Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

Defence and fall of Fort Fisher.

Letter from General Braxton Bragg.

Account of Colonel William Lamb.

On revisiting Fort Fisher after the war, I found that the post burial ground, where my soldiers who died previous to the battles, were buried, had been robbed of all its dead, and was told that a contractor for the government had stolen their bones in order to be paid for supplying them with coffins under an appropriation to rebury the dead of the Northern armies. I had this consolation when contemplating this act, that although their dust and ashes had been disturbed, their memories were none the less precious to the Southern heart, nor their reward for duty done less complete at the hands of Him who doeth all things well. Similar emotions filled my breast when I read the letter of General Braxton Bragg to his brother, in which he seeks to take from the dead of Fort Fisher an imperishable renown, and in which he seeks to excuse his desertion of an heroic garrison.

Nothing but an imperative sense of duty impels me to comply with the request made by many of the officers and soldiers of my old command to answer this letter. now that its author has been summoned to his final account. The letter bears date Wilmington, January 20, 1865, and was written to Ex-Governor Thomas Bragg. General Bragg wrote:

Two hours before hearing of the certain fall of the fort I felt as confident as ever man did of successfully defending it.

Further on he puts his certain information at a time which shows that the fort had fallen when he was confident of successfully defending it. To know the position of the enemy, to be informed promptly of the movements which he is executing, to gather sufficient facts from which his designs may be understood, is the first care of a commanding general, who should spare no labor or risk to arrive at such information.

No commanding general ever had such an opportunity to watch the movements of the enemy, and direct the management of his forces with such slight personal danger as General Bragg. The Cape Fear river, with its channel at least three-quarters of a mile from the open beach upon which the enemy had landed, gave him an unobstructed view from a deck of a vessel of all their movements. Besides he could see inside of the fort and with a good glass distinguish individuals. With signal officers comparatively free from danger at Battery Buchanan and on the Mound, perfectly secure on the western shore of the river and on the right flank of his camp, General Bragg could have watched the [351]

Second attack upon Fort Fisher.

The letter continues:

No human power could have prevented the enemy from landing, covered as he was by a fleet of ships carrying six hundred heavy guns.

Some fifty yards from the land face of the fort the river bank was high enough to form a perfect defence from the fleet at sea, and from its trend, unfortunately for the besieged, hid an approach to the fort. This natural protection from the fleet extended for some miles up the river until it reached the camp of General Bragg. In the previous attack, Sergeant Glennan had volunteered to carry a message to General Bragg and see if “the coast was clear,” and had passed unobserved from fort to camp up this natural covered way, on December 26th, while Butler's troops still occupied the beach. Besides this river bank, from Battery Holland, a half mile north of Fort Fisher to the head of the sound, were a series of batteries, curtains and sand hills, giving excellent protection to infantry against the fire of the fleet. Both nature and art combined to make a landing of troops from beyond the close range of the fort to the head of the sound impossible in the face of a few thousand determined troops, who could have moved from point to point behind the works and hills unobserved by the enemy. It was the opinion of Whiting, Beauregard and Longstreet that a landing south of Masonboro sound was impracticable in the face of a well handled force on shore. The fleet in the day could not have fired over their friends so effectively as to have silenced the sharpshooters, and the few who landed, without works to defend them, would have [353] been at the mercy of our troops at night. The fact that not a single gun on our sea-face was dismounted, and very few of our soldiers killed and wounded at the guns, shows that the direct fire of the fleet could not have done much damage among sharpshooters behind the works and sand-hills lying parallel to the sea-beach. And yet not one gun was fired upon these invaders of the soil of North Carolina. Admiral Porter says the landing was effected without opposition. General Terry says:

At 3 o'clock P. M. (13th) nearly 8,000 men, with three days rations in their haversacks, and forty rounds of ammunition in their boxes, six days supply of hard bread in bulk, 300,000 additional rounds of small arm ammunition, and a sufficient number of entrenching tools, had been safely landed. The surf on the beach was still quite high, notwithstanding that the weather had become very pleasant, and, owing to it, some of the men had their rations and ammunition ruined by water. With this exception, no accident of any kind occurred.

