The Grand strategy of the last year of the War.1
On the 4th day of March, 1864,
General U. S. Grant was summoned to
Washington from
Nashville to receive his commission of lieutenant-general, the highest rank then known in the
United States, and the same that was conferred on
Washington in 1798.
He reached the capital on the 7th, had an interview for the first time with
Mr. Lincoln, and on the 9th received his commission at the hands of the
President, who made a short address, to which
Grant made a suitable reply.
He was informed that it was desirable that he should come east to command all the armies of the
United States, and give his personal supervision to the Army of the Potomac.
On the 10th he visited
General Meade at
Brandy Station, and saw many of his leading officers, but he returned to
Washington the next day and went on to
Nashville, to which place he had summoned me, then absent on my
Meridian expedition.
2 On the 18th of March he turned over to me the command of the
Western armies, and started back for
Washington, I accompanying him as far as
Cincinnati.
Amidst constant interruptions of a business and social nature, we reached the satisfactory conclusion that, as soon as the season would permit, all the armies of the
Union would assume the “bold offensive” by “concentric lines” on the common enemy, and would finish up the job in a single campaign if possible.
The main “objectives” were
Lee's army behind the
Rapidan in
Virginia, and
Joseph E. Johnston's army at
Dalton, Georgia.
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On reaching
Washington,
Grant studied with great care all the minutiae of the organization, strength, qualities, and resources of each of the many armies into which the
Union forces had resolved themselves by reason of preceding events, and in due time with wonderful precision laid out the work which each one should undertake.
His written instructions to me at
Nashville were embraced in the two letters of April 4th and April 19th, 1864, both in his own handwriting, which I still possess, and which, in my judgment, are as complete as any of those of the
Duke of
Wellington contained in the twelve volumes of his published letters and correspondence.
With the month of May came the season for
action, and by the 4th all his armies were in motion.
The army of
Butler at
Fort Monroe was his left,
Meade's army the center, and mine at
Chattanooga his right.
Butler was to move against
Richmond on the south of
James River,
Meade straight against
Lee, intrenched behind the
Rapidan, and I to attack
Joe Johnston and push him to and beyond
Atlanta.
This was as far as human foresight could penetrate.
Though
Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac,
Grant virtually controlled it, and on the 4th of May, 1864, he crossed the
Rapidan, and at noon of the 5th attacked
Lee. He knew that a certain amount of fighting, “killing,” had to be done to accomplish his end, and also to pay the penalty of former failures.
In the “wilderness” there was no room for grand strategy, or even minor tactics; but the fighting was desperate, the losses to the
Union army being, according to
Phisterer, 18,387,
3 to the
Confederate loss of 11,400--the difference due to
Lee's intrenchments and the blind nature of the country in which the battle was fought.
On the night of May 7th both parties paused, appalled by the fearful slaughter; but
Grant commanded, “Forward by the left flank.”
That was, in my judgment, the supreme moment of his life; undismayed, with a full comprehension of the importance of the work in which he was engaged, feeling as keen a sympathy for his dead and wounded as any one, and without stopping to count his numbers, he gave his orders calmly, specifically, and absolutely--“Forward.
To
Spotsylvania.”
But his watchful and skillful antagonist detected his purpose, and, having the inner or shorter line, threw his army across
Grant's path, and promptly fortified it. These field intrenchments are peculiar to
America, though I am convinced they were employed by the Romans in
Gaul in the days of
Caesar.
Troops, halting for the night or for battle, faced the enemy; moved forward to ground with a good outlook to the front; stacked arms; gathered logs, stumps, fence-rails, anything which would stop a bullet; piled these to their front, and, digging a ditch behind, threw the dirt forward, and made a parapet which covered their persons as perfectly as a granite wall.
When
Grant reached
Spotsylvania, May 8th, he found his antagonist in his front thus intrenched.
He was delayed there till the 20th, during which time there was incessant fighting, because he was compelled to attack his enemy behind these improvised intrenchments.
His losses, according to
Phisterer, were 12,564,
4 while the
Confederates lost 9000.
Nevertheless, his renewed
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order, “Forward by the left flank,” compelled
Lee to retreat to the defenses of
Richmond.
