle.”
This included
Bragg's,
Smith's, and
Marshall's columns, and although it is probably true that their aggregate strength in August was 48,776, it would have been as difficult for
Bragg and
Smith to have concentrated that number as it would have been for
Buell and
Wright to have concentrated the 163,633 which they commanded.
Even with such a force available to drive 40,000 men out of
Kentucky,
General Wright on the 16th appealed to the governors of
Indiana,
Illinois,
Wisconsin, and
Michigan for additional troops.
What troops came in answer to these calls I would not venture to say; but leaving these and the troops in
West Virginia under
General Wright out of the calculation, our strength, even after
Stevenson joined us, was less than half, and but little more than one-third that of the enemy, and that powerful enemy was directly on its base of supplies, with unlimited commissary and
[
13]
ordnance stores, while the Confederate army had no base, was living off the country, and had no possibility of replenishing ammunition.
Bragg felt very keenly the misfortune caused by his inability to concentrate and gain a victory over
Buell before he should reach the reinforcements which awaited him at
Louisville.
In writing to the
Government, September 25th,
Bragg says:
I regret to say we are sadly disappointed in the want of action by our friends in Kentucky.
We have so far received no accession to this army.
General Smith has secured about a brigade — not half our losses by casualties of different kinds.
Unless a change occurs soon we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky. . . .
On September 18th,
Kirby Smith writes to
General Bragg:
The Kentuckians are slow and backward in rallying to our standard.
Their hearts are evidently with us, but their blue-grass and fat-grass are against us. Several regiments are in process of organization, and if we remain long enough recruits will be found for all the disposable arms in our possession.
These letters illustrated why a victory over
Buell was necessary.
Although
Kentucky maintained her neutrality as long as it was possible, the chivalric spirit of her gallant sons was fully manifested at the earliest opportunity — each obeying
only the dictates of his own convictions of duty.
While thousands united their fortunes with the
South, other and more thousands flocked to the standard of the
North.
The proud old families — descendants of the pioneers of the
Commonwealth — each sent sons to do battle in the opposing armies.
Friends, neighbors, kinsmen, and even brothers bade each other adieu--one to the
Northern army, the other to the
Confederate.
15 Wherever daring courage, rare intelligence, extraordinary fertility of resource, or fortitude under privation and suffering were displayed, Kentuckians were conspicuous; and when the fight was over and the battle-rent banner of the vanquished Confede racy
[
14]
furled about its shattered staff was buried in that grave from which a resurrection is no less unwished for than impossible, the survivors of the contest from that State returned to their homes with no feelings of animosity, no brooding hopes of vengeance to be wreaked upon their late opponents.
On October 1st
Buell commenced his march from
Louisville upon
Bragg at
Bardstown.
On September 29th
General Thomas had been assigned by
President Lincoln to the command of the army, but at
Thomas's request the order was revoked, and he was announced in orders as second in command.
Buell organized his infantry into three army corps, of three divisions each.
The First Corps on the left, under
Major-General McCook, marched through
Taylorsville.
The Second Corps, under
Major-General Crittenden, marched through
Mount Washington, and the Third Corps, under
Major-General Gilbert, which formed the
Federal right, took the route by way of
Shepherdsville.
General Sill, of
McCook's corps, reinforced by
Dumont's independent division, marched direct to
Frankfort to threaten
Kirby Smith.
Buell, in his official report, says:
Skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry and artillery marked the movement of each column from within a few miles of Louisville.
It was more stubborn and formidable near Bardstown, but the rear of the enemy's infantry retired from that place eight hours before our arrival, when his rear-guard of cavalry and artillery retreated after a sharp engagement with my cavalry.
The pursuit and skirmishing with the enemy's rear-guard continued toward Springfield.
General Smith prepared to meet
Sill and
Dumont, and on October 2d
Bragg ordered
General Polk to move the entire army from
Bardstown via
Bloomfield toward
Frankfort, and to strike
Sill's column in flank while
Smith met it in front.
