General Webb's book is a valuable one.
It is on the whole, a clear and simple narrative of the
Peninsula campaign, or rather of the actions and sufferings of the army of the Potomac during that campaign.
It is written with that comprehension of the military field of operations and of the movements therein, that we might expect from an officer of the rank and distinction of the author, and who was at the same time a participant in the campaign he describes.
His tone is temperate, his criticisms of the various Federal officers and authorities whom he thinks blameworthy, are judicious and moderate, though in some cases, as in that of
McClellan, they are, to say the least, generous; his spirit towards his foes, “the rebels” is generally fair, and he has evidently taken pains to consult the authorities on both sides.
The book is a pleasant contrast to the mass of misrepresentation and abuse that for years poured forth from northern papers under the name of History, the end of which, it is to be hoped, is heralded by this book and others like it.
General Webb has however given rather a narrative of the doings
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of the army of the Potomac than a history of the
Peninsula campaign.
His description of the
Confederate side of the struggle is very brief and meagre.
His attention, and his pages are chiefly filled with the
Federal plans of campaign, the differences between
McClellan and the
Federal administration, the difficulties which successively appeared in the path of the
Federal army and the questions as to responsibility connected with these difficulties and the consequent failures.
He handles
General McClellan's military reputation very tenderly, he is anxious to take care of it, and he has found, as others have, that this makes exhaustive draughts on his skill and his time.
There are too a numbers of errors of statement in the book, some of which are evidently due to haste in its preparation.
In the spring of 1862, the Confederate government found itself face to face with a difficult problem in
Virginia.
The largest and best appointed of the
Federal armies, under their
Commander-in-Chief, lay in front of
General Johnston at
Manassas, evidently waiting only for good weather to assume the offensive.
This army contained over 180,000 men “present for duty,” and from 600 to 700 pieces of artillery (p. 7).
Johnston was holding it in check with less than 50,000 men (p. 26). The Federal navy had virtually undisputed control of the sea and the rivers, except the
James.
Some Confederate batteries had partially obstructed the
Potomac below
Washington, but these could be driven away whenever the
Federal Commander chose to do it. A small Confederate force under
Huger still held
Norfolk and the
Navy Yard, where they were preparing the ram,
Virginia, to introduce a new era into naval warfare.
Magruder, with 11,000 men, watched the peninsula between the
James and
York, and by means of his works at
Yorktown and
Gloucester Point, closed the latter river above that point.
In the
West heavy reverses had already befallen the
Confederate arms, and still greater were impending, so that nothing could be drawn from that quarter to strengthen the slender means with which the
Confederacy was to meet the prodigious military armament that was about to set forth against
Richmond.
Johnston, who, by his boldness, had confined the
Federal army for months to the vicinity of
Washington, realized that with the advent of spring his advanced position at
Manassas was untenable.
McClellan could move against him in overwhelming strength, or he could leave
Washington securely defended by a force larger than the Confederate army, and then move an army twice as numerous as
Johnston's to the
Rappahannock or the lower
Chesapeake, and thus place it between
Johnston and
Richmond.
Seeing that
Fredericksburg offered the most direct route to
Richmond and
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possessed many advantages over all the others,
Johnston expected his adversary to move by it, and therefore prepared to fall back behind the
Rappahannock so that he might be ready to oppose an advance by way of
Fredericksburg as well as be within reach should
McClellan choose a more southerly line of approach.
Johnston continued to maintain a bold front at
Manassas, and by various
ruses imposed greatly exaggerated notions of his strength upon
McClellan to the last moment.
To the latter's great surprise he quietly evacuated
Manassas on March 9th.
This movement of the Confederate army somewhat deranged
McClellan's plans.
After long discussion, the latter had induced
President Lincoln to agree to his plan of transporting the mass of his army to
Urbana, on the lower
Rappahannock, for an advance thence by way of
West Point on
Richmond.
A main inducement to this plan was that the
Federal army might by a rapid movement interpose itself between
Richmond and
General Johnston.
With the
Confederates behind the
Rappahannock this last could no longer be hoped for, and
General McClellan now had recourse to the alternative plan which he had kept in reserve (
General Webb calls it a
dernier ressort, p. 30) of making his base at
Fortress Monroe and advancing thence up the
Peninsula.