Grant's
Memoirs enable us to follow him day by day across the various rivers which lay between him and
Richmond, and in the bloody assaults at Cold Harbor, where his losses are reported 14,931
5 to 1700 by his opponent.
Yet ever onward by the left flank, he crossed
James River and penned
Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia within the intrenchments of
Richmond and
Petersburg for ten long months on the pure defensive, to remain almost passive observers of local events, while
Grant's other armies were absolutely annihilating the Southern Confederacy.
While
Grant was fighting desperately from the
Rapidan to the
James, there were two other armies within the same “zone of operations”--that “of the
James” under
General Butler, who was expected to march up on the south and invest
Petersburg and even
Richmond; and that of
Sigel at
Winchester, who was expected to march up the
Valley of Virginia, pick up his detachments from the
Kanawha (
Crook and
Averell), and threaten
Lynchburg, a place of vital importance to
Lee in
Richmond.
Butler failed to accomplish what was expected of him; and
Sigel failed at the very start, and was replaced by
Hunter, who marched up the valley, made junction with
Crook and
Averell at
Staunton, and pushed, on with commendable vigor to
Lynchburg, which he invested on the 16th of June.
Lee, who had by this time been driven into
Richmond with a force large enough to hold his lines of intrenchment and a surplus for expeditions, detached
General Jubal A. Early with the equivalent of a corps to drive
Hunter away from
Lynchburg.
Hunter, far from his base, with inadequate supplies of food and ammunition, retreated by the
Kanawha to the
Ohio River, his nearest base, thereby exposing the
Valley of Virginia; whereupon
Early, an educated soldier, promptly resolved to take advantage of the occasion, marched rapidly down this valley northward to
Winchester, crossed the
Potomac to
Hagerstown, and thence boldly marched on
Washington, defended at that time only by militia and armed clerks.
Grant, fully alive to the danger, dispatched to
Washington, from his army investing
Petersburg, two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and also the Nineteenth Corps just arriving from New Orleans.
These troops arrived at the very nick of time,--met
Early's army in the suburbs of
Washington, and drove it back to the
Valley of Virginia.
This most skillful movement of
Early demonstrated to
General Grant the importance of the
Valley of Virginia, not only as a base of supplies for
Lee's army in
Richmond, but as the most direct, the shortest, and the easiest route for a “diversion” into the
Union territory north of the
Potomac.
He therefore cast around for a suitable commander for this field of operations, and settled upon
Major-General Philip H. Sheridan, whom he had brought from the
West to command the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac.
Sheridan promptly went to his new sphere of operations, quickly ascertained its strength and resources, and resolved to attack
Early in the position which he had chosen in and about
Winchester, Va. He delivered his attack across
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broken ground on the 19th of September, beat his antagonist in fair, open battle, sending him “whirling up the valley,” inflicting a loss of 5500 men to his own of 4873, and followed him up to
Cedar Creek and
Fisher's Hill.
Early recomposed his army and fell upon the
Union army on the 19th of October, at
Cedar Creek, gaining a temporary advantage during
General Sheridan's absence; but on his opportune return his army resumed the offensive, defeated
Early, captured nearly all his artillery, and drove him completely out of his field of operations, eliminating that army from the subsequent problem of the war.
Sheridan's losses were 5995 to
Early's 4200 ; but these losses are no just measure of the results of that victory, which made it impossible to use the
Valley of Virginia as a Confederate base of supplies and as an easy route for raids within the
Union lines.
General Sheridan then committed its protection to detachments, and with his main force rejoined
General Grant, who still held
Lee's army inside his intrenchments at
Richmond and
Petersburg.
I now turn with a feeling of extreme delicacy to the conduct of that other campaign from
Chattanooga to
Atlanta,
Savannah, and
Raleigh, which with liberal discretion was committed to me by
General Grant in his minute instructions of April 4th and April 19th, 1864.
To all military students these letters must be familiar, because they have been published again and again, and there never was and never can be raised a question of rivalry or claim between us as to the relative merits of the manner in which we played our respective parts.
We were as brothers — I the older man in years, he the higher in rank.
We both believed in our heart of hearts that the success of the
Union cause was not only necessary to the then generation of
Americans, but to all future generations.
