The concentration before Shiloh-reply to Captain Polk.
Fredericksburg, Va., December 31st, 1880.I have received, a moment since, Nos. 10, 11 and 12, vol. VIII, of the Southern Historical Society Papers, for “October, November and December, 1880,” containing Captain W. M. Polk's “Facts connected with the concentration” of Confederate forces before Shiloh, “April, 1862.” I am pleased to find that the Captain proposed to deal infacts, and on that basis ask him if he claims to comprise under this designation the leading portion of the paragraph he quotes from the report of Major-General Polk, bearing on a controverted point? As an interested party, who has been remorsely assailed while unconscious of such intention during a period of some twelve years, I have not only the right, but it becomes my duty, to defend myself and the gallant division I then had the honor to command against the implied defamation.  General Polk, after stating the measures taken to place his corps in position in line of battle during the afternoon of the 5th of April, continues as follows:
By this time it was near 4 o'clock, P. M., and, on arriving, I was informed that General Beauregard desired to see me immediately. I rode forward at once to his head quarters, where I found General Bragg and himself in conversation. He said, with some feeling, ‘I am very much disappointed at the delay which has occurred in getting the troops into position.’ I replied, ‘So am I, sir, but, so far as I am concerned, my orders are to form on another line--General Bragg's left wing--and that line must first be established before I can form upon it.’ (See report, February 4th, 1863.) I continued: ‘I reached Mickey's at nightfall yesterday (the 4th), whence I could not move, because of the troops which were before me, until 2 P. M. to-day. I then promptly followed the column in front of me, and have been in position to form upon it so soon as its line was established.’[I have to regret that I have not General Polk's report before me, nor those of the commanders of divisions and brigades of his corps.] It is to be observed, that General Polk was not only a high dignitary in the church, but a scholar and logician, of recognized ability. He states previously, in his report, “I had not advanced far before I came upon General Ruggles, who commanded General Bragg's left, deploying his troops.” It is to be observed that, in General Bragg's presence, he did not assume the responsibility of charging the cause of delay of the movement on my division directly, or other troops of Bragg's corps, and it is evident that had he done so he would have met with a peremptory rebuke! The General (Polk), as a logician, dodged the rebuke intended for him, by ignoring the facts connected with the obstruction at the commencement of the march of the troops during the morning, and thus, by implication, designed to throw the blame on my division! In Colonel W. P. Johnston's life of his lamented father, General A. S. Johnston, on page 562, we find “Ruggles's division did not come up promptly, and Polk's corps was held motionless by the delay.” This clause in the text is apparently the basis of an inference to my disparagement. On page 563, we find “Munford tells as follows of how the morning passed.” （Major Munford, of General Johnston's staff.) * * * * “ About half-past 9 General Johnston sent me to General Bragg to know why the column on his left was not in position. Bragg replied:  ‘Tell General Johnston the head of that column has not made its appearance. I have sent to the rear for information, and as soon as I learn the cause of its detention he shall be informed.’ Ten, eleven, half-past 11 o'clock came, and General Johnston began to show signs of impatience. I was again sent back to know of Bragg” why the column on his left was not yet in position. “I received identically the same answer he had given earlier in the morning. At last half-past 12 o'clock came and no appearance of the missing column, and no report from Bragg. He (General Johnston, with staff officers) and myself rode to the rear until we found the missing column standing stock still, with its head some distance out in an open field. General Polk's reserves were ahead of it, with their wagons and artillery blocking up the road. General Johnston ordered them to clear the road, and the missing column to move forward.” In “an open letter to Colonel William Preston Johnston,” of August 28, 1878, I note, comparing this declaration with the antecedent clause in the text, page 562, viz.: “Ruggles's division did not come up promptly and Polk's corps was held motionless by its delay.” “We find that there is an error involved; which horn of the dilemma will you take” ? Munford continues: “There was much chaffering among those implicated as to who should bear the blame.” “It does not appear that I was or could have been present at that time.” “ It was charged on General Polk, but the plucky old bishop unhorsed his accusers on the spot.” “If General Bragg was present I have no doubt that he vindicated the conduct of my division.” “I believe,” continues Munford, “their