by Jubal A. Early, Lieutenant-General, C. S. A.
The object of my presence in the lower valley during the two months after our return from
Washington2 was to keep up a threatening attitude toward
Maryland and
Pennsylvania, and prevent the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as well as to keep as large a force as possible from
Grant's army to defend the
Federal capital.
Had
Sheridan, by a prompt movement, thrown his whole force on the line of my communications, I would have been compelled to attempt to cut my way through, as there was no escape for me to the right or left, and my force was too weak to cross the
Potomac while he was in my rear.
If I had moved up the valley at all, I could not have stopped short of
New Market, for between that place and the country in which I was there was no forage for my horses; and this would have enabled the enemy to resume the use of the railroad and canal, and return all the troops from
Grant's army to him. Being compelled to occupy the position where I was, and being aware of its danger as well as apprised of the fact that very great odds were opposed to me, my only resource was to use my forces so as to display them at different points with great rapidity, and thereby keep up the impression that they were much larger than they really were.
The events of the last month had satisfied me that the commander opposed to me was without enterprise, and possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity.
Having been informed that a force was at work on the railroad at
Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of September, with
Rodes's and
Gordon's divisions and
Braxton's artillery, to
Bunker Hill, and on the morning of the 18th, with
Gordon's division and a part of the artillery, to
Martinsburg, preceded by a part of
Lomax's cavalry.
Averell's division of cavalry was driven from the town across the
Opequon in the direction
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of
Charlestown, and we then returned to
Bunker Hill.
Gordon was left at
Bunker Hill, with orders to move to Stephenson's Depot by sunrise next morning, and
Rodes's division moved to the latter place that night, to which I also returned.
At
Martinsburg, where the enemy had a telegraph office, I learned that
Grant was with
Sheridan that day, and I expected an early move.
At light on the morning of the 19th our cavalry pickets at the crossing of the
Opequon on the
Berryville road were driven in, and
Ramseur's troops, which were in line across the
Berryville road about one and one-half miles out from
Winchester, on an elevated plateau between
Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run, were soon skirmishing with the enemy.
Nelson's artillery was on
Ramseur's line, and
Lomax's cavalry occupied the right and
Fitz Lee the left.
I sent orders for
Breckinridge and
Rodes to move up as rapidly as possible.
Gordon's division arrived first, at a little after 10 A. M., and was placed on
Ramseur's left, and
Rodes was then placed on
Gordon's right, both under cover of woods.
While this movement was being executed, we discovered very heavy columns of the enemy, which had been massed under cover between the
Red Bud and the
Berryville road, moving to attack
Ramseur on his left flank, while another force pressed him in front.
Rodes and
Gordon were ordered forward and attacked with great vigor, while Nelson's artillery on the right and
Braxton's on the left opened a destructive fire.
But
Evans's brigade of
Gordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our infantry, received a check from a column of the enemy, and was forced back through the woods from behind which it had advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the woods, and to within musket range of seven pieces of
Braxton's artillery which were without support.
This caused a pause in our advance, and the position was most critical, for it was apparent that unless this force were driven back the day was lost.
Braxton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood their ground, and under the personal superintendence of
Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Braxton and
Colonel T. H. Carter, then my chief-of-artillery, opened with canister on the enemy.
This fire was so rapid and well-directed that the enemy staggered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle-flag on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister shot.
Just then
Battle's brigade of
Rodes's division, which had arrived and been formed in line for the purpose of advancing to the support of the rest of the division, moved forward and swept through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while
Evans's brigade was rallied and brought back to the charge.
Our advance, which had been suspended for a moment, was resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns were thrown into great confusion and driven from the field.
Lomax and
Lee had aided, while
Ramseur had received the enemy's shock and recovered.
This affair had occurred about 11 A. M., and a splendid victory had been gained.
But on our side
Major-General Rodes had been killed, in the very moment of triumph, while conducting the attack of his division with great gallantry and skill, and this was a heavy blow to me.
