Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 8.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

Sir — In the August and September, 1880, number of your journal, under the head of “Recollections of General Beauregard's Service in West Tennessee in the Spring of 1862,” appears a letter from General Jordan, dated New York, Nov. 2, 1874, in which it is stated that the failure to win Shiloh was mainly due to the delay in getting the army out of Corinth on the 3d of April, 1862, and that that delay was specially due to the action of General Polk's corps. The writer says: “General Polk's corps, which was ordered to move with the others at midday, though under arms and ready, was kept at a halt until late in the afternoon, when, it having been reported by Generals Bragg and Hardee that they were unable to move their corps at the hour indicated for them, because General Polk's corps was in the way, you sent one of your staff [General Beauregard's] to General Polk to inquire why he had not put his corps in motion.” He replied that he was awaiting the “written order” directing him to move. “You [General Beauregard] at once, through an aid-de-camp, directed him to clear the road and follow the movement as ordered.”

According to the first portion of the paragraph it would seem that General Polk was to precede Generals Bragg and Hardee on the march to Shiloh, for we read that they could not move, Polk being in the way, and that upon learning this General Beauregard sent to know why he did not put his corps in motion. According to the second portion of the paragraph it would seem that Polk was merely blocking the road — preventing the passing of Bragg and Hardee, who were to precede him. This last can hardly be the meaning of the writer, because the nature of the country was such, and General Polk's troops were so placed, as to make it impossible for them to offer any serious obstacle to the advances of the remainder of the army.

General Polk's corps consisted of two divisions, of two brigades each. One division (Cheatham's) was some twenty-four miles to the north, at Bethel, watching Grant's right; the other (Clark's) was about a mile from Corinth, to the north, encamped in an open wood, which was intersected by numerous roads. There were but two [458] brigades, and even had they been on the main road troops and wagons could easily have passed them. Again, Bragg was to assemble his corps at Monterey, a point some miles from Corinth, to the northeast. This compelled him to use roads running from Corinth to the right of Polk.

From this it will be seen that on August 3d, Polk could not have been in a position to impede the march of either Hardee or Bragg. We take it for granted then, that the writer's real charge is to be found in the first portion of the paragraph quoted — where it is implied, that the army was delayed because the head of the column, Polk, did not move, he awaiting the written order. By reference to the paragraph preceding that quoted, it seems that there was no need for him to await the order in writing, as it had already been given verbally, and presumably with care. The written order was to differ in no way from the verbal, but was merely for the better guidance of the commands. Now it so happens that the very order in question, the copy sent General Polk on April 3d, 1862, is before me, (it is the same as is to be found on pages 188, 189 and 160, first series, Official Reports of Battles, C. S. A.) Reference to it shows that Bragg was to move from Corinth, by way of Monterey; Hardee was to move by a separate road to the left, called the Ridge road; and Polk, with his one division, was to follow him, in fact was to form the rear of the column. Bragg and Hardee could not then have been waiting for Polk to move. From this it will be seen that no matter which may be the writer's charge, he is essentially wrong.

In a subsequent paragraph he goes on to say, “even the next day,” the 4th, “there was inexplicable delay in the movements, not only of Polk's corps, but of Bragg's also, so that on the night of the 4th of April, the Confederate forces were assembled no farther in advance than at and around Monterey.” Here again the writer falls into error. It is true that on that night General Bragg's corps was but a short distance from Monterey, but Hardee was at and beyond Mickey's, the point at which he was due, while Po<*>well closed up, was within a quarter of a mile of Mickey's, immediately in Hardee's rear, his proper place. For the accuracy of these statements, I refer you to the reports of these corps commanders, but especially to those of Hardee and Polk.

While upon this subject permit me to enter more freely into this question of the delay in reaching Shiloh. In order to do so properly, I will quote from memoranda prepared some time ago, for a forthcoming Memoir of Leonidas Polk. [459]

It was claimed by some that the failure to attack the enemy on the 5th, the day appointed, was due to the delay of General Polk in getting his command up to the point of concentration — Mickey's House. We find no mention of it in any official document, but in a work¹ partly written by the officer then acting as the Adjutant-General of the army, it appears as a distinct statement. The position occupied by this officer gives to his statements at least a semi-official force. To fully understand the point involved it is necessary to see what were General Polk's orders. Section 3 of the Special Orders as to the movements of troops towards Shiloh (page 189 1st Vol. Official Reports of Battles, published by Confederate Congress in 1862) reads:

April 3, 1864.