Captain H. C. Lockwood, Aid-de-Camp to General Ames, says:

The first troops were landed on the beach about four miles north of New Inlet. Pickets were thrown out in every direction. The enemy did not make any opposition to this movement. In fact, not a single shot was fired at our troops at this time. The landing was accomplished amid the greatest enthusiasm of the soldiers. Cheer upon cheer went up, clearly indicating their splendid moral. The surf gave some trouble at first, but it seemed to subside as the day progressed.

The officer who had command of the picket line on January 15, wrote that the landing of the troops was “exciting and amusing sport.” All this in the face of the army commanded by General Bragg, who censures my garrison for not holding the fort.

General Bragg's letter proceeds:

Anywhere beyond the range of our heavy guns on the fort our land force could not approach him. Once landed, our only chance was to keep him, if possible, from the fort.

When the enemy got within the range of the heavy guns of the fort, why did he not make the effort to keep him from the fort? General Bragg says:

We then confronted him as closely as possible, to watch his movements and endeavor to strike if he moved from under his shipping. A dense swamp lay between us and extended three miles towards Fort Fisher. In this position I found the two forces when I reached General [354] Hoke and took the command just at night on Friday. Cavalry was on our extended right towards Fort Fisher, and occupying ground entirely to the sea, placing us between the enemy and the fort for observation. These were to report any movement, and the troops lay upon their arms all night, ready to move to the attack or towards the fort if the enemy did so. My knowledge of the ground was good, as I knew General Hoke's to be, both of us having been over it. I fully approved his dispositions. We staid in our camp under the heavy shelling of the enemy's fleet for the night.

How did he expect the enemy to move from under his shipping? At night, however, the shipping could not cover him, and he did move towards the fort, but General Bragg did not follow. Cavalry on the beach at night to watch the enemy! A reconnoissance that an officer could have made on foot within an hour. To those familiar with the Carolina sea coast at night, and how a man on horseback looms up like a dromedary in the desert, it will not be surprising that these horse-marines, not wishing to become targets for the Federal sharpshooters, followed the example of General Bragg and his army, and retired for the night. The General proceeds:

No report of any movement having been made, we moved out early to reconnoitre. Hoke towards the fort and I to our left. I found the enemy in strong force in front of our left, as well as could be seen across the swamp. But to our great surprise Hoke found him extended beyond our right and entirely across the peninsula between us and Fort Fisher, and strongly entrenched, having no doubt been there most of the night. Not a word had been heard from our cavalry, and they had evidently withdrawn from their position in the night, and did not themselves know what had occurred, for they fired on Hoke and his staff, who got in front of them in reconnoitring.

While General Bragg and his army slumbered, the industrious Federals coolly and deliberately, after much marching and countermarching, chose a line about two miles from the fort, and by 8 o'clock the next morning had thrown up a line of entrenchments from the sea to the river. General Terry, in his official report, says:

The first object which I had in view, after landing, was to throw a strong defensive line across the peninsula from Cape Fear river to the sea, facing Wilmington, so as to protect our rear from attack while we should be engaged in operating against Fisher. * * * Shortly before 5 o'clock, leaving Abbott's brigade to cover our stores, the troops were put in motion. On arriving at it, the ‘pond’ was found to be a sand-flat, sometimes covered with water, giving no assistance to the [355] defense of a line established behind it. Nevertheless, it was determined to get a line across at this place, and Paine's division, followed by two of Ames's brigade, made their way through. The night was very dark, much of the ground was a marsh, and illy adapted to the construction of works, and the distance was found to be too great to be properly defended by the troops which could be spared from the direct attack upon the fort. It was not until 9 o'clock P. M. that Paine succeeded in reaching the river. The ground, still nearer the fort, was then reconnoitered and found to be much better adapted to our purposes; accordingly, the troops were withdrawn from their last position, and established on a line about two miles from the work. They reached this final position at 2 o'clock A. M. of the 14th instant. Tools were immediately brought up, and entrenchments were commenced. At 8 o'clock a good breastwork, reaching from the river to the sea, and partially covered by abattis, had been constructed, and was in a defensible condition. It was much improved afterward, but from this time our foothold on the peninsula was secured.

General Bragg continues:

On learning this I put the command in motion, and ordered the enemy dislodged, if it was at all practicable. General Hoke and his brigadiers made a close reconnoissance, and expressed to me the opinion that their troops were unequal to the task. I moved forward with them, and made a close examination, and after a conference confirmed their opinion, and decided not to attack.