Brigadier-General A. C. Godwin of
Ramseur's division had been killed, and
Brigadier-General Zebulon York of
Gordon's division had lost an arm.
When the order was sent for the troops to move from Stephenson's Depot,
General Breckinridge had moved to the front, with
Wharton's division and
King's artillery, to meet a cavalry force which had driven our pickets from the
Opequon on the
Charlestown road, and that division had become heavily engaged with the enemy, and had sustained and repulsed several determined charges of his cavalry, while its own flanks were in great danger from the enemy's main force on the right, and a column of his cavalry moving up the
Martinsburg road on the left.
After much difficulty and some hard fighting
General Breckinridge succeeded in extricating his force and moving up the
Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the field until about 2 o'clock. Late in the afternoon two divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in. the small force which had been watching it on the
Martinsburg road, and
Crook's corps, which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time on that flank, on the north side of the
Red Bud, and before this overwhelming force
Patton's brigade of infantry and
Payne's brigade of cavalry, under
Fitz Lee, were forced back.
A considerable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along the
Martinsburg road to the very skirts of
Winchester, thus getting in the rear of our left flank.
Wharton's two other brigades were moved in double-quick time to the left and rear, and twice repulsed the cavalry.
But
Crook advanced against our left, and again the enemy's cavalry succeeded in getting around our left, so that nothing was left for us but to retire through
Winchester; and
Ramseur's division, which maintained its organization, was moved on the east of the town to the south side of it, and put in position, forming the basis for a new line, while the other troops moved back through the town.
Wickham's brigade, with some pieces of horse artillery on
Fort Hill, covered this movement and checked the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry.
When the new line was formed the enemy's advance was checked until night-fall, and we then retired to
Newtown without serious molestation.
Lomax had held the enemy's cavalry on the
Front Royal road in check, and a feeble attempt at pursuit was repulsed by
Ramseur near
Kernstown.
A skillful and energetic commander of the enemy's forces would have crushed
Ramseur before any assistance could have reached him, and thus insured the destruction of my whole force; and, later in the day, when the battle had turned against us, with the immense superiority in cavalry which
Sheridan had, and the advantage of the open country, would have destroyed my whole force and captured everything I had. As it was, considering the immense disparity in numbers and equipment, the enemy had very little to boast of. I had lost a few pieces of artillery and some very valuable officers and men, but the main part of my
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force and all my trains had been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater than mine.
When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent.
3
At light on the morning of the 20th my troops moved to
Fisher's Hill without molestation, and the cavalry of
Fitz Lee (who was severely wounded at
Winchester), now under
Wickham, was sent up to Millford Pass to hold Luray valley.
In the afternoon
Sheridan's forces appeared on the banks of
Cedar Creek, about four miles from
Fisher's Hill, and the 21st, and the greater part of the 22d, were consumed by him in reconnoitering and gradually moving his forces to my front under cover of breastworks.
After some skirmishing he attained a strong position immediately in my front and fortified it, and I began to think he was satisfied with the advantage he had gained and would not probably press it further; but on the afternoon of the 22d I discovered that another attack was contemplated, and orders were given for my troops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force was not strong enough to resist a determined assault.
Just before sunset, however,
Crook's corps, which had moved to our left on the side of
Little North Mountain, and, under cover of the woods, had forced back
Lomax's dismounted cavalry, advanced against
Ramseur's left.
Ramseur made an attempt to meet this movement by throwing his brigades successively into line to the left, and
Wharton's division was sent for from the right, but it did not arrive.
Pegram's brigades were also thrown into line in the same manner as
Ramseur's, but the movement produced some disorder in both divisions, and as soon as it was observed by the enemy he advanced along his whole line, and the mischief could not be remedied.
After a very brief contest my whole force retired in considerable confusion, but the men and officers of the artillery behaved with great coolness, fighting to the very last, and I had to ride to some of the officers and order them to withdraw their guns before they would move.
In some cases they had held out so long, and the roads leading from their positions into the pike were so rugged,--that eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy.
Vigorous pursuit was not made, and my force fell back through
Woodstock to a place called the
Narrow Passage, all the trains being carried off in safety.