The First corps, under Major-General Polk, with the exception of the detached divisions at Bethel, will take up its line of march by Ridge road hence to Pittsburg half an hour after the rear of the Third corps (Hardee's) shall have passed Corinth, and will bivouac to-night in the rear of that corps, with the same interval of time as to-day. When the head of column shall have reached the vicinity of the Mickey House it will be halted in column, or massed on the line of the Bark road, according to the nature of the ground, as a reserve. The forces at Bethel and Purdy will defend their positions as already instructed, if attacked, otherwise they will assemble on Purdy, and thence advance, with advanced guards, flankers, and all other prescribed military precautions, by the road thence to Monterey, forming a junction with the rest of the First Corps at the intersection of that road with the Bark road leading to Corinth.

By this it is seen that General Polk was charged with the movements of the First corps, except the detached divisions at Bethel. The assembling of the troops at Bethel and Purdy was delayed by circumstances incident to the position and not by any fault of theirs or of their commander. It was, therefore, unable to leave Purdy before the morning of the 5th, and owing to the condition of the roads did not effect a junction with the command of General Polk till 4 that afternoon. Consequently, up to that time, General Polk was in no way responsible for its movements, nor was he expected to be. So far, then, as the statement in question concerns him it can apply only to those troops with which he marched from Corinth — Clark's division. What is said in his official report is a sufficient answer to the charge, but other proofs may not be out of place. We give, therefore, the following extracts from a letter of that gallant soldier, and accomplished gentleman, [460] General Charles Clark, afterward Governor of Mississippi, the division commander of the troops we are now writing of:

My division of General Polk's corps commenced its march from camp near Corinth, on Thursday evening before the battle of Shiloh, at the hour designated in the special order. It was then growing dark. We bivouacked Friday night on the road, the head of the column, General A. P. Stewart's brigade, within a quarter of a mile, I think, of Mickey's house. Very early in the morning the head of the column was at Mickey's Cross-Roads, I think, about sunrise. The rear brigade, with which I bivouacked, was in column for the march before daylight, but a very heavy storm of rain delayed the march for a short time. At Mickey's Cross-Roads, we were halted for some hours, General Polk was with me at the head of the column. While waiting there General Johnston and General Beauregard rode up, and remained some time in conversation, and then rode forward. I can confidently say that General Polk's Corps, at least my division of it, could have been in position on the battle field on Saturday morning.

In General Bragg's Official Reports² we find the following:

“Moving from there,” Monterey, “the command bivouacked for the night (4th), near Mickey's house immediately in rear of Major-General Hardee's Corps, Major-General Polk's being just in our rear.”

This is seemingly borne out by the instructions in paragraph II, of the above mentioned special order, in which after providing for the movement of the right wing of General Bragg's corps, by the Monterey and Savannah road to Mickey's, it goes on to say:

The left wing of this corps will advance at the same time, also, left in front by the road from Monterey to Purdy; the head of the column to reach by night the intersection of that road with the Bark road. This wing will continue the movement in the morning as soon as the rear of the third corps shall have passed the Purdy road, and which it will then follow.

As General Polk was marching by this same Bark road, just in rear of the third corps, the carrying out of the above instructions would have brought him on the night of the 4th about where General Bragg says he was, in rear of his corps. But that they were not carried out is shown by this note.

Monterey, 10 A. M., April 4th.

My Dear General — Circumstances have------------³ my second division from the Purdy road. Both my divisions will move from here, then, direct to Mickey's, on the Savannah road. I give you this information that you may not wait for my troops at the crossing of the [461] Purdy and Ridge roads. General Breckinridge has not arrived from Burnsville, and I fear bad roads may delay him much. His command forming the reserve must necessarily control our movements to some extent. Let me hear from you, by the courier, at Mickey's.

Yours most respectfully and truly,

Braxton Bragg. Major-General Polk.