commander, General Ruggles, was finally blamed,” page 564. “There was sharp controversy then, and afterwards, as to where the fault lay.” In my open letter of “August 28, 1878,” I continue: “It is somewhat remarkable that to-day, for the first time, I meet with this statement, and as I had not an opportunity then to rebuke the authors of it, I now resent it, with a deep sense of the wrong.” “ Had I been present it is possible that, as I was not ‘unhorsed’ myself, I could have ‘broken a lance’ with ‘the plucky old bishop’ had he presumed to reflect blame upon me.” I then, in continuation, said: “Do you assume that I was a party to this ‘sharp controversy’ in person ‘then’ or ‘afterwards,’ or was  ever aware of its existence? If so, I pronounce the assumption unfounded.” I quote freely from Colonel Johnston's book, where I encountered these allegations, as I have reason to assume that he and Captain Polk conferred very fully in relation to them, and that the article which now appears in the last volume of the Historical Papers as “facts, &c.,” is specially designed to establish this error as an historical record. In resuming the thread of events we note that General Polk states that General Bragg was present during his interview with General Beauregard. This is a significant fact, in connection with that other fact, that General Bragg commanded the Second corps, embracing Ruggles's division, and was also chief of staff of General Johnston's army, of which General Beauregard was the second in command; and still another fact, that Major Munford, of General Johnston's staff, had previously held communication with General Bragg, in person, on identically the same subject. It may thus be claimed that General Bragg held the key to the situation, and to assume that he was not cognizant of the facts connected with the march of my division, as well as that of General Clark, of Polk's First corps, would be a violent presumption and a reflection upon his intelligence, zeal and indomitable energy in the execution of his inexorable official duties. Had I been delinquent in the march of my division, in any particular, he would have displaced the commander of “the missing column” on the spot! General Bragg was an officer of prompt and vigorous action, requiring at all times, and under all circumstances, the prompt and vigorous execution of his orders. I had seen service with him during the war with Mexico — then my junior — and in disciplining his troops at Pensacola — then my senior; and well knew that he relied upon my vigorous execution of an imperative duty, and indeed that he would pursue with rigor the least degree of failure in its performance. Colonel Johnston states that “Polk's answer was sufficient — that Clark's division was ready to move at 3 o'clock A. M.” Let us follow this logic to legitimate conclusions. Attention is invited to the subjoined copy of an order:
Sir,--Take your ambulances and ammunition wagons, with an  officer in charge of them, 40 rounds of cartridges in boxes, one blanket, canteen and havresack, with two days cooked rations. Leave small camp guard, preserve silence in marching. (Signed),Daniel Ruggles, Brigadier-General Commanding.
General Patton Anderson, commanding my Second Brigade, in his report of the battle of Shiloh, says: “My brigade was ready to march at 3 o'clock, A. M., on the 5th, and was so reported at the division headquarters.” “My other two brigades were ready to march at the same hour--3 A. M.--on the 5th of April, and their commander and his staff with them.” Applying Colonel Johnston's rules of logic, is Ruggles's answer sufficient? As I am dealing in facts somewhat cumulative, I have to state that on or about the 20th of October, 1878, at Corpus Christi, Texas, I received a letter from General G. T. Beauregard, the second in command of the Confederate army on the battlefield at Shiloh, which was published, by permission, in the Galveston Daily News, November 22d, 1878, and of which an extract is appended.Headquarters camp, April 5th, 2 A. M.Note.--Send a staff officer to let me know you are ready. D. R. (Endorsed) Official business, (and): Received this dispatch at 1/4 to 4 A. M., 5th April. (Signed),Patton Anderson, Brigadier-General.A true copy of the original. (Signed),
Applying Colonel Johnston's logical rule, is Ruggles's answer “sufficient” for both himself and Doctor Polk? In a personal interview, subsequently, at San Antonio, Texas, with Colonel H. P. Brewster, Assistant Adjutant-General, and chief of General Johnston's personal staff, November 4, 1878, and on repeated occasions, subsequently there, and at Austin, he stated to me in explicit terms — after having carefully examined the allegations in Colonel Johnston's publication — that his relations with General Johnston were such that had there been any foundation for such an allegation he must have known it, and that no suggestion was made by General Johnston of any fault or failure by my division whatever. I now make reference to Colonel Brewster personally, and ask if Ruggles's answer is logical and “sufficient.” On the 15th of February, 1879, at