Humane commander! This line was held by Paine's division and Abbott's brigade, all colored troops, and numbering less than Hoke's division. General Bragg says:

The enemy had landed without artillery, and not even a general officer brought a horse.

While General Terry reports:

Early in the morning of the 14th, the landing of the artillery was commenced, and by sunset all the light guns were gotton on shore. During the following night they were placed on the line, most of them near the river, where the enemy, in case he should attack us, would be least exposed to the fire of the gunboats.

As some of these guns engaged the steamer Chicamauga, in full view of the General's camp, it is hard to understand his ignorance of their presence on the beach. The letter proceeds:

Believing myself that Grant's army could not storm and carry the fort, if it was defended, I felt perfect confidence that we were not only [356] safe, but that the enemy had assumed a most precarious position, from which he would escape with great difficulty.

If the fort had remained in the condition in which General Bragg saw it previous to January 13th, Grant's army could not have stormed and carried it. It had twenty heavy guns bearing on the beach, supplemented with one mortar and four Napoleons. In front was a perfect palisade line pierced for musketry, and constructed in irregular lines, giving an enfilading fire for light artillery, and in advance were numerous sub-terra mines capable of blowing up the beach from river to sea for more than one hundred yards in front of the works. Although constructed primarily with a view to prevent the entrance of a fleet into the river, yet uninjured by bombardment, it could have resisted any assault. But before the assault fifty thousand shells had expended their fury on the works. Every gun save one 10-inch Columbiad was destroyed, the use of all but one Napoleon rendered impracticable, every wire leading to the mines ploughed up, and the palisade such a wreck as actually to offer a protection to some of the assailants. The terrific fire in front, rear and enfilade from the fleet upon the land face rendering the salients practicable for assault forced me, from the numbers killed and wounded, to cover by bomb-proofs all the troops on the land face except those at the Columbiad and Napoleon and the sharpshooters protected by the traverses. Did General Bragg expect us, if we repelled all the assaults, to pursue the enemy without his co-operation? If not, why, in his inactivity, did he not only consider himself safe, but the enemy in a precarious position? I understood that General Bragg would take advantage of the darkness on the night of the 14th and attack the enemy. About 9 o'clock I went out of the works with Captain Patterson's company as skirmishers and engaged the enemy's pickets to ascertain their position, intending to attack them in force as soon as I heard the advance of General Bragg, but I waited in vain for him to avail himself of the last opportunity to capture the enemy and save the fort, while the fleet would have been forced to remain inactive.

General Bragg adds:

I accordingly ordered Hoke to entrench immediately in his front, and push his lines close on to him, so as to keep him engaged and closely observed.

I think it must be a mistake. General Hoke was not an officer to disobey the command to keep the enemy engaged. General Bragg continues:

While this was going on I started one thousand of our best men [357] who had defended forts at Charleston to reinforce Fisher, and as I considered the garrison there already as sufficient, being two thousand strong, I ordered about six hundred less reliable troops to come out, considering it an unneccessary exposure of life to keep them there. This order, however, was rescinded on General Whiting's appeal, and he was allowed to keep the whole. With this garrison I considered the fort perfectly safe and capable of standing any length of siege.

I am at a loss to know what day the General refers to. No reinforcements came from him on Saturday, the 14th, but during the day, Sunday, the 15th, Colonel Graham arrived at Battery Buchanan with his brigade. He did not land all of them, but telegraphed General Bragg from Smithville at 1 o'clock P. M.: “As instructed by you about four hundred of my men landed at Fisher. The rest were prevented by the fire of the enemy. I will go there to night unless otherwise instructed.” About three hundred and fifty of these men reported to me just previous to the assault, and they were all of the one thousand of Bragg's “best men,” whom he started for the fort, who got there. General Bragg is not accurate. Up to the arrival of the three hundred and fifty South Carolinians I had but about fifteen hundred and fifty men. If there were others sent to reinforce the fort they never reported, and if more prisoners were captured by General Terry on the peninsula than these figures indicate after subtracting the killed, they did not belong and were not properly chargeable to my garrison. The General says:

We had steamboat communication with it, which we could keep open at all times during the night.

