by Henry J. Hunt, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A., chief of artillery, A. P.
In view of the successes gained on the second day,
General Lee resolved to renew his efforts.
These successes were:
1st.
On the right, the lodgment at the bases of the
Round Tops, the possession of Devil's Den and its woods, and the ridges on the
Emmitsburg road, which gave him the coveted positions for his artillery.
2d.
On the left, the occupation of part of the intrenchments of the Twelfth Corps, with an outlet to the
Baltimore pike, by which all our lines could be taken in reverse.
3d.
At the center, the partial success of three of
Anderson's brigades in penetrating our lines, from which they were expelled only because they lacked proper support.
It was thought that better concert of action might have made good a lodgment here also.
Both armies had indeed lost heavily, but the account in that respect seemed in favor of the
Confederates, or at worst balanced.
Pickett's and
Edward Johnson's divisions were fresh, as were
Posey's and
Mahone's brigades of
R. H. Anderson's, and
William Smith's brigade of
Early's division.
These could be depended upon for an assault.; the others could be used as supports, and to follow up a success.
The artillery was almost intact.
Stuart had arrived with his cavalry, excepting the brigades of
Jones and
Robertson, guarding the communications; and
Imboden had also come up.
General Lee, therefore, directed the renewal of operations both on the right and left.
Ewell had been ordered to attack at daylight on July 3d, and during the night reenforced
Johnson with
Smith's, Daniel's, and
O'Neal's brigades.
Johnson had made his preparations, and was about moving, when at dawn
Williams's artillery opened upon him, preparatory to an assault by
Geary and
Ruger for the recovery of their works.
The suspension of this fire was followed by an immediate advance by both sides.
A conflict ensued which lasted with varying success until near 11 o'clock, during which the
Confederates were driven
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out of the
Union intrenchments by
Geary and
Ruger, aided by
Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Corps.
They made one or two attempts to regain possession, but were unsuccessful, and a demonstration to turn
Johnson's left caused him to withdraw his command to
Rock Creek.
At the close of the war the scene of this conflict was covered by a forest of dead trees, leaden bullets proving as fatal to them as to the soldiers whose bodies were thickly strewn beneath them.
Longstreet's arrangements had been made to attack
Round Top, and his orders issued with a view to turning it, when
General Lee decided that the assault should be made on
Cemetery Ridge by
Pickett's and
Pettigrew's divisions, with part of
Trimble's.
Longstreet formed these in two lines —
Pickett on the right, supported by
Wilcox;
Pettigrew on the left, with
Lane's and
Scales's brigades under
Trimble in the second line.
Hill was ordered to hold his line with the remainder of his corps,--six brigades,--give
Longstreet assistance if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.
Finally a powerful artillery force, about one hundred and fifty guns, was ordered to prepare the way for the assault by cannonade.
The necessary arrangements caused delay, and before notice of this could be received by
Ewell,
Johnson, as we have seen, was attacked, so that the contest was over on the left before that at the center was begun.
The hoped — for concert of action in the
Confederate attacks was lost from the beginning.
On the
Federal side
Hancock's corps held
Cemetery Ridge with
Robinson's division, First Corps, on
Hays's right in support, and
Doubleday's at the
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Steuart's Brigade renewing the Confederate attack on Culp's Hill, morning of the Third day. |
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The 29th Pennsylvania forming line of battle on Culp's Hill at 10 A. M., July 3. |
angle between
Gibbon and
Caldwell.
General Newton, having been assigned to the command of the First Corps,
vice Reynolds, was now in charge of the ridge held by
Caldwell.
Compactly arranged on its crest was
McGilvery's artillery, forty-one guns, consisting of his own batteries, reenforced by others from the Artillery Reserve.
Well — to the right, in front of
Hays and
Gibbon, was the artillery of the Second Corps under its chief,
Captain Hazard.
Woodruff's battery was in front of Ziegler's Grove; on his left, in succession,
Arnold's
Rhode Island,
Cushing's
United States,
Brown's
Rhode Island, and
Rorty's New York.
In the fight of the preceding day the two last-named batteries had been to the front and suffered severely.