We both professed to be gentlemen and professional soldiers, educated in the science of war by our generous Government for the very occasion which had arisen.
Neither of us by nature was a combative man; but with honest hearts and a clear purpose to do what man could we embarked on that campaign, which I believe, in its strategy, in its logistics, in its grand and minor tactics, has added new luster to the old science of war. Both of us had at our front generals to whom in early life we had been taught to look up,--educated and experienced soldiers like ourselves, not likely to make any mistakes, and each of whom had as strong an army as could be collected from the mass of the
Southern people,--of the same blood as ourselves, brave, confident, and well equipped; in addition to which they had the most decided advantage of operating in their own difficult country of mountain, forest, ravine, and river, affording admirable opportunities for defense, besides the other equally important advantage that we had to invade the country of our unqualified enemy and expose our long lines of supply to the guerrillas of an “exasperated people.”
Again, as we advanced we had to leave guards to bridges, stations, and intermediate depots, diminishing the fighting force, while our enemy gained strength by picking up his detachments as he fell back, and had railroads to bring supplies and reenforcements from his rear.
I instance these facts to offset the common assertion that we of the
North won the war by brute force, and not by courage and skill.
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From “the Mountain campaigns in Georgia; or, War scenes on the W. & A.”
published by the Western & Atlantic R. R.
Co. |
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On the historic 4th day of May, 1864, the Confederate army at my front lay at
Dalton, Georgia, composed, according to the best authority, of about 45,000 men [see also p. 281], commanded by
Joseph E. Johnston, who was equal in all the elements of generalship to
Lee, and who was under instructions from the war powers in
Richmond to assume the offensive northward as far as
Nashville.
But he soon discovered that he would have to conduct a defensive campaign.
Coincident with the movement of the Army of the Potomac, as announced by telegraph, I advanced from our base at
Chattanooga with the Army of the Ohio, 13,559 men; the Army of the Cumberland, 60,773, and the Army of the Tennessee, 24,465,--grand total, 98,797 men and 254 guns.
I had no purpose to attack
Johnston's position at
Dalton in front, but marched from
Chattanooga to feign at his front and to make a lodgment in
Resaca, eighteen miles to his rear, on “his line of communication and supply.”
The movement was partly, not wholly, successful; but it compelled
Johnston to let go
Dalton and fight us at
Resaca, where, May 13th-16th, our loss was 2747 and his 2800.
I fought offensively and he defensively, aided by earth parapets.
He then fell back to
Calhoun,
Adairsville, and
Cassville, where he halted for the battle of the campaign; but, for reasons given in his memoirs, he continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to
Allatoona.
Pausing for a few days to repair the railroad without attempting
Allatoona, of which I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push on toward
Atlanta by way of
Dallas;
Johnston quickly detected this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-28th, at New Hope Church, four miles north of
Dallas, with losses of 3000 to the
Confederates and 2400 to us. The country was almost in a state of nature — with few or no roads, nothing that a European could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as surely as at
Sevastopol.
Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reenforcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed.
He then fell back to his position at
Marietta, with
Brush Mountain on his right,
Kenesaw his center, and
Lost Mountain his left.
His line of ten miles was too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated on
Kenesaw.
We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared for the contest.
Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was there a cessation of fire.
Our skirmishers were in absolute contact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full cooperation of my great lieutenants,
Thomas,
McPherson, and
Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3000 men, to the
Confederate loss of 630.
Still, the result was that within three days
Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position and was in full retreat for the
Chattahoochee River.
We were on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the
Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered and
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protected by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance.
No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of
Joseph E. Johnston.
His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind.
We had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food, ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000 animals.
The city of
Atlanta, the gate city opening the interior of the important
State of Georgia, was in sight; its protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had to go,--illustrating the principle that “an army once on the offensive must maintain the offensive.”
We feigned to the right, but crossed the
Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy behind his first line of intrenchments at
Peach Tree Creek, prepared in advance for this very occasion.
At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service.
Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of
General Johnston, it relieved him, and
General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army [July 18th].
Hood was known to us to be a “fighter,” a graduate of
West Point of the class of 1853, No. 44, of which class two of my army commanders,
McPherson and
Schofield, were No. 1 and No. 7.