4
We moved up the valley during the succeeding days, followed by the enemy,Wickham,with his own and
Payne's brigades, having detained the enemy at Millford Pass until we had passed
New Market in safety.
On the 25th, between
Port Republic and Brown's Gap,
Fitz Lee's and
Lomax's cavalry joined us, and on the 26th
Kershaw's division with
Cutshaw's battalion of artillery came up, after having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and encountered and repulsed, below
Port Republic, a body of the enemy's cavalry.
There was likewise heavy skirmishing on my front on the 26th with the enemy's cavalry, which made two efforts to advance toward Brown's Gap, both of which were repulsed after brisk fighting in which artillery was used.
Thence I moved for
Waynesboro' and Rockfish Gap, where the enemy was engaged in destroying the railroad bridge and tunnel, and
Wickham drove the enemy's working parties from
Waynesboro‘. On the 1st of October I moved my whole force across the country to
Mount Sidney on the valley pike.
5 On the 5th
Rosser's brigade arrived, but it did not exceed six hundred mounted men for duty when it joined me.
Kershaw's division numbered 2700 muskets for duty, and he had brought with him
Cutshaw's battalion of artillery.
These reenforcements
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about made up my losses at
Winchester and
Fisher's Hill, and I determined to attack the enemy in his position at
Harrisonburg, and for that purpose made a reconnoissance on the 5th, but on the morning of the 6th it was discovered that he had retired during the night down the valley.
6
When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring, I moved forward at once and arrived at
New Market with my infantry on the 7th.
Rosser pushed forward on the back and middle roads in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, which was engaged in burning houses, mills, barns, and stacks of wheat and hay, and had several skirmishes with it, while
Lomax also moved forward on the valley pike and the roads east of it. I halted at
New Market with the infantry, but
Rosser and
Lomax moved down the valley in pursuit, and skirmished successfully with the enemy's cavalry on the 8th; but on the 9th they encountered his whole cavalry force at
Tom's Brook, in rear of
Fisher's Hill, and both of their commands were driven back in considerable confusion, with a loss of some pieces of artillery; nine were reported to me as the number lost, but
Grant claims eleven.
Having heard that
Sheridan was preparing to send part of his troops to
Grant, I moved down
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the valley again on the 12th.
On the morning of the 13th we reached
Fisher's Hill, and there remained until the 16th.
The enemy was found posted on the north bank of
Cedar Creek, in a very strong position and in strong force.
I was now compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from it, and I determined to attack.
General Gordon and
Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, my topographical engineer, were sent to the signal station on the end of
Massanutten Mountain, which had been reestablished, for the purpose of examining the enemy's position from that point, and
General John Pegram was ordered to go as near as he could to
Cedar Creek on the enemy's right flank and see whether it was practicable to surprise him on that flank.
Captain Hotchkiss returned to my headquarters after dark and reported the result of his and
General Gordon's examination, and he gave me a sketch of the enemy's position and camps.
He informed me that the enemy's left flank, which rested near
Cedar Creek, a short distance above its mouth, was lightly picketed, and that there was but a small cavalry picket on the north fork of the
Shenandoah, below the mouth of the creek, and he stated that, from information he had received, he thought it was practicable to move a column of infantry between the base of the mountain and the river to a ford below the mouth of the creek.
He also informed me that the main body of the enemy's cavalry was on his right flank on the back road to
Winchester.
The sketch made by
Captain Hotchkiss, which proved to be correct, designated the roads in the enemy's rear, and the house of
a Mr. Cooley as a favorable point for forming an attacking column, after it crossed the river, in order to move against the enemy and strike him on the valley pike in rear of his works.
The next morning
General Gordon confirmed the report of
Captain Hotchkiss, expressing confidence that the attack could be successfully made on the enemy's left and rear, and
General Pegram reported that a movement on the enemy's right flank would be attended with great difficulty, as the banks of
Cedar Creek on that flank were high and precipitous and were well guarded.