Lieutenant T. Fred Brown was severely wounded, and his command devolved on
Lieutenant Perrin.
So great had been the loss in men and horses that they were now of four guns each, reducing the total number in the corps to twenty-six.
Daniels's battery of horse artillery, four guns, was at the angle.
Cowan's 1st New York battery, six rifles, was placed on the left of
Rorty's soon after the cannonade commenced.
In addition, some of the guns on
Cemetery Hill, and
Rittenhouse's on
Little Round Top, could be brought to bear, but these were offset by batteries similarly placed on the flanks of the enemy, so that on the Second Corps line, within the space of a mile, were 77 guns to oppose nearly 150.
They were on an open crest plainly visible from all parts of the opposite line.
Between 10 and 11 A. M., everything looking favorable at
Culp's Hill, I crossed over to
Cemetery Ridge, to see what might be going on at other points.
Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes.
Our whole front for
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two miles was covered by batteries already in line or going into position.
They stretched — apparently in one unbroken mass — from opposite the town to the
Peach Orchard, which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which were pl anted thick with cannon.
Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely, if ever, abroad.
What did it mean?
It might possibly be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid
Ewell, or to guard against a counter-stroke from us, but it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the half mile of open ground which was beyond our effective musketry fire.
With such an object the cannonade would be long and followed immediately by the assault, their whole army being held in readiness to follow up a success.
From the great extent of ground occupied by the enemy's batteries, it was evident that all the artillery on our west front, whether of the army corps or the reserve, must concur as a
unit, under the
chief of artillery, in the defense.
This is provided for in all well-organized armies by special
rules, which formerly were contained in our own army regulations, but they had been condensed in successive editions into a few short lines, so obscure as to be virtually worthless, because, like the rudimentary toe of the dog's paw, they had become, from lack of use, mere survivals — unintelligible except to the specialist.
It was of the first importance to subject the enemy's infantry, from the first moment of their advance, to such a cross-fire of our artillery as would break their formation, check their impulse, and drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in such condition as to make them an easy prey.
There was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to
General Meade, and beginning on the right, I instructed the chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to withhold their fire for fifteen or twenty minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive to us — but slowly, so that when the enemy's ammunition was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the assault.
I had just given these orders to the last battery on
Little Round Top, when the signal-gun was fired, and the enemy opened with all his guns.
From that point the scene was indescribably grand.
All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accompaniment
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Gettysburg from Culp's Hill.
From a photograph taken about 1886. |
paniment to the deep roar of the guns.
Thence I rode to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the cannonade ceased; but both the reserve and the train had gone to a safer place.
Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them; then I returned to the ridge.
Turning into the
Taneytown pike, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had “decamped,” in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of a hill, but which the shells had managed to search out. In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge than on its crest, which I soon reached at the position occupied by
General Newton behind
McGilvery's batteries, from which we had a fine view as all our own guns were now in action.
Most of the enemy's projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the
Confederates--a mere waste of ammunition, for everything here could seek shelter.
And just here an incident already published may be repeated, as it illustrates a peculiar feature of civil war.
Colonel Long, who was at the time on
General Lee's staff, had a few years before served in my mounted battery expressly to receive a course of instruction in the use of field-artillery.
At
Appomattox we spent several hours together, and in the course of conversation I told him I was not satisfied with the conduct of this cannonade which I had heard was under his direction, inasmuch as he had not done justice to his instruction; that his fire, instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as it ought to have been, and as I expected it would be, was scattered over
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the whole field.
He was amused at the criticism and said: “I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the fire became so scattered, wondered what you would think about it!”
I now rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries.
The infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the crest, in open ranks, waiting events.
As I passed along, a bolt from a rifle-gun struck the ground just in front of a man of the front rank, penetrated the surface and passed under him, throwing
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Monument of the 2d Massachusetts infantry, facing the east base of Culp's Hill. |
him “over and over.”
He fell behind the rear rank, apparently dead, and a ridge of earth where he had been lying reminded me of the backwoods practice of “barking” squirrels.
Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests I found that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to
General Meade to advise its immediate cessation and preparation for the assault which would certainly follow.