Austin, Texas, I received a letter from General L. D. Sandige, now of New Orleans, La., my assistant inspector-general of division at, before and after the battle of Shiloh, bearing date “February 10, 1879,” in which he says: “There was no controversy during the march from Corinth that ever I heard of, then or afterwards.” At Austin, Texas, early in April, 1879, I met General William Preston, of Louisville, Kentucky, brother-in-law of General Albert Sidney Johnston, and a volunteer aid-de-camp during the march and at the battle of Shiloh. In reply to my inquiries General Preston stated that “his relations with General Johnston were intimate and confidential, and that he had  accompanied him on the march, and on the field, and that in compliance with his request he had noted the course of events, and that he is certain that my name, or that of my division, was never mentioned by General Johnston in connection with the delay in the march to the position where the line of battle was established preliminary to the battle of Shiloh, on the 5th day of April, 1862.” Reference is here made to General William Preston. I repeat the inquiry--is Ruggles's answer sufficient? In recurring to Colonel Johnston's narrative we find the additional statement that “his orders (Polk's) were to wait for the passage of Bragg's corps, and to move and form his line in rear of Ruggles's division, which composed Bragg's left wing.” * * * “He could not advance or establish his line until this had passed.” “There was doubtless some confusion or mistake of orders in Ruggles's division.” This assumption is entirely unfounded, as the position of my division was in strict conformity with Bragg's orders. To present the military status at the moment above noted, in the clearest light, I will refer, briefly, to some incidents connected with the previous march. Attention is invited to the following correspondence connected with the commencement of the march.New York, October 2d, 1878, 314 West 58th Street.My Dear General,--I have just read in the Fredericksburg SemiWeekly Reporter (Recorder) of the 13th ultimo, your vindication of yourself against the “calumny” of Colonel W. P. Johnston, in the life of his worthy father, relative to the concentration of troops, April 5th, 1862, preliminary to the battle of Shiloh.  This is the first time I have heard you blamed or rendered responsible for the unfortunate delay which occurred in the march of the troops to the battle field of Shiloh on the morning of the 5th. Neither General Johnston, in my presence, nor myself, ever attached such blame to you. The reasons you give for the delay are correct, as far as they go: bad roads, due to heavy rains, change of route from that ordered (by a subordinate commander), and the injudicious “blocking up” of the bark road by troops, wagons and artillery belonging to a different command. Colonel Johnston seems to attach, in his book, as little importance to the reputation acquired in the field by an officer as though it had been obtained in some nominal military position in Richmond or elsewhere. * * * * * * * * * (Signed)
This letter was written and sent at about 3 o'clock, A. M., April 3d,  by the mounted courier who brought the general order for the march in advance, dated April 3d, and received at 2.30 o'clock, April 3d, A. M. The courier returned promptly with an answer, as follows:Major Garner,--I desire to be informed if, by the terms “entire division,” the first brigade in advance is included, and that the preparation for the morning * * * * will include that brigade. Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, (Signed),D. Ruggles, Brigadier General, Confederate States Army, Commanding Division.Note.--Ketchum's battery, belonging to the Second brigade, is with the advance, and Bains's is not ready for field service.Daniel Ruggles, Brigadier General.
We note that Colonel Johnston, in the final clause of the second paragraph, p. 564, specified: “It is certain that one of Ruggles's brigade commanders, who was on outpost duty at Monterey, received no orders at all, and was left to surmise the meaning of the movement, as regiment after regiment filed by.” In my former notice of this gratuitous remark, I asked if it was designed as further evidence that “Ruggles was finally blamed,” justly? Then added, “This detached brigade” (Gibson's) “was not then under my orders — not until it rejoined my division. This is a rigid military rule. My troops, indeed, were disciplined to be held always ready, as was shown by Colonel Pond's” (3d) “brigade resisting General Buck's early attack, and my two other brigades having been the first troops to form and ready to march to engage the enemy on the morning of the 7th of April.” Furthermore I asked attention to the following orders, received at 1 o'clock P. M., on the 3d of April, at Corinth:General,--You will take all the troops of your division from here. Colonel Gibson, commander of First brigade, at Monterey, will be along, and some change may be made after a day or two.G. G. G.Bains's battery will not go. (Signed),Geo. G. Garner, Assistant Adjutant General.