How odd then not to have sent the reinforcements at night, when the enemy could not have seen them entering the fort. The letter continues:

The reports from the fort were of the most favorable character up to Sunday evening. Not a gun reported injured, the fort not damaged, and our loss three killed and thirty-two wounded in nearly three days.

It is painful to read this statement. I reported at 6 P. M. on Friday, the 13th, that our casualties were two killed and forty-one wounded. I have recovered the original report, a copy of which was sent to General Bragg. The list of killed and wounded on the 14th was very large, more than double that of the previous day. I have been unable to recover this report, but I remember very distinctly the proportion of killed was very great, detachments being kept at each gun to fire at long intervals, and deliberately, until it was rendered unserviceable by the fire of the fleet. More than ten per cent. of my garrison [358] were killed and wounded by 2 o'clock on Sunday, the 15th, and the land face was in the condition in which I have described it, and all had been reported to General Bragg. The only favorable report sent on Sunday was concerning the undiminished courage and endurance of the troops.

General Bragg says:

During Sunday I was greatly disturbed by the tone and phraseology of General Whiting's dispatches and by reports of others received from him in town.

Here is the dispatch which disturbed but could not arouse the apathetic Bragg:

Headquarters, Third military district, Fort Fisher, 1.30 P. M., January 14, 1865.
General Bragg, Commanding, etc.:

General — I send this boat (Cape Fear) to town for coal and wood, with the request that she return at once. She is necessary here for our communication. The game of the enemy is very plain to me. They are now furiously bombarding my land front. They will continue to do that, in order, if possible, to silence my guns, until they are satisfied that their land force has securely established itself across the neck and rests on the river. Then Porter will attempt to force a passage by to co-operate with the force that takes the river bank. I have received dispatches from you stating that the enemy had extended to the river bank. This they never should have been allowed to do, and if they are permitted to remain there the reduction of Fort Fisher is but a question of time. This has been notified heretofore frequently both to yourself and to the department. I will hold this place to the last extremity, but unless you drive that land force from its position I cannot answer for the security of the harbor. The fire has been and continues to be exceedingly heavy, surpassing not so much in its volume as in its extraordinary concentration, even the fire of Christmas. The garrison is in good spirits and condition.

I am, General,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. C. Whiting, Major-General.

General Bragg goes on to say:

As a good officer had been sent in command of the reinforcements I ordered General Whiting on Saturday evening to report to me in person. This order he declined to obey, as he had done one before [359] about moving troops. My mind was now made up as to his condition and I felt that the safety of the fort required his prompt relief. Brigadier-General Colquitt was accordingly sent to relieve him.

This remarkable letter is dated five days after the fall of the fort. The above statement shows one of two things — that his defeat had seriously affected his mind, or that he distorted the facts to justify himself to his brother. Colonel Graham, who commanded the reinforcements, was my junior, and had within thirty days been under my command by order of General Bragg. It was he who failed to bring in the reinforcements sent to the fort on Saturday. General Bragg never sent the order on Saturday; but here is a copy of the original, dated on Sunday:

This order, sent at the critical moment of the impending assault, and removing a gifted, brilliant and courageous hero, whose men loved him, and would follow him into the jaws of death, and supplanting him with a Georgia militia General, unknown to the garrison, was an act in keeping with the whole of General Bragg's conduct of the defence of Wilmington.

The letter continues:

About 3 o'clock P. M. Sunday evening, General Whiting informed me the enemy was moving, apparently to assault the fort. Hoke immediately moved to attack them under my direction. A feeble musketry fire was heard at the fort, when it ceased, not lasting over ten minutes. Hoke found them in very strong position and heavy force, ready to receive him. He moved in person close up to their lines with his skirmishers, receiving two balls in his clothes between the left arm and breast. Their line was impracticable for his small command, and I did not hesitate to recall him.