The brilliant naval victory of the
Virginia (March 8) in
Hampton Roads closed the
James for the time, but the Federal fleet in the lower
Chesapeake was able to confine the formidable iron-clad to that river, and thus the bay and the
York river up to
Yorktown were open to the unmolested use of the
Federal commander.
By the first of April a large part of
McClellan's army was at
Fort Monroe and ready to go forward.
The closing weeks of March and the early ones of April were anxious ones to the
Confederates.
McClellan's great army was evidently on the move against
Richmond, but from what point or points it would advance was for a time uncertain, and the utmost vigilance had to be exercised.
The Confederate forces were fearfully inadequate, even when concentrated, and now they were scattered to guard many places.
Early in April it became evident from the large number of troops that had landed at
Fort Monroe that
McClellan intended to try the
Peninsula route, and orders were given to begin the transfer of
Johnston's army from the
Rappahannock to
Yorktown.
Meantime, to
Magruder with 11,000 men was assigned the task of holding the
Federal army in check until
Johnston's forces could arrive.
We believe that history records few operations more skilful or successful than those by which
Magruder accomplished his task.
Magruder's line stretched across the
Peninsula from
Yorktown to
Mulberry Point on the
James.
With
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6,000 of his men he garrisoned the extremities of his line, holding
Gloucester Point and closing the
York river by his batteries.
The other 5,000 held the line of the
Warwick creek, which he had converted into a formidable line of defense by the use of all the resources that nature and engineering skill had placed within his reach.
On April 2
McClellan reached
Fort Monroe, and finding 58,000 of his troops ready to move, he ordered this force forward on the 4th, leaving the remainder to follow.
Next day he found himself in front of
Magruder's line, where his advance was checked, and so vigorously and skilfully did
Magruder manage his forces that the
Federal army forbore to assault, and deliberately set down to force the handful of Confederates out of their
Yorktown lines by regular approaches and siege guns.
A feeble and unsuccessful attempt was made on April 16 to break the
Confederate lines, and after this
McClellan seemed confirmed in his conviction that they could be carried only by regular siege operations.
These lines were held for one month — long enough for
Johnston and the bulk of his army to reach
Yorktown — long enough for the Confederate Government to make all the dispositions within its power to meet the invading army.
Much has been written in criticism, and much in defence of the
Federal administration and of
McClellan in reference to the “siege of
Yorktown.”
That the administration treated
McClellan badly there can be no doubt.
Its whole conduct towards him, in the spring of 1862, showed want of confidence, and in withholding
McDowell's corps at the last moment, it behaved in a way that should have caused his immediate and peremptory resignation.
But, on the other hand, it is nonsense to excuse, on the score of want of support, a commander who, with 80,000 or 90,000 troops, was completely held at bay by 11,000 men behind a line twelve miles long!
Johnston showed as great skill in retiring from
Yorktown as he and
Magruder had shown in defending it. At the last moment when
McClellan, after a month's arduous effort, was about ready to open his powerful batteries,
Johnston quietly retreated towards
Richmond, and so surprised and disconcerted
McClellan, that it was half a day before he could begin the pursuit. (Page 69.) At
Williamsburg (May 5) the
Confederates found it necessary to check the advance of the
Federals, which was pressing their rear.
Longstreet and
D. H. Hill were halted for this purpose.
Longstreet accomplished the end in view handsomely by severely defeating
Hooker's division, and inflicting some damage on
Kearney's.
D. H. Hill, on the
Confederate left, did not manage so well, and in consequence
Hancock was able there to
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inflict a severe repulse on
Early's brigade.
But, on the whole,
General Johnston, with a loss of over 1,500, inflicted a loss of over 2,200, and effectually checked the pursuit.
McClellan sent a large force, headed by
Franklin's division by water to the head of the
York opposite
West Point, with the purpose of there landing and seizing the
Confederate line of retreat; but
Johnston attacked the first troops that landed vigorously, drove them back to the cover of their gunboats, and penned them up there until his army trains had passed on towards the
Chickahominy.
Baffled thus in his movements against both the flank and rear of the retreating army,
McClellan was content to follow slowly and with great caution.