For reasons which were afterward explained that order was not complied with, but, on the approach of
Buell,
Polk marched via
Perryville toward
Harrodsburg, where he expected the entire army would be concentrated.
16 General Smith, confronted by
Sill and
Dumont near
Frankfort, had several times on the 6th and 7th called upon
Bragg for reinforcements, and
Withers's division of
Polk's corps was ordered to him. Reports reached
Bragg exaggerating the strength of the movement upon
Frankfort.
He was thus led to believe that the force behind
Polk was not so heavy as represented, and on the evening of October 7th he directed him to form the cavalry and the divisions of
Cheatham,
Buckner, and
Patton Anderson at
Perryville, and vigorously attack the pursuing column.
Since October 1st our cavalry had persistently engaged the two most advanced of
Buell's columns.
The reader should now observe, by the map [p. 6], that
McCook's corps approached
Perryville by the road through
Bloomfield,
Chaplin, and
Mackville, its general direction being nearly south-east.
General Gilbert's corps approached by the road from
Springfield, its general direction being east, but bearing north-east as it approached the town.
Crittenden's corps, accompanied by
General Thomas and preceded by cavalry, having crossed
Gilbert's line of march, was on a road which runs due east from
Lebanon to
Danville.
[
15]
At a point about five miles south-west of
Perryville this road has a branch which turns north-east to that place.
Now remember that our stores and supplies were at
Bryantsville and
Camp Dick Robinson about eighteen miles east of
Perryville, and that
Kirby Smith was at McCown's Ferry, on the
Kentucky River,
en route for
Versailles, menaced by two divisions under
General Sill.
Also observe the important feature that
McCook was at
Mackville during the night of the 7th, at which place a road forks, running east to
Harrodsburg and thence to our depot at
Bryantsville; and also consider that
Mackville was as near
Bryantsville as were our troops in front of
Perryville.
On the 7th our cavalry fought with considerable tenacity, particularly in the evening, when the enemy sought to get possession of the only accessible supply of water.
General Buell, in his report, says:
The advanced guard, consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported toward evening by two regiments of infantry, pressed successfully upon the enemy's rear-guard to within two miles of the town, against a somewhat stubborn opposition.
After dark, at
General Hardee's request, I went to his bivouac and. discussed the plans for the following day. I explained to him the topography of the country and the location of
Buell's columns.
I understood from him that the attack would be made very early the next morning, and I endeavored to impress upon him the great advantage which must follow an early commencement of the action.
An early attack on the 8th would have met only the advance of
Gilbert's corps on the
Springfield road, which was four or five miles nearer to
Perryville than any other Federal troops, and their overthrow could have been accomplished with little loss, while every hour of delay was bringing the rear divisions of the enemy nearer to the front, besides bringing the corps of
McCook and
Crittenden upon the field.
I explained, also, that
Thomas and
Crittenden on the
Lebanon and
Danville road could easily gain our rear, while all our forces were engaged with
McCook and
Gilbert.
For instance, if
Crittenden turned toward
Perryville at the fork five miles from that place, he would march directly in the rear of our troops engaged with
Gilbert's corps.
If he kept on toward
Danville and
Camp Dick Robinson, our position would be turned, and a rapid retreat to our depot of supplies, closely followed by
McCook and
Gilbert, would be the inevitable result.
With equal ease,
McCook, by marching from
Mackville to
Harrodsburg, could reach our depot, thus turning our right flank.
The reader will plainly see that
Perryville was not a proper place for six-teen thousand men to form and await the choice of time and manner of attack by
Buell, with his tremendous army, and that every moment's delay after daylight was lessening the probabilities of advantage to the
Confederates.
The cavalry under my command was pressed forward at dawn on the 8th, and skirmished with the outposts of the enemy, until, on the approach of a Federal brigade of cavalry supported by a line of infantry, we charged, dispersing the cavalry, and, breaking through both infantry and artillery, drove the enemy from their guns and took 140 prisoners.