I will show further on that had General Hoke attacked the enemy resolutely at 3 P. M., he would have saved the fort, and with darkness and the cooperation of the garrison, have captured the enemy. For over five hours an incessant musketry fire was kept up by thousands of troops, only ending with the exhaustion of all the ammunition of [360] the Confederates. The tremendous roar of the bombardment, which ceased but for a few minutes, as the charge on the fort was first sounded by the steam whistles of the fleet, drowned the sound of the small arms; but the Commanding-General seems to have comprehended nothing. General Bragg says further along:

General Colquitt soon returned and reported. He landed at a point about a mile behind the fort at 10.30 P. M., found everything in confusion, hundreds of men without arms, many of them drunk, and no one apparently in command. Colonel Lamb was there wounded. General Whiting was also pointed out lying on the beach severely wounded, but fast asleep. The enemy soon approached, and Colquitt barely had time to escape in his small boat.

I do not believe General Colquitt ever made such a report, for the charge that my brave men who, for sixty hours had withstood a furious bombardment and who for six hours had engaged in a hand to hand fight, and who had not retreated until their ammunition was gone and with it all hope, were drunk, is too absurd to require a denial. I had no liquor for distribution to the garrison, and what remained in the hospital bombproof was captured by some sailors from the fleet, who becoming intoxicated with it, entered the reserve magazine the morning after the battle seeking plunder, and causing its explosion, which resulted in the death and wounding of nearly two hundred brave men. The soldiers who carried their wounded General and Colonel to Battery Buchanan were without their guns, and also some artillerists who had stood by their cannon until driven away; but those of the garrison who were not captured in the fort were reported to me as having retired in good order.

General Colquitt came up to me and I told him even then, if Bragg would attack vigorously and he would land a fresh brigade that the fort could be retaken, as the enemy had been more or less demoralized by the resistance they met. One of my officers suggested that General Colquitt should carry me off, but I refused to leave, as no means had been provided for the retreat of my men, and I wished to share their fate, but I asked General Colquitt to take General Whiting, as he was a volunteer in the fort. But to my astonishment he left precipitately, leaving the wounded and bleeding hero to die in a Northern prison. The General was not asleep, but giving directions to his Adjutant-General about meeting the enemy.

Here comes the most extraordinary portion of this “confidential” epistle. It says: [361]

“Now for statements made by the enemy when meeting us under flag of truce. They assert that they walked into the fort without resistance, not a shot being fired at them, our men all being in the bomb-proofs; that after they got in a small force was rallied and fought them very gallantry, inflicting a heavy loss, but they soon overcame them and captured most of our officers and men, without arms, under cover of the bomb-proofs, and with the exception of Colonel Lamb, all the officers of any rank and many men were too drunk for duty.”

For General Bragg to repeat the slanders, circulated, we presume, by some gossiping subalterns, was adding insult to injury. My whole command which, previous to the attacks, had extended from New Inlet to Masonboroa, some twenty miles, had been noted for its sobriety. I had been sent to Fort Fisher to discipline the garrison against the temptations incident to blockade running. My first act on taking command, July 4, 1862, was to suspend an officer for being intoxicated, and I had him cashiered. The officers and men were not allowed the use of intoxicating liquors. I was among them all during both engagements, and I never saw them drink liquor, or show any evidence of its use. It is possible that some of the last reinforcements may have brought some with them, but I doubt it. Captain Munn, who was near me, and to whom I transferred the command of the force with me when I fell, was an officer of the strictest sobriety. As to the gallant Whiting and his staff, I desire once for all to repel the infamous charge that they indulged in liquor, or were under its influence while in Fort Fisher, and I beg all who know me, or who cherish the memory of that heroic officer, to denounce as false, upon my authority, this malicious slander.

When all of the heavy guns on the land face, save one, were disabled, I required a full detachment to stand by the remaining Columbiad, and ordered all the men belonging to the other batteries to remain in the galleries and bomb-proofs in their immediate rear, except so many sharp-shooters, who were to watch and annoy the enemy on shore, as could be measurably protected from the fire of the fleet by the heavy traverses. I also required a detachment to man the Napoleon in the rear of the left salient at all hazards, and the two Napoleons to be run out and used in front of the centry sally-port whenever the fire of the fleet rendered it practicable. I had placed the portions of the Twenty-first and Twenty-fifth South Carolina regiments, which reported just previous to the assault in a bomb-proof, about one hundred feet in the rear and to the left of the central sally-port. As soon as the enemy threw their sharpshooters forward, I manned the parapets with strong [362] detachments of sharpshooters to return their fire, and prevent, if possible, an advance. This was done despite the destructive fire of the fleet. When this fire ceased, and the steam whistles sounded for the charge, I ordered the reserves to man the parapets, and the South Carolina regiments to double quick to the rear of the left salient, between which and the river shore there was a space of some sixty feet, protected only by a shallow ditch, the remnants of a palisade, and one Napoleon. I went to meet the column assaulting my northeast salient, the success of which would have been fatal, as it would capture the centre of my work, and I sent my aid, Captain Blocker, with the South Carolina regiments, to report to Major Riley on the left.