The retreat from
Yorktown involved the evacuation of
Norfolk by the
Confederates; and the destruction of the iron-clad
Virginia quickly gave to the
Federals the command of the
James river up to
Drewry's Bluff.
This caused
Johnston to retire across the
Chickahominy and take position in front of
Richmond; and on May 21 the
Federal army advanced to the line of the
Chickahominy.
So far boldness and skill in strategy had given the
Confederates the advantage in the campaign, but the
Federals were gathering from different directions in overwhelming force, and it was evident that a great battle, or battles, must soon be fought for the possession of
Richmond.
The disparity of numbers against the
Confederates was alarming.
And here it should be said that
General Webb is inaccurate, and sometimes very unfair in his statement of numbers.
Thus, using an expression of
McClellan's which probably refers to the force he could place in line of battle in an aggressive movement, he states
McClellan's strength in May as 80,000 (p. 84), while he makes no reference to the official reports.
From the latter he elsewhere (p. 181) gives
McClellan's numbers when he left
Yorktown, as 109,335 “present for duty.”
There is no fair and honest basis for estimates of strength but the official reports.
All else is guess-work, and all cutting down of official numbers on special grounds is only fair when applied in the same way to both armies.
Now, it is plain that
McClellan had early in May 109,000 effectives.
How many of these he could throw forward to fight, and how many must be kept guarding his flanks, his communications and his depots, is not the question.
In answer to
McClellan's urgent appeals, at the middle of May,
McDowell was ordered forward from
Fredericksburg with a force which
General Webb correctly states at 41,000 men and 100 guns (p. 85). Thus, 150,000 men were about to unite in the attack on
Richmond.
To meet this,
Johnston had, by the official report of May 21, 53,688 men at
Richmond.
He called in
Branch's and
Anderson's brigades from
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Gordonsville and
Fredericksburg, and
Huger's three brigades from
Petersburg.
General Webb absurdly estimates
Branch's and
Anderson's brigades at 12,000 (p. 86). They actually numbered possibly as many as 5,500.
(See
Branch's order, Southern Historical papers, vol.
VIII, page 103, which shows his strength did not exceed 3,000, and
Taylor's
Four Years with General Lee, page 50, where
Anderson's strength is given at from 2,000 to 2,300 in the seven days battles.)
Huger's brigades may have numbered 6,000 at this time.
Thus the
Confederates were able to concentrate about 65,000 men to oppose the 150,000 which were about to unite against them.
It would be hard to find a finer illustration of the adage, that “fortune favors the brave” than occurred at this juncture.
Stonewall Jackson, after defeating
Fremont's advance in the mountains of
West Virginia, and while he was supposed to be one hundred and fifty miles away, suddenly surprised
Banks at
Front Royal and
Winchester, and driving him in confusion and route across the
Potomac, advanced to
Harper's Ferry.
Jackson and his 16,000 men created a marvelous panic at
Washington and throughout the
North, the accounts of which at this day read like the pages of a romance.
The Federal Capitol was believed to be in danger, 300,000 men were called for by the
President, the militia of whole States were ordered out, and the proclamations of Governors as far away as
Ohio and
Massachusetts would not have seemed tame to the Romans after
Cannae.
The most important result of
Jackson's dash was the stoppage of
McDowell, who had already begun the movement that in three days would have united him with
McClellan.
A large part of
McDowell's army was ordered back after
Jackson, and the remainder was held for the time at
Fredericksburg.
Relieved by
Jackson's success of the fear of
McDowell's forces from the
North,
Johnston, who had determined to attack
McClellan before the junction, if possible, postponed his attack until the advance of a part of the latter's army on the south side of the
Chickahominy should give the
Confederates a chance of concentrating against one of the
Federal wings.
Meantime
General Fitz John Porter gained an advantage which had no important results, at Hanover Court-house, where, with 12,000 men he attacked and defeated
Branch with 4,000.
Here again
General Webb greatly exaggerates the
Confederate force. (P. 96--see
Branch's order above referred to.)
At the last of May
Johnston thought the time to strike had come.
Two of
McClellan's corps lay on the south side of the
Chickahominy along the
Williamsburg road, their advance having been pushed as far as
Seven Pines.
The remainder of the
Federal army was on the north
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side of that river.