The Federal army was now being placed in line:
McCook's corps on the left,
Gilbert's in the center, and
Crittenden's corps, which reached the field
[
16]
at 11 o'clock,
17 on the right, its flank being covered by
Edward M. McCook's brigade of cavalry.
The management of the
Federal right wing was under the supervision of
General Thomas.
General Bragg reached
Perryville about 10 o'clock.
General Liddell's brigade, of
Buckner's division, had been advanced with his left near the
Springfield road, and his skirmish line became engaged.
The cavalry on the
Confederate left apparently being able to hold their own against the enemy upon that part of the field,
Cheatham's division, composed of
Donelson's,
Stewart's, and
Maney's brigades, was ordered to the right, where, between 1 and 2 o'clock, with its right supported by cavalry, it moved forward to the attack.
Generals Hardee and
Buckner, seeing
Cheatham fairly in action, ordered
General Bushrod Johnson's and
Cleburne's brigades
forward.
There being considerable space between
Cheatham's left and
Buckner's right,
General John C. Brown's and
Colonel Jones's brigades, of
Anderson's division, and
General S. A. M. Wood's, of
Buckner's division, had been placed in position to fill the vacancy.
Adams's and
Powell's brigades, of
Anderson's division, were to the left of
Buckner, and the line thus arranged with cavalry on both flanks gallantly advanced upon the enemy.
Cheatham was first in action and was almost immediately exposed to a murderous fire of infantry and artillery, which soon spread to the left of our line.
Our artillery, handled with great skill, told fearfully on the enemy, who sought, when practicable, to take shelter behind stone walls and fences.
Fortunately we were enabled to enfilade many of their temporary shelters with a well-directed fire from our batteries, and this, added to our musketry, was so effective that first one regiment, then another, and finally the entire Federal line, gave way before the determined onset of our troops.
[
17]
At one time
Cleburne and
Johnson seemed checked for a moment, as they assailed a very strong position, the fire from which cut down our men and severely wounded
General Cleburne.
But encouraged by the steady advance on both right and left, these troops recovered from the shock, and with increased speed the entire line overran the enemy, capturing three batteries and a number of prisoners.
Among the dead and wounded Federals lay one who, the prisoners told us, was
General James S. Jackson, the commander of one of
McCook's divisions.
General Liddell, who had been placed in reserve, followed the movement, and when the contest became warmest was sent to reinforce
Cheatham, where he did valiant service.
During this sanguinary struggle, our line had advanced nearly a mile.
Prisoners, guns, colors, and the field of battle were ours; not a step which had been gained was yielded.
The enemy, though strongly reinforced, was still broken and disordered.
He held his ground mainly because our troops were too exhausted for further effort.
At one point just at dusk we captured a disorganized body, including a number of brigade and division staff-officers.
Soon darkness came on and we rested on the field thus bravely won.
Our entire force engaged, infantry, cavalry and artillery, was but 16,000 men. Our loss was 510 killed, 2635 wounded, and 251 missing.
Generals S. A. M. Wood and
Cleburne were disabled, and a large proportion of higher officers were killed or wounded.
Three of
General Wood's staff were among the killed.
General Buell lost 916 killed, 2943 wounded, and 489 captured by the
Confederates.
General Jackson, commanding a division, and
General Terrill and
Colonel Webster, commanding brigades, were among the
Federal killed, and
Colonel Lytle was among the wounded.
At every point of battle the
Confederates had been victorious.
We had engaged three corps of the
Federal army;
18 one of these,
McCook's, to use
Buell's language, was “very much crippled,” one division, again to use his language, “having in fact almost entirely disappeared as a body.”
After darkness had closed a battle, it was a custom to send messengers or notes to the nearest generals, detailing results, telling of this or that one who had fallen, and asking information from other portions of the field.
Resting quietly on the ground, the army expected, and would gladly have welcomed, a renewal of the fight on the next day, but the accumulation of
Buell's forces was such as not to justify further conflict in that locality.
Kirby Smith was near
Lawrenceburg with his own troops and
Withers's division, and after full consultation it was determined to march to
Harrodsburg, where it was hoped the entire Confederate force in
Kentucky might be concentrated.