General Gordon and
Captain Hotchkiss were then to sent to examine and ascertain the practicability of the route at the base of the mountain, and reported it to be practicable for infantry but not for artillery, and a temporary bridge was constructed, under
Captain Hotchkiss's superintendence, at the first crossing of the river on our right.
The plan of attack on which I determined was to send the three divisions of the Second Corps, to wit,
Gordon's,
Ramseur's, and
Pegram's, under
General Gordon, over the route which has been specified to the enemy's rear; to make the attack at 5 o'clock in the morning — which would be a little before daybreak; to move myself, with
Kershaw's and
Wharton's divisions, and all the artillery, along the pike through
Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left flank as soon as
Gordon should become engaged, and for
Rosser to move with his own and
Wickham's brigade on the back road across
Cedar Creek and attack the enemy's cavalry simultaneously with
Gordon's attack, while
Lomax should move by
Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the valley pike, so as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which he was to judge by the sound of the firing.
The artillery was ordered to concentrate where the pike passed through the lines at
Fisher's Hill, and, at the hour appointed for the attack, to move at a gallop to
Hupp's Hill — the movement of the artillery being thus delayed for fear of attracting the attention of the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels over the macadamized roads.
Swords and canteens were directed to be left in camp, so that there would be as little noise as possible.
Gordon moved at the appointed time, and after he had started
General Pegram reported to me that he had discovered from the signal station on the mountain what he supposed to be an intrenchment thrown up across the road over which
Gordon would have to advance after crossing the river the second time, and that the signal operators had informed him that it had been thrown up since
Gordon and
Hotchkiss made their examination; and he suggested the propriety of attacking the enemy's left flank at the same time
Gordon made his attack, as he would probably have more difficulty than had been anticipated.
I adopted this suggestion, and at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 19th
Kershaw and
Wharton went forward, the former moving at
Strasburg to the right on the road to
Bowman's Mill, while
Wharton moved along the pike to
Hupp's Hill, with instructions not to display his forces, but to avoid the enemy's notice until the attack began, when he was to move forward, support the artillery when it came up, and send a force to get possession of the bridge on the pike over the creek.
I accompanied
Kershaw's division, and we got in sight of the enemy's fires at half-past 3 o'clock. The moon was now shining and we could see the camps.
The division was halted under cover to await the arrival of the proper time, and I pointed out to
Kershaw and the commander of his leading brigade the enemy's position and described the nature of the ground, and directed them how the attack was to be made and followed up.
Kershaw was directed cross his division over the creek as quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did so, and advance in that manner against the enemy's left breastwork, extending to the right or left as might be necessary.
At half-past 4 he was ordered forward, and a very short time after he started the firing from
Rosser on our left and the picket firing at the ford at which
Gordon was crossing were heard.
Kershaw crossed the creek without molestation and formed his division as directed, and precisely at 5 o'clock his leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over the enemy's left work, capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the enemy.
As soon as this attack was made, I rode as rapidly as possible to the position on
Hupp's Hill, to which
Wharton and the artillery had been ordered.
I found the artillery just arriving, and a very heavy fire of musketry was now heard in the enemy's rear from
Gordon's column.
Wharton
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had advanced his skirmishers to the creek, capturing some prisoners, but the enemy still held the works on our left of the pike, commanding that road and the bridge, and opened on us with his artillery.
Our artillery was immediately brought into action and opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated his works, and our men from the other columns rushed into them.
Just then the sun rose, and
Wharton's division and the artillery were immediately ordered forward.
I rode in advance of them across the creek, and met
General Gordon on the opposite hill.
Kershaw's division had swept along the enemy's works on the right of the pike, which were occupied by
Crook's corps, and he and
Gordon had united at the pike, and their divisions had pushed across it in pursuit of the enemy.
The rear division of
Gordon's column (
Pegram's) was crossing the river at the time
Kershaw's attack was made, and
General Gordon moved rapidly to Cooley's house, formed his troops and advanced against the enemy with his own division on the left, under
Brigadier-General C. A. Evans, and
Ramseur's on the right, with
Pegram's in the rear supporting them.