The communication between the wings was as yet imperfect, for but few of the numerous bridges
McClellan was building were complete.
Every advance towards
Richmond by the corps on the south side separated them more and more from their supports.
On May 30th
Johnston concentrated twenty-three of his twenty-seven brigades, and prepared to throw them, on the morrow, against the
Federal corps of
Keyes and
Heintzelman, which were on the south side.
A terrific rain storm occurred on the night of the 30th, which by flooding the
Chickahominy imperiled and finally interrupted the communication between
McClellan's wings.
While in this respect assisting the
Confederates, it seriously interferred with their movements on the 31st, as the whole country was covered with water, and some of the swollen sources of
White Oak Swamp caused a delay of many hours in the march of
Huger's division.
Longstreet with his own and
D. H. Hill's division was sent out to attack
Keyes in front at
Seven Pines.
Huger was to strike
Keyes's left flank, and
Johnston himself was to direct
G. W. Smith's division against his right flank and prevent a retreat towards the
Chickahominy.
Hours were wasted in waiting for
Huger to get into position.
Finally, about midday,
Longstreet ordered the attack to be made by
D. H. Hill.
Casey's Federal division was quickly routed and the whole of
Keyes's Corps and
Kearney's division of
Heintzelman's was during the afternoon, defeated and driven from their works and camps to a third line of works a mile or two in the rear.
Unfortunately
Johnston did not order
Smith forward promptly.
Longstreet had been two or three hours engaged before
General Johnston knew it, and when in the middle of the afternoon
Smith was hurried forward to give the
coup de grace to
Heintzelman, he was just in time to run against the head of
Sumner's corps at
Fair Oaks.
The latter sent by
McClellan to reinforce his left wing, had succeeded in crossing the
Chickahominy on the already floating bridges just before they were carried away, and hastening forward arrived soon enough to stop
Smith, and by engaging him in a stubborn and bloody contest until night, prevented his going to
Longstreet's assistance.
General Johnston fell severely wounded at night-fall and the usual result of a change of commanders in the midst of a battle was seen next day. No concerted, definite plan of operations guided the
Confederates on June 1st.
Severe but desultory fighting took place between
Longstreet's lines and the fresh troops of
Hooker's and
Richardson's divisions without any decided result, while
Smith, now in chief command of the
Confederates remained quiet in front of
Sumner, though
Magruder's large division, which had been unengaged, was at hand.
By midday all fighting had
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ceased.
Early in the afternoon
General R. E. Lee, was placed in command by
President Davis, and during the evening and night he ordered the Confederate army back to its late positions in front of
Richmond.
The battle of
Seven Pines, though costing each army about 6,000 men, resulted in little.
The plan of the
Confederate leader was admirable, but the execution of it was defective.
Too much time was wasted in waiting for
Huger; but a more serious fault was the delay in sending forward
Smith's division on
Longstreet's left.
Next morning the battle might have been renewed with the whole Confederate force at hand with good promise of success.
As it was, the
Confederates had hit
Keyes and
Heintzelman damaging blows, but it had been done at heavy cost, and the only result of value to them was the increased caution and slowness of
McClellan's movements.
The new Confederate
Commander at once began preparations for a renewal of the struggle.
Troops that could be spared from the
South were ordered to
Richmond.
Jackson was directed to be prepared to move to the same place from the
Valley at the critical moment. (
General Webb is in error in attributing this movement to
Jackson himself, as he does on page 122.
Jackson had been constantly instructed to keep such a movement in view, as may be seen from
General Lee's letter to him of May 16.) The victories of
Cross Keys and
Port Republic, on June 8 and June 9, made the withdrawal of
McDowell's corps from
McClellan permanent, and left
Jackson free to join
Lee. Meantime the latter was busy in preparation.
On June 11
Stuart was sent with the Confederate cavalry to reconnoiter
McClellan's right and rear.
This gallant cavalryman extended his reconnoissance into a raid completely around the
Federal army, cutting its communications and destroying supplies as he went.
This expedition, one of the most brilliant and successful feats of arms that had been accomplished up to that time in the war, gave
Lee the information on which he planned his attack on
McClellan.
General Webb thinks it worthy of only a passing allusion.