In continuation, I then said: “To have communicated in advance, under the circumstances, would have endangered my official integrity, and, as is apparent, was entirely unnecessary.” General Bragg, in his report of the battle of Shiloh, dated April 30, 1862, states that “the road to Monterey, eleven miles, was found very bad, requiring us until eleven o'clock on the 4th to concentrate at that place, where one of my brigades joined the column.” This was Colonel R. L. Gibson's detached brigade. General Chalmers's brigade, Withers's division, had previously marched that morning for Mickey's, direct. It appears that that which was “certain” proves quite uncertain — in fact, unfounded! “Was this charge made” (by Colonel Johnston) “on the principle that the effects of poisons are cumulative--as corroborative evidence?” The following letter, written by General Bragg at 10 o'clock A. M., April 4th, from Monterey, to General Johnston or General Beauregard, forms an important incident in the history of the march: “My Dear General,--I reached here at half-past 8 o'clock, ahead of my rear division. Bad roads, insufficient transportation badly managed, and the usual delays of a first move of new troops have caused the delay. My first division (Withers's) is at Mickey's, and the ignorance of the guide for the second (Ruggles's), as well as the reports I receive from people here, induced me to order my second division to move on the same road as the first. I am also influenced to do this from the information I have of General Hardee's advance.” * * * “I will send a courier to notify General Polk of my change.” p. 564. “The ‘special orders as to the movement of troops’ directed Bragg to move from Monterey to Mickey's with Withers's division, while Ruggles's division was to move from Monterey on the road to Purdy, which crossed the Bark road more than two miles in rear of Mickey's.” See p. 566. “ Had Ruggles pursued this route he could have passed to the left of Mickey's and deployed without interferences or obstruction from Hardee's or Withers's divisions. But Bragg's order, changing Ruggles's line of march and bringing him in rear of these commands, debarred any movements until they had cleared the way. To this cause of delay was added the confusion arising from any change of orders with raw  troops as to routes in the labyrinth of roads in that vincinty.” “See also General Jordan's account, page 567.” Captain Polk states that General Polk “therefore continued the march of his command in rear of the Third corps, reaching Mickey's that evening (the 4th). General Bragg's column (two divisions) moved by a different road, the head of it reaching Mickey's the same evening. During the night the whole of his corps was closed up and massed at the same point. We thus see that all the night of the 4th both commands bivouaced near Mickey's, not one near Mickey's and the other in its rear--General Bragg's on the Savannah and Monterey road, south of the Bark road; General Polk's on the Bark road, west of the Savannah and Monterey roads, these roads crossing nearly at right angles. General Hardee's was beyond Mickey's, in the direction of Pittsburg Landing, on the Bark road, along which all the commands were to move the next day. The orders for the 5th were that the troops should be ready for the march by 3 A. M. General Hardee to advance to the enemy's outposts, about four miles from Mickey's, and then form line of battle; General Bragg to follow next, furnishing General Hardee with sufficient troops to fill out the first line, and with the remainder of his corps to form line a thousand yards in rear of Hardee; General Polk to halt at Mickey's cross-roads till General Bragg had passed to his front, then to move forward and to form on the left of the road a certain distance from and parallel to General Bragg's line. Breckinridge was to form to the right of the road in Bragg's rear.” The solution of the question of precedence among the troops, thus concentrated at Mickey's, appears to be quite plain. “Special orders no. 8, Corinth, April 3d, 1862,” directed the concentration of the main bodies of the three corps--excepting only Ruggles's division — at Mickey's or vicinity, and finally that division marched there in conformity with orders from General Bragg, their corps commander. On the march from Monterey, Ruggles's division fell in the rear and followed the Third and First corps on the Ridge road to Mickey's. During a brief halt, the address of the commander-in-chief was probably read to the troops, and I had an excellent opportunity to notice them at rest as well as in motion. These troops bivouaced, just as night set in, in the midst of darkness, mud and rain, at Mickey's, not diverging, probably, materially from their order of march. In his report, General Bragg says, “the command bivouaced for the night near the Mickey house, immediately in rear of Major-General  Hardee's corps. Major-General Polk's being just in our rear.” Here reference was probably made to Withers's division, which was among the earlier arrivals. Morning came. The orders to march at 3 o'clock, A. M., were suspended on account of a drenching rain-storm having commenced about 2 o'clock, A. M., rendering it impracticable to move at night. General Bragg stated that it was 7 o'clock in the morning before the road was clear, so as to put my command in motion, though it had been in ranks and ready from 3 A. M., in the wet and cold, and suffering from inaction. At this juncture the commanding general arrived at our position. “My column, at last fairly in motion, moved on without delay, &c.” The general, in this instance, also referred to Withers's as the leading division. General John K. Jackson, commanding the Third brigade of this division, reported that he “arrived at the place of rendezvous near the battle field of Shiloh, at 12 o'clock on Saturday, 5th April, instant.” He had no connection with the obstructed march. Brigadier-General Patton Anderson, the commander of my Second brigade, to whose report reference has already been made, in continuation states:head quarters Second corps, A. M., Corinth, 3d April, 1862.You will move out your division by way of Monterey to the intersection of the Purdy and Monterey road with the Bark road, leading towards Pittsburg. Encamp there to-night. Do not encumber the Pittsburg road, as other troops may have to pass you. You will follow Withers's division to Monterey, and then take on your brigade to that place (Colonel Gibson's First Brigade). From Monterey you take the Purdy road, Withers one to the right of it. Captain Jenkins, in command of four companies of cavalry, will report to you. Captain Steele (engineers), will assign you a guide.  If you cannot reach your position to-night do so early to-morrow. (Signed),
Brigadier-General Ruggles Commanding Division:Braxton Bragg, Major-General Commanding.