There had been a delay of an hour at the river before crossing it, either from a miscalculation of time in the dark, or because the cavalry which was to precede his column had not gotten up, and the delay thus caused, for which no blame is to be attached to
General Gordon, enabled the enemy partially to form his lines after the alarm produced by
Kershaw's attack, and
Gordon's attack, which was after light, was therefore met with greater obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise have encountered, and the fighting had been severe.
Gordon, however, pushed his attack with great energy, and the Nineteenth and
Crook's corps were in complete rout, and their camps, with a number of pieces of artillery and a considerable quantity of small-arms, abandoned.
The Sixth Corps, which was on the enemy's right, and some distance from the point attacked, had had time to get under arms and take position so as to arrest our progress.
General Gordon briefly informed me of the condition of things, and stated that
Pegram's division, which had not been previously engaged, had been ordered in. He then rode to take command of his division, and I rode forward on the pike to ascertain the position of the enemy, in order to continue the attack.
There was now a heavy fog, and that, with the smoke from the artillery and small-arms, so obscured objects that the enemy's position could not be seen; but I soon came to
Generals Ramseur and
Pegram, who informed me that
Pegram's division had encountered a division of the Sixth Corps on the left of the valley pike, and, after a sharp engagement, had driven it back on the main body of that corps, which was in their front in a strong position.
They further informed me that their divisions were in line confronting the Sixth Corps, but that there was a vacancy in the line on their right which ought to be filled.
I ordered
Wharton's division forward at once, and directed
Generals Ramseur and
Pegram to put it where it was required.
In a very short time, and while I was endeavoring to discover the enemy's line through the obscurity,
Wharton's division came back in some confusion, and
General Wharton informed me that, in advancing to the position pointed out to him by
Generals Ramseur and
Pegram, his division had been driven back by the Sixth Corps, which, he said, was advancing.
He pointed out the direction from which he said the enemy was advancing, and some pieces of artillery which had come up were brought into action.
The fog soon rose sufficiently for us to see the enemy's position on a ridge to the west of
Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one.
After driving back
Wharton's division, he had not advanced, but opened on us with artillery, and orders were given for concentrating all our guns on him. In the meantime a force of cavalry was advancing along the pike and through the fields to the right of
Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in great danger, and
Wharton was ordered to form his division at once and take position to hold the enemy's cavalry in check.
Wofford's brigade of
Kershaw's division, which had become separated from the other brigades, was ordered up for the same purpose.
Discovering that the Sixth Corps could not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, because the approach in that direction was through an open flat and across a boggy stream with deep banks, I directed
Captain Powell, serving on
General Gordon's staff, who rode up to me while the artillery was being placed in position, to tell the general to advance against the enemy's right flank and attack it in conjunction with
Kershaw, while a heavy fire of artillery was opened from our right; but as
Captain Powell said he did not know where
General Gordon was, and expressed some doubt about finding him, immediately after he started I sent
Lieutenant Page, of my own staff, with orders for both
Generals Gordon and
Kershaw to make the attack.
In a short time
Colonel Carter concentrated eighteen or twenty guns on the enemy, and he was soon in retreat.
Ramseur and
Pegram advanced at once to the position from which the enemy was driven, and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on the right, and
Pegram's division was ordered to move to the north of
Middletown and take position across the pike against the cavalry.
Lieutenant Page had returned and informed me that he delivered my order to
General Kershaw, but the latter informed him that his division was not in a condition to make the attack, as it was very much scattered, and there was a cavalry force threatening him in front.
Lieutenant Page also stated that he had seen
Gordon's division in
Kershaw's rear reforming, and that it was also much scattered, and that he had not delivered the order to
General Gordon, because he saw that neither his division nor
Kershaw's was in a condition to execute it. As soon as
Pegram moved
Kershaw was ordered from the left to supply his place.
I then rode to
Middletown to make provision against the enemy's cavalry, and discovered a large body of it seriously threatening that flank, which was very much exposed.