I was directed with the cavalry to prevent an advance on the road leading to
Danville.
At midnight the troops withdrew to
Perryville, and at sunrise continued the march.
It was long after this when the
Federal pickets began to reconnoiter, and it was fully 10 o'clock when, standing on the edge of the town, I saw the advance of the skirmish line of
Buell's army.
Bragg prepared
[
18]
for battle on the
Harrodsburg road, only eight miles from
Perryville, and awaited
Buell's advance.
Two days elapsed, and the
Federal army evinced no disposition to attack.
A division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry fought me back to near
Danville, and at the same time
Buell formed with his right within four miles of that place, making a feint in
Bragg's immediate front on the road leading from
Perryville to
Harrodsburg.
Buell, no doubt, hoped to cut him off from the crossing of the
Dick River near
Camp Dick Robinson.
I sent
General Bragg information of
Buell's dispositions, whereupon he issued orders to his army and wrote me as follows:
Harrodsburg, Ky., October 10th, 1862. Colonel Wheeler.
Dear Colonel: I opened your dispatch to General Polk regarding the enemy's movements.
The information you furnish is very important.
It is just what I needed and I thank you for it. This information leaves no doubt as to the proper course for me to pursue.
Hold the enemy firmly till to-morrow.
Yours, etc., Braxton Bragg.
Bragg had now determined to retreat to
Knoxville by the way of
Cumberland Gap.
It was evident that
Buell's large army would enable him to select his own time and position for battle unless
Bragg chose to attack.
Bragg already had 1500 sick and over 3000 wounded. A severe battle would certainly have increased the wounded to 4000 or 5000 more.
The care of such a number of wounded would have embarrassed, possibly controlled, our movements.
Hardee states that he had but 10,000 men before the
battle of Perryville, and
Bragg said that the three divisions which fought that battle had but 14,500.
If that was correct they had now but 11,000.
It was too hazardous to guard our depot of supplies and contend with the
Federal forces within easy march.
Our wagon trains were immense, and our artillery large in proportion to other arms.
The enemy pushed up close to
Danville on the night of the 10th, but we easily held him in check until all our army had crossed
Dick River.
On the 11th we contended against a force of infantry, which finally pressed us so warmly that we were compelled to retire east of
Danville.
Here the enemy was again driven back, and we held our position near the town.
Before day on the 13th I received the following appointment and instructions in a special order from
General Bragg, dated
Bryantsville:
Colonel Wheeler is hereby appointed chief of cavalry, and is authorized to give orders in the name of the commanding general.
He is charged under Major-General Smith with covering the rear of the army and holding the enemy in check.
All cavalry will report to him and receive his orders.
Compliance with the above of course involved considerable fighting, but by using the cavalry to the best advantage, and adopting available expedients, the movement of our infantry and trains in retreat was unmolested.
These engagements were constant, and were often warmly and bitterly contested.
The large trains of captured stores made the progress of our infantry very slow, and the corps commanders sent frequent admonitions to me urging the
[
19]
importance of persistent resistance to
Buell's advance.
In crossing Big Hill, and at other points, the trains hardly averaged five miles a day, and
General Kirby Smith at one time regarded it as impossible for the cavalry to save them.
In his letter to
Bragg, on the 14th, he says: “I have no hope of saving the whole of my train” ; and in his letter on the 15th he says: “I have little hope of saving any of the trains, and fear much of the artillery will be lost.”
But fortunately nothing was lost.
Our cavalry at times dismounted and fought behind stone fences and hastily erected rail breastworks, and when opportunity offered charged the advancing enemy.
Each expedient was adopted several times each day, and when practicable the road was obstructed by felling timber.
These devices were continually resorted to until the 22d, when the enemy ceased the pursuit, and early in November the cavalry force, which covered the retreat from
Kentucky, reached
middle Tennessee and was close to the enemy, less than ten miles south of
Nashville.
The campaign was over.