The character of a leader is a large factor in the game of war, and I confess I was pleased at this change, of which I had early notice.
I knew that I had an army superior in numbers and
morale to that of my antagonist; but being so far from my base, and operating in a country devoid of food and forage, I was dependent for supplies on a poorly constructed railroad back to
Louisville, five hundred miles. I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country, but not behind well-constructed parapets.
Promptly, as expected,
General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the 20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps (
Hooker), which had just crossed
Peach Tree Creek by improvised bridges.
The troops became commingled and fought hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the
Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving behind their dead and wounded.
These amounted to 4796 men, to our loss of 1710.
We followed up, and.
Hood fell back to the main lines of the city of
Atlanta.
We closed in, when again
Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank “in air,” a movement that led to the hardest battle of the campaign.
He encountered the Army of the Tennessee,--skilled veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic valor.
The battle raged from noon to night, when the
Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the intrenchments of
Atlanta.
Their losses are reported 8499 to ours of 3641; but among our dead was
McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee.
While this battle was in progress,
Schofield at the center and
Thomas on the right made efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault.
The Army of the Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (
Howard), from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach, if possible,
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the railroad by which
Hood drew his supplies, when, on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d, sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4632 men to our 700.
These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor,
General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive.
Thereafter the Confederate army in
Atlanta clung to its parapets.
I never intended to assault these, but gradually worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies, because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food.
Our extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to the rear, and move with the other five to a point (
Jonesboro‘) on the railroad twenty-six miles below
Atlanta,
not fortified.
This movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted in our occupation of
Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864.
The result had a large effect on the whole country at the time, for solid and political reasons.
I claim no special merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings of the best masters of the “science of war” of which I had knowledge; and, better still, I had pleased
Mr. Lincoln, who wanted “success” very much.
But I had not accomplished all, for
Hood's army, the chief “objective,” had escaped.
Then began the real trouble.
We were in possession of
Atlanta, and
Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, thirty miles south-east, on the Savannah railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war, and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies, independent of the railroads.
On the 21st of September he shifted his position to Palmetto Station, twenty-five miles south-west of
Atlanta, on the Montgomery and Selma railroad, where he began systematic preparations for an aggressive campaign against our communications to compel us to abandon our conquests.
Here he was visited by
Mr. Davis, who promised all possible cooperation and assistance in the proposed campaign; and here also
Mr. Davis made his famous speech, which was duly reported to me in
Atlanta, assuring his army that they would make my retreat more disastrous than was that of
Napoleon from
Moscow.
Forewarned, I took immediate measures to thwart his plans.
One division was sent back to
Rome, another to
Chattanooga; the guards along our railroad were reenforced and warned of the coming blow.
General Thomas was sent back to the headquarters of his department at
Nashville,
Schofield to his at
Knoxville, while I remained in
Atlanta to await
Hood's “initiative.”
This followed soon.
Hood, sending his cavalry ahead, crossed the
Chattahoochee River at Campbelltown with his main army on the 1st of October, and moved to
Dallas, detaching a strong force against the railroad above
Marietta which destroyed it for fifteen miles, and then sent
French's division to capture
Allatoona.
I followed
Hood, reaching
Kenesaw Mountain in time to see in the distance the attack on
Allatoona, which was handsomely repulsed by
Corse.
Hood then moved westward, avoiding
Rome, and by a circuit reached
Resaca, which he summoned to surrender, but did not wait to attack.
He continued thence the destruction of the railroad for about twenty miles to the tunnel, including
Dalton, whose garrison he captured.
I followed up to
Resaca, then turned west to intercept his retreat
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down the
Valley of Chattooga [see map, p. 249]; but by rapid marching he escaped to
Gadsden, on the
Coosa, I halting at
Gaylesville, whence to observe his further movements.
Hood, after a short pause, crossed the mountains to
Decatur, on the
Tennessee River, which point, as it was defended by a good division of troops, he avoided, and finally halted opposite
Florence, Alabama, on the
Tennessee.
[See map, Vol.