Wharton's division and
Wofford's brigade were put in position
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on
Pegram's right, and several charges of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed.
I had no cavalry on that flank except
Payne's very small brigade, which had accompanied
Gordon and made some captures of prisoners and wagons.
Lomax had not arrived, but I received a message from him informing me that he had crossed the river after some delay from a cavalry force guarding it, and I sent a message to him requiring him to move to
Middletown as quickly as possible, but, as I subsequently ascertained, he did not receive that message.
Rosser had attacked the enemy promptly at the appointed time, but he had not been able to surprise him, as he was found on the alert on that flank, doubtless owing to the attempt at a surprise on the night of the 16th.
There was now one division of cavalry threatening my right flank, and two were on the left, near the back road, held in check by
Rosser.
The force of the latter was too weak to make any impression on the enemy's cavalry, and all he could do was to watch it. As I passed across
Cedar Creek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a number of men in the enemy's camps plundering, and one of
Wharton's battalions was ordered to clear the camps and drive the men to their commands.
It was reported to me subsequently that a great number were at the same work, and I sent all my staff-officers who could be spared to stop it if possible, and orders were sent to the division commanders to send for their men.
After he was driven from his second position the enemy had taken a new position about two miles north of
Middletown, and, as soon as I had regulated matters on the right so as to prevent his cavalry from getting in rear of that flank, I rode to the left for the purpose of ordering an advance.
I found
Ramseur and
Kershaw in line with
Pegram, but
Gordon had not come up. In a short time, however, I found him coming up from the rear, and I ordered him to take position on
Kershaw's left and advance for the purpose of driving the enemy from his new position-Ker-shaw and
Ramseur being ordered to advance at the same time.
As the enemy's cavalry on our left was very strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the rear of that flank, a repulse at this time would have been disastrous, and I therefore directed
General Gordon, if he found the enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make the assault.
The advance was made for some distance, when
Gordon's skirmishers came back reporting a line of battle in front behind breastworks, and
General Gordon did not make the attack.
It was now apparent that it would not do to press my troops further.
They had been up all night and were much jaded.
In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in the early morning their own ranks had been much disordered and the men scattered, and it had required time to re-form them.
Their ranks, more-over, were much thinned by the absence of the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps.
The delay which had unavoidably occurred had enabled the enemy to rally a portion of his routed troops, and his immense force of cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of our flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an advance extremely hazardous.
I determined, therefore, to try and hold what had been gained, and orders were given for carrying off the captured and abandoned artillery, small-arms, and wagons.
A number of bold attempts were made during the subsequent part of the day by the enemy's cavalry to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed.
Late in the afternoon the enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur's, Kershaw's, and Gordon's lines, and the attack on
Ramseur's and
Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between
Evans's brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that brigade gave way and
Gordon's other brigades soon followed.
General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men and lead them back against the enemy, but without avail.
The information of this affair, with exaggerations, passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first intimation of
Gordon's condition.
At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was again repulsed.
Every effort was made to stop and rally
Kershaw's and
Ramseur's men, but the mass of them resisted all appeals and continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disorder.
Ramseur, however, succeeded in retaining with him two or three hundred men of his division, and
Major Goggin, of
Kershaw's staff, who was in command of
Conner's brigade, about the same number from that brigade; and these men, aided by several pieces of artillery, held the enemy's whole force on our left in check for one hour and a half, until
Ramseur was shot down mortally wounded and the ammunition of those pieces of artillery was exhausted.
While the latter were being replaced by other guns the force that had remained with
Ramseur and
Goggin gave way also.
Pegram's and
Wharton's divisions and
Wofford's brigade had remained steadfast on the right, and resisted all efforts of the enemy's cavalry, but no portion of this force could be moved to the left without leaving the pike open to the cavalry, which would have destroyed all hope at once.
Every effort to rally the men in the rear having failed, I had now nothing left for me but to order these troops to retire also.
When they began to move the disorder soon extended to them, but
General Pegram succeeded in bringing back a portion of his command across
Cedar Creek in an organized condition, holding the enemy in check; but this small force soon dissolved.