General Polk, therefore, continued the march of his command in rear of the Third corps, reaching Mickey's that evening (the 4th). General Bragg's column (two divisions) moved by a different road, the head of it reaching Mickey's the same evening. During the night the whole of his corps was closed up and massed at the same point. We thus see that all the night of the 4th both commands bivouacked near Mickey's, not one near Mickey's and the other in its rear--General Bragg's on the Savannah and Monterey road, south of the Bark road; General Polk's on the Bark road, west of the Savannah and Monterey roads, these roads crossing nearly at right angles. General Hardee was beyond Mickey's, in the direction of Pittsburg Landing, on the Bark road, along which all the commands were to move the next day. The orders for the 5th were that the troops should be ready for the march by 3 A. M.; General Hardee to advance to the enemy's outposts, about four miles from Mickey's, and then form line of battle; General Bragg to follow next, furnishing General Hardee with sufficient troops to fill out the first line, and with the remainder of his corps to form line a thousand yards in rear of Hardee; General Polk to halt at mickey's Cross-Roads till General Bragg had passed to his front, then to move forward and form on the left of the road a certain distance from and parallel to General Bragg's line. Breckinridge was to form to the right of the road in Bragg's rear. At the hour ordered all the commands were ready to advance. During the night, however, a heavy rain storm set in, continuing to pour down in torrents. The streams and ravines across which the road ran were soon impassable. The movement was consequently postponed till dawn. General Hardee then moved forward, but with such difficulty, owing to the state of the roads, that it was 10 A. M.⁴ before he reached the enemy's outposts, the point at which his line was to form. This unavoidable delay necessarily affected the movements of General Bragg's Corps. So we find it was 12 o'clock when the last brigade (Jackson's) of the leading division reached the position it was to occupy in line,⁵ to the right of [462] the road, and 4 P. M. by the time the head of Patton Anderson's brigade, of the rear division, could reach the point at which the line of its corps crossed the road.⁶ This caused it to be half-past 4, or even later, before General Bragg's line to the left of the road was completed. As General Polk had to follow the movements of General Bragg's troops and form his line parallel to that portion of them placed to the left of the road, and as he actually got into position between 4 and 5, it is evident that neither at this nor at any other time during the entire march was the delay in question attributable to his movements. While Clark's division was being placed in line Cheatham's arrived from Purdy, having marched the entire distance since that morning. He was thus in position quite as soon as he would have been had he joined the command earlier.

In conclusion, permit me to offer an extract from General Polk's official report. After stating the measures taken to place his corps in position he goes on to say:

By this time it was near 4 o'clock P. M., and on arriving I was informed that General Beauregard desired to see me immediately. I rode forward at once to his Headquarters, where I found General Bragg and himself in conversation. He said, with some feeling, “ I am very much disappointed at the delay which has occurred in getting the troops into position.” I replied, so am I, sir, but so far as I am concerned my orders are to form on another line--General Bragg's left wing, and that line must first be established before I can form upon it.⁷ I continued: I reached Mickey's at nightfall yesterday (the 4th), whence I could not move, because of the troops which were before me, until 2 P. M. to day. I then promptly followed the column in front of me, and have been in position to form upon it so soon as its line was established. He said he regretted the delay exceedingly, as it would make it necessary to forego the attack altogether; that our success depended upon our surprising the enemy; that this was now impossible, and we must fall back on Corinth. Here General Johnston came up and asked what was the matter. General Beauregard repeated what he had said to me. General Johnston remarked that this would never do, and proceeded to assign reasons for that opinion. He then asked what I thought of it. I replied that my troops were in as good condition as they had ever been; that they were eager for battle; that to retire now would operate injuriously upon them, and that I thought we ought to attack.⁸

[463]

In all that I have said as to the delay I do not wish to be understood as casting blame upon any of the commands preceding General Polk. They and their commanders did their best in the march, as in the battle. General Beauregard, in his official report, tells the story when he says: “It was expected we should be able to reach the enemy's lines in time to attack him on the 5th instant. The men, however, were for the most part unused to marching, the roads narrow, and traversing a densely wooded country became almost impassable after a severe rain storm on the 4th, which drenched the troops in bivouac, hence our forces did not reach the intersection of the road from Pittsburg and Hamburg, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, until late Saturday afternoon.” Of the corps commanders themselves he speaks in the most generous terms. After detailing the battle he says:

To Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, commanding corps, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge, commanding the reserve, the country is greatly indebted for the zeal, intelligence, and energy with which all orders were executed; for the foresight and military ability they displayed in the absence of instructions in the many exigencies of the battle, on a field so densely wooded and broken, and for their fearless deportment as they repeatedly led their commands personally to the onset upon their powerful enemy.

With this tribute from a generous commander to the four noble dead, permit me to close my communication, but not before expressing the hope that it may prove of some service to the earnest seeker after truth in history.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,