III., p. 6.] Divining the object of his movement against our communications, which had been thus far rapid and skillful, I detached by rail
General Schofield and two of my six corps to
Nashville, all the reenforcements that
Thomas deemed necessary to enable him to defend
Tennessee, and began my systematic preparations for resuming the offensive against
Georgia.
Repairing the broken railroads, we collected in
Atlanta the necessary food and transportation for 60,000 men, sent to the rear all impediments, called in all detachments, and ordered them to march for
Atlanta, where by November 4th were assembled four infantry corps, one cavalry division, and 65 field-guns, aggregating 60,598 men.
Hood remained at
Florence, preparing to invade
Tennessee and
Kentucky, or to follow me. We were prepared for either alternative.
According to the great
Napoleon, the fundamental maxim for successful war is to “converge a superior force on the critical point at the critical time.”
In 1864 the main “objectives” were
Lee's and
Johnston's armies, and the critical point was thought to be
Richmond or
Atlanta, whichever should be longer held.
Had
General Grant overwhelmed and scattered
Lee's army and occupied
Richmond he would have come to
Atlanta; but as I happened to occupy
Atlanta first, and had driven
Hood off to a divergent line of operations far to the west, it was good strategy to leave him to a subordinate force, and with my main army to join
Grant at
Richmond.
The most practicable route to
Richmond was nearly a thousand miles in distance, too long for a single march; hence the necessity to reach the sea-coast for a new base.
Savannah, distant three hundred miles, was the nearest point, and this distance we accomplished from November 12th to December 21st, 1864.
6 According to the
Duke of
Wellington, an army moves upon its belly, not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons can operate more than a hundred miles from its base, because the teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons, leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of the men and animals at the front, who are fully employed in fighting; hence the necessity to “forage liberally on the country,” a measure which fed our men and animals chiefly on the very supplies which had been gathered near the railroads by the enemy for the maintenance of his own armies.
“The March to the sea” was in strategy only a shift of base for ulterior and highly important purposes.
Many an orator in his safe office at the
North had proclaimed his purpose to cleave his way to the sea. Every expedition which crossed the
Ohio River in the early part of the war headed for the sea; but things were not ripe till the Western army had fought, and toiled, and labored down to
Atlanta.
Not
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till then did a “March to the sea” become practicable and possible of grand results.
Alone I never measured it as now my eulogists do, but coupled with
Thomas's acts about
Nashville, and those about
Richmond directed in person by
General Grant, the “March to the sea,” with its necessary corollary, the march northward to
Raleigh, became vastly important, if not actually conclusive of the war.
Mr. Lincoln was the wisest man of our day, and more truly and kindly gave voice to my secret thoughts and feeling when he wrote me at
Savannah from
Washington under date of December 26th, 1864:
When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering “ nothing risked, nothing gained,” I did not interfere.
Now the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce; and taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success.
Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.
But what next?
I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.
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So highly do I prize this testimonial that I preserve
Mr. Lincoln's letter, every word in his own handwriting, unto this day; and if I know myself, I believe on receiving it I experienced more satisfaction in giving to his overburdened and weary soul one gleam of satisfaction and happiness, than of selfish pride in an achievement which has given me among men a larger measure of fame than any single act of my life.
There is an old maxim of war, that a general should not divide his forces in the presence of an enterprising enemy, and I confess that I felt more anxious for
General Thomas's success than my own, because had I left him with an insufficient force it would have been adjudged ungenerous and unmilitary in me; but the result, and
Mr. Lincoln's judgment
after the event, demonstrated that my division of force was liberal, leaving to
Thomas “enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole,
Hood's army,” and retaining for myself enough to march to the sea, and thence north to
Raleigh, in communication with the old Army of the Potomac which had so long and heroically fought for
Richmond, every officer and soldier of which felt and saw the dawn of peace in the near approach of their comrades of the
West, who, having finished their task, had come so far to lend them a helping hand if needed.
I honestly believe that the grand march of the Western army from
Atlanta to
Savannah, and from
Savannah to
Raleigh, was an important factor in the final result, the overwhelming victory at
Appomattox, and the glorious triumph of the
Union cause.
7
Meantime
Hood, whom I had left at and near
Florence, 317 miles to my rear, having completely reorganized and resupplied his army, advanced against
Thomas at
Nashville, who had also made every preparation.