A part of
Evans's brigade had been rallied in the rear, and held a ford above the bridge for a short time, but it followed the example of the rest.
I tried to rally the men immediately after crossing
Cedar Creek and at
Hupp's Hill, but without success.
Could five hundred men have been rallied at either
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of these places, who would have stood by me, I am satisfied that all my artillery and wagons and the greater part of the captured artillery could have been saved, as the enemy's pursuit was very feeble.
As it was, a bridge broke down on a very narrow part of the road between
Strasburg and
Fisher's Hill, just above
Strasburg, where there was no other passway, thereby blocking up all the artillery, ordnance, and medical wagons and ambulances which had not passed that point; and, as there was no force to defend them, they were lost, a very small body of the enemy's cavalry capturing them.
The greater part of the infantry was halted at
Fisher's Hill, and
Rosser, whose command had retired in good order on the back road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry.
The infantry moved back toward
New Market at three o'clock next morning, and
Rosser was left at
Fisher's Hill to cover the retreat of the troops, and hold that position until they were beyond pursuit.
He remained at
Fisher's Hill until after ten o'clock on the 20th, and the enemy did not advance to that place while he was there.
He then fell back without molestation to his former position, and established his line on
Stony Creek, across from
Columbia Furnace to
Edinburg, seven miles below
Mount Jackson.
My other troops were halted at
New Market, about seven miles from
Mount Jackson, and there was an entirely open country between the two places, they being very nearly in sight of each other.
7
Lomax had moved on the day of the battle, on the
Front Royal road toward
Winchester, under the impression that the enemy was being forced back toward that place, and he did not reach me. When he ascertained the reverse which had taken place in the latter part of the day, he retired up the
Luray Valley to his former position at
Millford, without molestation.
My loss in the
battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three pieces of artillery, some ordnance and medical wagons and ambulances, which had been carried to the front for the use of the troops on the field; about 1860 in killed and wounded, and something over 1000 prisoners.
8 Major-General Ramseur fell into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded, and in him not only my command,
but the country sustained a heavy loss.
He was a most gallant and energetic officer whom no disaster appalled, but his courage and energy seemed to gain new strength in the midst of confusion and disorder.
He fell at his post fighting like a lion at bay, and his native State has reason to be proud of his memory.
Brigadier-General C. A. Battle was wounded at the beginning of the fight, and other valuable officers were lost.
Fifteen hundred prisoners were captured from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and wounded in this action was very heavy.
This was the case of. a glorious victory given up by my own troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for on the ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plunder of the enemy's camps, and from the fact that the men undertook to judge for themselves when it was proper to retire.
Had my cavalry been sufficient to contend with
[
530]
that of the enemy, the rout in the morning would have been complete; as it was, I had only about 1200 cavalry on the field under
Rosser;
Lomax's force, which numbered less than 1700, did not get up. My infantry and artillery were about the same strength as at
Winchester.
The reports of the ordnance officers showed in the hands of my troops about 8800 muskets, in round numbers as follows: in
Kershaw's division, 2700;
Ramseur's, 2100;
Gordon's, 1700;
Pegram's, 1200, and
Wharton's, 1100.
Making a moderate allowance for the men left to guard the camps and the signal station on the mountain, as well as for a few sick and wounded, I went into this battle with about 8500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of artillery.
Sheridan was absent in the morning at the beginning of the fight, and returned in the afternoon before the change in the fortunes of the day. Nevertheless, I saw no reason to change the estimate I had formed of him.
9
It may be asked, why with my small force I made the attack.
I can only say we had been fighting large odds during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance of lessening them.
It was of the utmost consequence that
Sheridan should be prevented from sending troops to
Grant, and
General Lee, in a letter received a day or two before, had expressed an earnest desire that a victory should be gained in the valley if possible, and it could not be gained without fighting for it. I did hope to gain one by surprising the enemy in his camp, and then thought and still think I would have had it, if my directions had been strictly complied with, and my troops had awaited my orders to retire.
10 