I will now let the gallant officers who captured my fort say whether they “walked into the fort without resistance, not a shot being fired at them.” While they, very naturally, were not disposed to extol the gallantry of their enemies, I prefer to give their version instead of that of my officers or my own. Admiral Porter, in his official report, says:

I detailed 1,600 sailors and 400 marines to accompany the troops in the assault, the sailors to board the sea face, while the troops assaulted the land side. * * All the arrangements on the part of the sailors had been well carried out. They had succeeded in getting up to within a short distance of the fort, and lay securely in their ditches. We had but very few killed and wounded up to this point. The marines were to have held the rifle-pits and cover the boarding party, which they failed to do. On rushing through the palisades, which extended from the fort to the sea, the head of the column received a murderous fire of grape and canister, which did not, however, check the officers and sailors who were leading. The parapets now swarmed with rebels, who poured in a destructive fire of musketry. At this moment, had the marines performed their duty, every one of the rebels would have been killed. I witnessed the whole affair, saw how recklessly the rebels exposed themselves and what an advantage they gave our sharpshooters, whose guns were scarcely fired, or fired with no precision. Notwithstanding the hot fire, officers and sailors in the lead rushed on, and some even reached the parapet, a large number having reached the ditch. The advance was swept from the parapet like chaff, and notwithstanding all the efforts made by commanders of companies to stop them, the men in the rear, seeing the slaughter in front, and that they were not covered by the marines, commenced to retreat, and as there is no stopping a sailor [363] if he fails on such an occasion on the first rush, I saw the whole thing had to he given up.

In regard to the assault on the left of the work I refer the reader to General Terry's official report, which is easily accessible. General Terry's testimony must stamp forever as false the charge that “they (the Federals) walked into the fort without resistance, not a shot being fired at them, our men (the Confederates) all being in the bomb proofs.” I had about five hundred men with me on and near the redan or northeast salient repulsing the sailors and marines. This heroic column from the fleet struggled with us for thirty minutes or more, and did not retreat until about three hundred officers and men fell dead or wounded. There were in the western salient (which was an uninclosed battery) about two hundred and fifty men. The South Carolinians ordered there would have made six hundred men, but they did not move up promptly, and did not reach the work. The two hundred and fifty officers and men had to withstand the shock of two of General Ames's brigades — more than ten to one. My officers there claim that they twice repulsed the assault on the parapet, and that all of the original detachment at the Napoleon were killed and wounded, and that Captain Brady detailed men from his company to take their place, and these were killed, wounded or captured at the gun, whose carriage was riddled with bullets. When Captain Melvin surrendered the survivors, some two hundred, they were enveloped by Curtis's brigade in front, and Pennybacker's brigade in the rear, and besides, the two guns at Battery Buchanan had commenced to fire upon this salient, killing and wounding friend and foe indiscriminately. War never witnessed more determined bravery, and the fact that these brave men continued at their posts until overwhelmed, instead of retreating into the main work before the formidable assault, as they could honorably have done, proves each as much a hero as though victory had crowned their efforts.

There were three lines of mines in front of the work, and I intended at the moment of assault to explode one of them, and thus paralyze the assailants, giving me time to man the parapets with all of my reserves. At the final rush, I gave the signal, but there was no response — the tremendous fire of the fleet having ploughed up the connecting wires and rendered the mines harmless. As this was our main defence against assault on the extreme left, where the only remaining obstacle to an entrance into the fort was the remnants of a palisade and a single Napoleon, the failure of the mines to explode was enough to discourage the stoutest hearts, but it only seemed to make the men more stubborn in their resistance. As soon as the sailors [364] and marines retreated, I moved the whole of my available infantry some eight hundred men to dislodge the enemy, who had captured the left salient, two gun-chambers adjoining, and were busy entrenching inside my work. The heroic Whiting, who had rushed to the parapet and encouraged the troops in resisting the naval brigade, now led the van, and receiving two wounds in endeavoring to reach a Federal standard-bearer, had to be carried to the rear.