Lee now ordered
Jackson to join the main army, using a
ruse de guerre to prevent the large Federal forces in
Northern Virginia from following him. Considerable bodies of troops were sent up to
Jackson as if to reinforce him for another advance towards
Washington.
Care was taken that tidings of this movement should reach the enemy.
On June 16
Jackson was ordered to move down with the greatest expedition and secrecy, and so admirable was the execution of this plan, that when
Jackson reached
Ashland, twelve miles north of
Richmond on June 25th, neither
McClellan nor the government at
Washington had any knowledge of his whereabouts (page 124), and it
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was not until the
Federal pickets north of the
Chickahominy were driven in next day that the
Federal Commander had any certain information of the approach of his swift-footed assailant.
Lee was now ready to deliver battle.
His strength, including
Jackson, was from 80,000 to 81,000 men. (See the careful computations of
General Early, Southern Historical papers, vol.
I, p. 421, and of
Colonel Taylor,
Four Years with General Lee, the latter of which
General Webb adopts, p. 119).
General McClellan's strength, omitting
Dix's command at
Fort Monroe, was by his official return for June 10, 105,825 “present for duty.”
(This number
General Webb unfairly reduces to 92,500.) This disparity was not greater than must naturally exist between two combatants so unequal in resources as were the North and South.
If the independence of the
South was to be achieved it must be done in spite of it. To
Lee's mind a simply defensive policy, resulting ultimately in a siege, promised nothing beyond a protracted struggle, with certain disaster at the end of it. He believed he could best thwart his adversary by attacking him.
McClellan had, after the battle of
Seven Pines, transferred the bulk of his army to the south side of the
Chickahominy, where he reoccupied the ground from which
Keyes and Heinzelman had been driven on May 31.
This ground he covered with a network of entrenchments, and under the cover of strong works was slowly pushing his lines towards
Richmond.
About one-third of his army held the north side of the
Chickahominy as high up as
Meadow Bridge, and at the same time covered his communications with his base at
West Point, on the
Pamunkey.
Lee determined to attack the
Federal right wing, overwhelm it if possible, and destroy
McClellan's communications and depots.
McClellan would thus be forced to fight for his communications or to adopt some other line of retreat at immense cost of supplies.
The information brought by
Stuart confirmed
Lee in his plan, and
Jackson was then ordered to come down on
McClellan's right and rear.
When
Jackson was at hand
A. P. Hill was to send a brigade across the
Chickahominy above the
Federal right to unite with
Jackson, and when the Confederate forces had moved down the north side and uncovered
Meadow bridge, the remainder of
A. P. Hill's division was to cross there, and he was to be followed by
Longstreet and
D. H. Hill by way of the
Mechanicsville bridge as soon as it was open.
Magruder and
Huger were left to hold the lines in front of
Richmond, facing the mass of
McClellan's army.
Jackson, worn by his forced march from the
Valley, was behind time on the morning of June 26th, and
A. P. Hill waited from early in the
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morning until the middle of the afternoon for the approach of
Jackson, which was to uncover the bridge in his front.
Then, fearing lest further delay might imperil the whole movement by revealing it to the enemy, he carried the bridge before him, and, moving down towards
Mechanicsville, drove the small Federal force there to the lines at
Beaver Dam creek, which were held by
McCall's division.
Jackson was expected to turn this line, but being yet behind,
A. P. Hill engaged the
Federal forces and made attempts on each flank, which were, however, repulsed.
Longstreet and
D. H. Hill joined
A. P. Hill near nightfall, and the approach of
Jackson on their flank caused the
Federals to retreat next morning to
Gaines's Mill and Cold Harbor.
Here
Fitz John Porter held a strong position, covering the principal bridges across the
Chickahominy and protecting at the same time the York River railroad.
Porter was reinforced during the afternoon by
Slocum's division, and later by two additional brigades.
These Federal forces amounted probably to from 30,000 to 40,000 men, or about one-third of
McClellan's army.
The remaining 70,000 were on the south side of the river, in front of
Magruder and
Huger.
Lee had left on the south side some 25,000 to 30,000, and thus had probably about 50,000 men with which to attack
Porter.