At about 3 o'clock, P. M., of the 5th, my command took its position in the column, on the Bark road, marching left in front, in the direction of Shiloh. The road was much blocked up by the trains of wagons and artillery attached to corps in front. In order to reach my position in the designated line of battle, at the hour indicated in the plan, I left the main road, taking a course through the woods parallel to the road, passing other trains and brigades till the way was found open, only a short distance from the point at which I was to file off to the left and form line at right angles, or nearly so, with the Bark road, on which the column was moving. This point was reached by the head of my column at about 4 P. M. on the 5th instant. Colonel Pond, commanding the Third brigade, Ruggles's division, having preceded me in the direction of Owl creek. After leaving the Bark road and following Colonel Pond's command about half a mile, I found his rear halted and his line being formed. Meeting General Bragg at this point he gave me some directions as to the formation, rectifying, in some measure, the line formed by Colonel Pond. Soon after this I met Brigadier-General Ruggles, commanding the division, who substantially reiterated General Bragg's instructions, which I was in the act of carrying out.Here is unimpeachable evidence that the Bark road had been completed “blocked up.” In this connection the statement of Major Munford,  of General Johnston's staff, will bear repetition with emphasis. He says: * * “half-past 12 o'clock came, and no appearance of the missing column, and no report from Bragg. General Johnston and staff, including myself, rode to the rear until we found the missing column standing stock still, with its head some distance out in an open field. General Polk's reserves were ahead of it, with their wagons and artillery blocking up the road. General Johnston ordered them to clear the road and the missing column to move forward.” General Clark's division constituted that portion of Polk's reserves then present, and the inquiry at once arises as to how they came there? His division not having moved from its bivouac, occupied during the night, until notified to advance, at about 7 o'clock A. M. on the 5th of April, met with the obstruction of Clark's division, which had preceded it about sunrise--half-past 5 o'clock in the morning. Had Ruggles's division bivouaced in the advance of Clark's, as has been assumed, is there a probability that it would have been permitted to remain at a halt, while Clark's division moved past it, in violation of orders? This inquiry awaits an answer from both Colonel Johnston and Captain Polk. As a matter of courtesy I suggest, in taking a common-sense view, that Clark's division marched there, following General Withers's division of Bragg's second corps closely, as soon as it marched, at an early hour that morning, and thus obstructed the entrance of Ruggles's division into its prescribed position in the advancing column! Captain Polk quotes a clause from a letter received from General Charles Clark, the division commander of the First corps (Polk's), then present: Extract: “We bivouaced Friday night on the road, the head of the column--General A. P. Stewart's brigade — within a quarter of a mile, I think, of Mickey's house. Very early in the morning the head of the column was at Mickey's cross-roads — I think about sunrise.” * * * “At Mickey's cross-roads we were halted for some hours. General Polk was with me at the head of the column.” --S. H. S. Papers, p. 460, vol. 8. The inquiry is also presented as to what the missing column, “standing stock still, with its head some distance out in an open field,” was doing there? General Polk's version of an interview with Beauregard, “near 4 o'clock P. M.,” would warrant the inference that this may be a pure fiction, and that the conditions were reversed--that it was my bull which had gored the plucky old bishop's ox before both were corralled.  It would, indeed, have been quite superfluous to have troubled Beauregard with such an unimportant narrative — especially while Bragg was present and had, doubtless, already stated to Beauregard the essential particulars of the march! Again, reverting to a common-sense basis, we may assume that, owing to the tempestuous condition of earth and skies at 2 o'clock A. M. on the morning of the 5th of April, 1862, I directed that my division should be divested of all incumbrances in its advance to the field of impending battle. Further, we may assume that when my division filed into the Bark road its advance was obstructed by a division of General Polk's reserve corps--he being my senior — which had pressed forward contrary to the order of march, encumbered and halting, had “blocked up the road” and rendered the farther advance of my division quite impracticable. We may now still further assume, with confidence, that the head of my division, left in front, was, after encountering this obstruction, and some time held immovable, conducted into the open field with the view of advancing to its prescribed position on the line of battle as soon as a practicable route could be found through the deep mire and water and intervening forests. In