A hand-to-hand fight on the parapet and over a traverse ensued, while in the work, from behind everything that would yield the slightest protection to my men, a rapid fire was poured into the advancing column of three brigades. The enemy halted in the face of our desperate assault. I then had the two heavy guns on the mound, and two from another battery on the sea-face, turned on their column, and these, with the two guns from Battery Buchanan, seemed to have a demoralizing effect, as their fire slackened and their flags disappeared from the top of the traverses. Notwithstanding the loss of a part of the work, and of the garrison, and the serious effect of the fire of the fleet among our men, the garrison seemed in splendid spirits, and determined, if possible, to dislodge the foe. Believing that General Bragg, with the facilities at his command, was thoroughly posted as to affairs in the fort, and would now attack, I felt that a determined charge on our part, with this threatened danger in the rear, would cause a retreat by the enemy, and we would regain the work. I passed down the line, and officers and men, with the wildest enthusiasm, promised to follow me. As I sprang forward to lead them, I was shot down, several of my most gallant officers falling with me. The forward movement stopped with my fall, and afterwards the enemy, having been strongly reinforced, began an advance, which, although stoutly and even recklessly resisted for five hours (until all the ammunition was expended), resulted in the capture of the whole work. Not only were all the cartridges in the magazine consumed, but those in the boxes of the wounded and slain were gathered up by a detail and given to the men in action. My appeals to the officers and men to continue the struggle after I had fallen, were not from any disregard of the lives of my soldiers, as some have unkindly charged-but as General Lee had sent word to me that the fort was necessary to keep open the gateway to supply his army with food and clothing from abroad, I desired the resistance prolonged so long as there was a chance for General Bragg to come to our assistance and recall the enemy to their own defensive line. That this would have been the result of a determined attack upon the part of General Bragg, I am [365] convinced by my conversations with Federal officers after my capture.

An officer, writing of our attempt to dislodge the besiegers, says:

With the slackening of the naval fire the great bastion at the angle grew freer to offer resistance; the reversed guns of the inlet face of the fort, and the rifle line inside, found more area to play upon. So the work grew harder, and the progress slower. The rebels gained by the concentration, their artillery swelling a louder and louder roar as our naval fire grew faint. Then they turned assaulters, and dashed at the nearest traverse in our hands. Then came a time when, for hours, the battle made no progress either way. * * * *

Somewhere about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when the obstinate fight looked dubious, a distant sound of startling omen came to my ears — a sound of firing from the north. Absorbed as I was in the terrible game in front, I was alive enough to the responsibility of my position, as commander of the picket line, to hear this sound, which was probably inaudible to all other ears at Fort Fisher. An outburst of musketry from the north — to me an attack from Wilmington upon my northern picket line — an attempt to force our northern line of works across the peninsula! And this, too, coming at the critical hour when the assault at the fort had slackened to a standstill, and the exhausted men were losing heart. Turning to the northward with reluctant haste and anxious forebodings, I ran ankle-deep through the loose sand, which was dotted and spattered with grapeshot and bullets. * * But no more firing sounded from the north; it was absolutely still in that direction. This was so reassuring, that I slackened my pace as I came among the pines, and presently, coming upon the idle groups of negro soldiers lolling about the rear of their unscathed breastworks, I knew at last that General Hoke had made no impression on them.

Can any one doubt that if at this critical period in the attack General Bragg had done his duty and fiercely assaulted the enemy he would have retreated from the work to defend his rear?

General Bragg continues in his letter:

It is known that General Whiting left here for the fort on Friday in a steamer with a large party of these money-kings, called blockade-runners, and a very large supply of the material to produce this result.