The headquarters building, immediately behind the ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of the staff lay dead.
Being told that the general had gone to the cemetery, I proceeded thither.
He was not there, and on telling
General Howard my object, he concurred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge, ordering the fire to cease.
This was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impression that he had silenced our guns, and almost immediately his infantry came out of the woods and formed for the assault.
On my way to the
Taneytown road to meet the fresh batteries which I had ordered up, I met
Major Bingham, of
Hancock's staff.
who informed me that (oenp ral
Meade's aides were seeking me with orders to “cease firing” ; so I had only anticipated his wishes.
The batteries were found and brought up, and
Fitzhugh's,
Weir's, and
Parsons's were put in near the clump of trees.
Brown's and
Arnold's batteries had been so crippled that they were now withdrawn, and
Brown's was replaced by
Cowan's. Meantime the enemy advanced, and
McGilvery opened a destructive oblique fire, reenforced by that of
Rittenhouse's six rifle-guns from
Round Top, which were served with remarkable accuracy, enfilading
Pickett's lines.
The Confederate approach was magnificent, and excited our admiration; but the story of that charge is so well
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Slocum's headquarters, power's Hill. |
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known that I need not dwell upon it further than as it concerns my own command.
The steady fire from
McGilvery and
Rittenhouse, on their right, caused
Pickett's men to “drift” in the opposite direction, so that the weight of the assault fell upon the positions occupied by
Hazard's batteries.
I had counted on an artillery cross-fire that would stop it before it reached our lines, but, except a few shots here and there,
Hazard's batteries were silent until the enemy came within canister range.
They had unfortunately exhausted their long range projectiles during the cannonade, under the orders of their corps commander, and it was too late to replace them.
Had my
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Menchey's Spring, between Gulp's Hill and the Cemetery gate. |
instructions been followed here, as they were by
McGilvery, I do not believe that
Pickett's division would have reached our line.
We lost not only the fire of one-third of our guns, but the resulting cross-fire, which would have doubled its value.
The prime fault was in the obscurity of our army regulations as to the artillery, and the absence of all regulations as to the proper relations of the different arms of service to one
another.
On this occasion it cost us much blood, many lives, and for a moment endangered the integrity of our line if not the success of the battle.
Soon after
Pickett's repulse,
Wilcox's,
Wright's, and
Perry's brigades were moved forward, but under the fire of the fresh batteries in
Gibbon's front, of
McGilvery's and
Rittenhouse's guns and the advance of two regiments of
Stannard's Vermont brigade, they soon fell back.
The losses in the batteries of the Second Corps were very heavy.
Of the five battery commanders and their successors on the field,
Rorty,
Cushing, and
Woodruff were killed, and
Milne was mortally and
Sheldon severely wounded at their guns.
So great was the destruction of men and horses, that
Cushing's and
Woodruff's
United States, and
Brown's and
Arnold's Rhode Island batteries were consolidated to form two serviceable ones.
The advance of the Confederate brigades to cover
Pickett's retreat showed that the enemy's line opposite
Cemetery Ridge was occupied by infantry.
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Our own line on the ridge was in more or less disorder, as the result of the conflict, and in no condition to advance a sufficient force for a counterassault.
The largest bodies of organized troops available were on the left, and
General Meade now proceeded to
Round Top and pushed out skirmishers to feel the enemy in its front.
An advance to the
Plum Run line, of the troops behind it, would have brought them directly in front of the numerous batteries which crowned the
Emmitsburg Ridge, commanding that line and all the intervening ground; a farther advance, to the attack, would have brought them under additional heavy flank fires.
McCandless's brigade, supported by
Nevin's, was, however, pushed forward, under cover of the woods, which protected them from the fire of all these batteries; it crossed the Wheat-field, cleared the woods, and had an encounter with a portion of
Benning's brigade, which was retiring.
Hood's and
McLaws's divisions were falling back under
Longstreet's orders to their strong position, resting on
Peach Orchard and covering
Hill's line.