Buell was deprived of his command for not having defeated
Bragg, who, in turn, was censured by the
Southern people for his failure to destroy the
Federal army commanded by
Buell.
This campaign was made at a time when the opposing Governments hoped
for more from their generals and armies than could reasonably be accomplished.
The people of the
South were misinformed regarding the resources at the disposal of
Generals Bragg and
Kirby Smith, and our first successes aroused expectations and hopes that the
Kentucky movement would result in the defeat, or at least the discomfiture, of
Buell's army, the possible invasion of the
North, and certainly the recovery of Confederate power in the central and eastern portions of
Kentucky and
Tennessee.
They were sorely disappointed when they heard of
General Bragg's withdrawal through
Cumberland Gap, and could not easily be convinced of the necessity of such a movement immediately following the
battle of Perryville, which they regarded as a decisive victory.
The censure which fell upon
Bragg was therefore severe and almost universal.
It somewhat abated after the prompt advance of the army to
Murfreesboro‘; but to this day there are many who contend that
Bragg should have defeated
Buell and maintained himself in the rich and productive plains of
Kentucky.
On the other hand the
Federal Government was, if possible, more severe in denunciation of
General Buell, and held that, far from allowing
General Bragg to cross the
Tennessee River and the mountains into
middle Tennessee,
Buell should have anticipated these movements, occupied
Chattanooga, and, as some even contended, marched
[
20]
his army toward
Atlanta.
The Government was convinced that he could easily have met and halted
Bragg as he debouched from the mountains before entering
middle Tennessee.
It was emphatic in its assertion that ordinary celerity on the part of
General Buell would have saved
Munfordville and its garrison of 4200 men; that proper concentration would have destroyed the Confederate forces at
Perryville, and that the plainest principles of strategy presented the opportunity of throwing forward a column to cut off
Bragg's retreat via
Camp Dick Robinson, or that at least after the commencement of the conflict at
Perryville he should have pressed close to his antagonist and forced
Bragg to continuous battle, contending, as they did, that superior numbers and proximity to his base gave the
Federal commander advantages that, if properly improved, would have resulted in the destruction of the Confederate army.
Buell's strategy and tactics were the subject of Congressional investigation and inquiry by a military commission.
With regard to the adverse criticisms on
Bragg's campaign it must be admitted that there were opportunities, had they been improved, to cripple, if not to defeat, the
Federal army.
The failure to “concentrate and attack” tells the story of the campaign.
The first opportunity was on September 18th, when we caught
Buell south of
Munfordville.
Bragg could not have attacked at
Altamont, because it will be remembered that on August 30th, at the first appearance of our cavalry, the
Federal force retreated from that place down the mountain.
Neither could he have overtaken
Buell's troops at
McMinnville, because, fully three days before
Bragg could have reached that place,
Buell had ordered all his army to
Murfreesboro‘.
Those who contend that
Bragg should have followed
Buell to
Nashville do not consider that he would have found him in a good position, strengthened by fortifications, and defended by 9 divisions of infantry and 1 of cavalry; his available force for duty then being 66,595.
After the surrender of the
Federal fort at
Munfordville, it became painfully apparent that a single mind should control the
Confederate troops in
Kentucky, and concentrate our entire force and attack the divided enemy; but a condition existed which has been repeated in military operations for four thousand years, and always with disastrous results.
The troops in
Kentucky had two commanders.
The troops of two different departments were expected to cooperate.
Both
Kirby Smith and
Bragg were brave and skillful generals.
The devotion of each to the cause in which they were enlisted was absolute, and their only ambition was to contribute to its success.
In their characters the pettiness of personal rivalry could find no place, and either would willingly have relinquished to the other the honor of being the victor, if the victory could only have been won.
It will be remembered how promptly, in the preceding June,
General Bragg had weakened his own army and strengthened
Smith's by sending
McCown's division from
Tupelo to
Chattanooga, and again in August by sending the brigades of
Cleburne and
Preston Smith from
Chattanooga to
Knoxville;
[
21]
 |
|
Spring near Perryville, which helped to relieve Bragg's parched army.