The facts are: General Whiting and his staff arrived in the fort in the afternoon of Friday in the midst of the terrific bombardment. I did not know of their approach, until the General came up to me and remarked: “Lamb, my boy, I have come to share your fate. You and your garrison are to be sacrificed.” I replied: “Don't say so, General, [366] we will certainly whip the enemy again.” He then told me that when he left Wilmington, Bragg was looking for a place to fall back upon. I tendered him the command, although he had come into the fort without orders and unarmed; he refused it, saying he would advise and counsel with me, but would leave me to conduct the defense of my fort. General Bragg adds:

The fighting done was, no doubt, by the veterans who had reached the fort from Hoke's command. To my mind this is a clear solution of the whole thing.

This reflection upon my heroic garrison, forces me to state, what otherwise, I would leave unsaid, and that is, that with the exception of some brave officers and about forty men, under Captain Carson, the senior officer, the two South Carolina regiments (which was all of Hoke's command which reached me) failed to respond to my order to double quick to the left salient, although appealed to by their officers. They were somewhat excusable, for they had just passed through a severe fire in reaching the fort, and hardly recovered their breath after a double quick of a mile through the sand, and they afterwards, I was told, came out and fought gallantly. And now for the last clause in this letter.

General Bragg says:

Blockade running has cured itself. * * All, even to the privates, were more or less interested in the business. Under an arrangment with General Whiting, I learn salvage was regularly allowed on all property saved from wrecks, which was not stolen, and every vessel arriving made certain contributions of luxuries, whiskey being the principal.

I can only speak for my own garrison; but as this charge is false in regard to it, I take it for granted it is untrue as to all. I know of no officer or private in my command who was interested in blockade running. Of the very many captains who came in and went out under the protection of my guns, all will testify that I not only never asked, but refused to allow cotton or any articles of merchandise to be carried for me. Without my knowledge or consent, unknown parties sent out ten bales of cotton in my name and notified me, through Trenholm & Co., that they were in Liverpool, subject to my order. I immediately ordered them sold, and the proceeds to be invested in two one hundred and thirty-pounder Whitworth rifles, and ammunition for Fort Fisher. The order was executed. Some of the ammunition arrived, but the guns never got nearer than Nassau.

Many vessels which were beached to save them from capture were [367] protected by my light artillery, and details were made to recover the cargoes so valuable to our people. For these important services I allowed the men to be paid a moderate compensation for their labor and injury to clothing, by those interested in the cargoes; indeed, I felt that I had no right to prevent their receiving so trifling a remuneration.

From the repulse of General Butler and Admiral Porter on Christmas day, 1864, until the second expedition appeared against Fort Fisher, January 13th, 1865, the work was neglected by General Bragg. I had lost some important guns by explosion, and had several dismounted. The quarters of the men had all been destroyed, and with them their overcoats and blankets. Our provisions had been injured, and much of our ammunition expended. The garrison had been reduced in numbers, while the sick and slightly wounded were left to our care. I appealed to General Bragg for guns to replace those destroyed, for new carriages in place of those rendered useless, for additional ammunition, especially hand grenades, to repulse assaults. I asked that sub-marine torpedoes be placed where the ironclads had anchored, and where they would and did return. General Whiting approved all my requests. I felt sure that the enemy would return with redoubled vigor, and nothing being done to assist me to repair damages, or strengthen my position, I wrote to Governor Vance, and appealed to him to aid me in getting General Bragg to realize our situation. But no assistance was rendered, and I was not even warned of the returning fleet, but reported its reappearance to Wilmington from the fort. I have never complained of this, and mention it now to show the utter neglect with which the fort was treated by the Commanding-General, who seeks to throw the whole responsibility of the loss of Fort Fisher upon my garrison.

In those sixty hours of continuous battle, when my men were unable to provide a single meal, but had to subsist on uncooked rations and corn-meal coffee, when they were without overcoats or blankets to make them a bed in the sand, I heard no murmur of complaint, but witnessed deeds of heroism unsurpassed in ancient or modern story. I beheld acts of individual daring which would brighten the pages of history, or lend a charm to poetry. Side by side, as privates in the ranks, were brilliant youths, with as proud a lineage as any American could boast, and illiterate tillers of the soil, stirred with a patriotic love of home and State, sharing common hardships and dangers with that solid middle class, who, while not as reckless, were equally resolute. Nowhere, and at no time, in that or any struggle for right and country, did the sons of Carolina ever fill to greater overflowing the full measure of [368] patriotic duty, and their State will be recreant to her past renown and her present greatness if she fails to defend from defamation their stainless reputations.