The reason given by
General Polk for the delay in attack on the morning of September 20th, 1863, was that
General Hill's corps was not ready for the assault.
General Polk sent
General Hill an order at midnight to attack at daylight, but
General Hill could not be found (either on his line of battle or at Tedford's Ford, where his headquarters were reported to be). Upon learning this fact
General Polk issued an order, dated 5:30 A. M., direct to
Hill's division commanders to attack as soon as they could get into position.
This second order was delivered in the presence of
General Hill by
Captain Wheless soon after sunrise, about 6:15. To this
General Hill replied that his men were getting rations and that he would not be ready to move for an hour or more.
General Polk reported this reply to
General Bragg, in a note dated 7 A. M., and stated that the attack would be made as soon as
General Hill was ready.
This, of course, conflicts with the time given by
General Hill for the reception of the second order, viz., 7:25 A. M. These facts are derived from the official statements of
General Polk,
Captain Wheless, and of
John H. Fisher, on file in the
War Records office.
As to the whereabouts of
General Polk, on the morning of the 20th:
General Polk left his camp at
Alexander's Bridge, 1200 yards in rear of his line, between daylight and sunrise, and, as is shown by the statement of
General Cheatham ( “
Official Records” ), was on the line of battle at sunrise, where he remained and where he first met
General Bragg (
Captain Wheless, “
Official Records” ). These facts I state from my personal knowledge.
General Bragg's statement that
General Polk
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was away from his line of battle at this time was not derived from his own knowledge, but from a statement of one of his staff-officers, as is shown in the following extract from an unpublished private letter from
General Bragg, dated
Mobile, February 8th, 1873:
The staff-officer sent to General Polk (Major Lee, A. I. G.) to urge his compliance with the orders of the previous night, reported to me that he found him at a farmhouse, three miles from the line of his troops, about one hour after sunrise, sitting on the gallery reading a newspaper, and waiting as he (the general) said, for his breakfast.
The facts of the records above quoted are sufficient answer to this absurd statement.
But I can add further that I saw
Major Lee when he delivered
General Bragg's message to
General Polk, at his (
Polk's) camp in the woods, at
Alexander's Bridge, 1200 yards from his line, before sunrise.
General Polk was then preparing to mount his horse.
I will also add of my own knowledge that
General Polk had ridden from one end of his line to the other, and had met
General Hill and each of the division commanders before
General Bragg came upon his line of battle.
They met on the line about 7:45 A. M.
As to the failure to attack on the 13th, the object of
Polk's movement was to intercept
Crittenden before he should cross to the west side of the
Chickamauga and unite with other portions of
Roseerans's army.
Polk was told that he would find
Crittenden east of the creek about Pea Vine Church on the
Graysville road, and was directed to attack him there at daylight of the 13th.
He moved as ordered and found no enemy,
Crittenden having crossed to the west of the creek the evening before.
General Bragg in his report neglects to take this fact into account, and thus leaves the impression that
Crittenden's escape was due to
Polk's tardiness in moving rather than to his own tardiness in ordering the movement.
It should have been ordered for the morning of the 12th.