From a photograph taken in 1885. |
and again, when
Smith was pressed at
Frankfort, that
Bragg reenforced him promptly with one of his best divisions.
That
Kirby Smith would, at any time, have been as ready and prompt to give
Bragg any part or all of his army there can be no doubt, but when the decisive moment came, the two independent armies were more than one
 |
|
Pear-tree, one hundred years old, at the left of Rousseau's position, Perryville.
From a photograph taken in 1885. |
hundred miles apart, and neither commander could be informed of the other's necessities.
Bragg and
Smith conferred together, but neither commanded the other.
If all the troops had belonged to one army,
Bragg would have ordered, and not conferred or requested.
To aggravate the difficulties inherent in the system of independent commands and divided responsibility,
Brigadier-General Marshall, who had commanded in
West Virginia, appeared upon the field of active operations with 2150 men. He was an able and distinguished man and determined in his devotion to the
Confederacy.
He wished to do his full duty, but he appeared to feel that he could render more efficient service with a separate command than if trammeled by subordination to a superior commander; and his aversion to having any intervening power between himself and the
President was apparent.
While
General Smith was anxious to cooperate, he nevertheless, in reply to
Bragg's request for cooperation, wrote indicating very forcibly that he thought other plans were more important; and, in fact, the only cooperative action during the campaign was
Bragg's compliance with
Smith's request to
[
22]
transfer to him two brigades on August 5th, and to transfer
Withers's division to him on October 7th.
In reply to the question as to what one supreme commander could have done, I confidently assert he could have concentrated and attacked and beaten
Buell on September 18th south of
Munfordville.
He could then have turned and marched to
Louisville and taken that city.
If it should be argued that this plan involved unnecessary marching on the part of
Kirby Smith, who was then at
Lexington, a supreme commander could have adopted the one which was contemplated by
Bragg early in the campaign.
19
After the surrender of
Munfordville he could by September 21st have reached
Louisville with all the force in
Kentucky, taken the city, and then risked its being held by a small garrison, while making another concentration and attack upon
Buell.
As an evidence of how easily we could have taken
Louisville, it must be observed that on September 22d
Buell sent
Major-General Nelson orders containing these words:
If you have only the force you speak of it would not, I should say, be advisable for you to attempt a defense of Louisville unless you are strongly intrenched; under no circumstances should you make a fight with his whole or main force.
The alternative would be to cross the river or march on this side to the mouth of Salt River and bridge it so as to form a junction with me. . . .
Nelson seemed to concur with
Buell, and it was not until that officer was but a day's march from
Louisville that
Nelson telegraphed the fact to
General Wright, saying, “
Louisville is now safe; ‘God and Liberty.’
”
In further corroboration of this, “
Harper's history,” p. 311, says:
Just before the Federal army entered Louisville, on the 25th of September, the panic there had reached its height.
In twenty-four hours more Nelson would have abandoned the city.
But suppose neither plan had been adopted, the next chance for a supreme commander of the
Kentucky forces was to “concentrate and attack”
Buell's flank while his army was strung out
en route to
Louisville.
Elizabethtown would have been a good place, and had it been done with vigor about September 23d it certainly would have resulted in victory.
But at this time
General Smith's forces were all moving to
Mount Sterling, 130 miles to the east of that place (
Elizabethtown), and
General Smith was asking, not ordering,
General Marshall to cooperate with him. The next field upon which a supreme commander had an opportunity to concentrate and attack was at
Perryville.
Three hundred cavalry could have played with
Generals Sill and
Dumont around
Frankfort, and every other soldier, except a few
[
23]
scouts, could then have struck
Gilbert's corps as day dawned on the 8th of October.
Since, in the final result, we neither defeated
Buell nor took
Louisville, it is now evident that it was unfortunate
Bragg did not foresee the end immediately after his victory at
Munfordville.
He could certainly have crippled
Buell to some extent as he attempted his hazardous flank movement
en route to
Louisville, and then, by a rapid march, he could have reached and captured
Nashville and returned and established himself at
Bowling Green.
