Nov. 23, 1863. |
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and thence over the mountains toward Trenton, some distance up the Lookout Valley, to menace Bragg's left front, while the remainder of Sherman's force, excepting Osterhaus's division, moved up quickly and secretly to Brown's Ferry, crossed the river there on Smith's pontoon bridge, and marched round behind Chattanooga toward Grant's left, thereby giving Bragg the impression that they were more likely to be moving to the relief of Burnside than to attack his extreme right.
The latter was the real movement intended.
These troops, as we shall observe presently, crossed the Tennessee to Chattanooga, and at a proper time took position on Thomas's left.
Ewing's troops were stealthily withdrawn from near Trenton, and ordered to follow the others of the corps to the extreme left of the Union Army, leaving only Hooker, with the addition of Osterhaus's division, on Bragg's left.
The latter had been prevented from crossing the river at Brown's Ferry, on account of the breaking of the pontoon bridge by drift-wood, and was ordered to join Hooker.
On account of bad roads, caused by heavy rains, Ewing's march was more tardy than was contemplated, and he did not reach his assigned position until the 23d, instead of on the 21st, when Grant expected to make his attack.
The latter was impatient, for he knew that Burnside was in peril; and by a note from Bragg on the 20th,1 and the report of a Confederate deserter on the 22d, he was impressed with a belief that his adversary was preparing to fly southward.
Bragg was simply repeating the trick he so successfully played upon Rosecrans, to draw Grant into action prematurely, before his re-enforcements should arrive.
It succeeded in a degree, for before Sherman's troops had crossed the river, he ordered
Thomas to move the center forward to find out what was going on behind the strong line of Confederate pickets in front of Chattanooga.
The fact was, Bragg, instead of preparing to retreat, was making dispositions for a formidable resistance to the impending attack.
In the arrangement for the attack on the 21st, Hooker was to assail Bragg's left on Lookout Mountain.
This movement was suspended, and Howard's corps was called to Chattanooga and temporarily attached to Thomas's command.
The Fifteenth Army Corps (Sherman's) was now under the command of General Blair, with orders to take position on the extreme left, near the mouth of the West Chickamauga River.
They had with them on their march up the north side of the Tennessee, a concealed train of one hundred and sixteen pontoon boats, wherewith to construct a bridge for passing over; and on the afternoon of the 23d, when Thomas moved out, they were at the crossing point.
When Thomas moved, the heavy guns of Fort Wood, at Chattanooga, were playing upon the Missionaries' Ridge and Orchard Knob,2 the latter a much lower hill considerably in front of the former.
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1 Bragg's note, dated “Headquarters Army of the Tennessee, in the field, November 20, 1863,” was as follows: “General — As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.”
2 In the picture, on the next page, of that portion of the Missionaries' Ridge that was the chief theater of war, Orchard Knob is the eminence on the left of the figures on Cemetery Hill, rising above the rolling plain to about half the height of the ridge. That ridge is made up of a series of connected knobs, with depressions, the most considerable of which is Rossville Gap.
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