It needs but a moment's examination of the official map to see that our troops on the left were locked up. As to the center,
Pickett's and
Pettigrew's assaulting divisions had formed no part of
A. P. Hill's line, which was virtually intact.
The idea that there must have been “a gap of at least a mile” in that line, made by throwing forward these divisions, and that a prompt advance
from
Cemetery Ridge would have given us the line, or the artillery in front of it, was a delusion.
A prompt counter-charge after a combat between two small bodies of men is one thing; the change from the defensive to the offensive of an army, after an engagement at a single
point, is quite another.
This was not a “
Waterloo defeat” with a fresh army to follow it up, and to have made such a change to the offensive, on the assumption that
Lee had made no provision against a reverse, would have been rash in the extreme.
An advance of 20,000 men from
Cemetery Ridge in the face of the 140 guns then in position would have been stark madness; an immediate advance from any point, in force, was simply impracticable, and before due preparation could have been made for a change to the offensive, the favorable moment — had any resulted from the repulse — would have passed away.
Whilst the main battle was raging, sharp cavalry combats took place on both flanks of the army.
On the left the principal incident was an attack made by order of
General Kilpatrick on infantry and artillery in woods and behind stone fences, which resulted in considerable losses, and especially in the death of
General Farnsworth, a gallant and promising officer who had but a few days before been appointed brigadier-general and had not yet received his commission.
On the right an affair of some magnitude took
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Pickett's charge, I.--looking down the Union lines from the “clump of trees.”
General Hancock and staff are seen in the left center of the picture.--This and the two pictures that follow are from the Cyclorama of Gettysburg, by permission of the National Panorama Company. |
place between
Stuart's command of four and
Gregg's of three brigades; but
Jenkins's Confederate brigade was soon thrown out of action from lack of ammunition, and two only of
Gregg's were engaged.
Stuart had been ordered to cover
Ewell's left and was proceeding toward the
Baltimore pike, where he hoped to create a diversion in aid of the Confederate infantry, and in case of
Pickett's success to fall upon the retreating Federal troops.
From near Cress's Ridge, two and a half miles east of
Gettysburg,
Stuart commanded a view of the roads in rear of the
Federal lines.
On its northern wooded end he posted
Jackson's battery, and took possession of the Rummel
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farm-buildings, a few hundred yards distant.
Hampton and
Fitzhugh Lee were on his left, covered by the wood,
Jenkins and
Chambliss on the right, along the ridge.
Half a mile east on a low parallel ridge, the southern part of which bending west toward Cress's Ridge furnished excellent positions for artillery, was the
Federal cavalry brigade of
McIntosh, who now sent a force toward
Rummel's, from which a strong body of skirmishers was thrown to meet them, and the battery opened.
McIntosh now demanded reenforcements, and
Gregg, then near the
Baltimore pike, brought him
Custer's brigade and
Pennington's and
Randol's batteries.
The artillery soon drove the
Confederates out of
Rummel's, and compelled
Jackson's Virginia battery to leave the ridge.
Both sides brought up reenforcements and the battle swayed from side to side of the interval.
Finally the
Federals were pressed back, and
Lee and
Hampton, emerging from the wood, charged, sword in hand, facing a destructive artillery fire — for the falling back of the cavalry had uncovered our batteries.
The assailants were met by
Custer's and such other mounted squadrons as could be thrown in; a
melee ensued, in which
Hampton was severely wounded and the charge repulsed.
Breathed's and
McGregor's Confederate batteries had replaced
Jackson's, a sharp artillery duel took place, and at nightfall each side held substantially its original ground.
Both sides claim to have held the
Rummel house.
The advantage was decidedly with the
Federals, who had foiled
Stuart's plans.
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Pickett's charge, III.--(continuation of the picture on P. 378.) from the Gettysburg Cyclorama. |
Thus the
battle of Gettysburg closed as it had opened, with a very creditable cavalry battle.
General Lee now abandoned the attempt to dislodge
Meade, intrenched a line from
Oak Hill to
Peach Orchard, started all his
impedimenta to the
Potomac in advance, and followed with his army on the night of July 4th, via
Fairfield.