The Confederates followed up the retreating Federals to
Gaines's Mill on the afternoon of Friday, June 27th, attacked them in their positions, and after a fierce and bloody combat completely defeated
Porter, driving his troops to the
Chickahominy (which they crossed under cover of the night), and capturing twenty-two guns.
While this was going on,
Magruder made such a display of force in front of
Richmond that the mass of the
Federal army was held there inactive, and none of their officers in high command deemed it possible to spare any considerable force from that side to reinforce
Porter.
Thus
Lee managed to hold
two-thirds of
McClellan's army idle with
one-third of his own, while with the main body of the Confederate forces he inflicted a crushing blow on
Porter.
The Federal commander was certainly outgeneraled.
The defeat of
Porter threw the York River railroad and the
Federal depots on that road and on the
Pamunkey into the hands of the
Confederates and forced the
Federal army to another line of retreat.
It was. now that
McClellan made his wisest move in the campaign.
He had been thinking of the
James river as a base, and now cut off from the
Pamunkey, he determined to move towards the
James at its nearest point, instead of recrossing the
Chickahominy and retreating down the peninsula.
He began at once the movement of the immense trains and material of his army across
White Oak Swamp, in the direction of
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Turkey Bend.
The highest commendation that can be given of this movement is that it deceived his adversary and gained him a day's breathing time.
Lee was uncertain as to
McClellan's designs on the 28th, and such movements as he made that day were made with the notion that
McClellan would recross the
Chickahominy at Battner's bridge or at some of the crossings below.
It was night before the
Confederate commander divined
McClellan's plans, and issued orders accordingly.
On the 29th
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill were sent to the south side of the
Chickahominy.
They were, by a circuit, to strike the
Long-Bridge road and the flank of the retreating army.
McGruder and
Huger were to press the rear of the
Federals by the
Williamsburg and Charles City roads,
Jackson to cross the
Chickahominy and join in the pursuit.
Longstreet was busy all day marching towards his destination.
Jackson was compelled to repair the bridge over the
Chickahominy, which kept him back all day.
Magruder finding that the enemy had abandoned the lines in his front and had left or destroyed great quantities of stores, pressed after him and attacked the rear, under
Sumner, at Savage Station.
Magruder's attack was partial, he only using about half his force, and though there was much demoralization in the
Federal army as indicated by
Heintzelman's precipitate retreat and the destruction of stores,
Sumner was able to hold his ground and keep
Magruder at bay until night-fall, when the
Federals made good their retreat to the south side of
White Oak Swamp.
Next day, June 30th, was the day of greatest peril to the
Federal army.
Jackson having crossed the
Chickahominy, was ordered to follow in its wake towards
White Oak Swamp.
Huger was directed to press along the
Charles City road.
Longstreet, with his own and
A. P. Hill's divisions, was to attack its flank along the
Long-Bridge road.
Nearer the
James,
Holmes was advancing along the
River road.
Magruder was directed to make a circuit around
Huger and follow
Longstreet.
Jackson soon reached
White Oak Swamp and found the passage of this difficult stream strongly defended by
Franklin.
A severe artillery fight took place, in which the
Federal batteries suffered greatly, but
Jackson's efforts to reconstruct the bridge and force a passage for his infantry were successfully resisted by
Franklin until night-fall.
Meantime
Huger was impeded by some felled timber in his way, and did nothing.
Holmes, on the extreme Confederate right, ran against
Porter and some Federal artillery that had taken position at
Malvern under the fire of the gunboats in
James river, and
Holmes was quickly and completely checked.
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill, however, attacked
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vigorously at
Frazier's farm, and defeated and put to flight the greater part of
McCall's division, capturing its commander and inflicting severe losses on the troops brought up in support.
At night-fall the
Confederates had pressed nearly to the
Quaker road, on which the
Federals were retreating, and had taken many prisoners and ten guns.
Longstreet was unsupported, however, and the
Federals were able to hold on to their line of retreat until dark, when they fell back to
Malvern Hill.
This was the day big with fate to
McClellan.
Had
Jackson and
Huger co-operated with
Longstreet in his assault, the result can hardly be doubted; the greater part of the
Federal army must have been overwhelmed.
Huger, though nearest
Longstreet, did nothing, and some of the
Federal troops in his front were actually sent against the latter.
This failure was one of the greatest blunders of the
Confederate campaign.