Hood first encountered
Schofield at
Franklin, November 30th, 1864, attacked him boldly behind his intrenchments, and sustained a positive check, losing 6252 of his best men, including
Generals Cleburne and
Adams, who were
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Ration-day at Chattanooga in 1864.
from a War-time sketch. |
killed on the very parapets, to
Schofield's loss of 2326.
Nevertheless he pushed on to
Nashville, which he invested.
Thomas, one of the grand characters of our civil war, nothing dismayed by danger in front or rear, made all his preparations with cool and calm deliberation; and on the 15th of December sallied from his intrenchments, attacked
Hood in his chosen and intrenched position, and on the next day, December 16th, actually annihilated his army, eliminating it thenceforward from the problem of the war.
Hood's losses were 15,000 men to
Thomas's 3057.
Therefore at the end of the year 1864 the conflict at the
West was concluded, leaving nothing to be considered in the grand game of war but
Lee's army, held by
Grant in
Richmond, and the
Confederate detachments at
Mobile and along the sea-board north of
Savannah.
Of course
Charleston, ever arrogant, felt secure; but it was regarded by us as a “dead cock in the pit,” and fell of itself when its inland communications were cut. In January
Fort Fisher was captured by a detachment from the Army of the Potomac, aided by
Admiral Porter's fleet, and
Wilmington was occupied by
Schofield, who had been brought by
Grant from
Nashville to
Washington and sent down the
Atlantic coast to prepare for
Sherman's coming to
Goldsboro‘,
North Carolina,--all “converging” on
Richmond.
Preparatory to the next move,
General Howard was sent from
Savannah to secure
Pocotaligo, in South Carolina, as a point of departure for the north, and
General Slocum to Sister's Ferry, on the
Savannah River, to secure a safe lodgment on the north bank for the same purpose.
In due tine — in February, 1865--these detachments, operating by concentric lines, met on the
South Carolina road at Midway and
Blackville, swept northward through
Orangeburg and
Columbia to
Winnsboro‘, where the direction was changed to
Fayetteville and
Goldsboro‘, a distance of 420 miles through a difficult and hostile country, making junction with
Schofield at a safe base with two good railroads back to the sea-coast, of which we held absolute dominion.
The
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resistance of
Hampton,
Butler,
Beauregard, and even
Joe Johnston was regarded as trivial.
Our “objective” was
Lee's army at
Richmond.
When I reached
Goldsboro‘, made junction.
with
Schofield, and moved forward to
Raleigh, I was willing to encounter the entire Confederate army; but the Confederate armies--
Lee's in
Richmond and
Johnston's in my front-held interior lines, and could choose the initiative.
Few military critics who have treated of the civil war in
America have ever comprehended the importance of the movement of my army northward from
Savannah to
Goldsboro‘, or of the transfer of
Schofield from
Nashville to cooperate with me in
North Carolina.
This march was like the thrust of a sword toward the heart of the human body; each mile of advance swept aside all opposition, consumed the very food on which
Lee's army depended for life, and demonstrated a power in the
National Government which was irresistible.
Therefore, in March, 1865, but one more move was left to
Lee on the chessboard of war: to abandon
Richmond; make junction with
Johnston in
North Carolina; fall on me and destroy me if possible — a fate I did not apprehend; then turn on
Grant, sure to be in close pursuit, and defeat him. 3ut no!
Lee clung to his intrenchments for political reasons, and waited for the inevitable.
At last, on the 1st day of April,
General Sheridan, by his vehement and most successful attack on the
Confederate lines at the “
Five Forks” near Dinwiddie Court House, compelled
Lee to begin his last race for life.
He then attempted to reach
Danville, to make junction with
Johnston, but
Grant in his rapid pursuit constantly interposed, and finally headed him off at
Appomattox, and compelled the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, which for four years had baffled the skill and courage of the Army of the Potomac and the power of our National Government.
This substantially ended the war, leaving only the formal proceedings of accepting the surrender of
Johnston in
North Carolina and of the subordinate armies at the South-west.
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The “Calico House,” General Sherman's first headquarters in Atlanta — afterward the Office of his Engineers; also for several months a hospital.
From a photograph. |