This compelled
Meade to take the circuitous routes through the lower passes; and the strategic advantage to
Lee and disadvantage to
Meade of
Gettysburg were made manifest.
General Meade has been accused of slowness in the pursuit.
The charge is not well founded; he lost no time in commencing, or vigor in pushing, it. As early as the morning of the 4th he ordered French at
Frederick to seize and hold the lower passes, and he put all the cavalry except
Gregg's and
McIntosh's brigades in motion to harass the enemy's anticipated retreat, and to destroy his trains and bridges at
Williamsport.
It stormed heavily that day, and the care of the wounded and burial of the dead proceeded whilst the enemy's line was being reconnoitered.
As soon, on the 5th, as it was certain that
Lee was retreating,
Gregg was started in pursuit on the
Chambersburg pike, and the infantry — now reduced to a little over 47,000 effectives, short of ammunition and supplies — by the lower passes.
The Sixth Corps taking the
Hagerstown road,
Sedgwick reported the
Fairfield pass fortified, a large force present, and that a fight could be had; upon which, on the 6th,
Meade halted the rest of the infantry and ordered two corps to his support, but soon learning that although the pass could be carried it would cause too much delay, he resumed the march, leaving
McIntosh and a brigade of the Sixth
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Inside Evergreen Cemetery, Cemetery Hill.
From a War-time sketch. |
Corps to follow the enemy through the
Fairfield pass.
On the evening of the 4th--both armies being still in position at
Gettysburg —
Kilpatrick had a sharp encounter with the enemy in Monterey pass, and this was followed by daily cavalry combats on the different routes, in which much damage was done to trains and many captures of wagons, caissons, and prisoners effected.
On the 5th, whilst
Lee was moving through the passes, French destroyed the pontoon-bridge at
Falling Waters.
On the 6th--as
Meade was leaving
Gettysburg —
Buford attacked at
Williamsport and
Kilpatrick toward
Hagerstown, on his right, but as
Imboden's train guard was strong,
Stuart was up, and
Longstreet close by, they had to withdraw.
[See p. 427.] The enemy proceeded to construct a new bridge and intrench a strong line covering
Williamsport and
Falling Waters.
There were heavy rains on the 7th and 8th, but the infantry corps reached
Middleton on the morning of the 9th, received supplies, crossed the mountains that day, and at its close the right was at
Boonsboro‘, and the left at
Rohrersville, on the roads to
Hagerstown and
Williamsport.
By this time the
Potomac was swollen and impassable.
On the 10th
Meade continued his advance, and received information that the enemy had occupied a line extending from near
Falling Waters, through
Downsville to
Funkstown, which he was intrenching.
This at 1 P. M. he reported to
Halleck, informing him at the same time that his cavalry had driven that of
Lee to within a mile of
Funkstown, and that he would next day move cautiously until he had developed the enemy's force and position.
Halleck, at 9 P. M., sent him a cipher dispatch as follows:
I think it will be best for you to postpone a general battle till you can concentrate all your forces and get up your reserves and reinforcements; I will push on the troops as fast as they arrive.
It would be well to have staff-officers at the Monocacy, to direct the troops arriving where to go, and to see that they are properly fitted out. They should join you by forced marches.
Beware of partial combats.
Bring up and hurl upon the enemy all your forces, good and bad.
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Map 21: July 4th. |
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Map 22: July 5th. |
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Map 23: July 6th. |
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Map 24: July 7th. |
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Map 25: July 8th. |
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Map 26: July 9th. |
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Map 27: July 11th. |
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Map 28: July 13th. |
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Map 29: July 14th. |
Meade, fully alive to the importance of striking
Lee before he could cross the
Potomac, disregarded this, advanced on the 11th, and on the 12th pushed forward reconnoissances to feel the enemy.
After a partial examination made by himself and his chiefs of staff and of engineers, which showed that its flanks could not be turned, and that the line, so far as seen by them, presented no vulnerable points, he determined to make a demonstration in force on the next morning, the 13th, supported by the whole army, and to attack if a prospect of success offered.
On assembling his corps commanders, however, he found their opinion so adverse that he postponed it for further examination, after which he issued the order for the next day, the 14th.