I have pointed out these lost opportunities as an additional proof of the adage, as old as war itself, “that one bad general is better than two good ones.”
The very fact that both the generals are good intensifies the evil; each, full of confidence in himself and determined to attain what he has in view, is unwilling to yield to any one; but if both are weak the natural indisposition of such men to exertion, their anxiety to avoid responsibility, and their desire in a great crisis to lean on some one, will frequently bring about the junction of two independent armies without any
 |
|
Corner of the Confederate Cemetery at Perryville.
From a photograph taken in 1886.
The cemetery is situated on a knoll a few rods south-east of the hill on which General J. S. Jackson was killed.
After the battle Squire Henry P. Bottom offered the friends of the Confederates any plot of ground they might choose on his farm for a burial spot.
They chose this knoll because their dead lay thickest near its eastern slope.
In the autumn of 1886 a fragment of a lime-stone wall was visible above the weeds.
At that time Squire Bottom said that 435 Confederates were buried here, of whom about 100 were identified.
Only one headstone was to be found, and that bore the name of Samuel H. Ransom, of the 1st Tenn., and was placed there by his wife.
Several officers were buried with the unidentified dead.--editors. |
deliberately planned concert of action between the commanders.
Both
Bragg and
Kirby Smith were men who had, to an eminent degree, those qualities that make good generals, and, once together with their armies upon the same field, victory would have been certain.
Both fully appreciated the fact that, when an adversary is not intrenched, a determined attack is the beginning of victory.
By this means
Smith had been victorious at
Manassas and at
Richmond, Ky., and by vigorous attack
Albert Sidney Johnston and
Bragg had won at every point of
battle at Shiloh, on the 6th of April.
Later, the
Confederate points of attack were
Bragg's scene of victory the first day at
Murfreesboro‘, and the boldness of his onset gave
Bragg his great triumph at
Chickamauga.
Nothing was therefore wanting in
Kentucky but absolute authority in one responsible commander.
Cooperation of the most cordial character is a poor substitute.
The word cooperation should be stricken from military phraseology.
In writing to the
Government on August 1st, after he had met
General Smith,
General Bragg says: “We have arranged measures for mutual support
[
24]
[
25]
 |
|
Defense of Cage's Ford, on the Cumberland River, near Gallatin, November 21, 1862.
from a Lithograph.
Colonel Basil W. Duke, with a, detachment of General John H. Morgan's Confederate cavalry, and of infantry, approached Cage's Ford at daybreak of November 21, 1862, hoping to surprise the 31st Ohio regiment, which had been encamped on the south side of the Cumberland.
Finding that the Union troops had changed their camp to the north side, the Confederates threw shells from two 12-pounder howitzers until their cannoneers were driven from the pieces by the musketry fire of the Ohioans, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lister, three of whom were wounded.
The Confederates made no serious attempt to cross, and soon withdrew.--editors. |
port and effective cooperation.”
On August 8th
Bragg writes to
Smith: “I find myself in your department; without explanation this might seem an unjustifiable intrusion.”
While it is no doubt true that
General Smith was at all times willing to yield to the authority of
General Bragg, yet the fact that
Smith was the commander of an independent department, receiving orders from and reporting directly to the
President, made him primarily responsible to the
Executive, and this limited the authority of
General Bragg.
Nevertheless the
Kentucky campaign was attended with great results to the
Confederacy.
Two months of marches and battle by the armies of
Bragg and
Smith had cost the
Federals a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners of 26,530.
We had captured 35 cannon, 16,000 stand of arms, millions of rounds of ammunition, 1700 mules, 300 wagons loaded with military stores, and 2000 horses.
We had recovered
Cumberland Gap and redeemed
middle Tennessee and
north Alabama.
Yet expectations had been excited that were not realized, and hopes had been cherished that were disappointed; and therefore this campaign of repeated triumphs, without a single reverse, has never received — save from the thoughtful, intelligent, and impartial minority — any proper recognition.