this position my division was found by General Johnston, when he directed the road cleared of Polk's reserves, and ordered my advance, to which my troops responded with notable enthusiasm. Such was the emphatic answer to the inquiry why the head of the missing column (Ruggles's third brigade) was found “stock still out in the open field.” The three brigades advanced along and near the same route and encountered similar obstacles to those stated by General Anderson in his report. This succinct outline will, it is assumed, stand the crucial test of the sophistry of the first, the casuistry of the second, and the array of facts of the last of my assailants, and every combination of their pigeon-hole batteries in attempting to breach the military record of my division on the battle-field of Shiloh. Colonel Johnston assumed that there was “some confusion or mistake of orders in Ruggles's division!” I now deny, as I did in August, 1878, “both allegations positively and emphatically.” The troops of my division disclosed neither evidences of confusion nor mistake in the execution of explicit orders, and maintained their proper organization, marched like veterans, and were distinguished for their undaunted bravery in their successive conflicts throughout the great battle of Shiloh--as Johnston's own frequent mention of the conduct of my troops — without honoring, by customary courtesy, my name, as their  commander, clearly shows! On one occasion, subsequent, General Bragg declared, publicly, in my presence, that “these troops of my division, and his troops from Pensacola, Withers's division, which I had in part disciplined,” “were distinguished as among the few troops who maintained their organization through the battle of Shiloh.” I renew my statement of 1878, “that of the ‘chaffering’ and ‘controversy’ I know nothing now, nor did I know anything then, and in no manner was I a party to it,and that if General Bragg was cognizant of it, he must have rebuked the slander, and defended the conduct of his corps, and stood firm in its vindication. It is therefore apparent that he held me blameless, or that, with his accustomed promptitude, he would have directed me ‘to rise and explain!’ ” The question now recurs, “Why did Major-General Polk block up” the Bark road with his reserve corps, and hold it, obstructing the passage of Ruggles's division in violation of the prescribed order of march, and in my absence, and without my knowledge, attribute his fault to me? It appears that after ten months delay — possibly for reflection--“the plucky old bishop” made his report of the battle of Shiloh at Richmond, February 4th, 1863, embodying in it his own version of his interview with Beauregard on the field of Shiloh. This recalls the declaration of Honorable John C. Calhoun, when in the Senate, the posthumous diary of ex-President John Quincy Adams was quoted by Senator Thomas H. Benton against him, that “the diary might be accepted as evidence against the author--Mr. Adams--but was worthless as evidence against any other person!” The question of the “plucky old bishop's” infallibility belongs to the theologians. The local or objective point involved, when sharply drawn, is, who was responsible for the delay on the 5th day of April, 1862, in the formation of the line of battle on the field of Shiloh, which prevented an attack on the enemy on that day. Correlatively this involves, also, the emphatic inference that such delay precluded, for the want of time, a completed victory before General Buell's corps arrived on the field on Sunday evening, the 6th of April, 1862. Field-Marshal Grouchy arrived upon the battle field of Warterloo too late to defeat General Blucher! The orders of General Bragg were explicit and were executed with promptitude and fidelity. My troops needed no apology and their surviving commander offers none — but he scorns any attempt to defame him or them. Colonel Johnston has, during two years past, had ample time to have consulted authorities, and to have expunged this error from his  book; but, as I am not advised that he has done so, I am constrained to appeal to the great tribunal of public opinion. Captain Polk having already invoked its judgment, I commend for his consideration a more critical examination of the questions at issue. I must claim indulgence in repeating here the concluding paragraph of my letter to Colonel Johnston, bearing date August 28th, 1878:
It is natural that Colonel Johnston should cherish with pride the high character and the brilliant military achievements of his father; indeed, it is praiseworthy, and I would rebuke any attempt to snatch one laurel from the sacred fame of General Albert Sidney Johnston. And yet, I have kindred and friends who cherish my name and military record with equal solicitude, and would resent every attempt to defame them. I cordially invite my surviving, gallant comrades (which invitation I now renew), as a special favor, to send me, here, memoranda relating to the military march and the services of my division on the battle field of Shiloh, on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, 1862.
Daniel Ruggles, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division, late C. S. Army.