On advancing that morning, it was found that the enemy had abandoned his line and crossed the river, partly by fording, partly by a new bridge.
A careful survey of the enemy's intrenched line after it was abandoned justified the opinion of the corps commanders against an attack, as it showed that an assault would have been disastrous to us. It proved also that
Meade in overriding that opinion did not shrink from a great responsibility, notwithstanding his own recent experience at
Gettysburg, where all the enemy's attacks on even partially intrenched lines had failed.
If he erred on this occasion it was on the side of temerity.
But the hopes and expectations excited by the victory of
Gettysburg were as unreasonable as the fears that had preceded it; and great was the disappointment
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that followed the “escape” of
Lee's army.
It was promptly manifested, too, and in a manner which indicates how harshly and unjustly the Army of the Potomac and its commanders were usually judged and treated; and what trials the latter had to undergo whilst subjected to the meddling and hectoring of a distant superior, from which they were not freed until the general-in-chief accompanied them in the field.
On the day following
Lee's withdrawal, before it was possible that all the circumstances could be known, three dispatches passed between the respective headquarters.
First. Halleck to
Meade July 14th (in part):
I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore.
Second. Meade to
Halleck July 14th:
Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President conveyed in your dispatch of 1 P. M. this day, is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army.
Third. Halleck to
Meade July 14th:
“My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit.
It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved.”2
Whatever the object of these dispatches of
General Halleck, they are perfectly consistent with a determination on the part of the War Department to
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Confederate prisoners on the Baltimore pike.
From a War-time sketch. |
discredit under all circumstances the Army of the Potomac and any commander identified with it,--and that was the effect in this case.
The losses of both armies were very large.
The revised returns show for the Army of the Potomac: killed, 3072; wounded, 14,497; missing, 5434,--total, 23,003; and for the Army of Northern Virginia: killed, 2592; wounded, 12,709; missing, 5150,--total, 20,451.
But the returns for the latter army are not complete; some commands are not reported, and in others the regimental show larger losses than do the brigade returns from which the foregoing numbers are compiled.
As to the comparative strength of the two armies on the field of battle, we have no satisfactory data.
The last Confederate return was for May 31st, showing “Present for duty, under arms,” 59,484, infantry.
The morning report of the Army of the Potomac for June 30th shows “Present for duty, equipped,” 77,208, infantry.
Neither return is worth much except as a basis
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for guessing; the long marches, followed by the forced ones of July 1-2, of the Army of the Potomac left thousands of stragglers on the roads.
These totals are of little importance; they would have been of some significance had the larger army been defeated; but it was not. At the “points of contact” the
Confederates were almost always the stronger.
On July 1st 18,000 Federal combatants contended against at least 25,000 Confederates, and got the worst of it. On July 2d
Longstreet's 15,000 overcame
Sickles's 10,000, and had to halt when a larger force was opposed to them.
Williams's Twelfth Corps retook its works from a larger body of
Ewell's troops, for at the contested point they were opposed by an inferior number; and then held them, for
Johnson's superior force was as much hampered here by the nature of the ground as was
Meade's on the left, the evening before.
In many respects the
Confederates had the advantage: they had much better ground for their artillery; they were fresher; they were all veterans; they were better organized; they were commanded by officers who had been selected for their experience and abilities, and in whom they had implicit confidence.
These were enormous advantages, sufficient to counterbalance the difference of numbers, which, if any existed, was small; and whilst all the Confederate army, except here and there a brigade, were fought to the utmost, the strongest Federal corps (the Sixth) was hardly in action, the total loss of its eight brigades being but two hundred and forty-two killed, wounded, and missing. But the Southerners were subjected here to the disa dvantages that the Northerners had to contend with in
Virginia: they were surrounded by enemies, not friends who supplied them with aid and information; and they were not by choice, but by necessity, the assailants on the chosen ground of their opponents.
Right gallantly did they act their part, and their failure carried no discredit with it. Their military honor was not tarnished by their defeat, nor their spirit lowered, but their respect for their opponents was restored to what it had been before
Fredericksburg and
Chancellorsville.