Jackson was held back by a very serious obstacle, backed by a strong and well commanded force, sufficient, perhaps, to account in an ordinary case for his failure to unite in the attack, but it is hard to avoid the belief that had he exhibited on this occasion the wonderful skill and audacity that characterized his Valley campaign, he would have crossed
White Oak Swamp in spite of
Franklin.
Next day, July 1st, the
Confederates, once more reunited, followed the retreating army to
Malvern Hill, where
McClellan had selected an admirable position and massed on it all of his forces and his immense artillery.
Here
Lee again attacked, but after a sanguinary contest, in which the
Federal lines were severely tested, he was repulsed.
The attack on the part of the
Confederates was badly managed.
Some confusion about the roads in this intricate region caused
Magruder to be late in reaching the field.
Concert of action between the attacking columns was not secured; the assaults, especially on the right, where
Magruder commanded, were partial and disjointed, and the result was that
McClellan saved his army by inflicting a severe repulse upon his adversary.
As soon as the battle was ended,
McClellan abandoned the field and retreated to
Harrison's Landing (or
Westover), where he could be more completely protected by the fleet in the
James river.
The Confederates followed, but the check at
Malvern made their pursuit slow, and when the army again closed up with the
Federals the latter were found in possession of a strong position, commanded by the gunboats and defended by earthworks.
The contest now ceased, and
General Lee withdrew to the neighborhood of
Richmond.
McClellan's losses were great.
His loss in men was heavy, though not so large as that of the
Confederates.
His losses in material and supplies were far greater.
They were simply immense; but his loss in
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prestige and
morale was greatest of all. His campaign was felt to be a complete failure, and this conviction became so general that all his efforts could not prevent the
Federal Government from withdrawing his army (we think wisely) from the
James to the
Potomac.
McClellan fought injudiciously at Cold Harbor.
After his defeat he selected skilfully his plan of retreat, but his mode of conducting that retreat has been most severely, and we believe justly, criticised.
Good fighting and the advantages afforded by the country enabled him to escape.
He chose an admirable position at
Malvern Hill, and made there a judicious and successful stand which saved his defeated army from destruction.
On the other hand
Lee won a great success.
With an army only four-fifths as numerous as his adversaries, and of which he had been in command only a little more than three weeks, he had driven
McClellan twenty miles from
Richmond, had broken up his depots and communications, and had compelled the splendid army that threatened the
Confederate capitol to fly for refuge to the protection of the gunboats in the river.
He had, indeed, nearly accomplished the destruction of this army.
On the 30th of June his admirable plans failed of their full results, only from the incapacity or want of energy of some of his subordinates.
On the next day, at
Malvern Hill, more, perhaps, might have been accomplished if he had himself used greater care and watchfulness to ensure concert of action in the attack.
As it was, he completely broke up the campaign against
Richmond, and having huddled up the
Federal army on the banks of the
James, left it to a July sun to force the speedy evacuation of the
Peninsula and the withdrawal of the enemy to the front of
Washington.
General Lee was new to his plan and new to the army he was thenceforth to lead, and for this reason this campaign is, in some respects, inferior to those that followed, especially to the great, the almost incomparable one of 1864; but, nevertheless, it will remain an ever-enduring monument of his military audacity and skill.
One of the best chapters in
General Webb's book is the last.
It is clear, temperate and judicious.
One of the worst is that on
Malvern Hill, which is disjointed and confused.
There are numerous smaller oversights, some of which show haste in preparation or careless proof-reading.
Thus
Whiting is several times called
Whitney (pages 82-134),
Mechum's River is called Mechanic's Run (page 122),
R. H. Anderson is erroneously put for
J. R. Anderson (page 96), Ellison's Mill is called Ellicott's Mill.
(Page 126.) Confederate
brigades are frequently spoken of as
divisions--as
Gregg's brigade (page 132),
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Armistead's brigade. (Page 156.)
A. P. Hill's report is misquoted, to make the same mistake on page 150, where
Field's and
Pender's brigades are turned into divisions.
I have noted no mistakes of the opposite kind.
On page 187, the
Confederates attacking
Porter are spoken of as 70,000 in number (?), though here
General Webb may be giving
McClellan's estimate and not his own.